The mission of the Connecticut Judicial Branch is to serve the interests of justice and the public by resolving matters brought before it in a fair, timely, efficient and open manner.

Habeas Appellate Court Opinion

   by Oumano, Emily

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5089

AC44504 - Diaz v. Commissioner of Correction (“The petitioner, Raul Ivan Diaz, appeals from the judgment of the habeas court dismissing in part and denying in part his fourth petition for a writ of habeas corpus. On appeal, the petitioner claims that the habeas court erred in rejecting his claims that (1) his right to due process was violated when the court in his underlying criminal trial failed to instruct the jury on the requirement of unanimity in its verdict, and (2) he was denied effective assistance by his trial counsel, his first habeas counsel and his second habeas counsel. We affirm the judgment of the habeas court as to the petitioner's claims as to his second habeas counsel. We dismiss the appeal as to the petitioner's remaining claims.”)


Criminal Law Appellate Court Opinions

   by Oumano, Emily

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5090

AC43092 - State v. Glass (“The defendant, Edwin Ronald Glass, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of burglary in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-101 (a) (3), and robbery in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-134 (a) (3). On appeal, the defendant claims that there was insufficient evidence to establish his identity as the person who committed the burglary and robbery. We agree and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the trial court.”)

AC44342 - State v. Waters (“The defendant, Rodney Waters, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol in violation of General Statutes § 14-227a (a) (1), and, following a plea of guilty to a part B information, of being a second time offender pursuant to § 14-227a (g) (2). On appeal, the defendant claims that his conviction under § 14-227a (a) (1) is not supported by sufficient evidence. He also claims that the trial court improperly admitted expert testimony related to the defendant's blood alcohol content (BAC) in contravention of § 14-227a (c), restricted his cross-examination of the state's expert witness, and denied his motion to suppress inculpatory statements he made to the police. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.”)


Interpleader Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Roy, Christopher

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5094

AC44397 - Sargent, Sargent & Jacobs, LLC v. Thoele ("This interpleader action arises from a dispute between the defendant purchaser, Merwin, LLC (purchaser), and the defendant seller, Alan Thoele (seller), concerning a failed commercial real estate transaction. The seller appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the purchaser on its claims for breach of contract and return of deposit. On appeal, the seller claims that the court erred in concluding that (1) the parol evidence rule precluded consideration of a letter of intent from 2016, (2) the purchaser did not have actual knowledge of a potential sewer easement on the property, (3) the potential sewer easement was an encumbrance on the property, and (4) the seller's failure to disclose the potential sewer easement was a material breach of the purchase and sale agreement. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.")


Property Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Zigadto, Janet

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5093

AC44707 - Davis v. Property Owners Association of Moodus Lake Shores, Inc. ("In this property dispute action, the plaintiffs, Kirk B. Davis and Elyssa J. Davis, appeal from the summary judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of the defendant, Property Owners Association of Moodus Lake Shores, Inc. (association). On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the court improperly concluded that the doctrine of res judicata barred the present action. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")


Business Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Roy, Christopher

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5092

AC4417, AC44597 - Levco Tech, Inc. v. Kelly ("In this dispute among family members over control of the family business, the defendants, Sally Levene (Sally), both individually and as executrix of the estate of Martin Levene (Martin), and Edward Levene (Edward), bring these consolidated appeals from the judgment of the trial court determining that the defendants Robert Levene (Robert), Jeffrey Levene (Jeffrey), and Dorothy Kelly (Dot) owned the majority of the outstanding shares of common stock of the plaintiff, Levco Tech, Inc. (Levco). On appeal, Sally and Edward claim that the court improperly determined that (1) Dot had not placed her ten shares of Levco stock in an irrevocable trust and (2) the issuance of twelve shares of Levco stock to Edward was invalid. We disagree and, therefore, affirm the judgment of the trial court.")


Civil Rights Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Agati, Taryn

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5088

AC44192 - Francis v. Briatico ("The self-represented plaintiff, Ernest Francis, appeals from the summary judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of the defendants, Captain Bryan Viger, Lieutenant Wilkens and Correction Officer Briatico, all current or former employees of the Department of Correction (department). The plaintiff brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the defendants violated his rights under the eighth amendment to the United States constitution by virtue of the manner in which they responded to an electrical fire in the plaintiff's housing unit at the Cheshire Correctional Institution (Cheshire), where he was incarcerated. On appeal, he contends that the court applied an unduly exacting legal standard—one that required him to prove that the defendants had acted in bad faith and with the malicious intent to harm him—in holding that the defendants' conduct did not violate the eighth amendment as a matter of law. Because we conclude that the court correctly determined that the defendants are entitled to summary judgment, we affirm the judgment.")


