AC48082 - 62-64 Bank Street, LLC v. Amelio ("In this summary process appeal, the self-represented defendant, Carmine Amelio, appeals from the judgment of possession rendered by the trial court in favor of the plaintiff, 62-64 Bank Street, LLC, as well as from the court's denial of his motion to reargue. On October 11, 2024, the plaintiff moved to dismiss this appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the grounds that it is (1) jurisdictionally late pursuant to General Statutes § 47a-35 (b) and/or (2) moot because the defendant is no longer in possession of the premises at issue. On February 5, 2025, we denied the plaintiff's motion to dismiss and indicated that an opinion would follow. This opinion sets forth the reasoning for our decision. . . .

The motion to dismiss is denied. In this opinion the other judges concurred.")

AC47702 - ECR 2 LLC v. Thompson ("In this summary process action, the defendant, Raschid Thompson, appeals from the judgment of possession, rendered after a court trial, in favor of the plaintiff, ECR 2 LLC. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court (1) violated his constitutional right to due process by denying his motion for a continuance of the trial date and refusing to consider his motion to preclude evidence and testimony that had not previously been disclosed by the plaintiff; (2) applied the wrong legal standard in rejecting his special defense of equitable nonforfeiture; and (3) erred in rejecting his special defense that he had a right to cure, and did cure, his nonpayment of rent. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

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AC46040 - Freccia v. Freccia ("In this opinion, we resolve claims raised in three separate but related appeals, Docket Nos. AC 46037, AC 46038, and AC 46040. In the summary process action underlying AC 46037, the plaintiff, Theresa K. Freccia, in her capacity as the executor of the estate of Frank J. Freccia, Jr. (decedent), brought a summary process action against the defendants, Guin Freccia and David D'Andrea, seeking to obtain a judgment of possession with respect to real property located at 95 Bryam Road in Greenwich. The court rendered a judgment of possession in favor of the plaintiff in that action. On appeal, the defendants claim that (1) the plaintiff lacked the power to commence the underlying summary process action, (2) the court improperly failed to conclude that they had a present right to remain in the subject property or that equitable considerations precluded the plaintiff from obtaining a judgment in her favor, and (3) the court prejudiced the defendants by consolidating five related summary process actions for trial.

In AC 46038, the plaintiff, Theresa K. Freccia, in her individual capacity, brought a summary process action against the defendants, Frank J. Freccia III, Tammie Freccia, Locksley Freccia, and D'Artagnan Freccia, seeking to obtain a judgment of possession with respect to real property located at '40 Locust Street, Building 2 and Garage' in Greenwich. In that action, the court rendered a judgment of possession in favor of the plaintiff. On appeal, the defendants claim that (1) the notice to quit served on them was invalid, (2) the court improperly failed to conclude that equitable considerations precluded the plaintiff from obtaining judgment in her favor, and (3) the court prejudiced the defendants by consolidating five related summary process actions for trial.

In AC 46040, the plaintiff, Theresa K. Freccia, in her capacity as executor of the estate of the decedent, brought a summary process action against the defendant, Frank J. Freccia III, doing business as Freccia Brothers Auto Sales, seeking to obtain a judgment of possession with respect to real property located at 246-248 West Putnam Avenue in Greenwich. In that action, the court rendered a judgment of possession in favor of the plaintiff. On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) the plaintiff lacked standing to commence the action, (2) the court improperly failed to conclude that he had a present right to remain in the subject property or that equitable considerations precluded the plaintiff from obtaining a judgment in her favor, and (3) the court prejudiced the defendant by consolidating five related summary process actions for trial.

We affirm the judgments of the court.")

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AC47173 - Troy Laundry Building, LLC v. Beautiful Life Adult Daycare, LLC ("In this commercial summary process action, the defendant, Beautiful Life Adult Daycare, LLC, appeals from the judgment of possession rendered in favor of the plaintiff, Troy Laundry Building, LLC. On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court erred in denying its motion to dismiss, in which it argued that the notice to quit was defective. The defendant also claims that the court erred in granting the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment because (1) there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether the defendant had materially breached the lease agreement and/or whether that breach was excused, and (2) the court impermissibly found facts regarding whether an additional security deposit was owed. We do not reach the merits of the defendant's claims because, during the pendency of this appeal, the defendant vacated the premises, and, accordingly, we dismiss this appeal as moot.")

