AC43066 - In re Geoffrey G. (Termination of parental rights; review sought under State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239–40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989), as modified by In re Yasiel R., 317 Conn. 773, 781, 120 A.3d 1188 (2015); "On appeal, the respondent claims that the court improperly failed to order, sua sponte, an evaluation of her competency to assist her counsel at trial, in violation of her due process rights under the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution. We affirm the judgment of the court")

• Posted in:
• Juvenile Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC42221 - Cheswold (TL), LLC, BMO Harris Bank, N.A. v. Kwong ("The self-represented defendant, Matthew J. Kwong, appeals from the trial court's judgment of foreclosure by sale of his property located at 9 Bradley Lane in the village of Sandy Hook in Newtown (property).He claims that the court erred in denying his motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the ground that the substituted plaintiff, ATCF REO Holdings, LLC (ATCF), lacked standing to foreclose the property because the assignment of certain municipal tax liens to ATCF was not recorded on the Newtown land records. Accordingly, the principal issue in this appeal is whether the assignment of a municipal tax lien is required to be recorded on the land records in order for the assignee to have standing to foreclose the property, which is an issue of first impression for this court. For the following reasons, we conclude that such recording is not required and affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

• Posted in:
• Foreclosure Law,
• Property Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC41997 - Young v. Hartford Hospital (Medical malpractice; certificate of good faith and opinion required by statute (§ 52-190a) for negligence action against health care provider, discussed; "The plaintiff, Wendy Young, appeals from the trial court's judgment dismissing her complaint against the defendant, Hartford Hospital, for her failure to provide a certificate of good faith pursuant to General Statutes § 52-190a. The plaintiff claims that the trial court erred in determining that her complaint sounded only in medical malpractice and, consequently, dismissing her complaint for failure to file an accompanying certificate of good faith as required for medical malpractice claims by § 52-190a. We agree.")

• AC41997 Dissent - Young v. Hartford Hospital

• Posted in:
• Medical Malpractice Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC41918 - Windham Solar, LLC v. Public Utilities Regulatory Authority (Administrative appeal; appeal from decisions by defendant Public Utilities Regulatory Authority concerning plaintiff's petition, pursuant to statute (§ 16-243a), to compel defendant utility to enter into contract with plaintiff for purchase of energy and capacity from solar electric generating facilities; "In this administrative appeal seeking regulatory remedies with respect to a proposed contract for the sale of energy, the plaintiff, Windham Solar, LLC, appeals from the judgment of dismissal rendered by the trial court on the ground that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction.The plaintiff claims that the court erred in concluding that it did not have standing to bring this administrative appeal and that, even if it did, its claims were moot. We agree with the plaintiff and reverse the judgment of the trial court.")

• Posted in:
• Administrative Appeal Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC42610 - American Tax Funding, LLC v. First Eagle Corp. (Municipal tax collection; special defenses; "In this collection action, the plaintiff, American Tax Funding, LLC, appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the defendant First Eagle Corporation on two of its special defenses. The court concluded that the plaintiff, the assignee of municipal tax liens, was barred from recovery. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court (1) improperly determined that its claims were extinguished pursuant to General Statutes § 12-195, and (2) erred when concluding that the defendant's debt to the plaintiff had been satisfied. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

AC40608 - Morton v. Syriac (Temporary and permanent injunction; easement; "The defendant, Neil Syriac, appeals from the judgment of the trial court granting a permanent injunction enjoining him from obstructing the use of a shared driveway that runs across the defendant's property by the plaintiff, Michele Morton, who is his former wife. The defendant asserts that the trial court erred by (1) issuing a permanent injunction when the plaintiff neither alleged nor proved that she would suffer irreparable harm and that she lacked an adequate remedy at law, (2) modifying the separation agreement previously stipulated to by the parties and incorporated into an earlier judgment of dissolution, (3) allowing the plaintiff to introduce evidence that contradicted judicial admissions contained in her complaint, and (4) denying his motion to disqualify the trial judge without a hearing. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

