The mission of the Connecticut Judicial Branch is to serve the interests of justice and the public by resolving matters brought before it in a fair, timely, efficient and open manner.
Freedom of Information Law

Freedom of Information Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Dowd, Jeffrey

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5892

AC46003, AC46064 - Town of Greenwich v. Freedom of Information Commission ("On appeal, the defendants claim that the court improperly substituted its judgment for that of the commission by concluding that the requested records are preliminary drafts that are exempt from disclosure under § 1-210 (b) (1). We agree with the defendants. We also are not persuaded by the plaintiffs’ proffered alternative ground for affirmance, namely, that the requested records are exempt from disclosure under § 1-210 (b) (20).")


Administrative Appeal Appellate Court Opinion

   by Dowd, Jeffrey

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5788

AC45885 - Avon v. Sastre (Administrative appeal; "The plaintiffs, the town of Avon (town) and the town manager, Brandon Robertson, appeal from the judgment of the Superior Court dismissing their administrative appeal from the final decision of the defendant Freedom of Information Commission (commission) regarding a complaint filed by the defendant Joseph Sastre. In its final decision, the commission found that the plaintiffs had violated the Freedom of Information Act (act), General Statutes § 1-200 et seq., when they denied Sastre's request for a document (log) related to the resignation in 2019 of the town's police chief, Mark Rinaldo (Chief Rinaldo), and ordered that the town disclose the log pursuant to the act. On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the court improperly dismissed their appeal from the commission's decision ordering disclosure of the log because (1) the log is not a public record under § 1-200 (5) and, thus, is not subject to disclosure under the act, and (2) even if the log is a public record, it is exempt from disclosure under General Statutes § 1-210 (b) (10) pursuant to the attorney-client privilege. We disagree with the plaintiffs and affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.")


Freedom of Information Law Supreme Court Opinion

   by Dowd, Jeffrey

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5782

SC20656 - Drumm v. Freedom of Information Commission (Exception from law enforcement records; "Because § 1-210 (b) seeks to strike a balance between competing public goods, fostering openness and transparency while protecting important governmental functions that demand a degree of confidentiality, it makes sense that the legislature would have carved out an exception only for law enforcement actions that are, at the very least, reasonable possibilities. ...Although the commission found this evidence to be insufficient to satisfy the respondents’ burden, we find it significant that the commission’s final decision was predicated, as we explain hereinafter, on the clearly erroneous factual finding that the police department had not identified a suspect and, potentially, on the application of a standard that required the respondents to demonstrate either an actual or pending law enforcement action. Because application of the reasonable possibility standard that we adopted in this opinion is fact intensive, we conclude that the case must be remanded to the commission for further proceedings.")


Freedom of Information Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Dowd, Jeffrey

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5636

AC452587 - City of Bridgeport v. Freedom of Information Commission ("The plaintiffs disagree with the commission’s claims and contend that the judgment may be affirmed on the alternative grounds that the commission (1) violated § 1-206 (b) (2) by failing to seek leave of the commission before scheduling a hearing on Daley’s complaint, (2) should have dismissed the appeal pursuant to § 1-206 (b) (4), (3) improperly decided issues not raised in Daley’s complaint, and (4) improperly concluded that the plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of establishing that certain information in the records was exempt from disclosure pursuant to General Statutes § 1-210. We agree with the commission’s first and third claims and reject the plaintiffs’ alternative grounds for affirming the judgment. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Superior Court.")


Freedom of Information Law Supreme Court Opinion

   by Zigadto, Janet

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5593

SC20686 - Commissioner of Mental Health & Addiction Services v. Freedom of Information Commission ("This appeal presents the issue whether a police report created by the police department at the Whiting Forensic Division of Connecticut Valley Hospital (Whiting) is subject to disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), General Statutes § 1-200 et seq. The police report at issue documented the police department's investigation into the death of a patient at Whiting after a medical event. The named defendant, the Freedom of Information Commission (commission), appeals from the judgment of the trial court, which ordered the disclosure of a redacted version of the police report under FOIA, claiming that the report should be released in its entirety because it is not exempt from disclosure by (1) the psychiatrist-patient communications privilege codified at General Statutes §§ 52-146d (2) and 52-146e (a), or (2) the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), 42 U.S.C. § 1320d et seq., as implemented by the Privacy Rule, 45 C.F.R. § 160.101 et seq. The plaintiffs, the Commissioner of Mental Health and Addiction Services and the Department of Mental Health and Addiction Services (DMHAS), disagree and cross appeal, claiming that the police report should not be released at all, even in redacted form, because it is protected by the psychiatrist-patient communications privilege and HIPAA.

We conclude that the police report is not a communication or record, as those terms are used in § 52-146e (a), and, therefore, is not exempt from disclosure under FOIA. Nonetheless, the police report includes information that would identify a patient at Whiting, even though such information specifically was excluded from the FOIA request, and the report therefore should be redacted in the manner described in part III A 2 of this opinion. Because the police report, with minimal redaction, must be disclosed pursuant to FOIA, we further conclude that it is not protected from disclosure by HIPAA and its implementing Privacy Rule. Accordingly, we reverse in part the judgment of the trial court.")


Freedom of Information Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Booth, George

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5489

AC44972 - AC44972 - Lowthert v. Freedom of Information Commission (Administrative appeal; alleged violation of open meeting requirements of provision (§ 1-225 (a)) of Freedom of Information Act (§ 1-200 et seq.) by defendant Freedom of Information Commission and/or its staff; "The self-represented plaintiff, Marissa Lowthert, appeals from the judgment of the Superior Court denying her application, pursuant to General Statutes § 1-206 (b) (2), for an order requiring the defendant, the Freedom of Information Commission (commission), to hold a hearing on a complaint she filed with the commission. On appeal, she claims that the court erred in denying her application because the commission and its executive director had a conflict of interest in violation of General Statutes § 1-85 when they decided not to schedule a hearing on her complaint. We affirm the judgment of the court.")


