SC20734 - State v. Langston (“On appeal, the defendant claims that the sentencing court’s consideration of conduct related to a charge of which he was acquitted violated his rights to due process and to a trial by jury under the sixth and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution and article first, §§ 8 and 19, of the Connecticut constitution. The defendant also urges us, in the absence of a constitutional violation, to use our supervisory authority to prohibit consideration of acquitted conduct during sentencing. Although we do not endorse that practice, we decline to reverse the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion because (1) a long line of both federal and state precedent has allowed significant latitude for what judges may consider during sentencing and has permitted sentencing courts to consider a wide range of conduct, including conduct related to acquitted charges, and (2) the sentence imposed by the sentencing court in this case was within the statutorily prescribed range for the counts of conviction. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to correct an illegal sentence.”)

• Posted in:
• Criminal Law & Procedure,
• Recent Opinions

AC42991 - State v. Olivero (“On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) the trial court incorrectly denied his pretrial motion to dismiss the charges of first degree burglary and home invasion, (2) the trial court abused its discretion by denying his requests to present testimony in support of his pretrial motion to dismiss, (3) the trial judge, White, J., improperly failed, sua sponte, to disqualify himself from presiding over the defendant’s jury trial because Judge White previously had denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss and used the term ‘victim’ in various pretrial hearings, (4) the trial court improperly restricted his ability to cross-examine the victim concerning the content of certain text messages, and (5) the prosecutor’s use of the term ‘victim’ during the trial and in closing argument deprived him of his constitutional right to a fair trial. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.”)

• Posted in:
• Criminal Law & Procedure,
• Recent Opinions

AC44738 - State v. Ebron (Motion to correct illegal sentence; motion to dismiss; "The defendant, Brian Ebron, appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Practice Book § 43-22. On appeal, he argues that the court erred when it dismissed his motion for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the motion set forth a colorable claim that his sentence is illegal or was imposed in an illegal manner. Specifically, the defendant, who was twenty years old when he committed the crime for which he was convicted, argues that his thirty-two year sentence for that conviction violates the prohibition in the eighth amendment to the United States constitution against cruel and unusual punishment, his right to due process under article first, §§ 8 and 9, of the Connecticut constitution and his state and federal constitutional rights to equal protection under the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution and article first, § 20, of the Connecticut constitution, notwithstanding the fact that he will be parole eligible after serving approximately twenty-seven years of his thirty-two year sentence. We agree with the defendant that the court improperly dismissed his motion to correct on the ground that he failed to state a colorable claim, but we nevertheless conclude that his claims fail as a matter of law. As a result, we reverse the judgment dismissing the defendant's motion to correct an illegal sentence and remand the case with direction to render judgment denying the defendant's motion to correct.")

AC38602 - State v. Taveras (Violation of probation; probation revocation hearing; "This appeal returns to us on remand from our Supreme Court. In State v. Taveras, 183 Conn. App. 354, 356, 193 A.3d 561 (2018), rev'd, 342 Conn. 563, 271 A.3d 123 (2022), the defendant, Kerlyn M. Taveras, appealed from the judgments of the trial court finding him in violation of his probation and revoking his probation pursuant to General Statutes § 53a-32, following his arrest on a charge of breach of the peace in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-181 (a). In a divided opinion, this court concluded that the state had failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that the defendant's remarks during an incident at his son's preschool, which formed the basis for the breach of the peace charge and his violation of probation, constituted either "`fighting words'" or a "`true threat,'" and, therefore, the remarks were protected under the first amendment to the United States constitution. Accordingly, this court reversed the judgments of the trial court and remanded the cases with direction to render judgments in favor of the defendant. As a result of that conclusion, this court did not address the other claims raised by the defendant in his appeal.

After granting the state's petition for certification to appeal, our Supreme Court disagreed with this court's conclusion that the defendant's remarks warranted first amendment protection. State v. Taveras, 342 Conn. 563, 580, 271 A.3d 123 (2022). Our Supreme Court thus reversed the judgment of this court and remanded the case to us with direction to consider the defendant's remaining claims on appeal.

In accordance with that order, we now consider whether the trial court improperly admitted into evidence at the probation revocation hearing the testimony of Monica Bevilaqua, the director of the preschool where the incident took place, as to statements made to her by Sondra Cherney, the preschool's assistant education manager. The defendant claims that (1) the admission of Bevilaqua's testimony violated his due process right to cross-examine Cherney, and (2) Bevilaqua's testimony concerning Cherney's hearsay statements should have been excluded because the statements were unreliable and uncorroborated. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.")

