SC20360 - State v. Turner (Felony murder; Larceny; Whether appellate court properly upheld defendant's conviction of robbery and felony murder based on legally invalid but factually supported theory for conviction; "This certified appeal requires us to consider whether the defendant's convictions of robbery in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-134 (a) (1) and felony murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54c should be reversed due to the trial court's references to larceny by false pretenses in its instructions to the jury on both offenses. The defendant, Elizabeth K. Turner, appeals from the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming her conviction on sixteen counts, including three counts of robbery in the first degree and two counts of felony murder, for her involvement in the murder of Donna Bouffard and her son, Michael Perkins (Perkins). The defendant contends that the trial court, by referring to larceny by false pretenses in its instructions, improperly presented the jury with a legally invalid but factually supported basis for finding her guilty of both robbery and felony murder. The Appellate Court rejected that claim, concluding that the trial court's instructions, although improper, provided the jury with a legally valid but factually unsupported basis for finding the defendant guilty and, as a result, did not impact her due process right to a fair trial. See State v. Turner, 190 Conn. App. 693, 709–15, 212 A.3d 715 (2019). The Appellate Court further held that the trial court's instructional error was harmless because the jury had a legally valid and factually supported alternative basis for finding the defendant guilty of robbery and felony murder. We affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.")

SC20370 - State v. Jodi D. (Assault of a disabled person; Whether general statutes §§ 1-1f (b) and 53a-60b (a) (1) were not unconstitutionally vague as applied to the defendant; Whether evidence was sufficient for state to prove a beyond a reasonable doubt that victim was "Physically disabled" under those statutes; "The issues before us in this appeal are (1) whether the term "physically disabled," as used in General Statutes § 53a-60b (a) (1) and defined by General Statutes § 1-1f (b), is unconstitutionally vague as applied to the conduct of the defendant, Jodi D., who was convicted of assault on a victim who suffered from fibromyalgia and other physical ailments, (2) if the statutes are not unconstitutionally vague, whether they are unconstitutionally overinclusive, and (3) whether there was insufficient evidence to establish that the victim suffered from a physical disability within the meaning of § 53a-60b (a) (1).

The defendant was charged with assault of a disabled person in the second degree in violation of § 53a-60b (a) (1), assault in the third degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-61 (a) (1) and reckless endangerment in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-64 (a) after an altercation with the victim, the defendant's sister, during which the defendant struck the victim with a wooden billy club. The jury found the defendant guilty of assault of a disabled person in the second degree and reckless endangerment in the second degree and not guilty of assault in the third degree, and the trial court rendered judgment of conviction. Thereafter, the defendant appealed to the Appellate Court, claiming, among other things, that "§ 53a-60b (a) (1) is unconstitutionally vague as applied to her conduct" and that "the evidence did not support a finding that the victim was physically disabled . . . ." (Footnote omitted.) State v. Dojnia, 190 Conn. App. 353, 355–56, 210 A.3d 586 (2019). The Appellate Court rejected these claims and affirmed the judgment of conviction. Id., 386. We then granted the defendant's petition for certification to appeal to this court, limited to the following issues: (1) "Did the Appellate Court correctly conclude that . . . §§ 1-1f (b) and 53a-60b (a) (1) were not unconstitutionally vague as applied to the defendant?" And (2) "[d]id the Appellate Court correctly conclude that the evidence the state presented at trial was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim was `physically disabled' under the governing statutes?" State v. Dojnia, 333 Conn. 914, 215 A.3d 1211 (2019). The defendant also claims on appeal that, even if the statutes are not unconstitutionally vague, § 53a-60b (a) (1) is unconstitutional because there is no rational nexus between the broad scope of the statute and the legislature's narrow purpose in enacting it. Although we reject the defendant's claim that the statutes are unconstitutionally vague, we conclude that they are unconstitutionally overinclusive and lack any rational basis as applied to assaults on persons whose physical disabilities neither diminish their ability to defend themselves from assault nor make them particularly vulnerable to injury. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court and remand the case for a new trial.")

• SC20370 Concurrence & Dissent - State v. Jodi D.

• Posted in:
• Criminal Law & Procedure,
• Recent Opinions

The Connecticut Law Journal, Volume LXXXIII, No. 9, for August 31, 2021 is now available.