Foreclosure Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Zigadto, Janet

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5091

AC44964 - Wilmington Trust, National Assn. v. N'Guessan ("The defendant Victor K. N'Guessan appeals from the judgment of strict foreclosure rendered by the trial court in favor of the plaintiff, Wilmington Trust. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court (1) erred in granting the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment without considering the applicability of the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel and (2) abused its discretion by sustaining the plaintiff's objections to his interrogatories and requests for production. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the court.")




Law Library Hours - 7/21/22 to 7/29/22

   by Dowd, Jeffrey

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5076

Tuesday, July 26th

  • Danbury Law Library closes at 1:15 p.m.
  • Putnam Law Library closes at 2:30 p.m.

Wednesday, July 27th

  • New London Law Library closes at 3:00 p.m.

Thursday, July 28th

  • New Britain Law Library opens at 11:30 a.m.

Friday, July 29th

  • Danbury Law Library is closed.
  • Middletown Law Library is closed.
  • New Britain Law Library opens at 10:00 a.m.
  • Putnam Law Library opens at 10:30 a.m.
  • Torrington Law Library closes at 3:30 p.m.
  • Waterbury Law Library opens at 10:30 a.m.


Criminal Law Supreme Court Opinion

   by Zigadto, Janet

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5084

SC20335 - State v. Davis ("In State v. Davis, 338 Conn. 458, 460, 258 A.3d 633 (2021), this court agreed with the defendant, Brock Davis, that, on two separate occasions, the trial court improperly failed to inquire into whether defense counsel, Kirstin B. Coffin, had a conflict of interest. We therefore remanded the case to that court for a determination of whether Coffin did, in fact, have such a conflict and, if so, whether it adversely affected her representation of the defendant. Id., 460, 475. Because a new trial would have been required if the trial court answered these two questions in the affirmative, we did not reach the defendant’s additional claim that the trial court had improperly admitted into evidence testimony from lay witnesses identifying him in a surveillance video recording. Id., 479. In accordance with this court’s remand order, the trial court, following a hearing, determined that the defendant had failed to establish that Coffin was burdened by an actual conflict of interest that adversely affected her performance. On appeal, the defendant challenges that determination. We reject this claim, and, because we also reject the defendant’s remaining claim, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.")


Connecticut Law Journal - July 26, 2022

   by Roy, Christopher

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5083

The Connecticut Law Journal, Volume LXXXIV, No. 4, for July 26, 2022 is now available.

Contained in the issue is the following:

  • Table of Contents
  • Replacement Pages 343 Conn. 569-570, 601-602
  • Volume 344: Connecticut Reports (Pages 113 - 150)
  • Volume 344: Cumulative Table of Cases Connecticut Reports
  • Volume 213: Connecticut Appellate Reports (Pages 858 - 892)
  • Volume 214: Connecticut Appellate Reports (Pages 1 - 132)
  • Volume 214: Cumulative Table of Cases Connecticut Appellate Reports
  • Miscellaneous Notices
  • Connecticut Practice Book Amendments
  • Notices of Connecticut State Agencies
  • Cumulative Table of Cases Connecticut Appellate Reports


Criminal Law Supreme Court Opinion

   by Townsend, Karen

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5082

SC20513 - State v. Council (Whether trial court properly precluded testimony of expert on cell phone location data; conviction of murder and criminal possession of a firearm by a convicted felon; “At trial, defense counsel proffered testimony from an expert witness as to the defendant’s location during certain relevant times on the basis of cell phone carrier data. The trial court precluded the witness from testifying on the grounds that (1) the evidence was immaterial and irrelevant, (2) the witness did not articulate sufficient qualifications to provide expert opinion on the data, and (3) the testimony did not establish the reliability of the data. On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court improperly excluded the testimony because the witness was qualified as an expert pursuant to § 7-2 of the Connecticut Code of Evidence. We dismiss the defendant’s appeal as moot because he has not challenged all of the trial court’s bases for its evidentiary ruling, and, therefore, this court cannot provide him practical relief.”)