Freedom of Information Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Booth, George

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5396

AC45024 - Braasch v. Freedom of Information Commission (Administrative appeal; alleged violation of Freedom of Information Act (§ 1-200 et seq.); "The plaintiff, Sarah Braasch, appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing her administrative appeal from the final decision of the Freedom of Information Commission (commission), one of three defendants in this action. The commission concluded that the other two defendants in this action, the Yale University Police Department (department) and the Assistant Chief of the Yale University Police Department (assistant chief), properly denied the plaintiff's request for a copy of certain body camera recordings that were in their custody. On appeal to this court, the plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly (1) concluded that the recordings were exempt from disclosure under General Statutes § 1-210 (b) (3) (H), and (2) granted the motion of the department and the assistant chief to seal the body camera recordings. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")


Tort Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Agati, Taryn

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5232

AC44491 - Parnoff v. Stratford ("The plaintiff, Laurence V. Parnoff, appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered following the granting of motions to strike filed by the defendants, the town of Stratford (town), Melinda Fonda, Berchem Moses PC (Berchem Moses), and Laura Hoydick. On appeal, the plaintiff argues that (1) his claims under the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), General Statutes § 42-110a et seq., and his negligent infliction of emotional distress claims, all stemming from a public records request he made pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (act), General Statutes § 1-200 et seq., were improperly stricken because he pleaded allegations sufficient to support those claims, and (2) the court improperly granted the motions to strike with prejudice. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")


Administrative Appeal Appellate Court Opinions

   by Booth, George

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5169

AC44284 - Clerk of the Common Council v. Freedom of Information Commission (Administrative appeals; alleged violations of Freedom of Information Act (§ 1-200 et seq.); "These consolidated appeals arise out of an investigation by the city of Middletown (city) into alleged improprieties by the former mayor and the city's subsequent refusal to provide unredacted records related to that investigation on the ground that the records were not subject to disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act (act), General Statutes § 1-200 et seq. The defendant Freedom of Information Commission (commission) appeals from the judgments of the Superior Court in Docket No. AC 44284, sustaining the appeal of the plaintiff, the Clerk of the Common Council for the city (clerk of the common council), and in Docket No. AC 44295, sustaining the appeal of the plaintiffs Sebastian Giuliano and Mary Bartolotta from the commission's decisions ordering disclosure of unredacted billing and email records, respectively, after rejecting the city's claims that the information at issue was either protected personnel or similar files or subject to the attorney-client privilege. In AC 44284, the commission claims that the court erred in (1) concluding that the attorney billing records were personnel or similar files pursuant to General Statutes § 1-210 (b) (2); (2) making a factual finding that the disclosure of the redacted information would constitute an invasion of personal privacy and was thus prohibited under § 1-210 (b) (2); and (3) concluding that certain information in attorney billing records was exempt from disclosure as privileged attorney-client communications pursuant to § 1-210 (b) (10). In AC 44295, the commission claims that the court erred in concluding that certain email communications also were privileged attorney-client communications protected under § 1-210 (b) (10). We agree with the commission except with respect to the issue of whether the invoices constitute personnel or similar files. Therefore, in AC 44284, we affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the court. In AC 44295, we reverse the judgment of the court.")

AC44295 - Giuliano v. Freedom of Information Commission (Administrative appeals; alleged violations of Freedom of Information Act (§ 1-200 et seq.); "These consolidated appeals arise out of an investigation by the city of Middletown (city) into alleged improprieties by the former mayor and the city's subsequent refusal to provide unredacted records related to that investigation on the ground that the records were not subject to disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act (act), General Statutes § 1-200 et seq. The defendant Freedom of Information Commission (commission) appeals from the judgments of the Superior Court in Docket No. AC 44284, sustaining the appeal of the plaintiff, the Clerk of the Common Council for the city (clerk of the common council), and in Docket No. AC 44295, sustaining the appeal of the plaintiffs Sebastian Giuliano and Mary Bartolotta from the commission's decisions ordering disclosure of unredacted billing and email records, respectively, after rejecting the city's claims that the information at issue was either protected personnel or similar files or subject to the attorney-client privilege. In AC 44284, the commission claims that the court erred in (1) concluding that the attorney billing records were personnel or similar files pursuant to General Statutes § 1-210 (b) (2); (2) making a factual finding that the disclosure of the redacted information would constitute an invasion of personal privacy and was thus prohibited under § 1-210 (b) (2); and (3) concluding that certain information in attorney billing records was exempt from disclosure as privileged attorney-client communications pursuant to § 1-210 (b) (10). In AC 44295, the commission claims that the court erred in concluding that certain email communications also were privileged attorney-client communications protected under § 1-210 (b) (10). We agree with the commission except with respect to the issue of whether the invoices constitute personnel or similar files. Therefore, in AC 44284, we affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the court. In AC 44295, we reverse the judgment of the court.")


Administrative Appeal Appellate Court Opinions

   by Booth, George

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=4808

AC44255 - Avon v. Freedom of Information Commission (Administrative appeal; subject matter jurisdiction; "The self-represented defendant, Joao Godoy, appeals from the judgment of the trial court, which he claims sustained in part the administrative appeal filed by the plaintiffs, the town of Avon (town), the Avon Police Department (department), and the Avon Police Chief, from the final decision of the defendant Freedom of Information Commission (commission). The commission found that the plaintiffs violated the Freedom of Information Act (act), General Statutes § 1-200 et seq., by requiring Godoy to sign an acknowledgment form before releasing copies of the public records he had requested and ordered that the plaintiffs shall not require the signing of such a form as a condition precedent to the inspection or receipt of copies of public records. The court affirmed the commission's decision as to the provision of copies but reversed the commission's order "to the extent that" it applied to the inspection of original public records. We conclude that, because the only public records sought by Godoy in the present case were copies, the court's statements regarding original public records are merely dicta, and, consequently, Godoy is not aggrieved by the judgment. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.")

