SC20133 - Reclaimant Corp. v. Deutsch (Conflict of laws; unjust enrichment; statutes of limitations (§§ 52-576 and 52-577); motion for summary judgment on ground that plaintiff failed to timely commence action; claim that plaintiff failed to commence action within three year limitation period set forth in § 17-607 (c) of Delaware Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act; claim that trial court incorrectly determined that Delaware law rather than Connecticut law governed issue of whether plaintiff's unjust enrichment claims were time barred; "The narrow issue presented by this appeal is whether the statute of limitations of the state of Connecticut or the state of Delaware governs the unjust enrichment claims brought by the plaintiff, Reclaimant Corp., against the defendants, William J. Deutsch and Laurence B. Simon, seeking recovery for alleged overpayments issued to the defendants by the plaintiff's putative predecessor in interest pursuant to a limited partnership agreement. The trial court rendered summary judgment in favor of the defendants, concluding that the plaintiff's unjust enrichment claims were governed by Delaware law and were time-barred under the three-year statute of limitations in the Delaware Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act (DRULPA), Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 17-607 (c) (2005). On appeal, the plaintiff contends that summary judgment was improper because Connecticut law governs the timeliness of its unjust enrichment claims and that those claims timely were filed under Connecticut law.

We conclude that Delaware law governs the substantive rights and liabilities of the parties arising out of the limited partnership agreement but that Connecticut law governs matters of judicial administration and procedure. We further conclude that, because the plaintiff's unjust enrichment claims have a common-law origin, the limitation period properly is "characterized as procedural because it functions only as a qualification on the remedy to enforce the preexisting right." Baxter v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 230 Conn. 335, 347, 644 A.2d 1297 (1994). Thus, Connecticut law, rather than Delaware law, controls the timeliness of the plaintiff's claims. We therefore reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for further proceedings.")

• Posted in:
• Business Law,
• Contract Law,
• Recent Opinions

Wednesday, July 29th

• New Britain Law Library closes at 4:30 p.m.

Thursday, August 1st

• New London Law Library opens at 9:30 a.m.

• Bridgeport Law Library closes at 3:30 p.m.

• Posted in:
• Library Notices

SC20075 - Meletrich v. Commissioner of Correction (“The petitioner appeals from the judgment of the Appellate Court dismissing his appeal from the judgment of the habeas court, which denied his amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The petitioner claims that the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that the habeas court acted within its discretion in denying certification to appeal because he established that his counsel had performed deficiently by failing to call a second alibi witness and, further, that had that witness testified, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the petitioner’s criminal trial would have been different. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.”)

• Posted in:
• Habeas Corpus Law,
• Recent Opinions

The Connecticut Law Journal, Volume LXXXI, No. 5, for July 30, 2019 is now available.

Contained in the issue is the following:

• Table of Contents
• Volume 332: Connecticut Reports (Pages 510 - 589)
• Volume 332: Cumulative Table of Cases Connecticut Reports
• Volume 191: Connecticut Appellate Reports (Pages 413 - 587)
• Volume 191: Cumulative Table of Cases Connecticut Appellate Reports
• Miscellaneous Notices
• Notices of Connecticut State Agencies

• Posted in:
• Connecticut Law Journal,
• Recent Opinions

The 2019 edition of Glossary of Connecticut Family Law Terms has been posted to our research guides webpage.

• Posted in:
• Family Law,
• FYI,
• Legal Research,
• Self-Help

AC40976 - Monroe v. Ostrosky (Injunction; "The defendant . . . appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying his motion to open and to vacate the court's judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, the town of Monroe and several of its agencies and employees. The defendant claims that he did not have notice of and an opportunity to be heard at an evidentiary hearing. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