Contained in the issue is the following:

• Table of Contents
• Volume 337: Connecticut Reports (Pages 739 - 858)
• Volume 337: Cumulative Table of Cases Connecticut Reports
• Volume 207: Connecticut Appellate Reports (Pages 1 - 210)
• Volume 207: Cumulative Table of Cases Connecticut Appellate Reports
• Miscellaneous Notices

• Posted in:
• Connecticut Law Journal,
• Recent Opinions

SC20479 - State v. Tinsley (Manslaughter; Risk of injury; Double jeopardy; Whether the Appellate Court correctly determined that the defendant's conviction of manslaughter in the first degree and risk of injury to a child violated the double jeopardy clause because those crimes stood in relation of greater and lesser included offenses; "The sole issue in this certified appeal is the extent to which a court should consider the facts alleged by the state in the charging documents when determining whether a crime is a lesser included offense of another, rather than confining its analysis to the elements of the statutes at issue, under Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S. Ct. 180, 76 L. Ed. 306 (1932). The state appeals, upon our grant of its petition for certification, from the judgment of the Appellate Court reversing the judgment of the trial court, which denied the motion to correct an illegal sentence filed by the defendant, Darrell Tinsley, on the basis of its conclusion that the defendant's convictions of manslaughter in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-55 (a) (1) and risk of injury to a child in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 1995) § 53-21, as amended by Public Acts 1995, No. 95-142, § 1, violate the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. See State v. Tinsley, 197 Conn. App. 302, 304, 326, 232 A.3d 86 (2020). On appeal, the state claims that the Appellate Court improperly considered the factual allegations in the information in concluding that risk of injury to a child, as charged therein, was a lesser included offense of manslaughter in the first degree, rendering the defendant's conviction of both offenses a violation of his right to be free from double jeopardy. We conclude that the Appellate Court improperly considered the facts alleged in the state's information, rather than confining its analysis to the statutory elements under the Blockburger test, insofar as risk of injury to a child is not a lesser included offense of manslaughter in the first degree because each offense requires the state to prove an element the other does not. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.")

• Posted in:
• Criminal Law & Procedure,
• Recent Opinions

AC43208 - Stafford v. Commissioner of Correction (“On appeal, the petitioner claims that the court improperly dismissed his petition on the grounds that (1) the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the petitioner failed to state a claim involving the deprivation of a recognized liberty interest, and (2) the petition was rendered moot by a witness’ testimony at the habeas trial. We agree with both jurisdictional claims and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the habeas court and remand with direction to render judgment stating that the petitioner is parole eligible.”)

AC43105 - Finney v. Commissioner of Correction (The petitioner claims that the court improperly dismissed his habeas petition pursuant to Practice Book § 23-29 (2) on the ground that the petition failed to state a claim on which habeas relief could be granted. The respondent, the Commissioner of Correction, both refutes the petitioner’s claim and raises as an alternative ground for affirmance that, even if the petition raises a cognizable claim for habeas relief, the court should have dismissed the petition as untimely filed in accordance with General Statutes § 52-470. We agree with the petitioner that the habeas court improperly dismissed the petition pursuant to Practice Book § 23-29 (2). We also agree that, in resolving the court’s order to show cause why the petition should be permitted to proceed in accordance with § 52-470, the habeas court improperly determined that the petition was filed within the prescribed statutory time limit. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the habeas court and remand the case with direction (1) to deny the court’s own motion to dismiss and (2) to conduct a new hearing to determine, in accordance with § 52-470 (e), whether the petitioner can demonstrate good cause for the delay in filing the petition and, if not, to dismiss the petition on that basis.”)

• Posted in:
• Habeas Corpus Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC42669 - Coleman v. Bembridge (Dissolution of marriage; claim that trial court improperly modified physical custody of parties' minor child prospectively; claim that trial court acted beyond its statutory authority and violated plaintiff's due process rights to extent that it awarded parties joint physical custody of child; "In this dissolution matter, the plaintiff, Carolyn Coleman, appeals from the judgment of dissolution rendered by the trial court insofar as the court entered orders regarding the physical custody of the parties' minor child. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that (1) the court improperly modified the child's physical custody prospectively, (2) to the extent that it awarded the parties joint physical custody, the court (a) acted beyond its statutory authority and (b) violated the plaintiff's due process rights when neither she nor the defendant, Martin Bembridge, requested joint physical custody, and (3) the court abused its discretion in entering physical custody orders that were (a) predicated on inconsistent factual findings, (b) incompatible with the court's legal custody orders, and (c) not in the child's best interests. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

