SC20992 - Suprynowicz v. Tohan ("The plaintiffs, Kayla Suprynowicz and Reilly Flaherty, who were strangers for most of their lives, discovered through the genetic testing company 23andMe that they are half siblings. They allege in this action that their biological father is the defendant, Narendra B. Tohan, the reproductive endocrinologist who assisted the plaintiffs' parents in the parents' efforts to conceive children. The plaintiffs claim that, in treating their parents' infertility, the defendant utilized his own sperm rather than the sperm of the men they believed to be their fathers to impregnate their mothers, causing the plaintiffs physical and emotional harm. Although the plaintiffs' causes of action were labeled in the complaint as ordinary negligence claims, the defendant moved to strike them on the ground that they were noncognizable wrongful life claims. The trial court agreed and granted the motion to strike the plaintiffs' complaint.

The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the trial court correctly determined that the plaintiffs' negligence claims sounded in wrongful life rather than ordinary negligence. We conclude that the answer to that question is no and that our recent decision in Lynch v. State, 348 Conn. 478, 308 A.3d 1 (2024), controls the outcome. In Lynch, this court clarified that a claim arising from hospital staff's alleged negligence in using sperm infected with a virus in the course of a therapeutic donor insemination (TDI) procedure sounded in medical negligence, not wrongful life. See id., 484–87, 489–91, 505, 507. Similarly, the plaintiffs' claims in the present case are ordinary negligence claims rather than wrongful life claims because they arise from the defendant doctor's alleged negligence in using his own sperm to impregnate the plaintiffs' mothers during in vitro fertilization (IVF) procedures. Accordingly, we reverse in part the judgment of the trial court.")

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AC46498 - Roux v. Coffey ("The plaintiffs, Carri Roux and Stephen J. Roux, coadministrators of the estate of their son, Luke M. Roux (Roux), appeal from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the defendant Live Nation Worldwide, Inc., following the court's granting of the defendant's motion to strike all counts of the complaint brought against it. On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the court improperly struck counts four and five of their complaint, which alleged negligence and public nuisance claims, respectively. We affirm the judgment of the court.")

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• Tort Law

AC46166 - Unifoods, S.A. de C.V. v. Magallanes ("The plaintiff, Unifoods, S.A. de C.V., appeals from the summary judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of the defendants Julia Magallanes and Calvin Cordulack on counts two through five of the plaintiff's operative complaint asserting violations of the Connecticut Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (CUFTA), General Statutes § 52-552a et seq. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly concluded that (1) the defendants satisfied their initial burden of demonstrating that no genuine issues of material fact existed and that, as a matter of law, the plaintiff's fraudulent transfer claims were time barred pursuant to General Statutes § 52-552j, and (2) after shifting the burden of proof to the plaintiff, the plaintiff had not established the existence of genuine issues of material fact regarding the timeliness of its claims. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

• Posted in:
• Property Law,
• Recent Opinions,
• Tort Law

AC46508 - Civic Mind, LLC v. Hartford (“In this action concerning the redevelopment of Dillon Stadium (stadium) in Hartford, the plaintiff, Civic Mind, LLC, appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing its complaint against the nineteen defendants, including the city of Hartford (city) and the Capital Region Development Authority (CRDA). On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly granted motions to dismiss filed by the defendants on the ground that the plaintiff lacked standing to pursue its claims against the defendants. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.”)

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• Contract Law,
• Recent Opinions,
• Tort Law

AC 46133 - Lafferty v. Jones ("In these consolidated appeals, the defendants Alex Emric Jones and Free Speech Systems, LLC, appeal from the judgments of the trial court rendered following jury verdicts returned in favor of the plaintiffs in the underlying consolidated tort actions arising out of the 2012 mass shooting at Sandy Hook Elementary School in Newtown. On appeal, the defendants claim that the court improperly (1) defaulted them as a sanction for violating certain discovery orders and a protective order, (2) construed the effect of the default to relieve the plaintiffs of the burden to prove the extent of their damages, (3) restricted the scope of Jones’ testimony at the hearing in damages, (4) denied their motion for a remittitur, and (5) concluded that the plaintiffs’ claim asserting a violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), General Statutes § 42-110a et seq., was legally sufficient. For the reasons that follow, we disagree with the defendants’ first, second, and fourth claims, and deem the defendants’ third claim to be abandoned as inadequately briefed. We agree, however, with the defendants’ fifth claim. Accordingly, we reverse in part the judgments of the trial court.")