Contract Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Zigadto, Janet

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5081

AC44380 - Reiner v. Reiner (Declaratory judgment; contract interpretation; interest; settlement agreement; "In this declaratory judgment action, the defendant Michael D. Reiner appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the plaintiff Jeffrey A. Reiner. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court erred in concluding that the term 'interest,' as used in the buyout provisions of the parties' settlement agreement (agreement), meant 'equitable interest' and, thus, that the buyout amount for the defendant's interests in certain parcels of real property is equal to his percentage interest in each property multiplied by the difference of the fair market value of the property minus any outstanding mortgage debt. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.")


Criminal Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Townsend, Karen

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5080

AC43868 - State v. Guild (Subject matter jurisdiction; petition to extend commitment to jurisdiction of Psychiatric Security Review Board; denial of motion to dismiss state’s petition, filed pursuant to § 17a-593 (c); “On appeal, as a threshold matter, the acquittee claims that this court has subject matter jurisdiction over this appeal because the trial court’s denial of his motion to dismiss satisfies at least one prong of the finality test set forth in State v. Curcio, 191 Conn. 27, 31, 463 A.2d 566 (1983). We conclude that the trial court’s denial of the acquittee’s motion to dismiss is not a final judgment for appeal purposes under either prong of Curcio and, accordingly, dismiss the acquittee’s appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.”)


Civil Rights Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Agati, Taryn

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5079

AC43845 - Miller v. Doe ("The defendant Joshua Medina, a central transportation unit officer for the Department of Correction (department), appeals from the trial court's denial of his motion for summary judgment in the action brought by the self-represented plaintiff, Omar J. Miller, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging deliberate indifference in violation of the eighth amendment to the United States constitution. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly denied his motion for summary judgment because he is entitled to qualified immunity from the plaintiff's claim. We agree and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the trial court.")


Property Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Zigadto, Janet

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5078

AC44377 - Kazemi v. Allen ("In this vexatious litigation action, the defendants, Lawrence Allen (Allen) and Green Tree Estate Association, Inc. (Green Tree), appeal from the judgment of the trial court in favor of the plaintiffs, Hossien Kazemi and Mahvash Mirzai. On appeal, the defendants claim that the trial court improperly (1) determined that the plaintiffs established that the defendants lacked probable cause to bring the claims for adverse possession and trespass in their counterclaim, (2) denied the defendants' motion for a directed judgement, (3) determined that the defendants failed to establish their advice of counsel defense, and (4) found that the defendants acted with malice. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")


Family Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Booth, George

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5077

AC44033 - Olson v. Olson (Dissolution of marriage; motion to dismiss; "The defendant, Brian Matthew Olson, appeals from the judgment of the trial court granting a motion to dismiss filed by the plaintiff, Cheryl Abbott Olson, in which the court concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to modify the parties' spousal support order that had been issued by a court of the United Kingdom. On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court erred in dismissing his motion for modification of alimony on the basis that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction, and argues that (1) the court misapplied the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, General Statutes § 46b-301 et seq., in determining that the United Kingdom had continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over the spousal support order; (2) the United Kingdom could not have continuing, exclusive jurisdiction because it lost its exclusiveness when the trial court, S. Richards, J., decided motions to modify alimony in 2013; (3) the application of the doctrine of comity demonstrates that Connecticut courts have jurisdiction to modify the foreign country order in this case; (4) the trial court erred in its reliance on this court's decision in Hornblower v. Hornblower, 151 Conn. App. 332, 94 A.3d 1218 (2014); and (5) the court erroneously relied on a United Kingdom statutory instrument, the Reciprocal Enforcement of Maintenance Orders (United States of America) Order 2007, in determining that the United Kingdom had continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify the support order. On the basis of our thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we agree with the defendant that the court erred in concluding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to modify the spousal support order at issue. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.")