• Posted in:
• Family Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC43101 - State v Glen S. (Violation of probation; "The defendant, Glen S., appeals from the judgment of the trial court revoking his probation after finding that he had violated the conditions of his probation in violation of General Statutes § 53a-32. On appeal, the defendant claims: (1) the court's canvass regarding the waiver of his right to be represented by counsel was constitutionally inadequate under Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S. Ct. 2525, 45 L. Ed. 2d 562 (1975); (2) even if the canvass was constitutional under Faretta, he is entitled to a new trial under State v. Connor, 292 Conn. 483, 973 A.2d 627 (2009), because he exhibited a noticeable impairment during the first day of the violation of probation evidentiary hearing; (3) this court should exercise its supervisory authority to require that trial courts canvass criminal defendants about the waiver of their constitutional rights to testify; (4) this court should review his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal because the ineffectiveness of his trial counsel is clear from the record; and (5) the court's judgment should be reversed because he was deprived of his constitutional right to conflict free representation. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

AC43775 - State v. Dionne (Sexual assault in fourth degree; risk of injury to child; plain error doctrine; "The defendant, Christopher J. Dionne, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of one count of sexual assault in the fourth degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-73a (a) (1) (A) and one count of risk of injury to a child in violation of General Statutes § 53-21 (a) (2). On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court improperly (1) permitted the victim’s mother to testify as a constancy of accusation witness regarding statements made by the victim to her that disclosed the sexual abuse perpetrated by the defendant, and (2) admitted a videotape of the victim’s forensic interview under the constancy of accusation doctrine or pursuant to the medical diagnosis or treatment exception to the rule against hearsay evidence. The defendant concedes that both of these claims are unpreserved and are not of constitutional magnitude. Accordingly, he seeks to prevail under the plain error doctrine. We conclude that the defendant has failed to meet his high burden of demonstrating plain error and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of conviction.")

AC40250 - State v. Stephenson (Burglary in third degree; attempt to commit tampering with physical evidence; attempt to commit arson in second degree; claim that evidence was insufficient to support conviction of charged offenses; "This appeal returns to us on remand from our Supreme Court. In State v. Stephenson, 187 Conn. App. 20, 201 A.3d 427 (2019), rev'd, 337 Conn. 643, ___ A.3d ___ (2020), the defendant, Joseph A. Stephenson, appealed from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of burglary in the third degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-103, attempt to commit tampering with physical evidence in violation of General Statutes § 53a-49 (a) (2) and General Statutes (Rev. to 2013) § 53a-155 (a) (1), and attempt to commit arson in the second degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-49 (a) (2) and 53a-112 (a) (1) (B). The court imposed a total effective sentence of twelve years of incarceration followed by eight years of special parole. On appeal, the defendant claimed that (1) the state presented insufficient evidence to support his conviction of those charges, and (2) the court improperly excluded evidence regarding his mental state prior to the commission of those offenses.

This court concluded that the state had failed to produce sufficient evidence regarding the defendant's intent to commit the crime of tampering with physical evidence, a requirement common to all the charged offenses. Id., 39. Accordingly, we reversed the defendant's conviction and remanded the case with direction to render a judgment of acquittal on all three charges. Id. As a result of this conclusion, we did not address the other claims raised by the defendant in his appeal. See id., 30 n.4, 39.

After granting the state's petition for certification to appeal, our Supreme Court reversed the judgment of this court. State v. Stephenson, supra, 337 Conn. 654. Specifically, it agreed with the state that this court improperly had "addressed an issue of evidentiary sufficiency sua sponte without calling for supplemental briefing as required by Blumberg Associates Worldwide, Inc. v. Brown & Brown of Connecticut, Inc., 311 Conn. 123, 84 A.3d 840 (2014) (Blumberg)." State v. Stephenson, supra, 645–46. As a result of this conclusion, our Supreme Court remanded the case to this court "in order to address the claims raised by the defendant in his initial appeal. If, during that proceeding, the Appellate Court chooses to exercise its discretion to reach the sufficiency issue raised in its previous decision, it must do so in a manner consistent with this court's decision in Blumberg." Id., 654; see also Stephenson v. Commissioner of Correction, 203 Conn. App. 314, 317 n.2, 248 A.3d 34, cert. denied, 336 Conn. 944, 249 A.3d 737 (2021).

