AC44975 - CCI Computerworks, LLC v. Evernet Consulting, LLC (“The defendant, Evernet Consulting, LLC, appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the plaintiff, CCI Computerworks, LLC, on the defendant’s counterclaim asserting claims of breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and indemnification. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly concluded that (1) the agreement executed by the parties attributed liability to the defendant, rather than to the plaintiff, for unemployment taxes, plus interest and penalties, assessed on the defendant by the Department of Labor (department), or (2) in the alternative, the plaintiff was not unjustly enriched by the defendant’s payment of the unemployment taxes, interest, and penalties. We conclude that the court properly rendered judgment in the plaintiff’s favor on the defendant’s counterclaim. In addition, the plaintiff cross appeals from the judgment of the court rendered in its favor on count one of its second amended complaint asserting breach of contract. On cross appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly (1) denied its motion in limine seeking to exclude evidence of a settlement offer, (2) admitted the settlement evidence in full into the record, (3) relied on the settlement evidence to conclude that it had failed to mitigate its damages, and (4) failed to adjudicate its claim that the defendant breached the parties’ agreement by crediting certain costs against the payments that the defendant owed pursuant to the agreement. We agree with the plaintiff’s claims of error regarding the settlement evidence, but we disagree with the plaintiff’s contention that the court overlooked one of its claims. Accordingly, we reverse in part the judgment of the trial court rendered on the plaintiff’s second amended complaint, and we affirm the judgment in all other respects.”)

• Posted in:
• Contract Law,
• Employment Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC45274 - Fraser Lane Associates, LLC v. Chip Fund 7, LLC . (The defendant, Chip Fund 7, LLC, appeals from the judgments of the trial court confirming an arbitration award in favor of the plaintiff, Fraser Lane Associates, LLC, and denying the defendant’s application to vacate an arbitration award. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred because (1) the arbitration award violates public policy, (2) the arbitrator exceeded his authority under the arbitration agreement, and (3) the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgments of the trial court.”)

• Posted in:
• Contract Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC44836, AC45267 - Barbara v. Colonial Surety Co. ("In Docket No. AC 44836, Colonial appeals from the denial of its motion for summary judgment in the Barbaras’ action, in which it asserted that the Barbaras’ claims were precluded pursuant to the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. In Docket No. AC 45267, the Barbaras appeal from the judgment of the trial court rendered following the granting of Colonial’s motion for summary judgment in the indemnity action. On appeal, Colonial claims that the court improperly concluded that the Barbaras’ action is not precluded by the doctrines of res judicata and/or collateral estoppel, and the Barbaras claim that the court improperly concluded that they failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact with respect to their allegations that Colonial acted in bad faith in settling the New York action. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.")

• Posted in:
• Contract Law,
• Insurance Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC45127 - Brownstone Exploration & Discovery Park LLC v. Borodkin (“The plaintiff, Brownstone Exploration & Discovery Park, LLC (Brownstone), appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying its application to compel arbitration of a dispute involving the defendant, Diane Borodkin, who previously had filed an action against Brownstone for personal injuries (personal injury action) that she allegedly sustained when she slipped and fell on an unmarked tree root while walking on a path just past the entrance to a park owned and operated by Brownstone. Brownstone filed its application pursuant to General Statutes § 52-410 seeking to compel arbitration of the dispute in accordance with an agreement that Borodkin signed when she entered the park, which was titled ‘‘Release and Waiver of Claims Arising From Inherent Risks, Indemnity and Arbitration Agreement’’ (agreement). The trial court found the language of the arbitration provision in the agreement to be ambiguous and, as a result, concluded that the issue of arbitrability was a matter for the court to decide. The court further determined that the claim was not arbitrable because it did not fall within the scope of the agreement. Finally, the court concluded, sua sponte, that Brownstone’s application also must be denied on procedural grounds.

On appeal, Brownstone claims that (1) the court erred by concluding that the issue of arbitrability was a matter for the court, not the arbitrators, to decide, and (2) the court erred in denying its application to compel arbitration on procedural grounds. We agree with both of these claims and, thus, reverse the judgment of the court.”)