AC40975 - Newtown v. Ostrosky (Injunction; "The defendant . . . appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying his motion to dismiss the action and to open and vacate the court's prior judgment that had been rendered in favor of the plaintiffs, the town of Newtown and several of its agencies and employees. On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the plaintiffs' claims, (2) he was deprived of his due process right to notice and the opportunity to be heard on the merits of his case, and (3) the court had continuing jurisdiction to enforce and to modify its injunctive orders even if the motion to open and to vacate judgments was untimely. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

• Posted in:
• Land Use Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC40311 - State v. Alicea (Assault in first degree; "The defendant . . . appeals, following a jury trial, from the judgment of conviction of assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-59 (a) (1) (intentional assault) and assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-59 (a) (3) (reckless assault). The defendant, following a plea of nolo contendere to a part B information, also was convicted of being a persistent dangerous felony offender pursuant to General Statutes § 53a-40 (a) (1) (A). On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) the jury's verdicts of guilty on both intentional and reckless assault were legally inconsistent, (2) the court erred in excluding his statement to the police, given approximately forty-five minutes after the incident at issue, and (3) the state failed to disprove his claim of self-defense. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

AC40889 - State v. Juan V. (Risk of injury to child; "The defendant . . . appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of two counts of risk of injury to a child in violation of General Statutes § 53-21 (a) (1) and two counts of risk of injury to a child in violation of General Statutes § 53-21 (a) (2). On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly (1) permitted the jury to have with it during its deliberations a video recording of a forensic interview between the victim and a forensic interviewer, which was admitted as a full exhibit, (2) instructed the jury on inferences in a manner that diluted the state's burden of proof, and (3) denied his motion for a disclosure of the victim's school records. The defendant's first two claims concededly are unpreserved and we conclude that the defendant has failed to demonstrate that this court should review them or that he should prevail pursuant to the doctrines on which he relies. As to the defendant’s third claim of error, we have reviewed the victim's school records and conclude that they do not contain any information that is exculpatory or otherwise bears on the victim’s credibility. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

AC40163 - State v. Kerlyn T. (Aggravated sexual assault in first degree; "The defendant . . . appeals from the judgments of conviction, rendered following a trial to the court, of aggravated sexual assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-70a (a) (1), home invasion in violation of General Statutes § 53a-100aa (a) (2), risk of injury to a child in violation of General Statutes § 53-21 (a) (1), assault in the second degree with a firearm in violation of General Statutes § 53a-60a (a), unlawful restraint in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-95 (a), and two counts each of threatening in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-61aa (a) (3), and assault in the third degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-61 (a) (1). On appeal, the defendant claims that the court erred (1) in finding that his jury trial waiver was knowing, intelligent and voluntary, and (2) by failing to conduct an adequate inquiry into the underlying facts giving rise to his request to remove his privately retained counsel. Upon review, we conclude that the court did not err when it determined that the defendant's jury trial waiver was knowing, intelligent and voluntary, nor did it err when it denied the defendant's request to remove defense counsel midtrial without a more searching inquiry. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of conviction.")

AC40305 - State v. Porfil (Possession of narcotics; "The defendant . . . appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of possession of narcotics with intent to sell by a person who is not drug-dependent in violation of General Statutes § 21a-278 (b), sale of narcotics within 1500 feet of a school in violation of General Statutes § 21a-278a (b), possession of drug paraphernalia in violation of General Statutes § 21a-267, and possession of narcotics in violation of General Statutes § 21a-279 (a). The defendant claims on appeal that (1) the evidence was insufficient to establish that he was in constructive possession of narcotics, (2) the trial court deprived him of his constitutional right to present a defense by improperly excluding certain photographic evidence and (3) the trial court deprived him of his constitutional right to present a misidentification defense by preventing him from displaying a scar to the jury. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

• Posted in:
• Criminal Law & Procedure,
• Recent Opinions

AC41582 - Dufresne v. Dufresne (Postdissolution appeal of the granting of a motion to modify visitation; testimony of family relations counsel- claim of hearsay; “On appeal, the plaintiff claims that, in granting the motion to modify, the court improperly (1) concluded that it was not in the child’s best interests to continue counseling with her therapist and terminated the relationship, and (2) failed to credit the testimony of a family relations counselor. We reverse the judgment of the trial court.”)