AC43314 - Kiyak v. Dept. of Agriculture (Appeal of animal control officer's disposal orders pursuant to statute (§ 22-358); claim that § 22-358 (c) was unconstitutionally vague as applied because it permitted animal control officers to issue disposal orders as they deem necessary, thereby authorizing arbitrary enforcement; "The plaintiff, Michael Kiyak, appeals from the judgment of the Superior Court dismissing his administrative appeal from the final decision of the defendant Department of Agriculture (department) to uphold two disposal orders issued by an animal control officer for the defendant town of Fairfield (town) to euthanize the plaintiff's German shepherd dog pursuant to General Statutes § 22-358. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court erred in dismissing his appeal because (1) § 22-358 (c) is unconstitutionally vague as applied in that the word "necessary," concerning the issuance of a disposal order, authorizes arbitrary enforcement of the statute, (2) the department's hearing officer violated the plaintiff's right to procedural due process by using inadequate procedures in upholding the disposal orders, and (3) the hearing officer erred in designating Animal Control Officer Paul Miller as an expert. We affirm the judgment of the Superior Court dismissing the plaintiff's appeal.")


Freedom of Information Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Booth, George

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=4466

AC42992 - Allco Renewable Energy Ltd. v. Freedom of Information Commission (Administrative appeal; alleged violation of Freedom of Information Act (§ 1-200 et seq.); "The plaintiffs, Allco Renewable Energy Limited (Allco) and its principal Thomas Melone, appeal from the judgment of the Superior Court dismissing their appeal from the final decision of the defendant Freedom of Information Commission (commission), in which the court concluded that the commission properly dismissed the plaintiffs' request for certain documents of the codefendant Department of Energy and Environmental Protection (department). On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the court improperly concluded that the commission correctly applied General Statutes § 1-210 (b) (5) (A) and (B) of the Freedom of Information Act (act), General Statutes § 1-200 et seq. We affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.")


Freedom of Information Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Booth, George

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=4378

AC42496 - Lindquist v. Freedom of Information Commission (Administrative appeal; Freedom of Information Act (§ 1-200 et seq.); whether trial court properly concluded that Freedom of Information Commission did not abuse its discretion in finding that redacted records were exempt from disclosure under statute (§ 1-210 (b) (1)); "The self-represented plaintiff, Richard Lindquist, at all relevant times, a tenured professor at the defendant University of Connecticut Health Center (health center), appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing his appeal from the final decision of the defendant Freedom of Information Commission (commission), in which the trial court concluded that the commission correctly dismissed the plaintiff's request for certain documents of the health center relating to his annual performance review. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that (1) the trial court failed to consider whether the commission failed to apply various provisions of the Freedom of Information Act (act), General Statutes § 1-200 et seq., including General Statutes §§ 1-200 (6), 1-210 (b) (2), 1-213 and 1-225, and General Statutes (Rev. to 2015) § 1-214, and chapters 563 and 563a of the General Statutes, (2) the trial court improperly concluded that the commission properly applied § 1-210 (b) (1) and (e) (1) of the act to the records at issue, (3) the trial court improperly rejected the due process claim raised by the plaintiff, and (4) the commission failed to comply with General Statutes §§ 1-210 (b) (2) and 10a-154a. We agree, in part, with the plaintiff's second claim, as it relates to § 1-210 (e) (1), that he is entitled to judgment in his favor requiring the disclosure of the final individual comments and ratings by the committee members that were delivered to the dean of the University of Connecticut School of Medicine (dean), and, accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case to that court with direction to render judgment for the plaintiff. In light of our resolution on the basis of the plaintiff's second claim, we need not reach the plaintiff's other claims.")


Freedom of Information Law Supreme Court Slip Opinion

   by Booth, George

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=4360

SC20378 - Meriden v. Freedom of Information Commission (Freedom of Information; Whether Appellate Court Properly Held that a Gathering of Less than a Quorum of Meriden City Council Members did not Constitute a "Meeting" Subject to FOIA's Open Meeting Requirements; "Although all meetings of individuals may be gatherings, the general question before us is whether all gatherings of individuals are necessarily meetings. More specifically, this certified appeal requires us to construe the meaning of the term "meeting" as it is defined in the Freedom of Information Act (act), General Statutes § 1-200 et seq. Even more precisely, the narrow issue we must decide is whether a gathering of individuals comprising less than a quorum of the members of a city council, together with the mayor and the city manager, constitutes a "hearing or other proceeding of a public agency"; General Statutes § 1-200 (2); and, therefore, a "meeting" within the meaning of the act. If that gathering was a meeting, it was subject to the open meeting requirements of the act. See General Statutes § 1-225 (a).

The defendant Freedom of Information Commission appeals from the judgment of the Appellate Court, which reversed the judgment of the trial court and concluded that the plaintiffs, the city of Meriden and the Meriden City Council, did not violate the open meeting requirements of the act. Meriden v. Freedom of Information Commission, 191 Conn. App. 648, 650, 663, 665, 216 A.3d 847 (2019). On appeal, the commission claims that the Appellate Court incorrectly determined that a "hearing or other proceeding" refers to a process of adjudication, which fell outside the scope of the activities conducted during the gathering at issue in this case. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 659.

...