Juvenile Law Appellate Court Slip Opinion

   by Roy, Christopher

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5075

AC45092 - In re Omar I. ("The self-represented respondent, Ammar I., whose parental rights had been terminated in a prior proceeding, appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying his motion to open and set aside the adoptions of his three minor children, Omar I., Safiyah I. and Muneer I., on the ground that he lacked standing under In re Zen T., 165 Conn. App. 245, 252–54, 138 A.3d 469, cert. denied, 322 Conn. 905, 138 A.3d 934 (2016), cert. denied sub nom. Heather S. v. Connecticut Dept. of Children and Families, 580 U.S. 1135, 137 S. Ct. 1111, 197 L. Ed. 2d 214 (2017). On appeal, the respondent claims that he did not receive timely and proper notice of the court's July 27, 2021 ruling regarding his amended petition for a new trial so that the court incorrectly determined that he lacked standing to challenge the adoption decrees issued on August 20, 2021. We conclude that, because the court correctly determined that notice of its July 27, 2021 decision had been sent properly to the respondent the same date as its issuance, the respondent's parental rights had been adjudicated fully and fairly prior to the issuance of the adoption decrees. Thus, the court properly determined that the respondent lacked standing to challenge the adoption decrees. See In re Zen T., supra, 252–54; see also Practice Book § 7-5 ('[t]he clerk shall give notice, by mail or by electronic delivery, to the attorneys of record and self-represented parties' (emphasis added)).

We further conclude, however, that the form of the court's judgment is improper. The court should have dismissed, rather than denied, the motion to open and set aside. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment and remand the case to the trial court with direction to dismiss the motion to open and set aside.")


Tort Law Supreme Court Opinion

   by Agati, Taryn

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5074

SC20537 - Costanzo v. Plainfield ("The apportionment statute, General Statutes § 52-572h, allows a party sued for damages resulting from personal injury, death or property damage caused by that party's negligence to file an apportionment complaint against additional parties, not named as defendants in the plaintiff's lawsuit, whose negligence caused the alleged losses. The statute expressly prohibits apportionment claims between a party liable for negligence and a party liable, among other things, "pursuant to any cause of action created by statute, except that liability may be apportioned among parties liable for negligence in any cause of action created by statute based on negligence . . . ." General Statutes § 52-572h (o). The central issue in this certified appeal is whether the apportionment statute, by this language, permits municipal defendants whose liability is based on General Statutes § 52-557n (b) (8) to file an apportionment complaint sounding in negligence. Section 52-557n (b) (8) renders municipal actors liable for damages and injuries that occur due to the failure to inspect or the negligent or inadequate inspection of property if (1) the municipality had notice of a hazard or violation of law (first exception), or (2) the act or omission "constitutes a reckless disregard for health or safety under all the relevant circumstances" (second exception).

Resolution of this appeal thus requires us to consider whether a claim brought under § 52-557n (b) (8) is a "cause of action created by statute based on negligence," such that apportionment is allowed under § 52-572h (o). As we explain herein, because § 52-557n (b) (8) expressly abrogates the common-law doctrine of municipal immunity, and because the first exception thereunder allows for a cause of action that we determine is based on negligence, we conclude that claims brought pursuant to that exception do qualify for apportionment.

The named plaintiff, Malisa Costanzo, the administratrix of the estate of the decedent, Isabella R. Costanzo, brought claims against the defendants, the town of Plainfield (town), and two of its employees, Robert Kerr and D. Kyle Collins, Jr., under § 52-557n (b) (8), stemming from the drowning of the decedent in a pool located on privately owned property in the town. Thereafter, the defendants filed a notice of intent to seek apportionment against the owners of the property where the pool was located and an apportionment complaint against the former tenants of the property, who had the pool constructed. The plaintiff objected to the defendants' efforts to seek apportionment, claiming that her complaint set forth a cause of action alleging recklessness or an intentional act under § 52-557n (b) (8), rather than negligence, and, therefore, that the apportionment statute did not apply. The trial court agreed and concluded that, "[i]f the defendants are found liable to the [plaintiff] on [the basis of] the [plaintiff's operative] revised complaint, it will be for reckless disregard for health [or] safety under all relevant . . . circumstances, not for negligence." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Therefore, the trial court issued orders sustaining the plaintiff's objections and dismissing the defendants' apportionment complaint and notice of intent to seek apportionment. The defendants appealed to the Appellate Court, and that court reversed the orders of the trial court, concluding that the plaintiff's claims under § 52-557n (b) (8) fell within the first exception, which it held to incorporate a negligence standard. See Costanzo v. Plainfield, 200 Conn. App. 755, 770, 239 A.3d 370 (2020). Consequently, the Appellate Court determined that § 52-572h (o) authorizes apportionment in connection with such claims. See id. We agree with the Appellate Court and, accordingly, affirm its judgment.")