AC46774 - Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities ex rel. Pizzoferrato v. Mansions, LLC ("In this housing discrimination action, the defendants, The Mansions, LLC (Mansions), 75 Hockanum, Inc., and Candace Barnard, appeal from the judgment of the trial court, rendered after a court trial, in favor of the plaintiff, the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities (commission), and the intervening plaintiffs, Wendy Pizzoferrato (Wendy) and Rudy Pizzoferrato (Rudy). The court found that the defendants violated the state fair housing laws, General Statutes § 46a-64b et seq., by constructively denying the Pizzoferratos' request for an accommodation of the defendants' 'no pets' policy for Wendy's two emotional support dogs. On appeal, the defendants claim that the court improperly concluded that (1) Wendy needed her emotional support dogs to ameliorate the effects of a disability when the court found only that the defendants regarded her as being disabled and not that she actually was disabled, (2) two emotional support dogs were necessary for Wendy's equal use and enjoyment of the dwelling, and (3) the defendants constructively denied the Pizzoferratos' request for an accommodation. We agree with the defendants' second claim and, therefore, reverse the judgment of the trial court.")

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AC46873 - Brook Run Development Corp. v. Noon ("In this summary process action, the defendant Kristine Noon appeals from the judgment of the trial court in favor of the plaintiff, Brook Run Development Corp. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly concluded that her residential lease with the plaintiff had terminated because a specific provision of the lease did not operate to automatically renew the lease. We affirm the judgment of the court.")

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AC46972 - Colchester Estate Ventures, LLC v. Madden ("The self-represented defendant, Peter Madden, appeals from the trial court's denial of his motion to restore to the docket (motion to restore) the summary process action filed against him by the plaintiff, Colchester Estate Ventures, LLC. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court abused its discretion in denying his motion to restore because he had acquired a vested right to litigate various allegations of malfeasance by the plaintiff. We affirm the judgment of the court.")

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AC46290 - Milford Redevelopment & Housing Partnership v. Glicklin ("In this summary process action, the plaintiff, Milford Redevelopment & Housing Partnership, appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the defendant, Lisa Glicklin. The plaintiff initiated this summary process action against the defendant claiming that the defendant repeatedly violated the plaintiff's smoke-free housing policy. In rendering judgment for the defendant, the trial court rejected the plaintiff's claim on the basis that the plaintiff failed to prove that the defendant had not cured the violation of the plaintiff's policy. On appeal, the plaintiff raises interrelated claims. First, it claims that the court improperly raised sua sponte the unpleaded special defense of cure to defeat its summary process action. Second, it claims that, even if it was proper for the court to raise the special defense of cure sua sponte, the court improperly placed the burden on the plaintiff to prove that the defendant did not cure her violations. The defendant, in addition to disputing the plaintiff's claims, argues that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the action because of alleged inadequacies in the pretermination notice provided to the defendant. For the reasons that follow, we reject the defendant's jurisdictional argument and agree with the plaintiff that the court improperly rendered judgment in favor of the defendant. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court.")

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AC47018 - Samsel v. Parks ("In this summary process action, the defendant, William Parks, appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying his motion to open the judgment of possession in favor of the plaintiff, Jozef Samsel. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly denied his motion to open the judgment. We dismiss the defendant's appeal as moot.")

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SC20826 - PPC Realty, LLC v. Hartford ("In this appeal, we must interpret provisions of the Uniform Relocation Assistance Act (act), §§ 8-266 through 8-282, also known as the URRA, to determine whether a city can maintain a lien against a property to secure repayment of costs incurred when relocating residents who find themselves displaced following the city's enforcement of its building codes, even if the property owner did not cause the building to become uninhabitable. The defendant, the city of Hartford, contends that the trial court improperly discharged its lien on the property of the plaintiff, PPC Realty, LLC. Relying on the statutory text of the act, we agree with the defendant that its lien was proper, and we reverse the trial court's judgment.")

SC20826 Concurrence - PPC Realty, LLC v. Hartford

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AC46505 - Gateway Development/East Lyme, LLC v. Duong ("In this summary process action, the plaintiff, Gateway Development/East Lyme, LLC, leased property located at 295 Flanders Road in East Lyme (premises) and subleased the premises to the defendants, Anh Duong doing business as Daddy's Noodle Bar and Daddy's Noodle Bar 2, LLC. The defendants appeal from the trial court's judgment of possession rendered in favor of the plaintiff. It is undisputed that the defendants failed to pay rent in a timely manner. On appeal, the defendants claim that the court improperly concluded that the plaintiff was not required to provide them with a pretermination notice and an opportunity to cure their default for nonpayment of rent within ten days of such notice. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

AC46467 - Meineke Bristol, LLC v. Premier Auto, LLC ("Premier Auto, LLC (Premier Auto), and Patrick Flynn appeal from the judgments rendered by the trial court in four related civil actions that were consolidated for trial. The actions encompass various claims by multiple entities concerning the sale by Vazhayil Babu of three businesses as well as associated leases, notes, and guarantee agreements to Premier Auto. On appeal, Premier Auto and Patrick Flynn claim that the trial court abused its discretion when it precluded them from presenting certain evidence. Premier Auto also claims that the court erred in determining that Premier Auto failed to prove its breach of contract cause of action. For the reasons set forth subsequently in this opinion, we conclude that the portion of the appeal concerning the first claim is moot and must be dismissed. With respect to the remaining claim in this appeal, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.")

