AC47394 - Zhuleku v. Naugatuck Valley Radiology Associates ("In this medical malpractice action, the plaintiffs, Nexhmije Zhuleku (Zhuleku) and her husband, Fuat Zhuleku (husband), appeal from the judgment of the trial court rendered after the court directed the verdict in favor of the defendant Lauren Perugini (substitute defendant), in her capacity as executrix of the estate of the defendant Josephine Perugini (Perugini), and, after a jury trial, in favor of the defendants Naugatuck Valley Radiology Associates (NVRA) and Gregory D. Gersten. The plaintiffs claim that the court improperly (1) sustained the defendants' objection to their amended revised complaint and (2) instructed the jury after denying their requests to charge. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the court.")

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SC20854 - Marland v. University of Connecticut Health Center ("This appeal arises from a claim of medical malpractice initiated by the plaintiff, Larissa Marland, individually and as administratrix of the estate of the decedent, Norman Marland, against the defendants, the University of Connecticut Health Center, UConn Health Partners, and UConn John Dempsey Hospital (collectively, the state). After the claims commissioner waived the state’s sovereign immunity and granted the plaintiff permission to sue the state, the plaintiff filed the present action in the Superior Court. The state moved to dismiss the complaint, asserting that the claims commissioner’s failure to timely dispose of the plaintiff’s claim deprived the commissioner of the authority to waive the state’s sovereign immunity and to grant the plaintiff permission to sue the state. The trial court agreed with the state and dismissed this action. This appeal requires us to decide whether the state can challenge, in the Superior Court, the decision of the claims commissioner to grant permission to sue under General Statutes (Rev. to 2015) § 4-160 (b) for medical malpractice. We conclude that, once the claims commissioner grants permission to sue the state and waives sovereign immunity, the state cannot challenge that decision in the Superior Court. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court dismissing the plaintiff’s complaint.")

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SC20646 - Lynch v. State ("In this medical malpractice action arising from a therapeutic donor insemination (TDI) procedure, the named defendant, the state of Connecticut (state), appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the plaintiffs, Aaron Lynch (Aaron) and Jean-Marie Monroe-Lynch (Jean-Marie), individually and in their representative capacities as parents of their minor son, Joshua Isaac Monroe-Lynch (Joshua), and as the administrators of the estate of Shay Ashlan Monroe-Lynch (Shay). On appeal, the state contends that (1) the claims on which the plaintiffs prevailed at trial were barred by sovereign immunity, (2) Joshua and Shay did not suffer legally cognizable injuries necessary to support the trial court's award of damages, and (3) the testimony of the plaintiffs' primary causation expert was improperly admitted because it was not supported by a valid scientific methodology. The plaintiffs ask this court to resolve a split among Superior Court decisions and to recognize a cause of action for wrongful life. We conclude that it is unnecessary to reach the wrongful life issue and, finding no error, affirm the trial court's judgment.")

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SC20772 - Escobar-Santana v. State ("General Statutes § 4-160 (f) waives the state's sovereign immunity with respect to qualified medical malpractice actions and allows such actions to proceed against the state without the need for prior authorization from the Claims Commissioner. The statute also expressly provides that "[a]ny such action shall be limited to medical malpractice claims only . . . ." General Statutes § 4-160 (f). The primary question presented by this interlocutory appeal is whether the statutory phrase "medical malpractice claims" is broad enough to encompass a mother's allegation that she suffered emotional distress damages from physical injuries to her child that were proximately caused by the negligence of health care professionals during the birthing process. We hold that claims alleging such damages can qualify as medical malpractice claims for purposes of § 4-160 (f). Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court properly denied the motion of the defendant, the state of Connecticut, to dismiss the second count of the complaint of the plaintiffs, Celine Escobar-Santana (Escobar-Santana) and her son, Emmett Escobar-Santana (Emmett), because the plaintiffs alleged a valid medical malpractice claim in that count.")

