The mission of the Connecticut Judicial Branch is to serve the interests of justice and the public by resolving matters brought before it in a fair, timely, efficient and open manner.
SC20844 - State v. Iverson (Murder; attempted murder; burglary in the first degree; arson
in the first degree; “The trial court subsequently sentenced the defendant to a
total effective sentence of 105 years of imprisonment for those crimes. In this
direct appeal, the defendant asserts that the trial court improperly (1) denied
his request to charge the jury on the lesser included offense of manslaughter
in the first degree, and (2) admitted into evidence an autopsy report authored
by a nontestifying expert in violation of his confrontation rights under the
federal constitution. Because the evidence was insufficient to justify an
instruction on the lesser included offense of manslaughter and the defendant
waived any challenge to the admission of the autopsy report, we affirm the
judgment of the trial court.”)
SC20869 - State v. Villanueva (Murder; carrying a pistol without a permit; criminal
possession of a firearm; “The defendant claims that the trial court (1)
deprived him of his right to present a defense by refusing to instruct the jury
on investigative inadequacy, (2) violated his right to due process under the
state constitution by admitting a witness’ out-of-court identification of him,
and (3) violated his right of confrontation under the sixth amendment to the
United States constitution by admitting the testimony of a medical examiner who
did not personally perform the autopsy on the victim, Casey Schoonover. We
affirm the judgment of the trial court.”)
AC46379 - Giglio v. Ardohain ("The plaintiff, Cynthia Giglio, appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the defendants, Janine Ardohain, Sean McAleer, and American Marine Electronics, LLC (AME). On appeal, the plaintiff contends that the court improperly (1) determined that the defendants' conduct did not constitute a private nuisance and (2) declined to grant injunctive relief due to the defendants' violation of certain municipal zoning regulations. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")
AC47829 - Stanley v. Scott (“The defendants, in their capacities as assistant state’s
attorneys, were involved in a successful prosecution of the plaintiff, which
resulted in his conviction of multiple crimes and imprisonment. Thereafter, in
the underlying action, the plaintiff sought damages from the defendants related
to their use of his cell phone records as evidence in connection with his
criminal trial. The plaintiff’s principal appellate brief and his reply brief
are incomprehensible; the plaintiff neither identifies a cogent claim of error
nor adequately analyzes such a claim. This appeal is governed by our analysis
in another appeal that was brought by the plaintiff, Stanley v. Commissioner
of Correction, 233 Conn. App. 759, A.3d (2025), which we resolve today. The
deficiencies in the plaintiff’s briefs leave us unable to undertake appellate
review of any claim and, thus, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.”)
AC47085 - Buchanan v. East Hartford (“In this workers’ compensation matter, the defendant, the town of East Hartford, appeals from the decision of the Compensation Review Board (board), which reversed the decision of the administrative law judge for the First District of the Workers’ Compensation Commission (commission), dismissing the claim for survivorship benefits under General Statutes § 31-3061 filed by the plaintiff, Patricia Buchanan, the surviving spouse of the deceased employee, Paul Buchanan (decedent). On appeal, the defendant claims, inter alia, that the board (1) improperly substituted its own factual findings for those of the administrative law judge, which were not clearly erroneous, and (2) misapplied General Statutes (Rev. to 2013) § 31-275 (16) (A) and (B)2 by including post-traumatic stress disorder and/or depression as qualified injuries under the Workers’ Compensation Act (act), General Statutes § 31-27 et seq. The plaintiff raises four alternative grounds on which she claims we may affirm the board’s decision. See footnote 8 of this opinion. We agree with the defendant’s first claim and disagree with the alternative grounds for affirmance raised by the plaintiff. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the board and remand the case to the board with direction to affirm the decision of the administrative law judge.”
