SC19928 - Breton v. Commissioner of Correction (“Claim that the “2013 amendment to General Statutes (Rev. to 2013) § 54-125a; see Public Acts 2013, No.13-3, § 59 (P.A. 13-3), codified at General Statutes (Supp.2014) § 54-125a; which eliminated risk reduction credit awarded pursuant to General Statutes § 18-98e from the calculation of a violent offender’s initial parole eligibility date, thereby requiring the offender to complete 85 percent of his definite sentence before becoming parole eligible, as applied retroactively to him, violates the ex post facto clause of the United States constitution because he was statutorily entitled to such earlier parole consideration when he committed the crimes for which he is now incarcerated.”… On appeal, the petitioner renews his claim of an ex post facto violation. We agree with the petitioner that the ex post facto clause bars the respondent from applying the 2013 amendment to the petitioner, and, accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the habeas court.”)
SC19927 - Garner v. Commissioner of Correction (Claim of ineffective assistance; claim that a “2013 amendment to General Statutes (Rev. to 2013) § 54-125a; see Public Acts 2013, No. 13-3, § 59 (P.A. 13-3), codified at General Statutes (Supp. 2014) § 54-125a; which eliminated risk reduction credit awarded pursuant to General Statutes § 18-98e from the calculation of a violent offender’s initial parole eligibility date, as applied retroactively to him, violates the ex post facto clause of the United States constitution, because, under the version of § 54-125a in effect when he committed his offenses, he was entitled to have any such credit that he had earned applied to advance his initial parole eligibility date…The habeas court, Fuger, J., rejected the petitioner’s ex post facto claim…On appeal, the petitioner challenges both of these determinations by the habeas court. Although we reject the petitioner’s ineffective assistance claim, we agree that the ex post facto clause bars the respondent from applying the 2013 amendment retroactively to the petitioner. Accordingly, we reverse in part the judgment of the habeas court.”)
AC39715 - Boria v. Commissioner of Correction
(Practice Book § 23-29; “The petitioner claims that the
habeas court improperly dismissed his claim (1) that amendments to the risk
reduction earned credits statute in 2013 and 2015 violated the ex post facto
clause of the United States constitution and (2) that his right to due process
had been violated because his guilty plea in his underlying criminal case was
not knowingly and voluntarily made. As to the first claim, we disagree and,
accordingly, affirm that aspect of the judgment of the habeas court. As to the
second claim, although we agree with the petitioner that the habeas court
should not have dismissed that claim as an improper successive petition under
Practice Book § 23-29, we affirm that aspect of the judgment on the alternative
ground that it was barred by collateral estoppel.”)
AC40090 - Davis v. Commissioner of Correction
(“On appeal, the petitioner claims that the court (1) abused
its discretion in denying his petition for certification to appeal and (2)
erred in concluding that his trial counsel had not rendered ineffective
assistance by failing to (A) file a motion in limine to preclude certain
evidence, (B) consult with and present the testimony of an eyewitness identification
expert, (C) object to the testimony of a laboratory supervisor on the ground
that the testimony violated his right to confrontation under the federal
constitution and (D) prepare the petitioner for the presentence investigation
interview. We dismiss the petitioner’s appeal.”)
AC40101 - Nicholson v. Commissioner of Correction (Amended writ; “On appeal, the petitioner claims that the
habeas court (1) abused its discretion in denying his petition for certification
to appeal, (2) erroneously concluded that he failed to establish that his state
and federal constitutional rights to the effective assistance of counsel were
violated,1 (3) abused its discretion in declining to treat a witness at the
habeas trial as an expert witness, and (4) abused its discretion in failing to
review certain evidence admitted at the habeas trial prior to denying his
amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus. We conclude that the habeas court
did not abuse its discretion in denying the petition for certification to appeal
and, accordingly, dismiss the appeal.”)