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SC20797 - Collier v. Adar Hartford Realty, LLC ("This is an interlocutory appeal from the trial court's denial of a motion for class certification. The plaintiffs, former residents of Barbour Gardens, a housing development in the city of Hartford (city), instituted this action in connection with the living conditions at Barbour Gardens during their residency. They sought compensatory and punitive damages and attorney's fees from the owner of Barbour Gardens and its property management company, and alleged various tort, contract, equitable, and statutory claims, including a claim of a violation of a provision of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), General Statutes § 42-110g. The plaintiffs filed a motion to certify a class on behalf 'of all persons who lived at Barbour Gardens for any or all of the time between June 24, 2004, and October 13, 2019,' which the trial court denied on the grounds that individualized issues would predominate over class-wide issues and that a class action is not a superior method to resolve the plaintiffs' claims. See Practice Book § 9-8 (3). In this appeal brought pursuant to General Statutes § 42-110h, the plaintiffs contend that there is sufficient evidence in the record common to the entire class to satisfy the predominance and superiority requirements. We reject this claim due to the lengthy period of time for which class certification was requested—covering all residents at Barbour Gardens at any time over a span of more than fifteen years—and the absence of generalized evidence in the record concerning the living conditions at Barbour Gardens during most of the proposed class period. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiffs' motion for class certification.")

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• Recent Opinions,
• Tort Law

AC45890 - Iadanza v. Toor ("This appeal arises from a stipulated judgment in an action by the plaintiff landlord, Cosmo Iadanza, against the defendant tenant, Mohammed Toor, for breach of contract, serious nonpayment of rent, and fraudulent misrepresentation relative to the defendant's tenancy at the residential property known as 501 Woodbine Road in Stamford (property). According to the stipulation, judgment of possession entered in favor of the plaintiff 'with a final stay of execution based upon' several conditions pertaining to an option the defendant had to purchase the property. The conditions established, among other things, that the defendant would be able to purchase the property for $950,000, provided that he deposited 'with [his counsel] in trust pursuant to the terms of agreement the sum of $47,500 by August 26 [2022] [at] 4 p.m. eastern daylight time' and then satisfied certain conditions with respect to obtaining financing and closing by a date certain, and that time was of the essence 'for all actions and requirements in the stipulated agreement.' They further established that '[f]ailing to make the deposit will null and void the defendant's right to purchase the property, and the plaintiff may immediately file an affidavit stating this fact and immediately obtain a summary process execution for possession without any additional court hearings.'

The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the trial court properly ordered a summary process execution for possession to issue after the defendant failed to make the $47,500 deposit in accordance with the terms of the stipulated judgment. The defendant claims that the plaintiff materially breached the stipulated judgment prior to the August 26, 2022 deadline and that, consequently, the defendant's obligation to make the deposit by that time had been excused. As such, he maintains that the plaintiff was not entitled to the execution. We disagree with the defendant and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court ordering the summary process execution.")

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SC20927 - Centrix Management Co., LLC v. Fosberg ("When a consumer contract or lease includes a unilateral attorney's fees provision benefitting the commercial party, a consumer who successfully prosecutes or defends an action based on the contract is entitled as a matter of law to attorney's fees, and 'the size of the attorney's fee awarded to the consumer shall be based as far as practicable upon the terms governing the size of the fee for the commercial party.' General Statutes § 42-150bb. In this appeal, the plaintiff landlord, Centrix Management Co., LLC, challenges the trial court's award of reasonable attorney's fees in the amount of $3500, following the judgment rendered in favor of the defendant tenant, Donald W. Fosberg. The plaintiff contends that, because doing so would be 'practicable' pursuant to § 42-150bb, the court had discretion to award the defendant only up to $750, which was the maximum amount of attorney's fees that the plaintiff could have recovered pursuant to the terms of the lease agreement. The defendant responds that the plaintiff's claim rests on an overly narrow construction of two key statutory terms in § 42-150bb, 'based . . . upon' and 'practicable.' Consistent with the equitable purpose of the statute, the defendant contends, the trial court had discretion to award him reasonable attorney's fees in excess of $750. Although we conclude that trial courts have discretion to award a prevailing consumer reasonable attorney's fees pursuant to § 42-150bb when the court determines that it is not practicable to base the award upon the contractual terms governing the commercial party's recovery, in the present case, the trial court did not make this threshold determination. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court's award of attorney's fees and remand the case with direction to conduct a new hearing on the defendant's motion for attorney's fees consistent with this opinion.")