Applying these principles to the facts of this case, we conclude that the gathering of the leadership group with the mayor and the retiring city manager was not a "hearing or other proceeding" of a public agency under § 1-200 (2). The mayor and the retiring city manager had no authority to create the city manager search committee. There is no evidence in the record that the leadership group was formed pursuant to any official resolution of the city council, and it had no independent, express authority to take any action regarding the formation of the search committee that could legally bind the city council. There is no statute, ordinance, bylaw, or other legal source of power granting the leadership group any authority to act, either as a group or on behalf of the city council. Indeed, that is why the leadership group submitted the resolution to the full city council for its consideration and a vote. See Meriden City Charter § C5-1 ("[t]he [c]ity [m]anager . . . shall be appointed . . . by the [c]ity [c]ouncil"). The commission acknowledges in its brief that it was the city council "as a whole" that had responsibility for hiring a new city manager. Accordingly, because the gathering of the leadership group with the mayor and the retiring city manager did not constitute a "hearing or other proceeding of a public agency," and, therefore, a "meeting," the gathering was not subject to the act's open meeting requirements.

The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.")


Property Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Booth, George

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=4067

AC42683 - Godbout v. Attanasio (Official misconduct pursuant to statute (§ 12-170); motor vehicle tax assessment; "In this statutory civil action brought pursuant to General Statutes § 12-170, the plaintiff, David Godbout, appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing the action against the defendants, all of whom are individual members of the East Lyme Board of Assessment Appeals (board). In his action, the plaintiff sought to recover monetary relief pursuant to § 12-170 on the basis of alleged misconduct by the defendants related to his motor vehicle tax assessment appeal. The plaintiff claims that the court improperly concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits of his action because he (1) failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with the Freedom of Information Commission (FOIC) before filing his action in Superior Court and (2) failed to allege sufficient facts in his complaint demonstrating that each of the defendants had engaged in some unlawful act, or had failed to perform a necessary act, related to the tax assessment appeal. Although we agree with the plaintiff with respect to his first claim, we disagree with the second. We also conclude that the form of the judgment is incorrect in that, rather than granting the motion to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds, the court should have rendered judgment in favor of the defendants.")


Freedom of Information Appellate Court Opinion

   by Booth, George

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=3481

AC41297 - Aronow v. Freedom of Information Commission (Administrative appeal; request for documents pursuant to Freedom of Information Act (§ 1-200 et seq.); "The self-represented plaintiff, Michael Aronow, appeals from the dismissal by the trial court of his appeal from the final decision of the defendant Freedom of Information Commission (commission). Although, after a hearing, the commission concluded that the University of Connecticut Health Center (health center) had violated the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), General Statutes § 1-200 et seq., in regard to document requests made by the plaintiff, the plaintiff appealed to the trial court from the orders and subordinate findings made by the commission. On appeal from the judgment of the court dismissing his appeal from the commission, the plaintiff claims that the court erred in (1) concluding that he was not aggrieved by the commission's decision to decline to impose a civil penalty against the health center for the FOIA violation, (2) dismissing his claim that the commission improperly dismissed a previous FOIA complaint filed by the plaintiff regarding an earlier document request made to the health center, (3) concluding that there was substantial evidence in the record to support the commission's finding that the plaintiff had narrowed the scope of his FOIA request, and (4) concluding that the commission did not abuse its discretion by affording the health center nine months to comply with its document production order.

We agree with the court's conclusions regarding the plaintiff's first and second claims, and, accordingly, affirm the judgment as to those claims. We conclude, however, that the trial court erred in concluding that there was substantial evidence to support the commission's finding that the plaintiff had narrowed the scope of his original FOIA request in regard to paragraph eleven of the commission's final decision. Accordingly, the judgment is reversed in part, and the case is remanded to the trial court with direction to remand to the commission with direction to order that the health center comply expeditiously with the plaintiff's original request, as narrowed only by paragraph ten of the commission's final decision.")


Freedom of Information Law Supreme Court Opinion

   by Booth, George

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=3232

SC19852, SC19853 - Commissioner of Emergency Services & Public Protection v. Freedom of Information Commission (Freedom of information; administrative appeal; "The central issue in this appeal is whether the search and seizure statutes, General Statutes §§ 54-33a through 54-36p, provide a basis for an exemption from the disclosure requirements of the Freedom of Information Act (act), General Statutes § 1-200 et seq. Specifically, we must decide whether the trial court improperly concluded that the search and seizure statutes satisfy the requirements set forth in General Statutes § 1-210 (a), which exempts documents from disclosure under the act that are 'otherwise provided by any federal law or state statute . . . .' (Emphasis added.) We conclude that the search and seizure statutes do not meet the requirements set forth in § 1-210 (a) and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the trial court.")


Judicial Branch Now Publishing Headnotes for its Supreme & Appellate Court Opinions

   by Booth, George

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=534

The Judicial Branch has announced that it is now publishing a syllabus (headnote) at the top of each Supreme and Appellate Court opinion:

The Judicial Branch is now posting online headnotes for both Supreme and Appellate Court opinions. These headnotes, which accompany individual Supreme and Appellate Court decisions, include a short summary of the ruling and the procedural history of a case. The Reporter of Judicial Decisions prepares the headnotes, which are not part of the opinion. As such, the opinion alone should be relied upon for the reasoning behind the decision [Emphasis added].

Subscribe to a case law category (or categories) of your choice through our Email Digest or RSS delivery services to receive the latest cases from the Supreme or Appellate Courts delivered directly to your inbox.


Freedom of Information Law Supreme Court Opinion

   by Booth, George

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=93

SC19586 - Harrington v. Freedom of Information Commission (Freedom of information; "Clients call upon attorneys to provide advice on a range of matters, some that may be purely legal, some that may be purely nonlegal, and others where the line between legal and nonlegal advice is more nuanced. This case provides an opportunity to address the circumstances under which communications relating to both nonlegal and legal advice may be covered by the attorney-client privilege.

The plaintiff, Michael C. Harrington, appeals from the trial court's judgment dismissing his appeal from the decision of the Freedom of Information Commission, which concluded that e-mails that the plaintiff sought from the defendant Connecticut Resources Recovery Authority fall within the exemption from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act (act) for communications subject to the attorney-client privilege. See General Statutes § 1-210 (b) (10). We conclude that the commission failed to apply the proper standard for assessing the communications at issue, which include communications that the commission characterized as containing a mix of business and legal advice. Therefore, the case must be remanded to the commission for further proceedings.")