AC47982 - Housing Authority v. Singleton ("In this summary process eviction action, the plaintiff, the Housing Authority of the city of Stamford doing business as Charter Oak Communities, appeals from the judgment of possession rendered by the trial court in favor of the defendant Pauline Singleton on the basis of her special defense of equitable nonforfeiture. The plaintiff claims that the court improperly (1) failed to render a decision with respect to counts two through seven of its complaint, which contained independent grounds for eviction; (2) determined with respect to count one that the defendant had proven her special defense of equitable nonforfeiture; (3) failed to recognize that equitable nonforfeiture was inapplicable as a matter of law because ‘federal law is controlling regarding the relevant portions of the subject lease’; and (4) concluded that the defendant had proven her special defense of equitable nonforfeiture ‘as a factual matter.’ Because we conclude that the court failed to dispose of all counts of the complaint brought against the defendant and, thus, that the appeal was not taken from a final judgment, we dismiss the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.")
AC47706 - Stanley v. Commissioner of Correction (“The plaintiff sought damages from the defendants resulting
from a prison disciplinary report that was issued for his misconduct while
incarcerated, which resulted in sanctions. Due to the inadequacy of the briefs
filed by the plaintiff in this appeal, we are unable to undertake appellate
review of any claim of error. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial
court.”)
AC48460 - In re Janeleah I. ("The respondent mother, Desiree I.,
appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered
in favor of the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children
and Families, terminating her parental rights with
respect to her minor child, Janeleah. On appeal, the
respondent claims that the court (1) violated her rights
to procedural due process under the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution by conducting
the termination of parental rights trial in her absence
and (2) improperly failed to make written, mandatory
findings as to the seven best interest factors set forth
in General Statutes § 17a-112 (k). We disagree with the respondent’s first claim but agree with her second
claim. Accordingly, we reverse the court’s judgment
with respect to its dispositional determination that termination of the respondent’s parental rights was in
Janeleah’s best interest and remand the case for a new
dispositional hearing.")
SC21010- Aquarion Water Co. of Connecticut v. Public Utilities Regulatory Authority ("The plaintiff, Aquarion Water Company of Connecticut (Aquarion), appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing in part its appeal from the final decision of the defendant, the Public Utility Regulatory Authority (PURA), on the rate application submitted by Aquarion in 2022. Aquarion claims that PURA acted arbitrarily, capriciously, and in abuse of its discretion by denying its requests (1) to include in its rate base $42,136,826 million in capital improvements, and (2) to recover from ratepayers certain operating costs, namely, $2,222,298 million in employee incentive compensation and $1,498,051 million in deferred conservation expenses. Aquarion also claims that the total effect of PURA's rate order was confiscatory, in violation of the takings clause of the fifth amendment to the United States constitution and General Statutes § 16-19e (a). We conclude that PURA erred in rejecting Aquarion's request to recover $1,498,051 million in deferred conservation expenses but that its final decision on Aquarion's rate application was not otherwise improper or unconstitutional. Accordingly, we reverse in part the judgment of the trial court.")
SC21010 Appendix
The Connecticut Law Journal, Volume LXXXVII, No. 2, for July 8, 2025 is now available.
- Table of Contents
- Volume 352: Connecticut Reports (Pages 355 - 380)
- Volume 352: Orders (Pages 912 - 943)
- Volume 352: Cumulative Table of Cases Connecticut Reports
- Volume 233: Connecticut Appellate Reports (Pages 522 - 633)
- Volume 233: Cumulative Table of Cases Connecticut Appellate Reports
- Miscellaneous Notices
- Notices of Connecticut State Agencies
AC47799 - Anderson v. Reel Hospitality, LLC (“In this certified class action, which was brought by the
plaintiffs, individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, and
alleged violations of state minimum wage regulations; see General Statutes §
31-60 (b); see also Regs., Conn. State Agencies § 31-62- E1 et seq. (March 8,
2015);3 the court rendered summary judgment in favor of the defendants with
respect to count one of the plaintiffs’ amended complaint, which alleged that
the defendants had violated § 31-62-E3 of the Regulations of Connecticut State
Agencies (regulations) by, inter alia, failing to record on a weekly basis the
amount claimed as a tip credit for each server as a separate item in the wage
record. On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the court improperly determined,
as a matter of law, that a violation of the recordkeeping requirements in §
31-62-E3 of the regulations does not give rise to a private cause of action. We
disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the court.”)