• Concurrence

• Posted in:
• Family Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC41423 - Seward v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act ("The defendant, the Administrator of the Unemployment Compensation Act, appeals from the judgment of the Superior Court reversing the decision of the Employment Security Board of Review (board) denying benefits to the plaintiff, Karim Seward, and remanding the matter to the board for further proceedings. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly (1) found and relied on facts beyond those certified by the board and (2) used those facts to determine that the board had abused its discretion in concluding that the plaintiff had not established good cause to open the decision of the appeals referee. We agree and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the Superior Court.")

• Posted in:
• Administrative Appeal Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC41242 - IP Media Products, LLC v. Success, Inc.("In this appeal, the plaintiff, IP Media Products, LLC, brought a foreclosure action against the defendant, JD's Café I, Inc., seeking to enforce a mortgage and note that were conveyed and signed, respectively, by a purportedly different entity, namely, JD's Café I, LLC. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly concluded that it could not recover against the defendant because (1) the complaint contained no allegations against the defendant; (2) the entity that conveyed the mortgage and signed the note was not the named defendant; and (3) the mortgage and note were executed without the requisite corporate authority. As to the third claim, the plaintiff does not challenge the court's finding of lack of corporate authority, but argues for the first time on appeal that, because it is a holder in due course, this defense does not apply to it. We conclude that because this argument was not preserved, the plaintiff's third claim fails. Moreover, because we affirm the judgment of the trial court on this basis, we need not address the remainder of the plaintiff's claims.")

• Posted in:
• Foreclosure Law,
• Recent Opinions

SC20076 - Haughwout v. Tordenti ("In this appeal, we consider the limits of free speech on a public university campus in light of recent history that has led federal and state courts to describe threats of gun violence and mass shootings as the twenty-first century equivalent to the shout of fire in a crowded theater once envisioned by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. See, e.g., Ponce v. Socorro Independent School District, 508 F.3d 765, 772 (5th Cir. 2007); Milo v. New York, 59 F. Supp. 3d 513, 517 (E.D.N.Y. 2014); In re A.S., 243 Wis. 2d 173, 194, 626 N.W.2d 712 (2001). The plaintiff, Austin Haughwout, brought the present action seeking to challenge his expulsion from Central Connecticut State University (university). The plaintiff now appeals from the judgment of the trial court in favor of the defendants, Laura Tordenti, Ramon Hernandez, Christopher Dukes, and Densil Samuda, the university officials involved in that decision. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial court incorrectly determined that the various statements and gestures with respect to gun violence and mass shootings that led to his expulsion from the university were true threats that are not protected by the first amendment to the United States constitution, rather than hyperbolic and humorous statements on a matter of public concern. Although a public university campus is a unique forum for the free exchange of controversial, unpopular, and even offensive ideas, we nevertheless conclude that the plaintiff's statements and gestures were true threats. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

• Posted in:
• Declaratory Judgment Law,
• Recent Opinions

The 2019 edition of our research guide on Premarital (Antenuptial) and Postnuptial Agreements has been posted to our website.

• Posted in:
• Family Law,
• FYI,
• Legal Research,
• Self-Help

Thursday, July 25th

• Danbury Law Library opens at 10:00 a.m. and closes at 4:00 p.m.
• New Britain Law Library closes at 4:30 p.m.
• Torrington Law Library opens at 9:30 a.m. and closes at 3:00 p.m.

Friday, July 26th

• Danbury Law Library is closed.
• New Britain Law Library closes at 4:30 p.m.