Freedom of Information Supreme and Appellate Court Opinions

   by Mazur, Catherine

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=184

July 2009 - June 2016 (reverse chronological order)

SC19593, SC19594 - People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Freedom of Information Commission ("In these appeals, we must determine the standard of review that applies to a determination that public records are exempt from the disclosure provisions of the Freedom of Information Act (act), General Statutes § 1-200 et seq., pursuant to General Statutes § 1-210 (b) (19), because there are reasonable grounds to believe that their disclosure may result in a safety risk. The plaintiff, People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc., submitted a freedom of information request to the defendant University of Connecticut Health Center (Health Center), requesting copies of all correspondence between the Health Center and the National Institutes of Health regarding potential noncompliance with federal animal welfare guidelines. The Health Center produced the requested documents but redacted the names of the individuals who had violated federal protocols and grant identification numbers that would make it possible to identify those individuals. The plaintiff then filed a complaint against the Health Center with the named defendant, the Freedom of Information Commission (commission). While the complaint was pending, the Health Center requested a safety risk determination from the defendant Commissioner of the Department of Administrative Services (department) pursuant to § 1-210 (b) (19) and (d). The department determined that there were 'reasonable grounds to believe that [the] disclosure of this [redacted] material may result in a safety risk to persons or property' and directed the Health Center to withhold the redacted information. The commission upheld this determination. The plaintiff appealed from the commission's decision to the trial court, which sustained the appeal and ordered the Health Center to disclose the redacted information. The Health Center and the department then brought separate appeals, claiming that the trial court incorrectly determined that the commission had applied the wrong standard of review when it sustained the plaintiff's appeal. We agree with the Health Center and the department that the commission applied the proper standard of review. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court. We further conclude that the case should be remanded to that court so that it may decide whether the commission, upon application of the proper standard of review, properly upheld the determination of the department. ")

AC36821 - Burton v. Freedom of Information Commission ("The sole issue in this appeal is whether the plaintiff...had standing to appeal from a decision of the Freedom of Information Commission (commission) declining to impose a civil penalty against the defendant.... We conclude that the plaintiff lacked standing and affirm the trial court's judgment dismissing the appeal.")

SC19452 - Lieberman v. Aronow ("The primary issue in this appeal is whether two reports (reports) relating to the resolution of a formal grievance alleging misconduct against a state university faculty member fall within the exemption from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act (act), General Statutes § 1-200 et seq., created by General Statutes § 10a-154a. The plaintiff, Jay R. Lieberman, the chairman of the orthopedic surgery department at the defendant University of Connecticut Health Center (health center), appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing his appeal from the final decision of the defendant Freedom of Information Commission (commission). The commission concluded that the reports do not constitute a 'record of the performance and evaluation' within the meaning of § 10a-154a and that, therefore, the health center was required to disclose the reports pursuant to a request by the defendant Michael Aronow, an orthopedic surgeon at the health center.


On appeal, Lieberman claims, inter alia, that the trial court improperly interpreted the language and legislative history of § 10a-154a. Aronow and the commission contend that the trial court properly concluded that the reports do not constitute a 'record of the performance and evaluation' of a faculty member under § 10a-154a. We agree with Aronow and the commission and conclude that the reports at issue in this appeal do not fall within the exemption from disclosure contained in § 10a-154a. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court dismissing Lieberman's appeal from the commission's decision.")

SC19371 - Freedom of Information Officer, Dept. of Mental Health & Addiction Services v. Freedom of Information Commission ("The present case arises from the ruling of the named defendant...that the defendant Ron Robillard was entitled to the disclosure of documents in the possession of the plaintiffs, the Department of Mental Health and Addiction Services (department) and its Freedom of Information Officer (information officer), under the Freedom of Information Act (act), General Statutes § 1-200 et seq. The commission appeals from the judgment of the trial court, claiming, inter alia, that the plaintiffs lacked standing to appeal to the trial court from the commission's decision. The plaintiffs cross appealed from the judgment of the trial court, claiming, inter alia, that the trial court improperly rejected the plaintiffs' claim that the documents were medical records related to the diagnosis and treatment of a patient and were, thus, psychiatric records exempt from disclosure pursuant to General Statutes § 52-146e. We conclude that the plaintiffs had standing to appeal the decision of the commission, and further agree with the plaintiffs that the documents at issue are exempt from disclosure under § 52-146e. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case to that court with direction to sustain the plaintiffs' appeal.")

  • SC19371 Concurrence - Freedom of Information Officer, Dept. of Mental Health & Addiction Services v. Freedom of Information Commission

AC36436 - Peruta v. Freedom of Information Commission (Administrative appeal; appeal from decision of defendant Freedom of Information Commission dismissing complaint; "The plaintiffs, Edward A. Peruta and American News and Information Services, Inc., appeal from the judgment of the trial court affirming the decision of the defendant Freedom of Information Commission (commission) that dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint. The plaintiffs had filed a complaint with the commission claiming that the Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection (department) improperly denied them access to information contained in pending applications for temporary state permits to carry pistols or revolvers. On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the court erroneously construed General Statutes § 29-28 when it concluded that the names and addresses of those applicants were exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act (act), General Statutes § 1-200 et seq. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

AC36114 - Emerick v. Freedom of Information Commission ("The plaintiff...appeals
from the judgment of the trial court dismissing his administrative appeal from the decision of the defendant Freedom of Information Commission (commission). The plaintiff had filed a complaint with the commission claiming that the defendant Department of Public Health (department) improperly had denied him access to certain public records. We conclude that the court properly determined that the plaintiff’s appeal of the commission’s decision was untimely and, accordingly, properly dismissed the appeal. ")