In accordance with the directive from our Supreme Court, we ordered the parties to file simultaneous supplemental briefs addressing whether the evidence was sufficient to prove the defendant's intent to tamper with physical evidence. Following the receipt of the parties' supplemental briefs, we heard additional oral argument.

With this recitation of the appellate history of the case in mind, we set forth the issues before us, as presented in the defendant's original and supplemental briefs.

...

The judgment is affirmed.")

AC43966 - State v. Heriberto B. (Risk of injury to child; "The defendant, Heriberto B., appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing his motion to correct an illegal sentence and to vacate his pleas on the ground that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider the motion. On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court (1) improperly dismissed, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the first motion to correct an illegal sentence that he filed, and (2) violated his constitutional right to a jury trial under Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 186 L. Ed. 2d 314 (2013). We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

• Posted in:
• Criminal Law & Procedure,
• Recent Opinions

AC43085 - Belevich v. Renaissance I, LLC ("The plaintiff, Robert Belevich, and the intervening plaintiff, Yale University (Yale) (collectively, plaintiffs), appeal from the summary judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of the defendants, Renaissance I, LLC (Renaissance), B & W Paving & Landscaping, LLC (B & W), and Winstanley Property Management, LLC (Winstanley) (collectively, defendants), on Belevich's one count complaint sounding in premises liability arising out of his alleged slip and fall. On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the court improperly granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the basis of the ongoing storm doctrine because (1) the defendants did not establish the absence of a genuine issue of material fact as to the applicability of the doctrine, and (2) the court improperly, albeit implicitly, shifted the burden to the plaintiffs to negate the applicability of the doctrine, contending that the defendants should have been required to demonstrate that the ongoing storm produced the black ice on which Belevich allegedly fell. We affirm the summary judgment of the trial court.")

• Posted in:
• Recent Opinions,
• Tort Law

Please note: Starting August 4th Bridgeport Law Library is closed until further notice.

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• Posted in:
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AC44496 - In re Karter F. (Termination of parental rights; "The respondent father, Charles W. (respondent), appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and Families (commissioner), terminating his parental rights with respect to his minor child, Karter F., pursuant to General Statutes § 17a-112 (j). On appeal, the respondent claims that in terminating his parental rights, the trial court improperly found that (1) the department made reasonable efforts to reunify him with his child and that he was unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification services, (2) he had failed to rehabilitate, and (3) it was in the best interests of the child to terminate his parental rights. We disagree with the respondent and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

• Posted in:
• Juvenile Law,
• Recent Opinions

The Connecticut Law Journal, Volume LXXXIII, No. 8, for August 24, 2021 is now available.

Contained in the issue is the following:

• Table of Contents
• Volume 337: Connecticut Reports (Pages 627 - 738)
• Volume 337: Cumulative Table of Cases Connecticut Reports
• Volume 206: Connecticut Appellate Reports (Pages 754 - 884)
• Volume 206: Cumulative Table of Cases Connecticut Appellate Reports
• Assignment of Judges
• Miscellaneous Notices

• Posted in:
• Connecticut Law Journal,
• Recent Opinions

Please note: Starting August 4th Bridgeport Law Library is closed until further notice.

Monday, August 23rd

• Middletown Law Library is closed.

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• Hartford Law Library closes at 3:30 p.m.
• Middletown Law Library is closed.

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• Posted in:
• Library Notices

SC20320 - State v. Gibson (Felony murder; Whether trial court improperly admitted prior consistent statement; Whether trial court violated defendant's due process and confrontation clause rights in denying cross-examination regarding witness' pending charges; Whether trial court erred in failing to give Falsus in Uno, Falsus in Omnibus jury instruction; "The defendant, Tijuan Gibson, appeals from the judgment of the trial court convicting him of the crimes of felony murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54c, robbery in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-134 (a) (1), conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-48 and 53a-134 (a) (1), and criminal possession of a firearm in violation of General Statutes § 53a-217. On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) the trial court improperly admitted portions of a written statement from one of the state's witnesses, Shyaira Atkinson, into evidence; and (2) the trial court unduly restricted the cross-examination of another state's witness, Levar Roach, with respect to certain pending criminal charges. For the reasons that follow, we reject these claims and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

