The 2024 edition of our research guide on Dog Law in Connecticut has been added to our research guides webpage.

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AC46940 - Middletown v. Wagner ("In this animal welfare action, the self-represented defendant Justin Wagner appeals from the judgment of the trial court vesting ownership of the dogs seized from a barn leased by the defendant and Destiny Jennings, together with the puppies subsequently born to those dogs, in the plaintiff, the city of Middletown, after it found that the dogs were neglected. On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) the trial court erred when it denied the defendant's motion to return property and suppress evidence obtained pursuant to a warrantless search and seizure of the property, (2) General Statutes §§ 22-329a and 53-247, as applied to the defendant and Jennings, are void for vagueness, (3) the police did not provide Jennings with fair notice of the law, (4) the court did not apply the proper legal standard, and (5) there was insufficient evidence presented at the hearing to support a finding that the dogs in the barn were neglected. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

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• Property Law,
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The 2024 edition of our research guide on Abandoned, Lost or Unclaimed Property in Connecticut has been added to our research guides webpage.

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• FYI,
• Legal Research,
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SC20826 - PPC Realty, LLC v. Hartford ("In this appeal, we must interpret provisions of the Uniform Relocation Assistance Act (act), §§ 8-266 through 8-282, also known as the URRA, to determine whether a city can maintain a lien against a property to secure repayment of costs incurred when relocating residents who find themselves displaced following the city's enforcement of its building codes, even if the property owner did not cause the building to become uninhabitable. The defendant, the city of Hartford, contends that the trial court improperly discharged its lien on the property of the plaintiff, PPC Realty, LLC. Relying on the statutory text of the act, we agree with the defendant that its lien was proper, and we reverse the trial court's judgment.")

SC20826 Concurrence - PPC Realty, LLC v. Hartford

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AC45742 - New London v. Speer ("The self-represented defendant, Sheri Speer, appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing for lack of subject matter jurisdiction her counterclaim against the plaintiff, the city of New London, in which the defendant sought damages for the plaintiff's alleged violation of the automatic stay imposed by the United States Bankruptcy Code. See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (a) (2012). On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate her counterclaim seeking damages pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362 (k). We agree with the defendant and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the trial court.")

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AC46128 - Ryder v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Assn. ("The plaintiff, Gary Ryder, appeals from the judgment of the trial court, rendered after a jury trial, in favor of the defendant, JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly (1) denied his motions to set aside the jury's verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict 'to the extent that the verdict awarded no damages to the plaintiff,' (2) precluded the plaintiff from presenting evidence relevant to the damages incurred after November, 2014, when he transferred title to the property to a trust, (3) denied his motions to set aside the verdict as inadequate and for additur, and (4) denied his postjudgment motion to consolidate the underlying action with the defendant's related foreclosure action against the plaintiff. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

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• Contract Law,
• Foreclosure Law,
• Property Law

AC46455 - Walters v. Servidio ("In this land use dispute concerning whether the plaintiffs, Frederick J. Walters, Susan M. Walters, Michael S. Mason, and Michele A. Mason, have an easement over an approximately forty-four foot long by forty foot wide dirt section of a private road between 22 Ridge Street and 33 Cognewaugh Road in the Cos Cob section of Greenwich, known as the disputed area, the plaintiffs appeal from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the defendants, Francesco G. Servidio and Rita Servidio. On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the court improperly determined that (1) they could not prevail on their claims of (a) express easement, (b) easement by implication, and (c) obstruction of a purported easement, and (2) the defendants prevailed on their counterclaims of (a) trespass, (b) (1) slander of title, and (b) (2) a violation of General Statutes § 47-41. We agree only with the plaintiffs' claim concerning slander of title and, accordingly, reverse in part and affirm in part the judgment of the trial court.

-----

The judgment is reversed only with respect to the counterclaim of slander of title and the case is remanded with direction to render judgment in favor of the plaintiffs on that counterclaim; the judgment is affirmed in all other respects.")

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• Property Law,
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• SC20804 - FuelCell Energy, Inc. v. Groton (Tax assessment appeal; "This municipal tax appeal asks us to consider how, and whether, personal property tax exemptions should apply to fuel cell modules that produce both electricity and waste heat. It first asks whether fuel cell modules and related equipment were exempt from property taxation as a class I renewable energy source under General Statutes § 12-81. It then asks whether that same property was exempted from taxation for the October 1, 2016 grand list as ‘‘goods in [the] process of manufacture’’ pursuant to § 12-81. Last, it asks whether the taxpayers were required to formally declare their personal property pursuant to General Statutes §§12-40, 12-41 and 12-71, even if it was exempt from taxation, and what, if any, the consequences of failing to do so would be.")