• Posted in:
• Property Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC42745 - State v. Albert D. (Risk of injury to child; sexual assault in fourth degree; sexual assault in first degree; attempt to commit sexual assault in first degree; claim that defendant was entitled to new trial on basis of alleged prosecutorial improprieties during state's rebuttal closing argument; "The defendant, Albert D., appeals from the judgments of conviction, rendered following a jury trial, of two counts of sexual assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-70 (a) (2), one count of attempt to commit sexual assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-49 (a) and 53a-70 (a) (2), three counts of sexual assault in the fourth degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-73a (a) (1) (A), and six counts of risk of injury to a child in violation of General Statutes § 53-21 (a) (2). On appeal, the defendant claims that he is entitled to a new trial on the basis of alleged prosecutorial improprieties during the state's rebuttal closing argument. Specifically, the defendant contends that the prosecutor (1) incorrectly stated that the state's experts were not allowed to meet with the victims, and (2) improperly vouched for her own credibility and the credibility of one of the state's witnesses. The defendant further argues that the improprieties resulted in a denial of his due process right to a fair trial pursuant to the six factor test set forth in State v. Williams, 204 Conn. 523, 540, 529 A.2d 653 (1987). We conclude that the prosecutor's comments with regard to the purported inability of the state's experts to meet with the victims constituted an impropriety that, nevertheless, did not deprive the defendant of his due process right to a fair trial. We further conclude that the prosecutor's comments with respect to her own credibility and the credibility of one of the state's witnesses were not improper. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of conviction.")

AC42405 - State v. Hargett (Murder; claim that trial court's exclusion of evidence deprived defendant of right to present defense; "The defendant, Nasir R. Hargett, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of one count of murder. In addition, the jury also found, pursuant to an interrogatory, that "the defendant employed the use of a firearm in the commission of a felony," and the court accordingly enhanced his sentence. On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court (1) violated his sixth amendment right to present a defense by excluding from evidence (a) a statement purportedly made by a bystander and (b) an autopsy toxicology report, (2) violated his right to due process by declining to give a jury instruction on self-defense, (3) abused its discretion by admitting firearm related evidence, and (4) violated his right to a fair trial by failing to grant his motion for a new trial or to dismiss the charges. The defendant also claims that he was denied the right to a fair trial due to prosecutorial impropriety that occurred during final argument. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

• Posted in:
• Criminal Law & Procedure,
• Recent Opinions

AC42217 - Wells v. Wells ("In this marital dissolution action, the plaintiff, Barbara Wells, appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying her postdissolution motion for an order seeking payment of unallocated support owed by the defendant, Michael Wells, pursuant to the terms of the parties' separation agreement. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly interpreted the applicable provision of the separation agreement. We agree with the plaintiff and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the trial court.")

• Posted in:
• Family Law,
• Recent Opinions

SC20193 - State v. Jackson (Murder; conspiracy to commit murder; assault first degree; certification from Appellate Court; whether Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that trial court had not abused its discretion when it allowed state's belatedly disclosed expert witness on cell site location information to testify without first granting defense reasonable continuance to obtain its own expert; "The defendant, Raashon Jackson, appeals from the Appellate Court's judgment affirming his conviction of one count of murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a (a), one count of conspiracy to commit murder in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-48 (a) and 53a-54a (a), and four counts of assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-59 (a) (5). See State v. Jackson, 183 Conn. App. 623, 627, 193 A.3d 585 (2018). The defendant claims, among other things, that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to permit the state's expert witness on cell site location information (CSLI) to testify as to what that information revealed about the location of the defendant and his associates during the time the crimes occurred because the state disclosed the expert after voir dire began and only one week before evidence started, despite a court order issued six months earlier requiring the state to disclose any experts. Alternatively, the defendant argues that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to deny his related motion for a continuance to obtain his own CSLI expert. We conclude that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to allow the state's late disclosed expert witness to testify without first granting the defendant a reasonable continuance to obtain his own expert. Because we also conclude that this error was harmful, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.")

