AC44180, AC44181, AC44182 - Desmond v. Yale-New Haven Hospital, Inc. (“In these consolidated actions, the plaintiff, Sandhya Desmond, a former employee of the defendant Yale-New Haven Hospital, Inc., appeals from the judgments of the trial court rendered following the granting of the defendant's motions to strike her complaints. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court incorrectly construed her claims as alleging bad faith processing of a workers' compensation claim rather than as claims made pursuant to General Statutes § 31-290a and, therefore, erred in determining that her claims were barred by the exclusivity provision of the Workers' Compensation Act (act), General Statutes § 31-275 et seq. We disagree and, therefore, affirm the judgments of the trial court.”)

• Posted in:
• Recent Opinions,
• Workers' Compensation Law

AC43128 - Chapnick v. DiLauro ("The plaintiff Dominica Chapnick, individually and as administratrix of the estate of Randall Chapnick, appeals from the portion of the judgment of the trial court dismissing, pursuant to Connecticut's anti-SLAPP statute, General Statutes § 52-196a, the counts of the complaint against the defendants Cynthia Flaherty and John Popolizio, Jr., alleging nuisance and seeking injunctive relief. We reverse in part the judgment of the trial court.")

• Posted in:
• Recent Opinions,
• Tort Law

SC20598 - Conroy v. Idlibi (Dissolution; Fraud; Evidentiary hearing; Whether Appellate Court correctly concluded that trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied defendant's motion to open judgment based on allegations of fraud; "The defendant, Ammar A. Idlibi, appeals from the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming the trial court's denial of his motion to open the judgment in this marital dissolution case on the basis of fraud. Specifically, the defendant claims that the trial court improperly denied his motion to open without first affording him an opportunity to present certain evidence that the plaintiff, Katie N. Conroy, had lied under oath about certain topics during the underlying proceedings. For the reasons that follow, we agree with the Appellate Court's assessment that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that the defendant's particular allegations, even if proven to be true, were unlikely to have altered the ultimate resolution of the parties' divorce. As a result, we conclude that the Appellate Court properly affirmed the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to open.")

• Posted in:
• Family Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC43339 - State v. Gray (“On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court (1) improperly denied his motion to dismiss the charges against him or, in the alternative, to suppress any evidence relating to currency seized during his arrest, thereby violating his right to due process under article first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitution, (2) abused its discretion by denying the defendant’s postverdict motion for a new trial or, in the alternative, for a mistrial based on the state’s late disclosure of forensic lab photographs, and (3) abused its discretion by permitting the state, on rebuttal, to present an enlarged copy of a lab photograph already in evidence and witness testimony on that photograph. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.”)

• Concurrence

AC43377 - State v. Kyle A. (Burglary in the first degree, criminal mischief in the first degree, threatening in the second degree, criminal violation of a protective order, tampering with a witness in violation, attempt to commit criminal violation of a protective order. “The defendant’s appellate claims pertain solely to his burglary conviction. The defendant claims that, because the state did not present sufficient evidence that he committed the burglary offense, he is entitled to a judgment of acquittal with respect to that offense. Alternatively, the defendant claims that, because the court’s instruction concerning the burglary offense constituted plain error, the conviction for burglary should be overturned and the case remanded for a new trial with respect to that offense. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.”)

• Posted in:
• Criminal Law & Procedure,
• Recent Opinions

AC44918, AC44923 - In re Teagan K.-O. ("In these two appeals, the respondent parents appeal from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and Families, terminating their parental rights with respect to their minor child, Teagan K.-O. (Teagan). In Docket No. AC 44918, the respondent mother claims that the trial court lacked the statutory authority to terminate her parental rights under General Statutes § 17a-112 because Teagan was not in the custody of the petitioner pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-129. Specifically, she argues that the fact that our Supreme Court ordered that the neglect petition filed with respect to Teagan be dismissed vitiated the statutory predicate for the order of temporary custody over Teagan that had been granted to the petitioner under § 46b-129. In Docket No. AC 44923, the respondent father claims that the trial court lacked jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), General Statutes § 46b-115 et seq., to adjudicate the petition for termination of parental rights because (1) the order of temporary custody was not a final custody determination for purposes of establishing jurisdiction under the UCCJEA, and (2) there is no mechanism by which the order of temporary custody could become a final custody determination. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