• Posted in:
• Criminal Law & Procedure,
• Recent Opinions

SC210159 - State v. Malone ("The motion of the defendant, Erick Malone, filed November 10, 2021, for permission to file a late appeal, having been presented to the court, it is hereby ordered denied.")

• SC210159 Dissent - State v. Malone

• Posted in:
• Criminal Law & Procedure,
• Recent Opinions

SC20654 - State v. Malone (Whether Supreme Court has jurisdiction over appeal of denial of motion to dismiss based on right to speedy trial; Whether Supreme Court should grant permission to file late appeal; whether trial court properly accepted nolle; whether entry of nolle and denial of motion to dismiss violated defendant's right to speedy trial; "In this interlocutory appeal, the defendant, Erick Malone, asks this court to determine whether the trial court erroneously denied his motion to dismiss criminal charges the state has reinstituted against him after the state previously entered and the trial court accepted a nolle prosequi on the ground that the state was unable to locate material witnesses. More specifically, the defendant claims that the trial court erred in denying his motion because the state intentionally had delayed the prosecution in violation of his right to a speedy trial. We do not address the merits of this claim because we agree with the state that the denial of the defendant's motion to dismiss does not constitute a final judgment. Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.")

• Posted in:
• Criminal Law & Procedure,
• Recent Opinions

SC20697 - State v. Alvarez (Sexual assault in the fourth degree; risk of injury to a child; “On appeal, the state claims that the Appellate Court incorrectly held that (1) the state had failed to establish that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt that the trial court improperly withheld relevant sealed medical records of A, who testified on behalf of the state both to corroborate the testimony of the victim, K, and to provide uncharged sexual misconduct evidence, and (2) the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the state to introduce evidence of uncharged sexual misconduct, specifically, the testimony of P, on the ground that the conduct was not sufficiently similar to the conduct at issue in the present case. After examining the record and briefs on appeal and considering the arguments of the parties, we conclude that the judgment of the Appellate Court should be affirmed on the grounds stated by the Appellate Court.”)

• Posted in:
• Criminal Law & Procedure,
• Recent Opinions

AC45512 - State v. DeCosta (Interfering with an officer; payment of fine pursuant to § 54-96a; “In sentencing the defendant, the court imposed only a fine of $200, which the defendant immediately and voluntarily paid before leaving the courthouse on the date the judgment was rendered. On appeal, the defendant claims that the judgment must be reversed because the court improperly did not advise him during its plea canvass that, by pleading guilty, he was waiving his right to a jury trial.”)

• Posted in:
• Criminal Law & Procedure,
• Recent Opinions

AC44780 - State v. Santiago (Dismissal of motion to correct an illegal sentence; “In the motion to correct, the defendant argued that he was serving the functional equivalent of a life sentence, despite being eligible for parole, and that, when his sentence was imposed, the sentencing court violated his rights by not taking into account his youth as a mitigating factor. The defendant claims that, in dismissing his motion, the court improperly (1) denied him the right to ‘an evidentiary hearing concerning the current state of science on the maturity, impulse control, and over receptiveness to peer pressure of [eighteen year olds], and the effect of science on Connecticut law’ and (2) concluded that he did not present a colorable claim that he was entitled to relief under the Connecticut and United States constitutions. We dismiss the appeal as moot.”)

• Posted in:
• Criminal Law & Procedure,
• Recent Opinions

SC20523 - State v. Michael R. (Sexual assault in the first degree; Risk of injury to a child; Employing a minor in an obscene performance; consideration of when nude images of minor become “harmful to minors”; Assault in the third degree; Criminal violation of a protective order; Stalking in the first degree; “On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) the trial court abused its discretion in consolidating for trial the sexual offenses with the nonsexual offenses, (2) the obscene performance statute is unconstitutionally vague as applied to his conduct, and the first amendment to the United States constitution requires us to undertake an independent appellate review of that conviction, (3) the trial court improperly excluded from evidence exculpatory video recordings of forensic interviews of the victim, G, which violated the defendant’s constitutional rights to confrontation and to present a defense, and (4) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of assault in the third degree, criminal violation of a protective order, and stalking in the first degree. We disagree with the defendant’s claims and, accordingly, affirm the judgments of the trial court.”)