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• Administrative Appeal Law,
• Property Law

AC46383 - Mulvey v. Palo ("The plaintiff, Mona S. Mulvey, trustee of the Mona S. Mulvey Trust (trust), appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the defendants, Stefan Palo, Ema Palo, and Bank of America, N.A., on both her adverse possession claim and the defendants' quiet title counterclaim .On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly concluded that she failed to establish (1) her claim of adverse possession with respect to all areas of the property in question and (2) the boundaries of those areas with reasonable certainty. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

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• Declaratory Judgment Law,
• Property Law,
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AC46333 - Palmieri v. Cirino ("The plaintiff in the underlying quiet title action, Patrick Palmieri, appeals from the judgment of the trial court awarding attorney’s fees to the defendant, Frank Cirino, following a default judgment rendered against the plaintiff on the defendant’s counterclaim. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court (1) abused its discretion in issuing the award because the affidavit in support of attorney’s fees was filed beyond the thirty day deadline set forth in Practice Book § 11-21 and (2) improperly awarded attorney’s fees that were incurred prior to the present action. We agree with the plaintiff’s second claim and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for a new hearing on the defendant’s motion for attorney’s fees.")

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• Civil Procedure,
• Property Law,
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SC20838 - 9 Pettipaug, LLC v. Planning & Zoning Commission (Administrative appeal; Zoning appeal, constructive notice, "This certified appeal requires us to consider a significant question in this time of great change in the local journalism industry, namely, how a publication qualifies as "a newspaper having a substantial circulation in the municipality" for purposes of providing constructive notice of that municipality's promulgation of zoning regulations under General Statutes § 8-3 (d). The defendant, the Planning and Zoning Commission of the Borough of Fenwick (commission), appeals, upon our grant of its petition for certification, from the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming the judgment of the trial court in favor of the plaintiffs, 9 Pettipaug, LLC, and Eniotna, LLP. 9 Pettipaug, LLC v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 217 Conn. App. 714, 717, 737, 290 A.3d 853 (2023). On appeal, the commission claims that the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that its publication of notice in The Middletown Press (Press) of an amended zoning regulation did not comply with § 8-3 (d) because none of Fenwick's fourteen year-round households subscribes to the Press and it is not sold anywhere in Fenwick. Given the Press' focus on news items of general interest, its ready availability for purchase in the commercial area of the town of Old Saybrook, in which the borough of Fenwick is located, the fact that the Press' website allows free access to legal notices, and the deference that we afford the commission's long history of using the Press for its legal notices, we conclude that the Press is a newspaper having a substantial circulation in the municipality of Fenwick under § 8-3 (d). Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.")

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• Administrative Appeal Law,
• Property Law

AC46258 - Brennan v. Board of Assessment Appeals ("In this administrative tax appeal, the plaintiff, James R. Brennan, appeals from the judgment of the trial court affirming the decision of the defendant, the Board of Assessment Appeals of the Town of Seymour (board), which upheld the revaluation of his residential dwelling and the declassification of his 7.26 acres of nonresidential land (excess property) as farmland by the Seymour tax assessor (assessor). On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly (1) determined that he had abandoned his claim regarding the proper value of his residential dwelling, (2) considered the factors set forth in General Statutes § 12-107c (a) in determining whether the excess property was no longer being used as a farm for purposes of General Statutes § 12-504h, and (3) determined that the plaintiff changed the use of the excess property so as to have lost the entitlement to the farmland designation previously granted to him by the assessor. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

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• Property Law,
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AC46321 - Gleason v. Atkins ("The plaintiffs, Mary Gleason and Keavy Ann Gleason, appeal from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the defendant, Paul Atkins, in the plaintiffs' action to quiet title to a strip of land in the town of New Preston and to obtain damages for trespass. The disputed strip of land is the unpaved shoulder of a public highway, which extends across the defendant's property and lies to the south of a lakefront parcel (lakefront premises) that the plaintiffs have the exclusive right to use in common with other property owners who are not parties to this action. On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the court improperly concluded that the lakefront premises is bounded by the unpaved shoulder rather than the paved portion of the highway. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

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AC45875 - Krasko v. Konkos ("The defendants Robert Konkos and Chelsea Konkos (collectively, Konkos defendants); 105 Honeysuckle Trust, dated March 9, 2021, Owned Wealth, LLC, as trustee; and Owned Wealth, LLC, appeal from the judgment of the trial court granting a motion brought by the plaintiffs, Robert J. Krasko and Francis L. O'Neill, to enforce a settlement agreement allegedly entered into between the parties at a pretrial conference. On appeal, the defendants claim that the trial court erred in granting the plaintiffs' motion to enforce in the absence of a clear and unambiguous agreement. We reverse the judgment of the court.")