• Posted in:
• Criminal Law & Procedure,
• Recent Opinions

SC20338 - North Sails Group, LLC v. Boards & More GMBH ("This appeal requires us to consider whether, consistent with due process, a court of this state may properly exercise personal jurisdiction over the foreign national defendant in this breach of contract action when the resident plaintiff has alleged that its long-term, contractual relationship with the defendant created sufficient minimum contacts with Connecticut. The plaintiff, North Sails Group, LLC, appeals from the judgment of dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction over the defendants, Boards and More GmbH (B&M) and Emeram Capital Partners GmbH (Emeram). The plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly concluded that exercising personal jurisdiction over the defendants would violate their right to due process. Although we recognize that this is a close case, we conclude that the plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the defendants had sufficient minimum contacts with Connecticut, and, thus, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

• SC20338 - Dissent - North Sails Group, LLC v. Boards & More GMBH

• Posted in:
• Business Law,
• Contract Law,
• Recent Opinions

SC20436 - Abel v. Johnson ("In this certified appeal, we consider whether deed language providing that the grantees took title 'subject to' an earlier deed, which established a residential use restriction for the benefit of the original grantor's retained property, rendered that restriction enforceable against those grantees by adjoining property owners whose deeds contain similar 'subject to' language, pursuant to a common plan of development theory. The plaintiffs, Michael Abel and Carol Abel, appeal, upon our grant of their petition for certification, from the judgment of the Appellate Court reversing in part the judgment of the trial court, rendered after a court trial, granting injunctive relief against the defendant, Celeste M. Johnson, enforcing one restrictive covenant limiting the use of the property to residential use, which was contained in a deed that was executed by the original grantors of the parties' real properties, and two other use restrictions that appeared in a separate declaration that applied to the properties. See Abel v. Johnson, 194 Conn. App. 120, 142–43, 156, 220 A.3d 843 (2019). On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that they lacked standing to enforce the residential use restriction. We agree and, accordingly, reverse in part the judgment of the Appellate Court.")

• Posted in:
• Property Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC41793 - State v. Stephanie U. (Operating motor vehicle while under influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs; operating motor vehicle while operator's license was suspended; attempt to commit risk of injury to child; "The defendant, Stephanie U., appeals from the judgment of conviction of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs in violation of General Statutes § 14-227a (a) (1), operating a motor vehicle while her operator's license was under suspension in violation of General Statutes § 14-215 (a), and attempt to commit risk of injury to a child in violation of General Statutes §§ 53-21 (a) (1) and 53a-49 (a) (2). On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) the prosecutor violated her state constitutional rights to confront witnesses against her and to testify on her own behalf by improperly attacking her credibility during cross-examination and in her closing rebuttal argument by suggesting that she had tailored her testimony to conform to the evidence she had overheard during her trial, (2) the prosecutor denied her due process of law under both the federal and state constitutions when, during cross-examination, the prosecutor asked the defendant whether she had an interest in the outcome of the trial, and when, during rebuttal argument, the prosecutor told the jury that it could consider the defendant's vested interest in the outcome of the trial, (3) prosecutorial impropriety deprived her of a fair trial when the prosecutor argued that she had tailored her testimony and that she had a motive to lie, (4) this court, in the alternative, should order a new trial after we employ our supervisory authority to prohibit questions and arguments that amount to generic tailoring and/or telling or implying to the jury that it can or should discredit the defendant's trial testimony because she has an "interest in the outcome" of her trial, and (5) her conviction of attempt to commit risk of injury to a child should be vacated because it is not a cognizable crime. We reject the defendant's claims, although we agree with her request to exercise our supervisory authority over the administration of justice on the issue of generic tailoring. Nevertheless, because we conclude that the prospective rules we articulate regarding generic tailoring would not have changed the outcome of the defendant's trial, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

AC43117 - State v. Gamble (Motion to correct illegal sentence; manslaughter in first degree with firearm; "For a trial court to have jurisdiction over a defendant's motion to correct an alleged illegal sentence, the defendant must raise "a colorable claim within the scope of Practice Book § 43-22 that would, if the merits of the claim were reached and decided in the defendant's favor, require correction of a sentence. . . . In the absence of a colorable claim requiring correction, the trial court has no jurisdiction to modify the sentence." (Footnote added; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Evans, 329 Conn. 770, 783, 189 A.3d 1184 (2018), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 139 S. Ct. 1304, 203 L. Ed. 2d 425 (2019). "A colorable claim is one that is superficially well founded but that may ultimately be deemed invalid. . . . For a claim to be colorable, the defendant need not convince the trial court that he necessarily will prevail, he must demonstrate simply that he might prevail. . . . The jurisdictional and merits inquiries are separate, whether the defendant ultimately succeeds on the merits of his claim does not affect the trial court's jurisdiction to hear it." (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 784.