• Posted in:
• Juvenile Law,
• Recent Opinions

SC20522 - Maldonado v. Flannery ("This case presents the scenario, not altogether uncommon, in which a jury awards personal injury plaintiffs economic damages for medical expenses but zero noneconomic damages. The trial court granted the joint motion for additurs filed by the plaintiffs, William Maldonado and Geovanni Hernandez, and awarded each plaintiff additional money damages for pain and suffering. The Appellate Court reversed the judgment of the trial court on the grounds that it had failed to articulate the specific facts to justify the additur awards or to construe the conflicting evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the jury's verdict. See Maldonado v. Flannery, 200 Conn. App. 1, 9, 13, 238 A.3d 127 (2020). We reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.")

• SC20522 Dissent - Maldonado v. Flannery

• Posted in:
• Recent Opinions,
• Tort Law

The 2022 edition of our research guide on Abandoned, Lost or Unclaimed Property in Connecticut has been added to our research guides webpage.

• Posted in:
• FYI,
• Legal Research,
• Self-Help

Please note: Bridgeport Law Library is closed until further notice. Stamford Law Library hours are 10:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. until further notice.

Thursday, April 28th

• New Britain Law Library closes at 4:30 p.m.
• Putnam Law Library closes at 4:00 p.m.

Friday, April 29th

• Danbury Law Library closes at 3:30 p.m.
• New Britain Law Library opens at 11:00 a.m.
• Rockville Law Library closes at 4:30 p.m.
• Torrington Law Library closes at 1:00 p.m.
• Waterbury Law Library closes at 2:00 p.m.

• Posted in:
• Library Notices

The Connecticut Law Journal, Volume LXXXIII, No. 43, for April 26, 2022 is now available.

Contained in the issue is the following:

• Table of Contents
• Volume 343: Connecticut Reports (Pages 62 - 150)
• Volume 343: Orders (Pages 903 - 907)
• Volume 343: Cumulative Table of Cases Connecticut Reports
• Volume 211: Connecticut Appellate Reports (Pages 793 - 867)
• Volume 211: Memorandum Decisions (Pages 905 - 905)
• Volume 211: Cumulative Table of Cases Connecticut Appellate Reports
• Volume 212: Connecticut Appellate Reports (Pages 1 - 161)
• Volume 212: Cumulative Table of Cases Connecticut Appellate Reports
• Miscellaneous Notices
• Connecticut Practice Book Amendments

• Posted in:
• Connecticut Law Journal,
• Recent Opinions

SC20514 - Connecticut Judicial Branch v. Gilbert (“This case arises from allegations of sexual harassment brought by the named defendant, Germaine Gilbert (complainant), a judicial marshal who is employed by the plaintiff, the Connecticut Judicial Branch (branch). Following a contested public hearing before the defendant Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities (commission), the human rights referee (referee) found that the allegations were substantiated and awarded the complainant back pay with interest, emotional distress damages, attorney's fees, and injunctive relief. The branch appealed, and the trial court sustained the appeal in part. The court upheld the referee's determinations that (1) emotional distress damages and attorney's fees were available remedies under the state employment discrimination law then in effect if the complainant was able to establish a violation of Title VII of the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (2018) (Title VII), and (2) the state has waived its sovereign immunity with respect to prejudgment and postjudgment interest awards for civil rights violations, but also determined that (3) the award of emotional distress damages must be vacated because of the complainant's failure to fully comply with the branch's discovery requests in the administrative proceeding, and (4) the injunction reinstating the complainant to her former workplace must be vacated as overbroad and otherwise improper. The branch challenges the first two determinations on appeal; the commission challenges the latter two determinations on cross appeal. We affirm the judgment of the trial court with respect to the Title VII issue, reverse the judgment with respect to sovereign immunity, and remand the case for the referee to conduct a new hearing in damages and, if appropriate, to revisit the injunction reinstating the complainant to her former workplace.”)