SC19263, SC19264 Planning & Zoning Commission v. Freedom of Information Commission ("Connecticut’s Freedom of Information Act (act) allows public agencies to convene executive sessions, as an exception to the general rule that meetings must be open to the public, to discuss ‘strategy and negotiations with respect to pending claims or pending litigation to which the public agency...is a party....’ General Statutes § 1-200 (6) (B). The dispositive issue in these appeals is whether an executive session held by the named plaintiff...fell within the purview of the act’s ‘pending claims or pending litigation’ exception. The named defendant...initially determined that the zoning commission’s executive session was unlawful under the act. The zoning commission appealed from the FOIC’s decision to the trial court, which reversed the FOIC’s decision, concluding that the zoning commission’s executive session was permissible under the act’s pending claims or pending litigation exception. The FOIC now appeals from the judgment of the trial court, claiming that the executive session violated the act. The defendant...and its principal officers...who were seeking approval of a zoning permit extension by the zoning commission when it convened the executive session in question, also appeal from the judgment of the trial court, claiming that the executive session was unlawful. We conclude that the zoning commission’s executive session was not justified under the pending claims or pending litigation exception of the act and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the trial court.")

SC18966 - Gould v. Freedom of Information Commission ("The plaintiff...a member of the arbitration panel that is the subject of the present case, appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing his appeal from the final decision of the defendant Freedom of Information Commission (commission). In its decision, the commission concluded that: (1) the arbitration panel is a committee of the Department of Education (department); and (2) the evidentiary portion of an arbitration hearing under the Teacher Negotiation Act (TNA); see General Statutes § 10-153a et seq.; is subject to the open meetings provision of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA); see General Statutes § 1-225 (a); and ordered the plaintiff, along with the two other members of the three member arbitration panel, to create a transcript of the stenographic record from an arbitration hearing dated January 30, 2010, and to provide that transcript to the defendant Waterbury Republican-American (newspaper) and the defendant Jim Moore, a journalist with the newspaper, who had been excluded from the arbitration proceedings.


"The plaintiff advances two arguments in support of his contention that the trial court improperly dismissed his appeal. First, the plaintiff claims that, because a TNA arbitration panel is not a 'committee of' the department, it does not constitute a '"[p]ublic agency"' pursuant to General Statutes (Supp. 2014) § 1-200 (1) (A). Second, the plaintiff claims that, because the presentation of evidence and testimony at a TNA arbitration hearing constitutes 'strategy or negotiations with respect to collective bargaining,' the evidentiary portion of the hearings does not constitute a '"[m]eeting"' pursuant to § 1-200 (2). See footnote 4 of this opinion. We agree with the plaintiff's first claim and, therefore, reverse the judgment of the trial court.")

SC19046 - Commissioner of Public Health v. Freedom of Information Commission(Administrative agencies; Freedom of Information Act (§ 1-200 et seq.); "Congress created the National Practitioner Data Bank (Practitioner Data Bank) and the Healthcare Integrity and Protection Data Bank (Healthcare Data Bank) as national clearinghouses for, inter alia, information from health care entities and licensing boards regarding adverse actions taken against physicians and other licensed health care practitioners. The question we must answer in the present case is whether records received from these federal data banks by a state agency authorized to request this confidential information can be subject to disclosure under our Freedom of Information Act (act), General Statutes § 1-200 et seq.


The named defendant, the Freedom of Information Commission (commission), concluded that federal law permits disclosure of Practitioner Data Bank records if they are subject to disclosure under state law such as the act, but does not permit disclosure of Healthcare Data Bank records. The trial court dismissed the appeal of the plaintiff, the Commissioner of Public Health (department), from the commission's decision ordering the department to disclose Practitioner Data Bank records to a local newspaper, the defendant Greenwich Time (newspaper). The trial court also dismissed the newspaper's appeal from the commission's decision insofar as it had denied the newspaper's request for an order to disclose the Healthcare Data Bank records. The department appealed and the newspaper cross appealed from the trial court's judgment. We conclude that a public agency may not disclose to an unauthorized person or entity any records received from either the Practitioner Data Bank or the Healthcare Data Bank, although the agency may disclose to a member of the public information originating from the agency's own files if disclosure is otherwise required under the act. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's judgment in part.")

SC19055 - Chairperson, Connecticut Medical Examining Board v. Freedom of Information Commission ("This is an appeal by the plaintiffs...from the judgment of the trial court dismissing the plaintiffs' appeal from a final decision of the named defendant...in favor of the complainants, Attorney Michael K. Courtney and the Office of the Chief Public Defender. The trial court concluded that the commission properly had found that an executive session convened by the board on February 17, 2009, was not permissible under the Freedom of Information Act (act), General Statutes § 1-200 et seq. The board convened the executive session to obtain legal advice about issues raised in a letter from the complainants dated February 13, 2009 (letter), regarding their request for a declaratory ruling. The plaintiffs claim that the board was permitted to convene in executive session under the act because the letter demanded legal relief and, therefore, constituted notice of a pending claim as defined by § 1-200 (8). In addition, the plaintiffs claim that the executive session was permitted under the act because it involved discussions of strategy and negotiations as defined by § 1-200 (6) (B). The commission responds that the letter did not constitute notice of a pending claim but, rather, that the complainants merely noted a potential conflict of interest and suggested a course of action. We agree with the commission and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

AC32381 - Commissioner of Public Safety v. Freedom of Information Commission ("The plaintiff...appeals from the judgments of the trial court dismissing his appeals and concluding that the defendant...properly determined that the Connecticut Freedom of Information Act (act), General Statutes § 1-200 et seq., required the disclosure of printouts or 'rap sheets' obtained by the Department of Public Safety (department) from the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) computerized database, which is maintained by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The commissioner claims that the NCIC printouts were not subject to public disclosure under the act. We reverse, in part, the judgments of the trial court.")