• SC20772 Concurrence - Escobar-Santana v. State

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AC44757 - Gervais v. JACC Healthcare Center of Danielson, LLC ("This appeal returns to us on remand from our Supreme Court. Gervais v. JACC Healthcare Center of Danielson, LLC, 346 Conn. 910, 289 A.3d 596 (2023).The plaintiffs, Tammy Gervais and Cassandra Gervais, appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court granting the motion to dismiss filed by the defendants, JACC Healthcare Center of Danielson, LLC (JACC), and Beth Davis. The trial court, in its order dismissing the plaintiffs' medical malpractice action, concluded that (1) the opinion letter attached to the plaintiffs' complaint was deficient pursuant to Connecticut's good faith opinion letter statute, General Statutes § 52-190a, because it failed to sufficiently identify the author's qualifications, thereby depriving the court of the ability to determine whether the author was a "similar health care provider," as defined by General Statutes § 52-184c; and (2) it lacked the authority to grant the plaintiffs' request to amend the complaint, filed in response to the defendants' motion to dismiss, that sought to include two new attachments to the opinion letter elucidating the qualifications of the author. This court, by memorandum decision, affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Gervais v. JACC Center of Danielson, LLC, 212 Conn. App. 902, 273 A.3d 749 (2022).Thereafter, the plaintiffs petitioned our Supreme Court for certification to appeal. Our Supreme Court granted certification, vacated the decision of this court, and remanded the case to this court with direction to reconsider in light of its recent decision in Carpenter v. Daar, 346 Conn. 80, 287 A.3d 1027 (2023).Gervais v. JACC Center of Danielson, LLC, supra, 346 Conn. 910.Reconsidering this appeal in light of Carpenter, we now conclude that the trial court improperly concluded that it lacked authority to permit the plaintiffs to amend the opinion letter in response to the defendants' motion to dismiss. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.")

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SC20767, SC20768 - Manginelli v. Regency House of Wallingford, Inc. ("For approximately three and one-half years, the world has battled against the COVID-19 pandemic. As we explained in Casey v. Lamont, 338 Conn. 479, 258 A.3d 647 (2021), at the height of the pandemic, due to the highly contagious nature of COVID-19, "[a]round the country—indeed [around] the world—large segments of economic activity [had] been severely disrupted, if not fallen into collapse, millions of people [had] lost their employment, many hospitals and other health-care operations [had] been overrun by gravely ill and dying patients, and extraordinary lockdowns ordered by government officials, in an effort to abate the rate of infection . . . limited the free flow of personal and commercial activity." Id., 482. Addressing these issues, on March 10, 2020, Governor Ned Lamont issued a declaration of public health and civil preparedness emergencies, proclaiming a state of emergency throughout the state of Connecticut as a result of COVID-19. Then, on April 5, 2020, Governor Lamont issued Executive Order No. 7U, which he subsequently amended on April 7, 2020, by issuing Executive Order No. 7V, § 6, which provides, among other things, immunity from suit and liability to health care providers under certain circumstances relating to COVID-19.

In a companion case also decided today, we interpreted the scope of immunity afforded by Executive Order No. 7V as it related to acts or omissions undertaken in good faith by health care professionals and health care facilities while providing health care services in support of the state's COVID-19 effort. See Mills v. Hartford HealthCare Corp., 347 Conn. ___, ___ A.3d ___ (2023). In the present public interest appeal certified under General Statutes § 52-265a, we must determine the scope of this immunity as it particularly relates to acts or omissions undertaken because of an alleged lack of resources attributable to the COVID-19 pandemic. On appeal to this court, the defendants, Regency House of Wallingford, Inc., and National Health Care Associates, Inc., claim that the trial court improperly denied their motion to dismiss the wrongful death claims filed by the plaintiff, Kimberly Manginelli, both in her individual capacity and as administratrix of the estate of Darlene Matejek. Specifically, the defendants argue that the trial court incorrectly determined that they had failed to establish that the immunity provided by Executive Order No. 7V applied to the alleged acts and omissions at issue. According to the defendants, the trial court's error was premised on its overly narrow interpretation of the order as applying only when the alleged acts and/or omissions involved the diagnosis or treatment of COVID-19 patients. We agree with the defendants that the trial court too narrowly construed the language of the order but nevertheless hold that the defendants failed to establish that the immunity afforded by that order applied in this case. Accordingly, on this record, we uphold the trial court's denial of their motion to dismiss.")