In the present case, the self-represented defendant, Hudel Clifton Gamble, appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing his motion to correct an alleged illegal sentence (motion to correct) for lack of jurisdiction. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly dismissed the motion to correct because it advanced a colorable claim that his sentence on the underlying conviction of manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm was illegally enhanced on the basis of a fact not found by the jury. The state counters that the court properly dismissed the defendant's motion to correct because it challenges his underlying conviction, not the legality of his sentence. We agree with the state and, therefore, affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

• Posted in:
• Criminal Law & Procedure,
• Recent Opinions

AC43881 - Gutierrez v. Mosor ("The defendant, Daniel Mosor, appeals from the judgment of the trial court, rendered in favor of the plaintiff, Julio Gutierrez, after the defendant was defaulted for failing to appear at a deposition prior to a trial to a jury on the issue of damages. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court abused its discretion by (1) defaulting him for a single failure to attend the deposition, (2) refusing to set aside the default, and (3) sustaining the plaintiff's objection to the defendant's motion for permission to file a notice as to the hearing in damages, which precluded him from offering any evidence contesting liability at the trial before the jury. We agree with the defendant's first claim and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the trial court.")

• Posted in:
• Recent Opinions,
• Tort Law

AC43141 - Kenmore Road Assn., v. Bloomfield ("In this declaratory judgment action, the plaintiff, Kenmore Road Association, Inc., appeals from the judgment of the trial court, rendered after a court trial, in favor of the defendant, the town of Bloomfield. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial court erred in concluding that Kenmore Road had neither been impliedly dedicated to public use nor impliedly accepted as a public road by the defendant or the public. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

• Posted in:
• Declaratory Judgment Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC43653 - Rockstone Capital, LLC v. Caldwell ("In this strict foreclosure action, we consider the enforceability of a settlement and forbearance agreement (settlement agreement) entered into by the plaintiff, Rockstone Capital, LLC, the defendants, Vicki A. Ditri and Morgan J. Caldwell, Jr., and Caldwell's business, Wesconn Automotive Center, LLC (Wesconn), that resulted from a collections action brought by the plaintiff against Caldwell and Wesconn. The plaintiff appeals from the judgment of the trial court, rendered after a court trial, in favor of the defendant, on her special defense that the settlement agreement was unconscionable and, therefore, unenforceable. On appeal, the plaintiff contends that the trial court improperly concluded that the settlement agreement was both procedurally and substantively unconscionable as to the defendant. We agree and, accordingly, reverse in part the judgment of the trial court.")

• Posted in:
• Declaratory Judgment Law,
• Foreclosure Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC43755 - Lift-Up, Inc. v. Colony Ins. Co. ("In this declaratory judgment action, the substitute plaintiffs, Dennis Kinman (Kinman) and Amy Kinman (jointly, Kinmans), appeal from the summary judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of the defendant Colony Insurance Company (Colony) on the Kinmans' amended complaint and Colony's counterclaim.The litigation centers on whether Colony had a duty to defend the original plaintiffs, Lift-Up, Inc. (Lift-Up) and its president, Bruce Kutner, in a personal injury action that the Kinmans had brought against them. On appeal, the Kinmans' principal claim is that in granting Colony's motion for summary judgment, the court improperly construed the allegations of the operative complaint and the terms of the garage liability policy that Colony had issued to Lift-Up.More to the point, the Kinmans claim that the court improperly concluded as a matter of law that their injuries were not caused by an accident that resulted from Lift-Up's garage operations but, rather, arose out of Kutner's assault, battery, or assault and battery, for which the policy provides no coverage. The Kinmans also claim that the court improperly (1) ignored extrinsic evidence that they argue supported their claim that Colony had a duty to defend and (2) predicated its ruling on allegations of intentional and/or reckless conduct that were properly pleaded in the alternative. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

• Posted in:
• Declaratory Judgment Law,
• Insurance Law,
• Recent Opinions

Friday, August 20th

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• Posted in:
• Library Notices