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• Tort Law

AC46477 - Robinson v. V. D. ("The defendant, V. D., appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying his special motion to dismiss the underlying civil action pursuant to General Statutes § 52-196a, our state's anti-SLAPP statute. The civil action filed by the plaintiffs, Michael Robinson and Mary Robinson, seeks compensatory damages and injunctive relief for defamation, invasion of privacy by false light, statutory and common-law vexatious litigation, and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The defendant claims that (1) the court improperly denied his special motion to dismiss the action on the ground that his alleged conduct did not relate to an exercise of a protected right in connection with a matter of public concern and, thus, fell outside the scope of § 52-196a, and, (2) even if he is not entitled to a dismissal of the action pursuant to § 52-196a, the trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this action because the defendant is entitled to absolute immunity under the litigation privilege for his alleged conduct, all of which occurred in the course of judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings. In addition to disputing the defendant's claims, the plaintiffs raise as an alternative ground for affirming the denial of the special motion to dismiss that § 52-196a violates both the state and federal constitutions. We conclude that the question of whether the plaintiffs' action is barred by absolute immunity under the litigation privilege implicates the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction and, thus, must be considered prior to addressing the merits of the special motion to dismiss. We agree with the defendant that, with the exception of those counts sounding in vexatious litigation, the complaint is barred by absolute immunity. With respect to the remaining vexatious litigation counts, we affirm in part and reverse in part the court's decision to deny the special motion to dismiss, we reject the plaintiffs' alternative ground for affirmance, and we remand the matter for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.")

AC46645 - Vu v. N. L. ("The plaintiff, Nhan Vu, appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying his motion to open the judgment of dismissal rendered in favor of the self-represented defendant, N. L. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court abused its discretion in denying his motion to open. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

• Posted in:
• Employment Law,
• Recent Opinions,
• Tort Law

AC45829 - Mulvihill v. Spinnato ("The defendant, Kara Spinnato, known also as Kara Callahan, appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying her special motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Connecticut's anti-SLAPP statute, General Statutes § 52-196a, in this defamation action brought by the self-represented plaintiff, Daniel Mulvihill. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly concluded that the plaintiff met his burden under § 52-196a of establishing probable cause that he will prevail on the merits of his complaint. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

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• Tort Law

AC46182- Belton v. Dragoi (“At issue on appeal is whether the trial court properly rendered summary judgment for the defendants as to the plaintiff’s claims that the defendants committed a battery on him and falsely arrested him. Specifically, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly concluded (1) with respect to the alleged battery, that there are no genuine issues of material fact as to whether the defendants used more than reasonable force during the altercation and (2) with respect to the alleged false arrest, that (a) the defendants were entitled to governmental immunity because the plaintiff had failed to raise a claim of negligent false arrest and (b) there are no genuine issues of material fact as to whether the defendants had probable cause to arrest the plaintiff. We agree with the plaintiff’s first claim but disagree with his other claims. Accordingly, we reverse in part the judgment of the trial court.”)

• Posted in:
• Civil Rights,
• Recent Opinions,
• Tort Law

AC46362 - Walencewicz v. Jealous Monk, LLC ("In this premises liability action, the defendant, Jealous Monk, LLC, appeals from the judgment of the trial court, rendered after a jury trial, in favor of the plaintiff, Noemi Walencewicz. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly (1) denied the defendant's motions for a directed verdict and to set aside the verdict because the plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence to support the jury's findings that the defendant had constructive notice of the specific defect and that the specific defect caused her injuries, and (2) refused to charge the jury on the definitions of negligence and reasonable care. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

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• Tort Law

AC46295 - Orlando v. Liburd ("In this action arising out of a motor vehicle accident, the plaintiff, Rocco Orlando, appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the third-party defendant, Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company (Nationwide), on counts three and four of the operative amended complaint and from the court's denial of a motion for leave to amend an earlier complaint. The plaintiff claims that the court improperly (1) denied his request to amend, which prevented him from curing alleged pleading deficiencies and (2) dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction his counts directed against Nationwide because, contrary to the court's conclusion, the claims therein were ripe under the "make whole doctrine." We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