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SC20787 - Chabad Lubavitch of Western & Southern New England, Inc. v. Shemtov ("This appeal requires us to determine the enforceability of an agreement to arbitrate before a Jewish rabbinical court called a 'Bais Din' to resolve a dispute between the parties concerning the possession of certain real property. The defendants Rabbi Moshe Shemtov, Chabad of Stamford, Inc., and Gan Yeladim of Stamford, Inc., appeal from the trial court's judgment granting possession of a commercial property to the plaintiff, Chabad Lubavitch of Western and Southern New England, Inc. On appeal, the defendants claim that the trial court erred in failing to enforce an arbitration agreement that the plaintiff was bound by and refused to honor. We agree and reverse the judgment of the trial court.")

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AC46943 - 914 North Colony, LLC v. 99 West, LLC ("The plaintiff, 914 North Colony, LLC, appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing its summary process action against the defendant, 99 West, LLC. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly concluded that the plaintiff had reinstated the tenancy by accepting the defendant's tendered payments after service of the notice to quit, despite the fact that the notice to quit included a use and occupancy disclaimer. We disagree with the plaintiff's characterization of the court's judgment and conclude that the court properly found that the plaintiff's actions rendered the notice to quit equivocal, thereby depriving the court of subject matter jurisdiction over the summary process action. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

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AC46250 - Edgewood Properties, LLC v. Dynamic Multimedia, LLC ("In this summary process action, the defendants, Daniel A. Martin, Dynamic Multimedia, LLC, and Badger Entertainment, LLC, appeal from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the plaintiff, Edgewood Properties, LLC. On appeal, the defendants claim that the trial court improperly (1) determined that the plaintiff was entitled to a judgment of possession of the subject property based on lapse of time, (2) denied their motion in limine to present evidence of a purported settlement agreement reached by the parties, and (3) denied their motion for summary enforcement of the purported settlement agreement. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

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AC46885 - Altavista Investments, LLC v. Makeeva ("In the underlying summary process eviction action (eviction action), the trial court rendered a judgment of possession against the defendant Leyla Makeeva and seven other defendants, in favor of the plaintiff, Altavista Investments, LLC. . . Baotou Capital, LLC (Baotou), which holds a note secured by a mortgage on residential property located at 969 North Street in Greenwich (property), the property at issue in the eviction action, filed the present appeal from the denial of its postjudgment motion to intervene on the basis of an ownership interest it claims in use and occupancy payments made by the defendants in lieu of bond during the pendency of the prior appeal. See General Statutes § 47a-35a (a). Baotou claims that the trial court improperly determined that, because it lacked any possessory interest in the property, it was not a proper party to the eviction action and, thus, also was not entitled to intervene in postjudgment proceedings pursuant to General Statutes § 47a-35b regarding the final distribution of the use and occupancy payments. We agree that the court improperly failed to permit Baotou to intervene as a matter of right and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the court.")

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SC20769 - Northland Investment Corp. v. Public Utilities Regulatory Authority (Administrative appeal; Declaratory ruling; "This case resolves the question of whether a landlord of a multiunit residential building may recoup from its tenants the costs for utility services that it is liable to pay to a utility provider when the building does not have individual meters for each unit but, rather, has only a master meter. The plaintiff, Northland Investment Corporation, manages and owns multiunit residential buildings throughout the United States, including Connecticut. In its buildings that have only a master meter for the entire building, the plaintiff employs, or seeks to employ, a recoupment method it refers to as "ratio utility billing" (RUB). Under the RUB method, as developed by the plaintiff, it pays the utility company directly for the building's entire utility bill and then recoups the cost from the tenants in the form of a variable utility payment each month. Under this form of billing, the plaintiff bills each tenant directly for what the plaintiff contends is the tenant's "proportionate share" of utilities based on factors it has chosen (which it can modify in its sole discretion), such as a unit's square footage, number of occupants, number of bedrooms and bathrooms, or a combination of these. This method of utility billing is included in a provision of the plaintiff's lease agreements.