• Posted in:
• Contract Law,
• Recent Opinions,
• Tort Law

SC20746 - In re Cole (“In 1993, the legislature, for the first time, enacted a so-called ‘homestead act,’ whereby a debtor could protect up to $75,000 of the value of a primary residence from attachment in postjudgment proceedings or bankruptcy. See Public Acts 1993, No. 93-301, § 2 (P.A. 93-301). Although P.A. 93-301 had an effective date of October 1, 1993, and thus applied to any proceedings initiated on or after that date, the act included a special carve-out: the homestead exemption could not be claimed for debts accrued prior to the effective date. See P.A. 93-301, § 3. In 2021, the legislature amended the homestead act and replaced it with a new version that included several changes from the prior version of the act. For purposes of this appeal, the relevant change made by the legislature was to increase the exemption from $75,000 to $250,000, but this time the legislature did not include any carve-out for preexisting debts. See Public Acts 2021, No. 21-161, § 1 (P.A. 21-161). The primary question presented by this appeal, which reaches us in the form of a certified question in a bankruptcy appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, is whether we should nevertheless read a carve-out into the 2021 public act. We decline to do so.”

“The District Court therefore certified to this court the question of ‘[w]hether [P.A.] 21-161 applies retroactively to debts incurred by the debtor before [P.A.] 21- 161 took effect or prospectively.’ We accepted certification but, pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199b (k), and for the reasons discussed in part II B 3 of this opinion, we will answer a slightly modified version of the certified question: does the expanded homestead exemption contained in P.A. 21-161, § 1, apply in bankruptcy proceedings filed on or after the effective date of the act to debts that accrued prior to that date? We answer that question in the affirmative.”

• Posted in:
• Civil Procedure,
• Contract Law,
• Property Law

SC20694 - Connex Credit Union v. Thibodeau (“We subsequently granted the defendant’s petition for certification to appeal from the judgment of the Appellate Court to determine whether (1) ‘the Appellate Court properly interpret[ed] and appl[ied] the requirement of Connecticut’s [UCC] to notify a consumer-debtor that he or she has a right to an accounting of unpaid indebtedness after repossession of secured property,’ and (2) ‘[u]nder [RISFA] . . . a retail seller of a motor vehicle, after repossession and sale of the vehicle, [can] credit a retail buyer’s alleged deficiency only with the proceeds from the vehicle’s sale when the prima facie fair market value of the vehicle exceeded the amount of those proceeds . . . .’ Connex Credit Union v. Thibodeau, 342 Conn. 903, 270 A.3d 690 (2022).

After examining the entire record on appeal and considering the briefs and oral arguments of the parties, we have determined that the appeal should be dismissed on the ground that certification was improvidently granted.

The appeal is dismissed.”)

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• Contract Law,
• Recent Opinions

SC20581, SC20583 - Pryor v. Brignole (Appellate Jurisdiction; Whether the Denial of a Special Motion to Dismiss Filed Pursuant to General Statutes § 52-196a is an Appealable Final Judgment; "The sole issue in these certified appeals is whether the denial of a special motion to dismiss filed pursuant to our state's anti-SLAPP statute, General Statutes § 52-196a, is an appealable final judgment. The defendants, Timothy Brignole and Brignole, Bush & Lewis, LLC (law firm), appeal, upon our granting of their petitions for certification, from the judgments of the Appellate Court, which dismissed their appeals from the order of the trial court denying their special motions to dismiss the underlying civil action brought against them by the plaintiff, J. Xavier Pryor. Specifically, the defendants claim that the Appellate Court improperly dismissed their respective appeals for lack of a final judgment because (1) the legislature expressly provided for an interlocutory appeal of the denial of a special motion to dismiss in subsection (d) of § 52-196a, and (2) the denial of a special motion to dismiss filed pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute constitutes an appealable final judgment under the second prong of State v. Curcio, 191 Conn. 27, 31, 463 A.2d 566 (1983). For the reasons set forth in the companion case that we also decide today, Smith v. Supple, 346 Conn. ___, ___ A.3d ___ (2023), we conclude that a trial court's denial of a colorable special motion to dismiss filed pursuant to § 52-196a is an appealable final judgment under Curcio. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court and remand the case to that court for further proceedings according to law.")