• Posted in:
• Criminal Law & Procedure,
• Recent Opinions

SC20168 - State v. White (Assault first degree; claim that trial court abused its discretion and violated defendant's state and federal constitutional rights in denying his motion for public funding for procuring DNA expert to assist in his criminal defense; "The defendant, John White, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-59 (a) (1). On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court improperly denied his motions (1) seeking public funds to pay for a DNA expert to assist in his defense, and (2) to exclude certain evidence of the victim's confidence in her identification of the defendant when presented with a photographic array by the police. We disagree with the defendant's claims and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

• SC20168 Concurrence - State v. White

• Posted in:
• Criminal Law & Procedure,
• Recent Opinions

Wednesday, February 26th

• New Britain Law Library opens at 11:00 a.m.

• Posted in:
• Library Notices

The Connecticut Law Journal, Volume LXXXI, No. 35, for February 25, 2020 is now available.

Contained in the issue is the following:

• Table of Contents
• Volume 334: Connecticut Reports (Pages 688 - 741)
• Volume 334: Cumulative Table of Cases Connecticut Reports
• Volume 196: Connecticut Appellate Reports (Pages 1 - 155)
• Volume 196: Memorandum Decisions (Pages 901 - 901)
• Volume 196: Cumulative Table of Cases Connecticut Appellate Reports
• Miscellaneous Notices
• Supreme Court Pending Cases

• Posted in:
• Connecticut Law Journal,
• Recent Opinions

Most Connecticut Judicial Branch Law Libraries have received the 2020 edition of Connecticut Elder Law, volume 20 of the Connecticut Practice Series. New or updated information includes the following:

• Updates on the Connecticut Uniform Trust Code;
• Updates on Medicare topics;
• New material on Medicaid topics, including fair hearings
• New material on long-term care in nursing homes; and
• Updates on the Connecticut Family and Medical Leave Act

For a full list of Connecticut treatises by subject, see our Connecticut Treatise Index.

• Posted in:
• FYI,
• Legal Research,
• New in the Libraries

AC41966 - Peterson v. Torrington (Declaratory judgment; summary judgment; tax sale; "This appeal arises out of a system to collect and pay property taxes unique to the defendant city of Torrington (city). See 21 Spec. Acts 7, No. 4 (1931). Pursuant to the system, the defendant tax collector, Robert Crovo (tax collector), conducted a tax sale in which he sold the real property of the plaintiff, Alyssa Peterson, to collect unpaid property taxes. In response, Peterson commenced an action against the city, the tax collector, and the purchasers of the property at the sale, the defendants William Gilson and Sharon Gilson (purchasers). Subsequently, Homeowners Finance Company (lender), the first mortgage holder on the plaintiff's property, intervened as a defendant, in an attempt to void the sale of the property. All six parties filed motions for summary judgment. Ultimately, the trial court, after concluding that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact, granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants and denied summary judgment as to Peterson and the lender. Peterson and the lender filed separate appeals. We dismiss the lender's appeal." "[1]Peterson's appeal was dismissed after she failed to timely file a brief and appendix. She, therefore, is not a party to this appeal.")

AC42256 - Dickau v. Mingrone (Property; breach of contract; "The plaintiff, Jason Dickau, appeals from the trial court's judgment in favor of the defendant, Lawrence Mingrone, on the plaintiff's complaint, which alleged breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation, intentional misrepresentation, and innocent misrepresentation, relating to the defendant's sale of real property to the plaintiff. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court's findings that (1) the Office of Building Inspection and Enforcement for the City of New Haven (building department) had not made a determination that the number of legal units in the property was less than three, and (2) the plaintiff had failed to establish the existence of damages as to each of his claims were clearly erroneous. We disagree with the plaintiff and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