SC18724 - Pictometry International Corp. v. Freedom of Information Commission
SC18725 - Department of Environmental Protection v. Freedom of Information Commission("The primary issue to be resolved in these appeals is whether public records that are protected by federal copyright law fall within the 'otherwise provided by any federal law' exemption to the Freedom of Information Act (act), General Statutes § 1-200 et seq., set forth in General Statutes § 1-210 (a) (federal law exemption)....

"We conclude that, because the commission improperly ordered the DEP to provide copies of the images without first determining whether Whitaker wanted copies of the images stripped of the associated data, whether it was feasible for the DEP to provide such copies and whether doing so would pose a public safety risk, the matter must be remanded to the commission for further proceedings. We further conclude that, if the commission determines that Whitaker wants and is entitled to copies of the photographic images, the copying of the photographic images must be done in compliance with the provisions of the licensing agreement and federal copyright law, including payment by Whitaker of the $25 per image fee.")

SC18622, SC18623 - Commissioner of Correction v. Freedom of Information Commission, SC18624 - United States of America v. Freedom of Information Commission ("These appeals arise from the ruling of the named defendant...that the defendant Rashad El Badrawi was entitled, under the Freedom of Information Act (act), General Statutes § 1-200 et seq., to the disclosure of a document that the plaintiff...obtained from a file in the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) computerized database, which is maintained by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The commissioner and the intervenor...appealed from the commission's ruling to the trial court, claiming that the commission improperly had ordered disclosure of the document because, for among other reasons, disclosure was barred by a federal regulation, and, therefore, the document was exempt from the act in accordance with General Statutes § 1-210 (a). The trial court rendered judgments dismissing the appeals in part and sustaining them in part, and ordered that a redacted version of the document be disclosed to El Badrawi. The commissioner and the United States then filed these appeals.")

AC32246 - Commissioner of Public Safety v. Freedom of Information Commission ("The defendant...appeals from the judgment of the trial court sustaining the appeal of the plaintiff...from the decision of the commission. The court concluded that the commission erroneously had required the department of public safety (department) to release documents to the complainants....On appeal, the commission claims that the court erred by (1) concluding that the text of General Statutes § 1-215 does not plainly and unambiguously require disclosure of certain information at the time of the arrest; and (2) failing to defer to the commission's construction of General Statutes §§ 1-215 and 1-210 (b) (3), and thereby failing to follow the applicable scope of judicial review in an administrative appeal.")

AC32932 - Tompkins v. Freedom of Information Commission ("The issue presented in this appeal is whether the trial court properly dismissed the appeal of the plaintiff, Duane Tompkins, from the amended final decision of the named defendant, the freedom of information commission (commission), ordering the plaintiff's former employer, the town of Enfield police department (department), to disclose the plaintiff's redacted employment termination records to the defendants the Journal Inquirer and Alexander Wood and Jenna Carlesso, staff writers for the Journal Inquirer. The plaintiff claims that the trial court erred in sustaining the commission's order of disclosure over his objection that the subject records are exempt from disclosure under either General Statutes § 1-210 (b) (2) because their release would constitute an invasion of his personal privacy, or § 1-210 (b) (3) (G) because they contain uncorroborated allegations of criminal activity.")

AC33799 - Lucarelli v. Freedom of Information Commission ("The self-represented plaintiff, Lamberto Lucarelli, appeals from the judgment of nonsuit rendered against him in his appeal to the Superior Court from a final decision of the defendant, the freedom of information commission, and from the trial court's subsequent orders denying his motion to open the judgment of nonsuit, denying his motion to reargue the motion to open, finding his motion to disqualify the judge that rendered the judgment of nonsuit moot, and denying his second motion for reargument, clarification and disqualification. We construe the plaintiff's arguments on appeal as claiming that the court abused its discretion by rendering the judgment of nonsuit and by denying his postjudgment motions.")

AC33444 - Albright-Lazzari v. Freedom of Information Commission ("On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the court improperly (1) determined that the commission’s dismissal of their complaint without a hearing was not a violation of their constitutional rights and (2) deferred to the commission’s conclusion that it lacked jurisdiction to determine the rights of access to records of the intervening defendant, the department of children and families (department) pertaining to child protection activities.")

AC33368 - Lantieri v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation ("On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court improperly found facts beyond those certified to it by the board and utilized those facts to improperly determine that the board’s decision that the plaintiff engaged in wilful misconduct was not supported by the evidence.")

AC33336 - Lucarelli v. Freedom of Information Commission ("The self-represented plaintiff, Lamberto Lucarelli, appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing his administrative appeal from the decision of the defendant freedom of information commission (commission) ordering the defendant Old Saybrook police department (department) to produce certain records. The plaintiff claims that the court erred in concluding that (1) the commission properly determined that the department was not required to transcribe or to tape voice mail messages pursuant to General Statutes § 1-213 (b) (3), (2) the commission's failure to rule on his request for subpoenas was not reversible error and (3) the commission properly declined to enforce the penalty provision of General Statutes § 1-240 (a).")

AC33167 - Germain v. Manchester ("The plaintiff... appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing his administrative appeal from the decision of the defendant, freedom of information commission (commission). On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly (1) interpreted General Statutes § 1-212 (g) to limit the permissible type of scanner that can be used to copy public documents to a scanner that is held in the hand and dragged across the page being copied, to the exclusion of any other battery operated scanner, (2) deferred to the commission's interpretation of § 1-212 (g) and (3) concluded that the commission's prior decision in Kreutzer v. Assistant Dean, Administration & Special Projects, Freedom of Information Commission, Docket No. FIC 2004-463 (September 28, 2005), was inapplicable.")