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• Tort Law

AC 46228 - Sanchez v. Hartford ("The defendants, the city of Hartford (city) and James Davis, a police officer employed by the city, appeal from the judgment of the trial court rendered after a jury trial finding Davis negligent in violation of General Statutes § 14-283, the city liable for indemnification pursuant to General Statutes § 7-465, and finding the plaintiff, Jose Sanchez, contributorily negligent. On appeal, the defendants claim that the court committed plain error by (1) (a) instructing the jury on common law principles of negligence regarding the operation of a motor vehicle, including the duty to drive with due care, and (b) failing to instruct the jury that Davis, as an operator of an emergency vehicle, was permitted to disregard driving statutes, ordinances and regulations, and (2) failing to instruct the jury that, pursuant to § 14-283 (e), other operators of motor vehicles have a mandatory duty to drive to a position parallel to the curb of the roadway and remain there until the emergency vehicle has passed, ‘‘[u]pon the immediate approach of an emergency vehicle making use of . . . an audible warning signal device and such visible flashing or revolving lights . . . .’’ General Statutes § 14- 283 (e). We conclude that the record does not support the defendants’ claims that the challenged portions of the jury instructions constituted plain error. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

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• Tort Law

SC 20800 - Idlibi v. Hartford Courant Co. ("The self-represented plaintiff, Ammar Idlibi, a pediatric dentist, appeals from the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming the judgment of the trial court, which rendered summary judgment in favor of the defendant, Hartford Courant Company, on his defamation claims. The plaintiff’s complaint centers around two articles published by the defendant that allegedly exaggerated the scope and seriousness of disciplinary proceedings conducted by the Department of Public Health (department) and the Connecticut State Dental Commission that resulted in a reprimand, fines, and probation of the plaintiff’s license to practice as a dentist. The courts below concluded that the five allegedly defamatory statements contained in the articles either were substantially true or were subject to the fair report privilege and, therefore, were protected speech under the first amendment to the United States constitution. In this certified appeal, the plaintiff’s primary claim is that he should have been permitted to proceed to trial on a sixth allegation, one only vaguely alluded to in his pleadings, that a stock (or file) photograph accompanying the defendant’s articles also was defamatory. Although this case raises important questions about the extent to which the judiciary must accommodate the inexperience of self-represented litigants, and potentially implicates some constitutional questions of first impression that the parties have not fully briefed, we ultimately conclude that this sixth claim is not properly in the case and, therefore, affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.")

• SC 20800 Dissent - Idlibi v. Hartford Courant Co.

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AC46399 - Bucci v. Bridgeport ("The plaintiff, Elizabeth Bucci, appeals from the judgment rendered by the trial court following its granting of a motion for summary judgment that was filed by the defendant, the city of Bridgeport, and its denial of her motion for summary judgment. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that, in granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment, the court improperly (1) concluded that a genuine issue of material fact did not exist with respect to whether Bridgeport Police Officer Anthony Gianpoalo was acting within the scope of his employment or official duties, and (2) determined that her claim based on the defendant's negligent hiring of Bridgeport Police Officer John Carrano was barred by the applicable statute of limitations. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

AC46511 - Carty v. Merchant 99-111 Founders, LLC ("The plaintiff, Lloyd Carty, appeals from the summary judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of the defendant, Merchant 99-111 Founders, LLC, on the plaintiff's one count complaint sounding in premises liability arising out of his slip and fall. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly rendered summary judgment in favor of the defendant on the basis of the ongoing storm doctrine because (1) the defendant never produced evidence to refute the claim that the plaintiff fell on preexisting ice, and (2) the plaintiff raised genuine issues of material fact as to whether he fell on preexisting ice. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

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• Tort Law

SC20798 - Laiuppa v. Moritz ("This certified appeal requires us to construe General Statutes § 52-592, the accidental failure of suit statute, in order to determine whether the plaintiff, Paul Laiuppa, commenced his underlying civil action within the time limited by law. The plaintiff appeals from the judgment of the Appellate Court, which affirmed the trial court's decision to grant the motion for summary judgment filed by the defendant, Mary Moritz, on the ground that the original action was not "commenced within the time limited by law," as required by § 52-592 (a). On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that the action was not "commenced" for purposes of § 52-592 (a) on the ground that the defendant did not receive a copy of the summons and complaint within the time period prescribed by the statute of limitations. We affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.")

• SC20798 Dissent - Laiuppa v. Moritz

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AC46350 - Prescott v. Gilshteyn ("The defendant, Yuliya Gilshteyn, appeals from the judgment of the trial court granting the application for a prejudgment remedy filed by the plaintiff, Keren Prescott, upon findings of probable cause that the defendant committed a civil assault and battery against the plaintiff, that the defendant intentionally inflicted emotional distress on the plaintiff, that the defendant maliciously and intentionally harassed and intimidated the plaintiff by spitting in the plaintiff's face and that her actions in doing so were motivated, in whole or in substantial part, by the plaintiff's race. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court (1) improperly determined that the plaintiff was entitled to a prejudgment remedy in the amount of $295,239.60, (2) abused its discretion in permitting testimony from the plaintiff's expert concerning the racist import of certain statements made by the defendant, and (3) committed plain error in granting the plaintiff's application for a prejudgment remedy in a case involving freedom of speech and first amendment principles. We disagree and affirm the judgment of the court.")