SC20763, SC20764, SC20765 - Mills v. Hartford HealthCare Corp. ("This court recently discussed the legality of certain executive orders issued by Governor Ned Lamont in response to the catastrophic effects of the pandemic caused by the spread of the potentially fatal coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19). See Casey v. Lamont, 338 Conn. 479, 481–83, 258 A.3d 647 (2021). The present appeals require us to consider the scope and application of Executive Order No. 7V, issued by Governor Lamont in connection with his declaration of a public health emergency in March, 2020, which purports to confer immunity on health care professionals and health care facilities from suit or liability for any injury or death alleged to have been sustained because of acts or omissions undertaken in good faith while providing health care services in support of the state's COVID-19 response. We also must address similar questions with respect to 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d, a provision in the federal Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act (PREP Act) that confers immunity from suit and liability for injuries sustained as the result of the application or use of certain pandemic countermeasures (e.g., COVID-19 diagnostic tests).

These issues arise in the context of a wrongful death action filed by the plaintiff, Kristen Mills, the daughter of the decedent, Cheryl Mills, and the executor of her estate. The complaint alleges that the decedent died after she was misdiagnosed as having a non-life-threatening heart condition, when she actually was suffering from a life-threatening heart condition. According to the complaint, her death was the result of negligent and grossly negligent medical care provided by the named defendant, Hartford HealthCare Corporation, doing business as Hartford Hospital (hospital), and the defendant physicians, Asad Rizvi, Melissa Ferraro-Borgida, Brett H. Duncan, and William J. Farrell. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that they were immune from suit and liability under Executive Order No. 7V and the PREP Act in light of the role that COVID-19 had played in their diagnosis and treatment decisions. The trial court concluded that the defendants had immunity under Executive Order No. 7V for the allegedly negligent acts and omissions undertaken before the receipt of the decedent's negative COVID-19 test result and immunity under the PREP Act for the allegedly grossly negligent acts and omissions undertaken during that same period. The court consequently granted the motions to dismiss the counts against Rizvi, Ferraro-Borgida, and Duncan. The court further concluded, however, that the only physician responsible for the decedent's care after receipt of the negative test result, Farrell, did not have immunity under either Executive Order No. 7V or the PREP Act. The trial court accordingly denied the motion to dismiss the counts alleging negligence and gross negligence against Farrell.

In SC 20765, the plaintiff appeals from the trial court's judgment insofar as it granted the defendants' motions to dismiss. In SC 20763 and SC 20764, Farrell and the hospital, respectively, appeal from the denial of their motions to dismiss. We disagree with the trial court's conclusions only insofar as it determined that the defendants were entitled to immunity under the PREP Act. We therefore reverse the trial court’s judgment dismissing counts V, VI, and VII of the complaint. We affirm the judgment in all other respects.")

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AC45088 - Jakobowski v. State (Negligence; claim that sovereign immunity barred plaintiff's claims because claims commissioner exceeded statutory authority in granting permission to sue state; "The defendant, the state of Connecticut, appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying its motion to dismiss the claims asserted against it by the plaintiff, Edward Jakobowski, administrator of the estate of Melinda Jakobowski, on the basis of sovereign immunity. The defendant claims that the court improperly denied its motion to dismiss because the claims commissioner authorized only a medical malpractice claim pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 2017) § 4-160 (b), and the plaintiff did not comply with the mandatory requirements of that statute. Alternatively, the defendant contends that if the claims commissioner authorized the plaintiff to sue the defendant for negligence based on lack of informed consent pursuant to § 4-160 (a), any waiver of immunity was invalid because the claims commissioner did not develop a factual record, hold a hearing, or make a finding that the plaintiff's claim was just and equitable. Finally, the defendant claims than the trial court erred in concluding that the claims commissioner's failure to act on the plaintiff's claim within the two year period set forth in General Statutes § 4-159a did not deprive the claims commissioner of authority to act. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

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AC43955 - Perdikis v. Klarsfeld (Medical malpractice; general verdict rule; "In this medical malpractice action, the plaintiff Dimitri Perdikis appeals from the judgment of the trial court, rendered after a jury verdict in favor of the defendant Jay H. Klarsfeld, a physician and surgeon. The plaintiff claims that the court erred by denying his request to charge the jury that it could not consider his postsurgical actions as a cause of his injuries and, instead, instructing the jury that it could consider his postsurgical actions in its causation analysis. We conclude that, in the context of the present case, the introduction of competent evidence—an expert medical opinion stated with a degree of reasonable medical probability—was required to allow the jury to infer a causal link between the plaintiff's actions and his injury. Because no such evidence was presented at trial, we conclude that the court's jury instruction was improper and harmful and, therefore, reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for a new trial.")