• Posted in:
• Employment Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC42942 - Kaddah v. Commissioner of Correction (On appeal, the petitioner claims that the court erred in rejecting his claim that his prior habeas attorneys were ineffective in not pursuing the claim that his trial and appellate counsel were ineffective for their failure to challenge the trial court’s jury instructions as to (1) the element of intent required for the specific offenses alleged against him and (2) his affirmative defense of mental disease or defect. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the habeas court.)

AC44390 - O'Reagan v. Commissioner of Correction ("The petitioner claims that the court erred (1) in dismissing in part his habeas petition after finding that he was not in custody on two of his challenged convictions, and (2) in denying his habeas petition after concluding that his trial counsel had not provided ineffective assistance. We disagree with both of the petitioner’s claims and, therefore, affirm the judgment of the habeas court.")

AC44160 - Sease v. Commissioner of Correction (“The petitioner raises three principal issues on appeal: (1) the court abused its discretion in denying certification to appeal; (2) his right of due process was violated by the prosecuting authority’s knowing presentation of false testimony at his criminal trial; and (3) the court improperly denied his claim that his right to effective assistance of trial counsel at sentencing was violated. We make no determination as to whether the petitioner prevails on his third claim, but we conclude that the habeas court improperly denied his petition for certification to appeal, and remand the matter to the habeas court for additional factual findings regarding the performance prong of his ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing claim. We leave the petitioner’s second claim to another day in light of our remand order on his third claim.”)

• AC44160 Dissent

AC43862 - Jones v. Commissioner of Correction (“On appeal, the petitioner claims that the habeas court (1) abused its discretion in denying his petition for certification to appeal, (2) deprived him of his constitutional and statutory rights by failing to admit into evidence or consider the transcripts of the underlying criminal trial, (3) improperly concluded that his trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance, and (4) improperly concluded that there were no violations of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963), at his underlying criminal trial. We conclude that the habeas court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petitioner’s petition for certification to appeal and, therefore, dismiss the appeal.”)

• Posted in:
• Habeas Corpus Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC44409, AC44488 - Arrico v. Board of Education (“In this workers' compensation dispute, the plaintiff, James Arrico, and the defendants, the Board of Education of the City of Stamford (city) and PMA Management Corporation of New England, each appeal from separate decisions of the Compensation Review Board (board). In Docket No. AC 44409, the defendants appeal from the decision of the board reversing in part the decision of the Workers' Compensation Commissioner for the Seventh District (commissioner) of the Workers' Compensation Commission approving a form 36 that the defendants filed.The board vacated the majority of the commissioner's conclusions in her decision approving the form 36 and remanded the matter to the commissioner for further proceedings on several issues.On appeal, the defendants claim that the board (1) misconstrued the commissioner's decision as including a finding that the plaintiff was totally disabled as a result of preexisting, noncompensable injuries, (2) failed to affirm the commissioner's decision on the basis of her purported finding, as supported by sufficient evidence, that the plaintiff had a work capacity, and (3) misconstrued the commissioner's conclusion that further medical care of the plaintiff's compensable injuries was palliative.In Docket No. AC 44488, the plaintiff appeals from the decision of the board denying his motion for articulation or reconsideration vis-à-vis its ruling on the commissioner's decision approving the form 36.On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the board improperly denied his request for an order that the matter be remanded to a different commissioner for a de novo trial.We affirm the decisions of the board.”)

• Posted in:
• Recent Opinions,
• Workers' Compensation Law

AC43874 - New Milford v. Standard Demolition Services, Inc. (“The defendant, Standard Demolition Services, Inc., appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the plaintiff, the town of New Milford, on the plaintiff's complaint for breach of a contract entered into by the parties and as to all counts of a counterclaim filed by the defendant. On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) the court misapplied state and federal environmental regulations, (2) the court erred in not finding that the contract was impossible to perform, (3) the court improperly determined that the plaintiff lawfully had terminated the contract, and (4) evidence of certain change orders executed by the plaintiff in connection with a subsequent contract with a different contractor, pursuant to which the plaintiff had agreed to modify terms of that contract, constituted admissions that the plaintiff's contract with the defendant was defective and could not be performed by the defendant as written. The plaintiff has cross appealed, claiming that the court erred in its award of damages to the plaintiff. We affirm the judgment of the court in favor of the plaintiff on its complaint for breach of contract and as to all counts of the defendant's counterclaim, but we reverse it in part with respect to the award of damages and remand the case for a new hearing in damages.”)