AC47415 - SMDV 1, LLC v. 459-461 Pacific Street, LLC (“This appeal arises from an action brought by the
plaintiff, SMDV 1, LLC, against the defendants, 459-461 Pacific Street, LLC
(Pacific Street), and Frank Steinegger, related to Pacific Street’s notice of
termination of a contract for the sale and purchase of real property known as
459-461 Pacific Street in Stamford (property). The dispositive issue in this
appeal is whether the trial court correctly determined that the contract was
rendered unenforceable by the termination of a separate ground lease and
purchase agreement between two different entities. After our review of the
language of the contract, we conclude that the trial court’s determination
cannot stand. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court rendered
in favor of the defendants following a court trial and remand this case for
further proceedings.”)
AC47692- Gancsos v. Israel "This appeal arises from a dispute between owners of abutting properties located in Cheshire. The defendants, Lior Israel and Perla Israel, appeal from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the plaintiff, Mark Gancsos, in the plaintiff's action alleging trespass and breach of contract. On appeal, the defendants claim that the trial court improperly (1) found that the defendants trespassed on the plaintiff's property and (2) ordered injunctive relief. We affirm the judgment of the trial court."
SC240221 Order on Motion - State v. Moore (Meaning of the phrase ‘essential element'; when defendants accused of certain ‘serious firearm offense[s]’ may be released on bond; “The defendant, Aaron Moore, seeks review of the trial
court’s order that he post 30 percent of his $1 million bond in cash directly
with the trial court pursuant to § 54-64a (c). He contends that the court incorrectly
imposed a 30 percent cash bond requirement because the state did not charge him
with a ‘[s]erious firearm offense,’ as the legislature has defined that phrase
in § 53a-3 (24). Specifically, none of the crimes that the state charged him
with contained an ‘essential element’ requiring that the state prove that he
discharged, used, or was armed with and threatened the use of a firearm. Our
review of the plain language of the relevant statutes leads us to conclude that
the phrase ‘essential element’ has the same meaning that this court and the
legislature have consistently considered it to have throughout our case law and
statutes. We therefore vacate the trial court’s order.”)
The Connecticut Law Journal, Volume LXXXVII, No. 1, for July 1, 2025 is now available.
- Table of Contents
- Volume 352: Connecticut Reports (Pages 210 - 354)
- Volume 352: Orders (Pages 910 - 912)
- Volume 352: Cumulative Table of Cases Connecticut Reports
- Volume 233: Connecticut Appellate Reports (Pages 352 - 522)
- Volume 233: Memorandum Decisions (Pages 903 - 903)
- Volume 233: Cumulative Table of Cases Connecticut Appellate Reports
- Miscellaneous Notices
AC48262 - In re Emilia M. ("The respondent mother, Cydney M.,
appeals following the judgments of the trial court, rendered in favor of the petitioner, the Commissioner of
Children and Families, terminating her parental rights
with respect to her minor children, Emilia M. (Emilia)
and Ariella M. (Ariella). On appeal, the respondent
raises claims for the first time concerning the minor
children’s right to conflict free counsel. Specifically,
she claims that (1) the attorney who represented the
minor children at trial had a conflict of interest and that
the court’s failure to inquire into that conflict denied
the minor children their federal and state due process
rights to conflict free counsel, and (2) the court improperly failed to protect the children’s statutory right to
conflict free counsel. The respondent has not raised
any claim on appeal challenging the judgments terminating her parental rights with respect to the minor
children. Because we conclude that this court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction over the respondent’s
appeal, we dismiss the appeal.")
AC48482 - In re Noah R.-R. ("The respondent father, Jorge R.-M.,
appeals from the judgment of the trial court terminating
his parental rights with respect to his minor child, Noah
R.-R. (Noah). On appeal, he claims that the court
improperly determined that it was in Noah’s best interest to terminate the respondent’s parental rights. We
disagree and affirm the judgment.")