AC42000 - Jepsen v. Camassar (Declaratory judgment; "The plaintiffs Anders B. Jepsen and Beth Jepsen appeal from the denial of their postjudgment motions for equitable relief, for attorney's fees and costs, and to open the judgment rendered by the trial court following a remand by this court. See Jepsen v. Camassar, 181 Conn. App. 492, 187 A.3d 486 (Jepsen I), cert. denied, 329 Conn. 909, 186 A.3d 12 (2018). On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that (1) the trial court failed to provide them with relief that was encompassed within the mandate of Jepsen I when it denied their claims to equitable relief and attorney's fees and costs, (2) even assuming that the mandate did not encompass the relief sought by the plaintiffs, the trial court improperly declined to open the judgment to provide the plaintiffs with their desired relief, and (3) the trial court violated the plaintiffs' constitutional rights by failing to provide them with their desired relief on remand. We agree in part with the plaintiffs' claim to attorney's fees and costs, reverse the judgment of the trial court limited to that issue and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.")

AC41688 - Carabetta Organization, Ltd. v. Meriden ("In this case arising from a dispute that originated more than twenty years ago, the plaintiffs, The Carabetta Organization, Ltd., Summitwood Development, LLC (Summitwood), and Nipmuc Properties, LLC (Nipmuc), appeal from the summary judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of the defendants, the city of Meriden, Dominick Caruso, Tilcon, Inc., and Tilcon Connecticut, Inc. (Tilcon). The plaintiffs claim that the court erred in concluding that their claims were barred by the doctrine of res judicata. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

• Posted in:
• Contract Law,
• Declaratory Judgment Law,
• Property Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC41922 - Starboard Resources, Inc. v. Henry ("In this interpleader action, the Imbruce parties appeal from the trial court's interlocutory judgment of interpleader. On appeal, the Imbruce parties claim that the trial court (1) does not have subject matter jurisdiction over this interpleader action because the plaintiff, Starboard Resources, Inc., lacks standing, (2) erroneously denied the defendant Giddings Investments, LLC's motion to dismiss this interpleader action as moot, (3) improperly rendered the interlocutory judgment of interpleader, and (4) erroneously granted a motion to remand the matter to the arbitrator who had entered an award in an arbitration involving the Imbruce parties and the SOSventures parties. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

• Posted in:
• Business Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC41545 - Presto v. Presto ("The plaintiff Charles Presto, in his capacity as the executor of the estate of William Presto, and in his individual capacity, appeals from the judgment dismissing his declaratory judgment action against the defendants, Teodozja Presto, Andrzej Mazurek, and Stanislaus Mazurek, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the ground that the claims raised were not ripe for adjudication. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

• AC41545 Appendix - Presto v. Presto

• Posted in:
• Declaratory Judgment Law,
• Probate Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC42026 - Compass Bank v. Dunn ("Practice Book § 13-19 is a rule not often considered by either this court or the Supreme Court. We examine it in this appeal, because the defendants Jeffrey S. Dunn and Diane C. Dunn claim that, despite their counsel's compliance with § 13-19, the trial court erroneously granted the motion for default for failure to disclose a defense filed by the plaintiff, Compass Bank. We agree with the defendants and reverse the judgment of the trial court.")

AC41851 - Wachovia Mortgage, FSB v. Toczek ("The defendant Aleksandra Toczek appeals from the judgment of strict foreclosure rendered in favor of the substitute plaintiff, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court (1) lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiff did not have standing, (2) improperly granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment as to liability, (3) improperly granted the plaintiff's motion for a judgment of strict foreclosure in violation of Practice Book § 23-18, and (4) abused its discretion when it denied the defendant's motion to reargue the judgment of strict foreclosure. We disagree with the defendant and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

• Posted in:
• Foreclosure Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC41824 - Turek v. Zoning Board of Appeals (Zoning; "The defendant, the Zoning Board of Appeals of the City of Milford (board), appeals from the judgment of the trial court sustaining the appeal filed by the plaintiffs . . . and reversing the decision of the board that the plaintiffs were not entitled to a variance. On appeal, the board claims that the trial court erroneously sustained the appeal, and causes us to consider (1) whether the plaintiffs demonstrated a legally cognizable hardship, and (2) whether the plaintiffs' proposal qualifies under the exception to the hardship requirement set forth in Adolphson v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 205 Conn. 703, 710, 535 A.2d 799 (1988), and its progeny. We reverse the judgment of the trial court.")