• Posted in:
• Contract Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC44456 - Gilman v. Shames (Wrongful death; medical malpractice; bystander emotional distress; motion to dismiss; "The defendant state of Connecticut appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying its motion to dismiss the action of the plaintiff Glenn Gilman on the ground of sovereign immunity. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly determined that (1) the Claims Commissioner (commissioner) had waived sovereign immunity with respect to the plaintiff's claims, and (2) the accidental failure of suit statute, General Statutes § 52-592, exempted the plaintiff from the two year time limit for bringing a wrongful death action under General Statutes § 52-555. We reverse the judgment of the trial court.")

• Posted in:
• Medical Malpractice Law,
• Recent Opinions

SC20545 - Crouzet v. First Baptist Church of Stonington (Appellate Review; Whether appellate court properly reversed trial court's judgment for defendants in action regarding contamination of neighboring plaintiff's property because (1) trial court committed clear error in finding that secondary source was responsible for contamination and (2) even if there was secondary source, its presence did not mean that plaintiff failed to prove that defendants caused contamination; "The plaintiff, David Crouzet, brought this action against the defendants, First Baptist Church of Stonington and Second Congregational Church of Stonington, alleging that fuel oil had leaked from an underground storage tank that previously had been located on the defendants' property onto the plaintiff's property, thereby contaminating it. The case was tried to the court, which concluded that a "secondary source" for the oil contamination existed on the plaintiff's property and, therefore, that the plaintiff had failed to prove its case. Accordingly, the trial court rendered judgment for the defendants. The plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Court, claiming that the trial court's finding that there was a secondary source for the oil contamination was clearly erroneous and that, even if that finding was supported by the evidence, that would not mean that the plaintiff failed to prove that the oil tank on the defendants' property was the primary source of the contamination. Crouzet v. First Baptist Church of Stonington, 199 Conn. App. 532, 553–54, 239 A.3d 321 (2020). The Appellate Court agreed with the plaintiff and reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded the case for a new trial. Id., 555, 559–60, 562. We then granted the plaintiff's petition for certification to appeal, limited to the following issue: "Did the Appellate Court, on the record in this case, properly reverse the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the defendants on the grounds that (1) the trial court committed clear error in finding that a secondary source was responsible for the contamination of the plaintiff's property, and (2) even if there had been a secondary source of contamination, the presence of that secondary source does not mean that the plaintiff failed to prove that the defendants' oil tank contaminated [the] property?" Crouzet v. First Baptist Church of Stonington, 335 Conn. 979, 241 A.3d 703 (2020). We conclude that certification was improvidently granted and, therefore, dismiss the appeal.")

• Posted in:
• Environmental Law,
• Property Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC44831 - In re Ryder M. ("The respondent father, Phillip M., appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and Families, terminating his parental rights as to his minor son, Ryder M., on the ground that he failed to achieve a sufficient degree of personal rehabilitation pursuant to General Statutes § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) (i). On appeal, the respondent claims that the court improperly determined that (1) the Department of Children and Families (department) made reasonable efforts to reunify him with Ryder, (2) he failed to rehabilitate sufficiently, and (3) termination of his parental rights was in Ryder’s best interest. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