• Posted in:
• Criminal Law & Procedure,
• Recent Opinions

AC44280 - State v. Perez-Lopez ("The defendant, Robert A. Perez-Lopez, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-59 (a) (1). On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court (1) violated his state constitutional right to due process by denying his motion to suppress the victim’s out-of-court identification after it failed to apply the burden shifting analysis set forth by our Supreme Court in State v. Harris, 330 Conn. 91, 191 A.3d 119 (2018), (2) abused its discretion in denying his motion in limine to preclude the identification of him following the administration of a photo lineup, and (3) abused its discretion and violated his right to present a defense by denying his specific request to charge the jury on eyewitness identification. We affirm the judgment of conviction.")

AC44410 - State v. Orane C. ("The defendant, Orane C., appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of three counts of sexual assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-70 (a) (1). The defendant claims that the trial court erred by (1) denying his motion to dismiss the second count of the relevant information on statute of limitations grounds, (2) admitting an allegedly illegal recording of a phone conversation, and (3) restricting the scope of defense counsel’s closing arguments. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

• Posted in:
• Criminal Law & Procedure,
• Recent Opinions

AC44356 - State v. Delacruz-Gomez (Assault of public safety personnel and interfering with an officer; “On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court improperly admitted into evidence (1) testimony as to the names of felony charges contained in a prior outstanding warrant for the defendant’s arrest as prior uncharged misconduct evidence, and (2) testimony naming the task force that had executed that warrant, specifically, the Violent Fugitive Task Force. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.”)

• Posted in:
• Criminal Law & Procedure,
• Recent Opinions

SC20497 - State v. Calhoun (Eyewitnesses to unsolved murder; Murder charge under§ 53a-54a (a); “The outcome of the trial rested largely on the jury’s assessment of the credibility of Canty and Kierce. Their motivations were subject to impeachment because each of them was incarcerated when they first contacted the state about the case, and they each received consideration from the state in return for testifying pursuant to cooperation agreements. The jury returned a verdict finding the defendant guilty of murder. The defendant claims on appeal that the trial court made three erroneous rulings requiring reversal, namely, (1) declining to give the jury a jailhouse informant instruction, (2) admitting into evidence the entirety of Canty’s and Kierce’s cooperation agreements, and (3) not allowing defense counsel to cross-examine Kierce regarding certain details of a prior arrest. We affirm the judgment of conviction.”)

SC20521- State v. Curet (“The state appeals from the judgment of the Appellate Court reversing the conviction of the defendant, Shaila M. Curet, following her conditional plea of nolo contendere to the charge of possession of narcotics with intent to sell in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 2015) § 21a-277 (a). On appeal, the state claims that the Appellate Court incorrectly determined that the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized by the police following a warrantless entry into her apartment should have been granted. We agree and reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.”)

• Posted in:
• Criminal Law & Procedure,
• Recent Opinions

AC44561 - State v. Armstrong (“Attempt to commit robbery in the first degree; firearm possession; “The defendant claims that (1) the court violated his right to self-representation, (2) the court committed instructional error with respect to the essential elements of attempted robbery, (3) the court improperly enhanced his sentence pursuant to § 53a-40 (g), and (4) the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was guilty of attempted robbery. We agree with the defendant that the state did not satisfy its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that he took a substantial step in the commission of the offense because the evidence did not support a finding that he displayed or threatened the use of what he represented by his words or conduct to be a firearm. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of conviction and remand the case to the trial court with direction to render a judgment of acquittal.”)

• Posted in:
• Criminal Law & Procedure,
• Recent Opinions

SC20588 - State v. King (“On appeal before this court, the defendant claims that the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that the elements of Florida’s driving under the influence statute, Fla. Stat. Ann. § 316.193, which he previously had been convicted of violating twice, were substantially the same as the elements of § 14-227a (a) for enhancement purposes under § 14-227a (g) because, he contends, the phrase ‘actual physical control’ under § 316.193 (1) criminalizes a broader range of conduct than does the term ‘operating’ under § 14-227a (a). To decide this question, we first must address an issue we have not confronted before: the meaning of the phrase in § 14- 227a (g) that provides an enhancement for ‘any offense the essential elements of which are determined by the court to be substantially the same as subdivision (1) or (2) of subsection (a) of this section . . . .’ We conclude that this phrase means that the basic and necessary parts of the out-of-state statute, including the actus reus, mens rea, and causation, must be the same as the elements of § 14-227a (a) to a considerable degree. Applying this definition to the claim at issue, we conclude that the essential elements of § 14-227a (a) and § 316.193 are substantially the same. Accordingly, we affirm the Appellate Court’s judgment.”)