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AC44509 - Lastrina v. Bettauer and AC44510 - Lastrina v. Burnham ("In these medical malpractice actions, the plaintiff, Richard Lastrina, as conservator of the estate of his son Daniel Lastrina (Daniel), appeals from the judgments of the trial court granting the motions for summary judgment filed by the defendants, Evelyn Bettauer, a psychologist, and Bruce E. Burnham, a physician. The court granted summary judgment for each defendant, concluding that it would violate public policy to impose a duty on the defendants to protect Daniel from the harm caused by his own illegal conduct. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly granted summary judgment for the defendants because there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether Daniel's illegal conduct (1) caused his injuries and (2) constituted "serious criminality." We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgments of the trial court.")

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SC20524 - Carpenter v. Daar ("This certified appeal requires us to consider the extent to which our case law, most significantly, Morgan v. Hartford Hospital, 301 Conn. 388, 21 A.3d 451 (2011), has resulted in the deviation of Connecticut’s good faith opinion letter statute, General Statutes § 52-190a, from the legislature’s intention that it ‘‘prevent frivolous [medical] malpractice actions’’ but not ‘‘serve as a sword to defeat otherwise facially meritorious claims.’’ Wilkins v. Connecticut Childbirth & Women’s Center, 314 Conn. 709, 736 n.9, 104 A.3d 671 (2014). The plaintiff, Shane J. Carpenter, appeals, upon our grant of his petition for certification, from the judgment of the Appellate Court upholding the dismissal of his dental malpractice action against the defendants, Bradley J. Daar and his business entity, Shoreline Modern Dental, LLC (Shoreline). Carpenter v. Daar, 199 Conn. App. 367, 369–70, 405, 236 A.3d 239 (2020). On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that (1) because the opinion letter implicates the court’s personal jurisdiction, the trial court should not have considered an affidavit filed by the plaintiff to supplement a potentially defective opinion letter (supplemental affidavit) as an alternative to amending the operative complaint, and (2) the author of the opinion letter, Charles S. Solomon, an endodontist, was not a ‘‘similar health care provider,’’ as defined by General Statutes § 52-184c, to Daar, who is a general dentist. Our review of the plaintiff’s claims leads us to confront a more fundamental issue under § 52-190a, namely, whether this court correctly concluded in Morgan that the opinion letter requirement implicates the court’s personal jurisdiction for purposes of the procedures attendant to the motion to dismiss. See Morgan v. Hartford Hospital, supra, 401–402. Having received supplemental briefing on this issue; see footnote 2 of this opinion; we conclude that Morgan was wrongly decided on this point. We now hold that the opinion letter requirement is a unique, statutory procedural device that does not implicate the court’s jurisdiction in any way. We further conclude that, consistent with this court’s decision inBennett v. New Milford Hospital, Inc., 300 Conn. 1, 12 A.3d 865 (2011), for purposes of the motion to dismiss pursuant to § 52-190a (c), the sufficiency of the opinion letter is to be determined solely on the basis of the allegations in the complaint and on the face of the opinion letter, without resort to the jurisdictional fact-finding process articulated in, for example, Conboy v. State, 292 Conn. 642, 651–52, 974 A.2d 669 (2009). Because the opinion letter in the present case established that Solomon was a similar health care provider to Daar under the broadly and realistically read allegations in the complaint, we conclude that the plaintiff’s action should not have been dismissed. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.")

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AC44456 - Gilman v. Shames (Wrongful death; medical malpractice; bystander emotional distress; motion to dismiss; "The defendant state of Connecticut appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying its motion to dismiss the action of the plaintiff Glenn Gilman on the ground of sovereign immunity. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly determined that (1) the Claims Commissioner (commissioner) had waived sovereign immunity with respect to the plaintiff's claims, and (2) the accidental failure of suit statute, General Statutes § 52-592, exempted the plaintiff from the two year time limit for bringing a wrongful death action under General Statutes § 52-555. We reverse the judgment of the trial court.")