The plaintiff sought a declaratory ruling from the defendant, the Public Utilities Regulatory Authority (PURA), that it may use RUB in recouping its costs for utility services from tenants. PURA concluded that the plaintiff was not authorized to do so. In the administrative appeal that followed, the trial court upheld PURA's decision. Both of the parties rely on General Statutes § 16-262e (c) in support of their respective arguments. Section 16-262e (c) governs the liability for payment of utility services provided to residential dwellings. The plaintiff argues that the plain meaning of § 16-262e (c) does not expressly prohibit the use of RUB. Because RUB is not expressly prohibited by law, the plaintiff argues, the method qualifies as a payment of "rent" under General Statutes (Supp. 2024) § 47a-1 (h). PURA disagrees and instead argues that RUB violates the plain meaning of § 16-262e (c) because the provision allows a tenant to be liable for utility costs only if the tenant's unit is individually metered and he or she has exclusively used the utilities so provided. We agree with PURA and conclude that § 16-262e (c) precludes a landlord's use of RUB to recoup utility service charges from tenants.")

• SC20769 Dissent - Northland Investment Corp. v. Public Utilities Regulatory Authority

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AC45761 - U.S. Bank Trust, N.A. v. Healey (Summary process; "The defendants Gregg P. Healey, Bridgette G. Healey, and Claire A. Healey appeal, challenging the trial court's denial of their motion to open and dismiss the judgment of possession rendered in favor of the plaintiff, U.S. Bank Trust, N.A., as trustee for LSF9 Master Participation Trust. On appeal, the defendants claim that the judgment of possession, although valid when originally rendered, is no longer valid as a result of the fact that Connor Healey (Connor), the son of Gregg P. Healey and Bridgette G. Healey, who also resides at the premises, has since turned eighteen years old and was never served with a notice to quit. As a result, the defendants claim that the court was deprived of subject matter jurisdiction with respect to the judgment of possession and that the judgment, therefore, should have been dismissed. We conclude that the defendants are not aggrieved by the denial of their motion to open and dismiss and, accordingly, dismiss their appeal.")

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AC46942 - Black Rock Gardens, LLC v. Berry ("The defendant, Henry Berry, appeals from the trial court's denial of a special motion to dismiss that he filed pursuant to Connecticut's anti-SLAPP statute, General Statutes § 52-196a, in a summary process action brought against him by the plaintiff, Black Rock Gardens, LLC. Before this court is the plaintiff's motion to dismiss the defendant's appeal in which the plaintiff claims that the defendant has not appealed from a final judgment. Specifically, the plaintiff claims that the defendant has failed to assert a colorable claim to the protections afforded by the anti-SLAPP statute and, consequently, pursuant to Smith v. Supple, 346 Conn. 928, 952, 293 A.3d 851 (2023), this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the appeal. For the reasons that follow, we agree with the plaintiff and dismiss the defendant's appeal.")

AC45702 - 111 Clearview Drive, LLC v. Patrick ("In this summary process action, the defendants Lois Patrick, Justin Patrick, and Julian Patrick appeal from the judgment of possession rendered by the trial court in favor of the plaintiff, 111 Clearview Drive, LLC. On appeal, the defendants claim that the trial court improperly granted the plaintiff's motion in limine, which precluded them from presenting certain evidence to support their claim that Lois was an omitted party in the related foreclosure action of Benchmark Municipal Tax Services, Ltd. v. Roundtree, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV-16-6059553-S (Benchmark action and/or Benchmark judgment), and thus maintained a legitimate and legally viable interest in the property in question. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

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AC46343 - Three Deer Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Johnson (“The self-represented named defendant, DeNette Johnson (Johnson), appeals following the trial court’s denial of her second motion to open a stipulated summary process judgment, rendered after she had entered into a stipulated agreement with the plaintiff, Three Deer Associates Limited Partnership, doing business as Deerfield Apartments, in connection with a summary process action commenced by the plaintiff against Johnson and her son, the defendant Eric Johnson II. On appeal, Johnson raises five claims, namely, that (1) the court improperly denied her second motion to open, (2) the court improperly failed to conduct an evidentiary hearing before acting on her second motion to open, (3) an evidentiary hearing should have been conducted to determine if she was compliant with General Statutes § 47a-39, (4) the court violated her due process rights by failing to hold an evidentiary hearing, and (5) the underlying stipulated judgment should be vacated. We affirm the judgment with respect to Johnson’s first four claims relating to the denial of her motion to open and dismiss the appeal as it pertains to her fifth claim relating to the stipulated summary process judgment.”)

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