• Posted in:
• Juvenile Law,
• Recent Opinions

SC20580 - Stratford Police Dept. v. Board of Firearms Permit Examiners (Administrative Appeal; Statutory interpretation; Whether trial court improperly interpreted and applied General Statutes § 29-28 (b) (2) (b) to require statutory equivalency test for out-of-state misdemeanor convictions; Whether trial court improperly substituted its judgment for judgment of Board of Firearms Permit Examiners; "General Statutes § 29-28 (b) prohibits the issuance of a permit to carry a pistol or revolver if the applicant has been convicted of a felony or certain enumerated offenses under the Connecticut General Statutes but contains no language prohibiting the issuance of a permit on the basis of out-of-state, nonfelony convictions. See General Statutes § 29-28 (b) (2). The applicant in the present case had been convicted in New York of a misdemeanor crime that, had it been committed in Connecticut, would have been among the enumerated offenses precluding him from obtaining a permit. In this appeal, we must decide whether § 29-28 (b) prohibits the issuance of a permit for a pistol or a revolver to an applicant under these circumstances. In light of the fact that the legislature has previously used explicit language in other Connecticut statutes to incorporate equivalent out-of-state convictions, we conclude that the absence of such language in § 29-28 (b) (2) (B) indicates that the legislature intended only for the enumerated Connecticut offenses to operate as a per se bar to obtaining a state pistol permit.

The defendant Anthony Leo, appeals from the judgment of the trial court, which reversed the decision of the named defendant, the Board of Firearms Permit Examiners, ordering the issuance of a pistol permit to the defendant. On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court erroneously read § 29-28 (b) (2) (B) to include extraterritorial misdemeanor convictions, in contravention of the statute's clear language and enumeration of specific offenses that constitute a per se bar to obtaining a pistol permit in Connecticut. The defendant also claims that the trial court improperly substituted its own judgment for the board's judgment when it overturned the board's determination that the defendant was of suitable character to obtain a pistol permit. We agree with the defendant and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the trial court.")

• Posted in:
• Administrative Appeal Law,
• Recent Opinions

The Connecticut Law Journal, Volume LXXXIII, No. 42, for April 19, 2022 is now available.

Contained in the issue is the following:

• Table of Contents
• Volume 343: Connecticut Reports (Pages 1 - 61)
• Volume 343: Orders (Pages 901 - 903)
• Volume 343: Cumulative Table of Cases Connecticut Reports
• Volume 211: Connecticut Appellate Reports (Pages 742 - 793)
• Volume 211: Memorandum Decisions (Pages 904 - 905)
• Volume 211: Cumulative Table of Cases Connecticut Appellate Reports
• Miscellaneous Notices
• Notices of Connecticut State Agencies

• Posted in:
• Connecticut Law Journal,
• Recent Opinions

Please note: Bridgeport Law Library is closed until further notice. Stamford Law Library hours are 10:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. until further notice.

Tuesday, April 19th

• Middletown Law Library is closed.
• New Haven Law Library closes at 4:00 p.m.

Thursday, April 21st

• Waterbury Law Library closes at 1:00 p.m.

Friday, April 22nd

• New Britain Law Library opens at 10:00 a.m.
• New London Law Library is closed.

• Posted in:
• Library Notices

SC20574 - Lopez v. William Raveis Real Estate, Inc. ("In this appeal, we consider the standard for determining whether a statement made in connection with the sale or rental of a dwelling violates General Statutes § 46a-64c (a) (3) by indicating a 'preference, limitation, or discrimination,' or an 'intention to make any such preference, limitation or discrimination,' on the basis of an individual's 'lawful source of income . . . .' The plaintiff, Carmen Lopez, appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the defendants, William Raveis Real Estate, Inc. (Raveis), Sarah Henry, a licensed real estate salesperson, and Anthony Vaccaro and Eve Vaccaro, in this action alleging housing discrimination in violation of § 46a-64c (a). On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial court, in considering whether Henry violated § 46a-64c (a) (3) by making certain statements in the course of renting an apartment owned by the Vaccaros, improperly considered whether Henry had the subjective intent to discriminate on the basis of lawful source of income when she made those statements. The plaintiff specifically contends that she is entitled to judgment in her favor because (1) Henry's statements were facially discriminatory, rendering her subjective intent irrelevant as a matter of law, and (2) even if we were to conclude that Henry's statements were not facially discriminatory, the trial court nevertheless incorrectly determined that the statements, considered in context, did not convey an impermissible preference. We conclude that, although the trial court applied the proper legal standard in considering the plaintiff's claims under § 46a-64c (a) (3), its ultimate conclusion as to liability on the facts of this case was clearly erroneous with respect to Henry. Accordingly, we reverse in part the judgment of the trial court.")

• Posted in:
• Civil Rights,
• Landlord / Tenant Law