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AC44065 - Williams v. Lawrence + Memorial Hospital, Inc. ("In this medical malpractice action, the plaintiff, Christopher Williams, administrator of the estate of John Williams (decedent), appeals from the judgment of the trial court, rendered after a jury trial, in favor of the defendant, Peter Bertolozzi, an emergency medicine physician. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial court abused its discretion by declining to admit into evidence certain excerpts from the Advanced Trauma Life Support (ATLS) guidelines, which the plaintiff argues were admissible under § 8-3 (8) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

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SC20577 - Caverly v. State ("The decedent, James B. Caverly, died while under the medical care of the employees of the John Dempsey Hospital at the University of Connecticut Health Center. The plaintiff, Ronald G. Caverly, administrator of the decedent's estate, subsequently received authorization from the Office of the Claims Commissioner to file a medical malpractice action against the defendant, the state of Connecticut, doing business as UCONN Health Center/John Dempsey Hospital, pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 2017) § 4-160 (b). The plaintiff filed the present medical malpractice action, which the state moved to dismiss on the basis of sovereign immunity. The state argued that, because the plaintiff had received a settlement payment from a joint tortfeasor in connection with the decedent's death, the plaintiff's action was barred by General Statutes § 4-160b (a), which provides that "[t]he Office of the Claims Commissioner shall not accept or pay any subrogated claim or any claim directly or indirectly paid by or assigned to a third party." The trial court denied the state's motion to dismiss on the ground that § 4-160b (a) applies only to subrogated or assigned claims and not to payments made by joint tortfeasors. We affirm the trial court's denial of the state's motion to dismiss."

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AC44241 - Cockayne v. Bristol Hospital, Inc. ("The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the plaintiffs, Bruce Cockayne and Marion Cockayne, presented sufficient evidence in support of their claim of medical malpractice by employees of the defendant The Bristol Hospital Incorporated. Following the jury's verdict in favor of the plaintiffs, the defendant moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and to set aside the verdict. The trial court denied these motions and rendered judgment in accordance with the jury's verdict. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly denied (1) its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and (2) its motion to set aside the verdict and order a new trial. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

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SC20414 - Peek v. Manchester Memorial Hospital ("The defendants, Manchester Memorial Hospital and Prospect Medical Holdings, Inc., appeal from the judgment of the Appellate Court, which reversed the judgment of the trial court and concluded that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the action of the plaintiff, Delores Peek, was barred by the two year statute of limitations set forth in General Statutes (Rev. to 2015) § 52-584. We conclude that a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding whether the plaintiff initiated her action within two years from the date of her injury, as that term is understood in the context of § 52-584. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.")

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SC20529 - Riccio v. Bristol Hospital, Inc. ("The appeal in this medical malpractice action requires us to determine whether the trial court correctly concluded that the accidental failure of suit statute, General Statutes § 52-592, did not save the otherwise time barred action of the plaintiff, Joann Riccio, executrix of the estate of Theresa Riccio, because her first medical malpractice action was dismissed due to her attorney's gross negligence for failing to file with her complaint legally sufficient medical opinion letters, as required by General Statutes § 52-190a (a) and two Appellate Court decisions interpreting that statute. Specifically, we must determine whether the plaintiff met her burden of proving that her attorney's admitted failure to know of two Appellate Court decisions, issued six years before she initiated the first action, was a mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect rather than egregious conduct or gross negligence. We agree with the trial court that the plaintiff has not met her burden and, therefore, affirm its judgment.")

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SC20455 - Fajardo v. Boston Scientific Corp. ("This appeal arises from an action in which the named plaintiff, Lesly Fajardo (Fajardo), suffered injuries related to the implantation of a transvaginal mesh sling, a medical device that is implanted in women to treat stress urinary incontinence. In this action, the plaintiffs alleged that the named defendant, Boston Scientific Corporation (Boston Scientific), defectively designed its Obtryx Transobturator Mid-Urethral Sling System (Obtryx), a polypropylene transvaginal mesh sling, and that the product injured her in various ways after Edward Paraiso, a nonparty urologist, implanted it in her. The plaintiffs claimed, as relevant to this appeal, that Boston Scientific's sale of the Obtryx violated the Connecticut Product Liability Act, General Statutes § 52-572m et seq.

The plaintiffs also brought, inter alia, claims of negligence sounding in informed consent and misrepresentation against Fajardo's gynecologist, the defendant Lee D. Jacobs, and Jacobs' medical practice, the defendant OB-GYN of Fairfield County, P.C. (medical defendants).

. . .