• SC20581, SC20583 Dissent - Pryor v. Brignole

• Posted in:
• Civil Procedure,
• Contract Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC44867 - ARVYS Protein, Inc. v. A/F Protein, Inc. (Arbitration; whether trial court improperly denied plaintiff's application to modify or vacate arbitration award; "The plaintiff, ARVYS Protein, Inc., appeals from the judgment of the trial court, rendered in favor of the defendant, A/F Protein, Inc., on the plaintiff's application to modify or vacate an arbitration award. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly concluded that (1) the arbitrator's award did not exceed the scope of submission by awarding noncontractual relief, (2) the arbitrator did not manifestly disregard the law by ignoring undisputed contract provisions that limited damages and disclaimed warranties, and (3) the award did not violate public policy because it did not arise from the unauthorized practice of law. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment.")

• Posted in:
• Contract Law,
• Recent Opinions

SC20635, SC20637, SC20636 - Reserve Realty, LLC v. Windemere Reserve, LLC (“These consolidated appeals, which return to us for a second time, raise identical issues relating to the enforceability of four commercial real estate listing agreements. In Reserve Realty, LLC v. Windemere Reserve, LLC, 335 Conn. 174, 211, 229 A.3d 708 (2020) (Reserve Realty I), we held that the listing agreements did not violate state antitrust law and remanded the matter to the Appellate Court for consideration of the remaining grounds on which the defendants, BLT Reserve, LLC (BLT), and Windemere Reserve, LLC (Windemere), had prevailed at trial. On remand, the Appellate Court determined that the listing agreements were unenforceable because they failed to specify the duration of the brokerage authorization, as required by General Statutes § 20-325a (b) and/or (c). See Reserve Realty, LLC v. Windemere Reserve, LLC, 205 Conn. App. 299, 302–303, 336, 258 A.3d 711 (2021) (Reserve Realty II). We granted certification to address whether the Appellate Court decided that issue correctly and, if not, whether the trial court’s judgments should nonetheless be affirmed on the alternative ground that the listing agreements were unenforceable personal service contracts. We conclude that the exclusive listing agreements comply with the durational requirement of § 20-325a (c) but that they are personal service contracts that required the personal performance of the named broker, Jeanette Haddad, and we affirm the judgments of the Appellate Court on that basis.”)

• Posted in:
• Contract Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC45050 - Murchison v. Waterbury (“The defendant, the city of Waterbury, appeals from the judgment of the trial court awarding the plaintiffs, Dickie K. Murchison, Jr., and John J. Bigham, firefighters formerly employed by the defendant, terminal leave pay pursuant to their collective bargaining agreement (agreement). On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly concluded that the plaintiffs were entitled to terminal leave pay because (1) the plaintiffs ‘‘retired’’ within the meaning of the terminal leave pay provision of the agreement and (2) any ambiguity in the agreement should be construed against the defendant. We agree with the defendant and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the trial court.”)

• Posted in:
• Contract Law,
• Employment Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC44514 - Pascarella v. Silver ("This case concerns the proper application of the doctrine of res judicata. In their one count complaint, the plaintiffs, Henry Pascarella and Riversedge Partners, predicated their declaratory judgment action against the defendant R.S. Silver Enterprises, Inc., entirely on that doctrine of preclusion. Following a bifurcated bench trial, the trial court concluded that res judicata did not apply under the facts of this case. The plaintiffs now challenge the propriety of that determination. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

• Posted in:
• Contract Law,
• Declaratory Judgment Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC44925 - Stewart v. Old Republic National Title Ins. Co. (“On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the court improperly concluded that, pursuant to the plaintiffs’ title insurance policies, the defendant had no duty to defend the plaintiffs in two actions involving the plaintiffs’ properties. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.”)