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SC20759 - Canner v. Governors Ridge Assn., Inc. (“The plaintiffs, Glen A. Canner, the executor of the estate of Charles A. Canner, and Louis D. Puteri, brought separate actions against a condominium association, the named defendant in each case, Governors Ridge Association, Inc., alleging that the foundations supporting their respective units were sinking as a result of improper design. In this consolidated appeal, the plaintiffs contend that the Appellate Court improperly affirmed the trial court’s judgments in favor of the defendant on the ground that the three year tort statute of limitations; see General Statutes § 52-577; barred pursuit of an alleged cause of action under the Common Interest Ownership Act (CIOA), General Statutes § 47-200 et seq. We conclude that some, but not all, of the plaintiffs’ claims against the defendant are time barred and, accordingly, we affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the Appellate Court.”)

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• Tort Law

AC45450 - Patrick v. 111 Clearview Drive, LLC (Quiet title; "This appeal arises from the dismissal of a quiet title action. The plaintiff, Lois Patrick, initiated the action against the defendant 111 Clearview Drive, LLC, alleging that she has an interest in certain real property located in Bridgeport, as to which the defendant holds title. After a hearing on the defendant's motion to strike the plaintiff's amended complaint, the trial court dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction after determining, sua sponte, that the plaintiff was making an improper collateral attack on a prior judgment. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court (1) improperly concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the quiet title action because the plaintiff was collaterally attacking an underlying foreclosure action, and (2) failed to adjudicate whether the plaintiff may be considered an omitted party under General Statutes § 49-30. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

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AC45508 - Supronowicz v. Eaton (Adverse possesion; "In this action to quiet title alleging ownership by adverse possession, the plaintiffs, Jacek Supronowicz and Iwona Supronowicz, appeal from the summary judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of the defendants Michael Eaton and Stephanie Hawker. The plaintiffs claim that the court improperly concluded that they could not establish their claim of adverse possession as a matter of law because they (1) failed to demonstrate that privity existed between themselves and their predecessors in title for purposes of tacking periods of possession, (2) acknowledged the defendants' superior title to the disputed area, and (3) failed to show that their use of the disputed area was exclusive. The plaintiffs assert that genuine issues of material fact remain as to each of these issues and that the court therefore improperly granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment. We agree with the plaintiffs as to each of their claims and, for the reasons that follow, reverse the judgment of the trial court.")

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AC45974 - Vering v. Groton Long Point Assn., Inc. (Declaratory judgment; adverse possession; prescriptive easement; "The present case arises from a dispute between the plaintiffs, Peter B. Viering, Russell W. Viering, Jr., Christine Carr, Jane M. Battles, Thomas E. Kingston, Jr., and Bobbye Lou Sims, and the defendant, The Groton Long Point Association, Inc., concerning the plaintiffs' claimed right to make exclusive use of two strips of land denominated as rights-of-way on land owned by the defendant that abuts the plaintiffs' residential properties in the Groton Long Point section of Groton. The plaintiffs appeal from the judgment rendered against them by the trial court on the granting of a motion for summary judgment filed by the defendant and the denial of the plaintiffs' own motion for summary judgment. On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the court erred in its summary judgment rulings by (1) failing to consider whether access easements over the two rights-of-way had been granted to them by deed, and thereby conferred on them the right to use such rights-of-way to the exclusion of all others, and failing in so ruling to consider certain extrinsic evidence allegedly relevant to that claim; (2) concluding that the defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the plaintiffs' claim that they had acquired the rights-of-way by adverse possession or, alternatively, that they had acquired prescriptive easements over the rights-of-way; and (3) failing to address their claim that the defendant had abandoned the rights-of-way. We affirm the judgment of the court.")

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• Declaratory Judgment Law,
• Property Law,
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AC45863 - SG Pequot 200, LLC v. Fairfield (“The plaintiff, SG Pequot 200, LLC, appeals from the judgment of dismissal rendered in favor of the defendant, the town of Fairfield (town), by the trial court in this municipal tax appeal brought pursuant to General Statutes § 12-117a.1 On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly determined that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s municipal tax appeal on the basis that the plaintiff’s petition to the town’s board of assessment appeals (board) was untimely under General Statutes §§ 12-111 (a) (1) and 12-112. We agree and, accordingly, reverse in part the judgment of the trial court.”)

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AC45407 - Rader v. Valeri ("This interpleader action arises from a real estate transaction in which the defendant claimant, MSPD Downs Street, LLC (MSPD), purchased two properties located in Danbury from the defendant claimant, Paul J. Valeri. The plaintiff stakeholder, Martin A. Rader, Jr., sought an order determining the rights of Valeri and MSPD to funds held in escrow until Valeri obtained certain zoning approvals for the properties. Valeri appeals from the judgment of the trial court, rendered after a court trial, awarding MSPD the escrow funds and attorney's fees. On appeal, Valeri claims that the court (1) made clearly erroneous factual findings and (2) improperly concluded that he failed to satisfy one of the zoning contingencies set forth in the escrow agreement. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

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• Property Law,
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