SC20806 - State v. Hamilton (Murder; carrying a pistol or revolver without a permit; “For the reasons that follow, we agree with the defendant
that Carr’s two prior interviews with the police were improperly admitted as
prior inconsistent statements under Whelan because the state failed to demonstrate
that Carr’s prior interviews were in fact inconsistent with his trial
testimony. Because we conclude that the error was not harmless, we reverse the
judgment of conviction and remand the case for a new trial. As to the
defendant’s second claim, although we disagree with him that adopted statements
are inadmissible as prior inconsistent statements under Whelan, we nevertheless
conclude that the trial court improperly delegated to the jury the
responsibility of determining which of Cobia’s statements were adopted by Carr
as his own and, therefore, were admissible hearsay under Whelan. Lastly, we
conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the
video and photographs from the defendant’s social media accounts.”)
AC47400 - State v. Rivas (Conditional plea of nolo contendere; operating a motor
vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drugs; “On appeal, he claims
that the trial court improperly denied his motion to dismiss the charge because
(1) the state’s delay in executing the warrant for his arrest (preaccusation
delay) violated his right to due process, and (2) the prosecution violated an
earlier plea agreement he had entered into with the state. We disagree and,
accordingly, affirm the judgment of the court.”)
AC47461 -
Drummer v. State (“In this action for a declaratory judgment and
injunctive relief, the plaintiff, Gloria Drummer, appeals from the judgment of
the trial court denying her motion for summary judgment and granting the motion
for summary judgment filed by the defendants, the state of Connecticut, the
Department of Mental Health and Addiction Services, Connecticut Valley Hospital,
Whiting Forensic Hospital, Greater Bridgeport Community Mental Health Center,
Connecticut Mental Health Center, and Capital Region Mental Health Center. On
appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly (1) rendered summary
judgment in favor of the defendants and (2) denied her motion for class
certification. We do not reach the merits of these claims because, for reasons
that follow, we conclude that the plaintiff lacked the requisite standing to
assert her claims before the trial court. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment
of the trial court only as to the form of the judgment and remand the case with
direction to dismiss the action.”)
AC47195 - Narcisse v. Commissioner of Mental Health & Addiction
Services (“In the operative habeas petition, he alleged that his plea
of not guilty with the affirmative defense of mental disease or defect, made
pursuant to General Statutes § 53a-13 (a), was not made knowingly and
voluntarily because he was not canvassed pursuant to Duperry v. Solnit,
261 Conn. 309, 329, 803 A.2d 287 (2002), and that his criminal trial counsel,
Attorney Kim W. Mendola (trial counsel), had provided ineffective assistance.
On appeal, the petitioner claims that the habeas court improperly determined
that (1) the underlying criminal proceeding was contested and adversarial in
nature and, thus, that the petitioner was not required to be canvassed pursuant
to Duperry, and (2) his trial counsel did not render deficient performance by
failing to advise the petitioner regarding the canvass requirements of Duperry.
We disagree with both claims and affirm the judgment of the habeas court.”)
AC46937 - Abdus-Sabur v. Commissioner of Correction (“On appeal, the respondent claims that the court
incorrectly determined that the petitioner’s criminal trial counsel had
rendered ineffective assistance by failing to subpoena and present the
testimony of the petitioner’s brother. We agree and, accordingly, reverse in
part the judgment of the habeas court.”)
AC47213 - Birch Groves Assn., Inc. v. Jordon ("The defendant, Kathleen Casey Jordon, also known as Kathleen C. Jordan, appeals from the judgments of foreclosure by sale rendered in favor of the plaintiff, Birch Groves Association, Inc. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court (1) abused its discretion by not vacating her default for failure to plead, and (2) erred in rendering judgments on the basis of the plaintiff’s affidavit of debt when the debt was disputed by the defendant. We affirm the judgments of the trial court and remand the case for the purpose of setting new sale dates.")