• Posted in:
• Contract Law,
• Insurance Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC45151 - Stamford Property Holdings, LLC v. Jashari ("The present appeal arises out of an action brought by the plaintiff lessor, Stamford Property Holdings, LLC, against the defendant lessees, Dorian Jashari (Jashari) and Ismet Jashari, seeking, inter alia, reformation of a commercial lease between the parties based on unilateral or mutual mistake. The defendants appeal from the trial court's judgment in favor of the plaintiff. On appeal, they claim that the court (1) improperly granted reformation of the contract based on the ground of unilateral mistake because, contrary to the court's conclusion, there was no clear, substantial, and convincing proof of inequitable conduct on the part of the defendants, and (2) erred by granting the plaintiff equitable relief because the plaintiff's misconduct before the parties executed the lease barred its claim for reformation. We conclude that the defendants' first claim is moot, and we are not persuaded by their second claim. Accordingly, we dismiss as moot the portion of the appeal related to the first claim and affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

AC45880 - Centrix Management Co., LLC v. Fosberg ("In this summary process action, the plaintiff landlord, Centrix Management Company, LLC, appeals from the trial court's postjudgment award of attorney's fees to the defendant tenant, Donald Fosberg, pursuant to General Statutes § 42-150bb. The defendant moves to dismiss this appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the ground that the plaintiff failed to timely appeal pursuant to General Statutes § 47a-35. The plaintiff opposes the motion, arguing that the applicable appeal period is not five days under § 47a-35 but, rather, twenty days under Practice Book § 63-1, as it is not challenging the judgment of possession. We conclude that the twenty day appeal period set forth in Practice Book § 63-1 applies to a postjudgment award of attorney's fees in the summary process context. We therefore deny the motion to dismiss.")

• Posted in:
• Contract Law,
• Landlord / Tenant Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC45040 - Bradley v. Yovino (“This appeal arises out of an action brought by the plaintiffs, Dhameer Bradley and Malik St. Hilaire, two former students of the defendant Sacred Heart University, Inc. (university), against the university and the defendant Nikki Yovino. Yovino, a fellow student at the university, accused the plaintiffs of sexually assaulting her but later recanted her allegations and pleaded guilty to the charges of falsely reporting an incident in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-180c and interfering with an officer in violation of General Statutes § 53a-167a. In this action, the plaintiffs allege that Yovino committed various torts against them by falsely accusing them of sexual assault and that the university breached its contract with them in the manner in which it conducted an investigation into Yovino’s accusations and by suspending them from the university.

Bradley appeals from the summary judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the university as to the count of the complaint brought by him against the university. On appeal, he claims that the court improperly (1) denied his motion to compel a round of second depositions of certain university employees and his related motion for an extension of time to respond to the university’s motion for summary judgment, (2) rendered summary judgment against him without permitting oral argument on the university’s motion in violation of Practice Book § 11-18, and (3) denied his motion for reargument of his motion to compel and the summary judgment rendered against him. We conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion by denying Bradley’s motion to compel a second round of depositions or his motion for an extension of time. We also conclude that, although the court improperly deprived the plaintiff of oral argument pursuant to Practice Book § 11-18, that error was harmless because, in light of the procedural posture of this case, there is not a reasonable probability that oral argument would have resulted in the trial court denying the motion for summary judgment. Finally, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion by denying Bradley’s motion for reargument. Accordingly, we affirm the summary judgment rendered against Bradley and in favor of the university.”)

• Posted in:
• Contract Law,
• Recent Opinions

SC20660 - Strazza Building & Construction, Inc. v. Harris ("In Girolametti v. Michael Horton Associates, Inc., 332 Conn. 67, 87, 208 A.3d 1223 (2019), this court held that, when a property owner and a general contractor have resolved disputes arising from a construction project by way of binding arbitration, there arises a rebuttable presumption that the general contractor and its subcontractors are in privity for purposes of res judicata in any subsequent litigation. In this certified appeal, we must determine whether the Appellate Court correctly applied Girolametti to the facts of the present case, in which a general contractor had sued the property owner to foreclose two mechanic's liens it served on the owner, claiming unpaid balances for labor and materials stemming from renovations it began on the owner's home. In particular, we consider whether the Appellate Court properly upheld the trial court's denial of the property owner's motion for summary judgment, declining to give preclusive effect to the findings of the trial court in a prior action between the owner and one of the general contractor's subcontractors. We agree with the Appellate Court that the presumption of privity that we held to apply in Girolametti does not apply in the present case, in which a property owner seeks to bind a general contractor to a prior judgment against a subcontractor. We also agree that the trial court correctly denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment because there remains an issue of material fact as to whether the doctrine of res judicata applies to the facts of this case.