• Posted in:
• Criminal Law & Procedure,
• Recent Opinions

SC20164 - State v. Juan A. G.-P. (“On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court violated his right to confrontation under the sixth amendment to the United States constitution by not ordering disclosure of the victims’ psychiatric records to the defense. The defendant asks this court to conduct an independent review of those records to determine whether they contain exculpatory or relevant impeachment material. The defendant further claims that the trial court violated his confrontation rights by preventing him from questioning the victims’ mothers about their U visa applications. Lastly, the defendant raises two unpreserved claims of instructional error. Specifically, he claims that the trial court improperly (1) instructed the jury that, if the evidence was subject to two different interpretations, the jury was ‘‘not required to accept the interpretation consistent with innocence,’’ and (2) failed to instruct the jury, in accordance with instruction 2.6-11 of Connecticut’s model criminal jury instructions, that it must consider each count separately and that a verdict reached on one count does not control the verdict on any other count.”)

• Posted in:
• Criminal Law & Procedure,
• Recent Opinions

AC44043 - State v. Foster (Psychiatric Security Review Board; § 17a-593; “The acquittee claims that the court improperly (1) found that the state had proven by clear and convincing evidence that he suffered from a mental illness resulting in his being a danger to himself or others and (2) rejected his claim that § 17a-593, as applied to him, violates his right to equal protection guaranteed by the federal constitution. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.”)

• Concurrence -

• Posted in:
• Criminal Law & Procedure,
• Recent Opinions

AC44701 - State v. Hurdle (Alford doctrine; robbery in the first degree; conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree; “The defendant claims that the trial court improperly (1) determined that it lacked the authority, in accordance with General Statutes § 18-98d, to award him presentence confinement credit, (2) accepted his guilty pleas and denied his subsequent motion for jail credit or to withdraw his pleas, despite his contention that there was never a ‘meeting of the minds’ regarding the terms of his plea agreement with the state, and (3) violated his constitutional rights by failing to advise him during his plea canvass that his guilty pleas would operate as a waiver of his right to a trial by jury. We affirm the judgment of conviction.”)

• Posted in:
• Criminal Law & Procedure,
• Recent Opinions

AC45019 - State v. Griffin (Assault of an elderly person in the second degree; “On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress a firearm and narcotics that were seized by the police following a warrantless search of a motor vehicle that was connected to the defendant and located near the scene of the defendant’s arrest. We conclude that, under the circumstances of this case, the court properly relied on the automobile exception in determining that the police were not obligated to obtain a warrant before searching the vehicle. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court.”)

AC44690 - State v. Charles L. (Risk of injury to a child; “On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) the evidence was insufficient for the jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that his actions constituted an act likely to impair the health of a child and (2) ‘‘§ 53-21 (a) (1) is unconstitutionally vague as applied to the facts of this case . . . .’’ We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.”)

• Posted in:
• Criminal Law & Procedure,
• Recent Opinions

AC45097 - State v. Henry (“On appeal, the defendant argues that the court improperly denied his motion to correct because his sentence imposing a period of special parole violated General Statutes (Rev. to 2017) § 54-125e (b) (1), as amended by No. 18-63 of the 2018 Public Acts (P.A. 18-63). In response, the state argues that the court properly denied the defendant’s motion to correct because that statutory provision does not apply retroactively to the defendant’s crimes. We agree with the state and, therefore, affirm the judgment of the trial court.”)

• Posted in:
• Criminal Law & Procedure,
• Recent Opinions

SC20371 - State v. Brandon (“The defendant appeals from the judgment of conviction, following a jury trial, of manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm in violation of General Statutes § 53a-55a (a). The defendant claims that the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress the statements he made during two separately recorded interrogations of him by police officers. As to the first interrogation, which occurred on February 16, 2016, sometime between 11 a.m. and noon, at the Bridgeport Office of Adult Probation, the defendant contends that, because the police failed to advise him of his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478–79, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966), the interrogation violated his rights under the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution. As to the second interrogation, which occurred later on the same day, at approximately 6 p.m., at the Bridgeport Police Department, the defendant claims that, notwithstanding the fact that the officers had issued Miranda warnings at the outset of that interrogation, it was tainted by the alleged illegality of the first interrogation. We disagree. After review, we have determined that the first interrogation was not custodial, and, therefore, that Miranda warnings were not required. Consequently, the failure to provide them did not violate the defendant’s rights and did not taint the second interrogation. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the statements he made during the two interrogations and, therefore, affirm the judgment of the trial court.”)

• Concurrence
• Dissent

• Posted in:
• Criminal Law & Procedure,
• Recent Opinions