• Posted in:
• Library Notices

SC20134 - State v. Weatherspoon (Sexual assault in cohabiting relationship; assault third degree; "Upon careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of conviction. We conclude that the prosecutor's tailoring comment constituted a specific, rather than a generic, tailoring argument because it was substantiated by express reference to evidence from which the jury reasonably could infer that the defendant had tailored his testimony. We therefore decline the defendant's request to decide whether generic tailoring arguments violate the state constitution. With respect to the alleged improprieties under Singh, for the purposes of our analysis, we assume, without deciding, that Singh was violated, but we nonetheless conclude that the defendant was not deprived of his due process right to a fair trial. We therefore affirm the judgment of conviction.")

• Posted in:
• Criminal Law & Procedure,
• Recent Opinions

The Connecticut Law Journal, Volume LXXXI, No. 4, for July 23, 2019 is now available.

Contained in the issue is the following:

• Table of Contents
• Volume 191 Conn. App. Replacement Pages 185 - 188
• Volume 332: Connecticut Reports (Pages 394 - 510)
• Volume 332: Orders (Pages 912 - 913)
• Volume 332: Cumulative Table of Cases Connecticut Reports
• Volume 191: Connecticut Appellate Reports (Pages 293 - 413)
• Volume 191: Cumulative Table of Cases Connecticut Appellate Reports
• Miscellaneous Notices
• Supreme Court Pending Cases

• Posted in:
• Connecticut Law Journal,
• Recent Opinions

SC20084 - Cimmino v. Marcoccia ("On December 9, 2014, after conducting an en banc hearing on an order to show cause, the defendant in error, the Appellate Court, issued an order suspending the plaintiff in error, Josephine Smalls Miller, "from practice before [the Appellate Court] for a period of six months" and barring her from representing "any client before [the Appellate Court] until she files a motion for reinstatement and that motion has been granted" (2014 order). On October 4, 2017, the Chief Disciplinary Counsel sent a letter to the Chief Clerk of the Supreme and Appellate Courts indicating that Miller had been retained to represent a client in an appeal before the Appellate Court. In response, on February 15, 2018, the Appellate Court issued an additional order, stating that it "hereby clarifies that [the 2014 order] precludes . . . Miller from providing legal services of any kind in connection with any . . . Appellate Court matter until she files a motion for reinstatement and that motion has been granted" (2018 order). Miller then filed the present writ of error, claiming that the 2018 order was an unconstitutional ex post facto law in violation of the United States constitution because it retroactively prohibited her from engaging in certain conduct. In addition, Miller claimed that the 2014 order was the result of the Appellate Court's selective enforcement of the rules of attorney discipline, and argued that both orders were the result of the court's disparate and retaliatory treatment of minority attorneys who pursue racial discrimination claims on behalf of their clients. After oral argument before this court, we, sua sponte, ordered the parties to submit supplemental briefs on the following issue: "Whether the Appellate Court's order of February 15, 2018, clarifying its order of December 9, 2014, violated [Miller's] constitutional right to due process?" We conclude that the 2018 order did not violate the ex post facto clause and that Miller's claims of selective enforcement and discriminatory and retaliatory treatment are not reviewable by this court. We further conclude that the 2018 order did not violate Miller's constitutional due process rights because, as applied, that order did not prohibit her from engaging in conduct that was not also prohibited by the 2014 order. Accordingly, we dismiss the writ of error.")

• Posted in:
• Legal Malpractice & Attorney Discipline Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC40525 - Board of Education v. Bridgeport ("The plaintiffs, the Board of Education of the Town of Stratford, James Feehan, the Board of Education of the Town of Trumbull, and the Board of Education of the Town of Monroe, appeal from the judgment of the trial court granting the motions to dismiss filed by the defendants, the State Board of Education (state board); the Commissioner of Education (commissioner); the Board of Education of the City of Bridgeport (Bridgeport board); the city of Bridgeport (city); Joseph Ganim, the mayor of the city; and Aresta Johnson, the interim superintendent of the city's schools. On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the trial court erred by (1) dismissing counts one, two, three, and four of their complaint against the state defendants for lack of subject matter jurisdiction for failing to exhaust their administrative remedies, and (2) dismissing count six, a civil theft claim against the Bridgeport defendants, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction for failing to exhaust their administrative remedies. For the reasons discussed herein, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