. . . The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.")

• Posted in:
• Contract Law,
• Foreclosure Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC45277 - Circulent, Inc. v. Hatch & Bailey Co.(“In this action for breach of contract, the plaintiff, Circulent, Inc., appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the defendant, The Hatch and Bailey Company. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court erred in finding that (1) the defendant paid in full the amounts owed to the plaintiff on the parties’ managed technologies services agreement (MTS agreement), (2) the term of the parties’ ‘‘Disaster Recovery-as-a-Service’’ agreement (DRaaS agreement) was one year rather than three years, and (3) the defendant paid in full the amounts owed on the DRaaS agreement. The plaintiff argues that, as a result of its erroneous findings, the court improperly rendered judgment in favor of the defendant as to counts one and two of the plaintiff’s complaint, which alleged a breach of the DRaaS agreement and a breach of the MTS agreement, respectively. Because we conclude that the court’s conclusions as to those counts rested on clearly erroneous factual findings, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for a new trial as to those counts.”)

• Posted in:
• Contract Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC44843 - Ah Min Holding, LLC v. Hartford ("The plaintiff, Ah Min Holding, LLC, appeals from the judgment of the trial court, rendered in favor of the defendant, the city of Hartford, on the plaintiff's claims that the defendant breached a tax abatement agreement (agreement) regarding properties owned by the plaintiff and known as the Clay Arsenal Renaissance Apartments (CARA properties) and that the defendant was unjustly enriched by that alleged breach. On appeal, the plaintiff argues that the court improperly (1) read into the agreement a term that the plaintiff must comply with the General Statutes and certain provisions of the defendant's Municipal Code (code) relating to the maintenance of dwelling units, (2) concluded that the defendant had a contractual right to terminate the agreement, and (3) concluded that the plaintiff failed to prove that the defendant breached the agreement. The defendant argues in response that the court properly read the related statutes and code provisions into the agreement. Further, the defendant argues that, because those provisions properly were read into the agreement, the court correctly determined that the defendant had the contractual right to terminate the agreement because the plaintiff failed to maintain the properties in accordance therewith and that the plaintiff failed to prove that the defendant breached the agreement. We agree with the defendant and, therefore, affirm the judgment.")

• Posted in:
• Contract Law,
• Property Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC45192 - Myshkina v. Gusinski (Breach of contract; motion for default for failure to appear; motion for judgment on default; "The defendant, Vladimir Gusinski, appeals from the default judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff, Galina Myshkina. The defendant claims that the court, in rendering the judgment, improperly relied on the affidavit of debt of the plaintiff's counsel in contravention of Practice Book § 17-25 (b) (1). We agree and reverse the judgment of the trial court.")

• Posted in:
• Contract Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC44274 - Schimenti Construction Co., LLC v. Schimenti (“The plaintiff, Schimenti Construction Company, LLC, appeals from the summary judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of the defendant, Joseph Schimenti, on counts one and two of its complaint alleging breach of an employment contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court erred in determining that continued employment of an at-will employee does not constitute consideration for a restrictive covenant. We agree with plaintiff’s claim and, therefore, reverse the summary judgment rendered in favor of the defendant and remand the case for further proceedings.”)

• Posted in:
• Contract Law,
• Employment Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC45123 - Johnson v. Vita Built, LLC (“We agree that the court improperly concluded that the contract unambiguously provided that the parties would share only in net profits and did not reflect an intent to share in all losses resulting from the sale of the property. We also agree with the plaintiffs that the court made clearly erroneous factual findings in support of its alternative conclusion that, even if the contract is ambiguous regarding the parties’ intent, the parol evidence established probable cause that the defendants would prevail on their counterclaim. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court granting the defendants’ application for a prejudgment remedy and remand for a new prejudgment remedy hearing.”)

• Posted in:
• Contract Law,
• Recent Opinions