On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the trial court (1) incorrectly concluded that Jacobs did not owe a duty to procure Fajardo's informed consent to the sling procedure, (2) improperly rendered summary judgment in favor of the medical defendants on the plaintiffs' misrepresentation claims, and (3) improperly failed to instruct the jury that it could find Boston Scientific liable under the Connecticut Product Liability Act if Fajardo's injuries resulted from Boston Scientific's failure to adopt a reasonable alternative design that rendered the Obtryx unreasonably dangerous. We conclude that the trial court properly rendered summary judgment in favor of the medical defendants on the informed consent and misrepresentation claims and that it properly declined to instruct the jury on the reasonable alternative design prong of the risk-utility test. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

• SC20455 Concurrence & Dissent - Fajardo v. Boston Scientific Corp.

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AC44055 - Barnes v. Greenwich Hospital ("This appeal arises out of a medical malpractice action brought by the plaintiffs, Lori Barnes (Barnes) and Ray Barnes, against the defendants, Felice Zwas, Greenwich Hospital, and the Center for Gastrointestinal Medicine of Fairfield and Westchester, P.C. (Center for Gastrointestinal Medicine), for an injury Barnes sustained during a colonoscopy procedure. The plaintiffs appeal from the judgment of the trial court dismissing their complaint for failure to attach a written opinion letter authored by a similar health care provider as required by General Statutes § 52-190a (a). On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the trial court improperly granted the defendants' motions to dismiss for failure to comply with § 52-190a because the amended complaint filed by the plaintiffs as of right pursuant to Practice Book § 10-59, to remedy their prior failure to attach a written opinion letter, was filed after the statute of limitations had expired and sought to attach an opinion letter that did not exist at the time the action was commenced. We disagree with the plaintiffs' claim and affirm the judgment of the court.")

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AC42835 - Guiliano v. Jefferson Radiology, P.C. ("The plaintiff, Ronna-Marie Guiliano, appeals from the judgment of the trial court, rendered after a jury trial, in favor of the defendants William S. Poole, a physician, and Jefferson Radiology, P.C. (Jefferson Radiology). On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial court abused its discretion by sustaining the objections of the defendants' counsel to the form of certain questions her counsel had posed to one of her expert witnesses.Additionally, the plaintiff claims that the trial court abused its discretion and violated her constitutional right of access to the courts by placing a time limit on her direct examination of a second expert witness.We disagree and affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

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AC42469, AC42493, AC42505 - Kissel v. Center for Women's Health, P.C. ("This trilogy of appeals originated when the plaintiff, Judith Kissel, sustained serious burns to her left foot during the course of an acupuncture treatment. The plaintiff commenced a medical malpractice action against the treating acupuncturist, Reed Wang, and his place of employment, the Center for Women's Health, P.C. (Center).The plaintiff subsequently filed a third-party complaint alleging a product liability claim against Health Body World Supply, Inc., also known as WABBO, the distributor of a device commonly referred to as the Miracle Lamp (heat lamp), which injured her. After a trial on both the medical malpractice and product liability claims, the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff on all counts, awarding her a total of $1 million in damages. Following the resolution of various postverdict motions, the court rendered judgment in accordance with the jury's verdict.

Wang, the Center, and WABBO each filed a separate appeal, docketed as AC 42469, AC 42493, and AC 42505, respectively. In AC 42469 and AC 42493, Wang and the Center claim that (1) the trial court improperly denied their motions to dismiss the medical malpractice action for failing to comply with General Statutes § 52-190a because the plaintiff failed to attach to her initial complaint an opinion letter from a similar health care provider and her efforts to cure this defect occurred outside of the limitation period, (2) the court improperly denied the request for an evidentiary hearing with respect to the jurisdictional facts related to the opinion letter, (3) the plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence with respect to causation, and (4) the court improperly instructed the jury regarding expert testimony and causation. In AC 42505, WABBO claims that the court improperly denied its motions for a directed verdict and to set aside the verdict because the plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence as to the element of causation. The plaintiff maintains that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.

In AC 42469 and AC 42493, we agree with Wang and the Center that the court improperly denied their motions to dismiss the plaintiff's medical malpractice complaint as a result of her failure to attach the requisite opinion letter to the complaint and to cure this defect by the expiration of the statute of limitations. In AC 42505, we conclude that the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence with respect to her product liability complaint. The court, therefore, properly denied WABBO's motions for a directed verdict and to set aside the verdict. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment with respect to Wang and the Center on the medical malpractice claims, and affirm the judgment with respect to the product liability claims.")

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