• Posted in:
• Administrative Appeal Law,
• Declaratory Judgment Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC40767 - Bolat v. Bolat ("In this contentious postdissolution case, the self-represented plaintiff, Jean-Pierre Bolat, appeals from various postdissolution judgments rendered by the trial court in favor of the defendant, Yumi S. Bolat. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly (1) granted the defendant's May 9, 2017 motion for contempt, denied his September 19, 2017 motion for contempt, and granted the defendant's August 23, 2017 motion for contempt; and (2) denied his motion to modify his child support obligation. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.")

• Posted in:
• Family Law,
• Recent Opinions

SC19938 - State v. Petion (Assault first degree; claim of evidentiary insufficiency; certification from Appellate Court; physical injury and serious physical injury, distinguished; disfigurement and serious disfigurement, distinguished; "Whether an assault results in physical injury or serious physical injury can have profound ramifications for the victim. Consequently, substantially greater punishment may be imposed for the latter injury than the former. Although this court has acknowledged "the difficulty of drawing a precise line as to where physical injury leaves off and serious physical injury begins" (internal quotation marks omitted); State v. Ovechka, 292 Conn. 533, 546–47, 975 A.2d 1 (2009); see also State v. Almeda, 211 Conn. 441, 451, 560 A.2d 389 (1989); the present case provides an opportunity to illuminate that distinction. In particular, we use this occasion to examine the parameters that should be used by the trier of fact to assess whether a defendant has inflicted serious physical injury in the form of serious disfigurement. See General Statutes § 53a-3 (4).

The defendant, Divenson Petion, appeals from the Appellate Court's judgment affirming his conviction of two counts of assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-59 (a) (1). See State v. Petion, 172 Conn. App. 668, 669–70, 687, 161 A.3d 618 (2017). The defendant claims that the forearm scar sustained by one of the two victims was an insufficient basis for the jury to find the serious physical injury necessary to support that charge. The state disagrees but requests, in the event that we conclude otherwise, that a judgment of acquittal not be rendered on that charge and, instead, that the judgment be modified to reflect a conviction of the lesser included offense of assault in the second degree; see General Statutes § 53a-60 (a) (2); and the case be remanded for resentencing. We conclude that the evidence was insufficient to support the challenged conviction. We further conclude that, under State v. LaFleur, 307 Conn. 115, 51 A.3d 1048 (2012), the state is not entitled to have the defendant's conviction modified. Therefore, we reverse in part the Appellate Court's judgment.")

• SC19938 Dissent - State v. Petion
• SC19938 Concurrence - State v. Petion

AC38035 - State v. Scott (Robbery in first degree; "The defendant, Emmit Scott, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered following a jury trial, of two counts of robbery in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-134 (a) (4). On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) the trial court deprived him of his right to due process under the federal and state constitutions when it denied his motion to suppress an out-of-court and subsequent in-court identification of him, (2) there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction of robbery as against one of the victims, and (3) the court, Clifford, J., abused its discretion by denying the defendant's motion to disqualify Judge Brian Fischer. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

• Posted in:
• Criminal Law & Procedure,
• Recent Opinions

AC41499 - Sack Properties, LLC v. Martel Real Estate, LLC (Quiet title; "In this action involving three lots of commercial property and a drainage easement enjoyed by the plaintiff, Sack Properties, LLC, the owner of two of those lots, over the lot owned by the defendant Martel Real Estate, LLC, the plaintiff challenges the judgment of the trial court, rendered after a court trial, in part in favor of the defendant. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly (1) rejected its quiet title and trespass claims on the ground that it failed to prove that it exclusively owned the pipe through which its drainage easement ran, and (2) found that it failed to prove that the defendant had overburdened its right to use the drainage easement. We disagree, and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

• Posted in:
• Property Law,
• Recent Opinions