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• Tort Law

SC20797 - Collier v. Adar Hartford Realty, LLC ("This is an interlocutory appeal from the trial court's denial of a motion for class certification. The plaintiffs, former residents of Barbour Gardens, a housing development in the city of Hartford (city), instituted this action in connection with the living conditions at Barbour Gardens during their residency. They sought compensatory and punitive damages and attorney's fees from the owner of Barbour Gardens and its property management company, and alleged various tort, contract, equitable, and statutory claims, including a claim of a violation of a provision of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), General Statutes § 42-110g. The plaintiffs filed a motion to certify a class on behalf 'of all persons who lived at Barbour Gardens for any or all of the time between June 24, 2004, and October 13, 2019,' which the trial court denied on the grounds that individualized issues would predominate over class-wide issues and that a class action is not a superior method to resolve the plaintiffs' claims. See Practice Book § 9-8 (3). In this appeal brought pursuant to General Statutes § 42-110h, the plaintiffs contend that there is sufficient evidence in the record common to the entire class to satisfy the predominance and superiority requirements. We reject this claim due to the lengthy period of time for which class certification was requested—covering all residents at Barbour Gardens at any time over a span of more than fifteen years—and the absence of generalized evidence in the record concerning the living conditions at Barbour Gardens during most of the proposed class period. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiffs' motion for class certification.")

• Posted in:
• Civil Procedure,
• Contract Law,
• Landlord / Tenant Law,
• Recent Opinions,
• Tort Law

AC46208 - Martinelli v. Martinelli (“In the latest chapter in this family dispute arising out of the administration of the estate of Kevin P. Martinelli (Kevin), the plaintiffs, Aubri E. Martinelli, Zachary Martinelli, and Linzy Martinelli, who are Kevin’s children, appeal from the judgment of the trial court granting the motions to dismiss filed by the defendants, Martin P. Martinelli (Martin), who is Kevin’s brother and was the first executor of Kevin’s estate, and Reid & Riege, P.C. (Reid & Riege), the law firm that represented Martin in the administration of Kevin’s estate. The court concluded that the plaintiffs lacked standing to assert their claims of breach of fiduciary duty, common-law conversion, and statutory theft against Martin and their legal malpractice claim against Reid & Riege. On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the trial court improperly (1) concluded that they lacked standing to assert their claims against the defendants, and (2) denied their request to amend their complaint. We are unpersuaded by either claim and, therefore, affirm the judgment of the trial court.”

• Posted in:
• Legal Malpractice & Attorney Discipline Law,
• Probate Law,
• Recent Opinions,
• Tort Law

AC46268 - Stoor v. Vehs (“The intervening plaintiff, Attorney Gregory P. Cohan, appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered after a court trial wherein the court determined that the plaintiff, Zachary Stoor, owed Cohan $9000 for his services as the plaintiff’s attorney. Specifically, Cohan claims that the court improperly awarded him less than the amount provided for in his contingency fee agreement with the plaintiff. On cross appeal, the plaintiff claims that ‘the discharge of an attorney in a contingency fee case prior to settlement does not constitute a breach of contract under Connecticut law and the award of damages for quantum meruit under [the breach of contract count] . . . was improper.’ As to both the appeal and cross appeal, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.”)

• Posted in:
• Contract Law,
• Recent Opinions,
• Tort Law

AC46047 - Speer v. Skaats ("The plaintiff, Sheri Speer, appeals from the judgment of the trial court, Goodrow, J., dismissing the civil action brought by her against the defendant, Donna Skaats. The plaintiff claims that, in dismissing the action, the court erred in concluding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because she was not aggrieved and, thus, lacked standing to bring the action. The plaintiff also claims that the court, Spallone, J., erred in "denying [her motion for] summary judgment." We agree with the plaintiff's first claim and, therefore, reverse the judgment of the trial court.")

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• Tort Law

AC46061 - Wylie v. APT Foundation, Inc. ("The plaintiff, Nadine Wylie, acting in her capacity as the administratrix of the estate of Keith Wylie (decedent), appeals from the judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of the defendant, APT Foundation, Inc., following the granting of a motion to strike her amended substitute complaint dated July 21, 2021. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly concluded that she failed to allege sufficient facts to support her public nuisance claim. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

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• Tort Law