AC47490 - Lombardi v. Westport (“The plaintiff, Kenneth Lombardi, appeals from the summary judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of the defendant, the town of Westport. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly concluded that there were no genuine issues of material fact as to the plaintiff’s breach of contract claim alleging that the defendant breached the terms of a pension plan. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.)

• Posted in:
• Contract Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC47140 - Ready v. New Canaan (“The plaintiffs, Scott Ready and Veronica Ready, appeal from the judgment of the trial court granting the motion for summary judgment filed by the defendant, the town of New Canaan, as to the plaintiffs’ complaint alleging breach of contract. On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the court improperly rendered summary judgment in favor of the defendant on the ground that the plaintiffs’ claim sounded in tort rather than in breach of contract and, therefore, was barred by the doctrine of governmental immunity. We reverse the judgment of the court.”)

• Posted in:
• Contract Law,
• Recent Opinions,
• Tort Law

AC47221 - Fezollari v. Jauzovic (“On appeal, the defendant claims that, at the hearing in damages, the court (1) improperly denied her the opportunity to present evidence to mitigate damages as provided for in Practice Book §§ 17- 34 (a) and 17-40 and (2) used an incorrect measure of damages in calculating the damages award. We agree with the defendant as to both claims and, accordingly, reverse in part the judgment of the court as to the award of damages and remand the case for a new hearing in damages.”)

• Posted in:
• Contract Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC47261 - Smith v. H. Pearce Real Estate Co. (“In this appeal from the judgments in two consolidated actions arising from an asset purchase agreement, the plaintiffs in the first action, DeForest W. Smith and DeForest Industries, Inc. (DII), challenge the judgments of the trial court, rendered after a court trial. On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the court improperly (1) found that the defendant H. Pearce Real Estate Company, Inc. (Pearce) was entitled to a setoff for the overpayment of a commission that it previously had paid to Smith, (2) concluded that Smith was personally liable to Pearce for the setoff, and (3) rejected their claim that certain lease renewals were excluded from its sale of assets to Pearce. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.”)

• Posted in:
• Contract Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC47098 - Schneider v. Federman (“The defendant, Martha Federman, appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying her motion to open the default judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiffs, Jeremiah T. Schneider III and Sara Papasidero. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly denied that motion. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.)

• Posted in:
• Contract Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC44253, AC44254 - Pryor v. Brignole (“These appeals involve a novel issue of statutory interpretation regarding a legal standard for which neither the language of the statute nor its legislative history provides clear resolution. It thus falls to this court to divine, as best we can, the proper construction of that statutory standard, ever mindful that it is the prerogative of our General Assembly to modify, alter, and amend the laws of this state.

In these related appeals, the defendants, Timothy Brignole and the law firm of Brignole, Bush & Lewis, LLC (law firm), appeal from the judgments of the trial court denying their special motions to dismiss filed pursuant to Connecticut’s anti-SLAPP statute, General Statutes § 52-196a, in this breach of contract action brought by the self-represented plaintiff, J. Xavier Pryor. On appeal, the defendants claim that the court improperly construed § 52-196a (e) (3) to require a moving party, as part of its initial burden under the first prong of that statute, to admit to engaging in the conduct alleged in the plaintiff’s complaint. In response, the plaintiff argues that the alleged conduct did not involve a matter of public concern, as required by § 52- 196a (e) (3), and that the defendants waived their ability to file special motions to dismiss because those motions were untimely. We agree with the defendants that the court improperly interpreted § 52-196a (e) (3) and, accordingly, reverse the judgments of the trial court.”)

• Posted in:
• Contract Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC46961 - Jackson v. Prince (“The self-represented plaintiff, Nicole C. Jackson, appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing her action against the defendants, Joshua Prince (Joshua), Melinda Prince (Melinda), Amy Zabetakis, and John B. Devine. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court erred in (1) concluding that it lacked personal jurisdiction over Joshua and Melinda on the basis of insufficiency of process and insufficient service of process, (2) failing to hold an evidentiary hearing prior to dismissing the action as to Joshua and Melinda, and (3) concluding that it lacked personal jurisdiction over Zabetakis and Devine on the basis of insufficient service of process. We conclude that the court erred in concluding that it lacked personal jurisdiction over Melinda and in failing to hold an evidentiary hearing prior to dismissing the action as to Joshua. We also conclude that the court properly dismissed the action as to Devine and Zabetakis. Accordingly, we reverse in part and affirm in part the judgment of the trial court.”)

• Posted in:
• Contract Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC46852 - Gama Aviation (Management), Inc. v. Senbahar (“The plaintiff, Gama Aviation (Management), Inc., commenced this action against the defendant, Izak Senbahar, alleging breach of the defendant’s agreement to personally guarantee payment of a promissory note that had been executed in favor of the plaintiff by a third-party borrower. The trial court rendered summary judgment for the plaintiff and, in so doing, rejected the defendant’s statute of limitations defense, concluding that, although the plaintiff’s action was not brought within the original six year limitation period, the action was not time barred because the defendant acknowledged the debt owed under the guaranty agreement, thereby resetting that six year period. On appeal, the defendant challenges the trial court’s determination that he could not prevail on his statute of limitations defense as a matter of law because, the defendant contends, he never acknowledged the debt and, consequently, the plaintiff’s action is barred by the original limitation period. We disagree with the defendant and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.”)