• Posted in:
• Land Use Law,
• Recent Opinions

SC20122 - Rutter v. Janis (Negligence; "Subject to certain requirements, General Statutes § 14-60 (a) permits motor vehicle dealers to temporarily loan a dealer license plate to, inter alia, the purchaser of one of their vehicles while that purchaser's registration is pending, but "for not more than thirty days in any year . . . ." The dispositive issue in this certified appeal is whether, for purposes of calculating that thirty day period, the "first day" is the date on which the dealer loans the plate to the purchaser or the first full calendar day thereafter.

Following a fatal motor vehicle accident, the plaintiffs in this joint appeal, Casey Leigh Rutter, Nancy Beale, as administratrix of the estate of Lindsey Beale, and Jason Ferreira, each commenced an action against the defendant Danbury Fair Hyundai, LLC, a motor vehicle dealer whose dealer license plate was displayed on one of the vehicles involved in the accident. The trial court concluded that the accident occurred on the last day of the thirty day limitation period of § 14-60 (a) because the day during which the defendant loaned the plate was not included in the calculation of the thirty day period. The Appellate Court agreed and affirmed the judgments of the trial court; see Rutter v. Janis, 180 Conn. App. 1, 5, 182 A.3d 85 (2018); and we granted certification, limited to the issue of whether the Appellate Court correctly excluded the date of the loan when calculating the thirty day loan period. See Rutter v. Janis, 329 Conn. 904, 185 A.3d 594 (2018).

We agree with the Appellate Court that the day of the loan does not count toward the thirty day limitation period of § 14-60 (a). In particular, we conclude that the legislature's unqualified use of the term "days"—a term that has a well established legal meaning in our jurisprudence—indicates that it intended the thirty day period to be measured in terms of full calendar days. Therefore, because the day of the loan was a "fraction" of a day rather than a full calendar day, it must be excluded. This construction is consistent with this court's long recognized policy that, when calculating statutory and other deadlines, "the day of the act from which a future time is to be ascertained . . . is to be excluded from the calculation . . . ." Weeks v. Hull, 19 Conn. 376, 382 (1849). This court established, and has consistently adhered to, this rule as a matter of policy in order to ensure uniformity and predictability in the computation of deadlines, and we see no reason why it should not be applied to § 14-60 (a). Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.")

• Posted in:
• Recent Opinions,
• Tort Law

AC41061 - Al-Fikey v. Obaiah ("The defendant, Mohamed Obaiah, appeals from the judgment of the trial court dissolving his marriage to the plaintiff, Reem Al-Fikey. The defendant asserts that the trial court improperly (1) found him at fault for the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage, (2) found that he was intentionally underemployed when calculating his earning capacity, and (3) determined which properties were part of the marital estate. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

AC42003 - Nietupski v. Del Castillo ("The self-represented plaintiff, Karol Nietupski, appeals from the judgment of the trial court dissolving his marriage to the defendant, Nerida Del Castillo. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court (1) violated the free exercise clause of the first amendment by rendering a judgment of marital dissolution, and (2) improperly entered orders regarding the travel and education of a minor child. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

• Posted in:
• Family Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC41145 - Bordiere v. Ciarcia Construction, LLC ("The self-represented defendant Michael Ciarcia appeals from the judgment of the trial court granting the motion of Patricia Bordiere, the executrix of the estate of Marcus Bordiere, to open a prior judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff, Marcus Bordiere, and to substitute herself as the plaintiff for purposes of enforcing the prior judgment by pursuing an after-discovered asset of the defendant. Specifically, the defendant claims that the trial court erred in relying on General Statutes § 52-107 to grant the executrix' motion to substitute herself as the plaintiff, as there was no case pending at the time she filed her motion to substitute and, thus, no case in which she could participate. We agree with the defendant and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the trial court.")

• Posted in:
• Civil Procedure,
• Recent Opinions