SC18772 - University of Connecticut v. Freedom of Information Commission ("This appeal concerns the issue of whether a public agency can create and maintain trade secrets that are exempt from disclosure under General Statutes § 1-210 (b) (5) (A) of the Freedom of Information Act (act), General Statutes § 1-200 et seq. The named defendant, the freedom of information commission (commission), appeals from the trial court's judgment sustaining the administrative appeal of the plaintiff, the University of Connecticut (university), from the commission's decision ordering the university to disclose databases identifying persons who had paid to attend, donated to, inquired about or participated in certain educational, cultural or athletic activities of institutions within the university. The commission contends that, in light of the public policy favoring disclosure of public records, the trial court improperly rejected the commission's determination that none of the databases at issue could be trade secrets because the university is not principally engaged in a trade")

SC18601 - Ethics Commission v. Freedom of Information Commission ("The plaintiff, the ethics commission of the town of Glastonbury, appeals from the trial court’s judgments dismissing the plaintiff’s consolidated appeals from four decisions of the named defendant, the freedom of information commission (commission). In each decision, the commission had ordered the plaintiff to make and to maintain, for a period of three years, audio recordings of the plaintiff’s executive sessions, or any other session closed to the public, after finding that the plaintiff had violated the open meetings provision of the Freedom of Information Act (act), General Statutes § 1-200 et seq., by convening in nonpublic sessions to discuss certain matters and further finding that the plaintiff had failed to comply with the commission’s orders to amend its minutes to reflect those discussions. The dispositive issue on appeal is whether the commission’s orders exceeded its remedial authority under the act.")

AC31780, AC31781 - Planning & Zoning Commission v. Freedom of Information Commission ("The defendant freedom of information commission (commission) appeals from the judgments of the trial court sustaining the administrative appeals of the plaintiff planning and zoning commission of the town of Pomfret from the final decisions of the commission. On appeal, the commission claims that the court erred in overturning its decisions because the court (1) addressed issues that were not before the commission, and (2) construed General Statutes §§ 1-210 (a) and 1- 212 (a) in a manner that (a) contradicted the statutes’ plain meaning, (b) contradicted the construction of the statutes by the commission, (c) failed to give deference to the commission’s construction of the statutes and (d) was inconsistent with the statutes’ underlying public policy interests.")

AC32409 - Commissioner of Correction v. Freedom of Information Commission ("The defendant David P. Taylor appeals from the judgments of the Superior Court sustaining the appeals of the plaintiffs, the commissioner of correction, Steven Petracca, Harry Soucy and AFSCME, Council 4, Local 387, from the decisions of the defendant freedom of information commission (commission) and prohibiting the disclosure of certain disciplinary records of department of correction (department) employees pursuant to General Statutes § 1-210 (c) and (b) (18) of the Freedom of Information Act (act), General Statutes § 1-200 et seq.")

SC18461 - Lash v. Freedom of Information Commission ("The named defendant, the freedom of information commission (commission), appeals from the judgment of the Appellate Court reversing the judgment of the trial court in favor of the commission. The commission claims that the Appellate Court improperly concluded that: (1) the plaintiffs, James A. Lash, first selectman of the town of Greenwich (town), and the town board of selectmen, sustained their burden of demonstrating that certain documents were exempt from disclosure because they were protected by attorney-client privilege; and (2) the commission abused its discretion in assessing a civil penalty against Lash.")

SC18489 - Dept. of Public Safety v. Freedom of Information Commission ("The principal issue in this appeal is whether the named defendant, the freedom of information commission (commission), properly ordered the plaintiff, the department of public safety (department), to disclose information contained in its sex offender registry because it was not subject to the provisions in General Statutes § 54-255 restricting the dissemination of registration information regarding certain offenders.")

Valvo v. Freedom of Information Commission - SC18283 ("The plaintiffs...filed a complaint with the named defendant,...after the defendant chief court administrator of the judicial branch of the state of Connecticut (chief court administrator), denied their request pursuant to the freedom of information act (act), General Statutes § 1-200 et seq., for copies of certain docket sheets...The plaintiffs then appealed from the judgment of the trial court claiming that, although the trial court properly determined that, under this court's decision in Clerk of the Superior Court v. Freedom of Information Commission, 278 Conn. 28, 37, 895 A.2d 743 (2006), the docket sheets were not administrative records subject to the act, that case was wrongly decided and this court should overrule it. ")

Board of Selectmen v. Freedom of Information Commission - SC18343 ("On appeal, the board contends that the trial court improperly: (1) determined that the emergency meeting provisions of §1-225 (d) were not unconstitutionally vague; (2) agreed with the commission's conclusion that the contested meeting had not been held under emergency circumstances; (3) concluded that the commission had not abused its discretion in declaring the contested board meeting null and void; and (4) relied on evidence outside the factual findings made by the commission and thereby substituted its own judgment for that of the commission.")

Director of Health Affairs Policy Planning v. Freedom of Information Commission - SC18286(Administrative appeal; "The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether certain records held by the plaintiff, the director of health affairs policy planning for the University of Connecticut Health Center, are exempt from disclosure under the freedom of information act (act), General Statutes § 1-200 et seq., pursuant to General Statutes § 19a-17b (d), which protects peer review proceedings from discovery and introduction into evidence in a civil action".)

AC30137 - Lash v. Freedom of Information Commission ("The plaintiffs James A. Lash, first selectman of the town of Greenwich, and the Greenwich board of selectment appeal from the judgment of the Superior Court dismissing their administrative appeal from the decision of the defendant freedom of information commission (commission) in favor of the defendant Stephen Whitaker. On appeal before this court, the plaintiffs claim that the Superior Court improperly dismissed the appeal because the commission erroneously (1) found that they violated General Statutes § 1-210 (a) by failing to provide prompt access to certain public records, (2) found that they failed to establish that two specific documents were exempt from disclosure under § 1-210 (b) (10) and (3) imposed a civil penalty of $100 against Lash pursuant to General Statutes § 1-206 (b) (2).")


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