• Posted in:
• Contract Law,
• Recent Opinions

SC21001 - Wisniewski v. Palermino ("Today we are called on to consider the scope of an attorney’s liability to third-party beneficiaries of a will. The plaintiffs, two of decedent Edward Wisniewski’s grandchildren, Emma Wisniewski and Madelyn Wisniewski, and his friend, Barbara Saccardo,1 brought this action alleging professional negligence and breach of contract by the defendants Anthony J. Palermino, an attorney, and his law firm, the Law Office of Anthony J. Palermino, LLC, in connection with estate planning work performed by the defendant for Wisniewski in April, 2018.2 The plaintiffs alleged that Wisniewski retained the defendant to draft a will that would transfer his interest in his TD Ameritrade security account, valued at $845,367.57, in five equal shares to them, to Wisniewski’s daughter, Joanna Cooper, and to Joanna Cooper’s child. Wisniewski died the next month. Joanna Cooper—the only designated beneficiary on the account— received the entire amount pursuant to the beneficiary designation on file with TD Ameritrade.3 The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant was professionally negligent for failing (1) to advise Wisniewski that he needed to change the TD Ameritrade account’s beneficiary designation so that the account’s assets would pass through Wisniewski’s estate in accordance with the will, and (2) to ensure that the account’s beneficiary designation was in fact changed. The plaintiffs also alleged that the defendant breached his contract with Wisniewski because he did not draft the will in accordance with Wisniewski’s wishes. The trial court ultimately dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims. On appeal, the plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in dismissing both claims. We agree that the trial court improperly dismissed the plaintiffs’ professional negligence claim. We conclude, however, that the trial court properly dismissed the plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim.")

• SC21001 Concurrence & Dissent - Wisniewski v. Palermino

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• Contract Law,
• Legal Malpractice & Attorney Discipline Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC47153 - Lalli v. New Haven (“The plaintiffs, thirty-seven retired New Haven police officers, appeal from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the defendant, the city of New Haven. On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the court improperly determined that the defendant did not breach the terms of a 2016 collective bargaining agreement by determining that the plaintiffs, as retirees and not active employees, were not entitled to retroactive wages. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the court.”

• Posted in:
• Contract Law,
• Employment Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC46449 - Whelan v. Brestelli ("In this action alleging, inter alia, the breach of a settlement agreement resolving disputes between abutting lakefront property owners, the defendants Christopher Brestelli and Virginia Brestelli (Brestellis) appeal, following a bench trial, from the judgment of the trial court rendered against them in favor of the plaintiffs, Benjamin Whelan and Alyson Whelan (Whelans), and from the court's subsequent award of costs and reasonable attorney's fees to the Whelans. The Brestellis claim that the court improperly (1) determined that they breached their settlement agreement with the Whelans; (2) found that they had erected a so-called 'spite fence' in violation of General Statutes §§ 52-480 and 52-570; (3) allowed the Whelans to amend their complaint during trial to add an additional count sounding in breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (4) rendered judgment in favor of the Whelans for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; and (5) exceeded the scope of the parties' settlement agreement by awarding attorney's fees and costs to the Whelans. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the court.")

• Posted in:
• Contract Law,
• Property Law,
• Recent Opinions

SC21013 - McCarter & English, LLP v. Jarrow Formulas, Inc. ("This case, which comes to us upon our acceptance of a certified question from the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, requires us to consider whether a law firm can recover punitive damages from a former client for the client's breach of contract. We have long recognized that the principal purpose of remedies in a breach of contract action is to provide compensation for loss. See, e.g., Vines v. Orchard Hills, Inc., 181 Conn. 501, 506, 435 A.2d 1022 (1980). As a result, damages for breach of contract are traditionally limited to compensatory damages. See, e.g., id., 506–507. Connecticut is unique among the states because common-law punitive damages are limited to litigation expenses that may also serve to compensate the plaintiff. See, e.g., Berry v. Loiseau, 223 Conn. 786, 827, 614 A.2d 414 (1992). But we have also recognized that, "in . . . light of the increasing costs of litigation," punitive damages can also "punish and deter wrongful conduct." Id. Consequently, punitive damages are often in tension with the purpose of damages in contract law because, "[e]ven if the breach [of contract] is deliberate, it is not necessarily blameworthy." Patton v. Mid-Continent Systems, Inc., 841 F.2d 742, 750 (7th Cir. 1988). In light of this tension, we tread carefully when determining whether to broaden the scope of a client's potential liability to its attorney when that attorney brings a breach of contract action against the client. After consideration of the common law of this state and other jurisdictions, and the relevant policy implications, we agree with, and adopt, the rule followed by the majority of jurisdictions and the Restatements: a law firm may not recover common-law punitive damages for its client's breach of contract unless it pleads and proves the existence of an independent tort for which punitive damages are available.")

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• Contract Law,
• Recent Opinions,
• Tort Law

SC20922 - Napolitano v. Ace American Ins. Co. (“This certified appeal requires us to consider the relationship between General Statutes § 31-348,1 which governs the cancellation of workers’ compensation insurance policies, and traditional principles of contract law governing the cancellation of insurance policies. The plaintiff, Thomas Napolitano, doing business as Napolitano Roofing, appeals, upon our grant of his petition for certification, from the judgment of the Appellate Court reversing the trial court’s judgment in favor of the plaintiff on his breach of contract claim. Napolitano v. Ace American Ins. Co., 219 Conn. App. 110, 114, 137, 293 A.3d 915 (2023). The plaintiff claims that the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that the named defendant, Ace American Insurance Company, effectively cancelled the plaintiff’s workers’ compensation insurance by providing a cancellation notice that complied with § 31-348, notwithstanding the fact that the defendant, during the same time period, engaged in other conflicting conduct that the plaintiff contends rendered its notice of cancellation indefinite, uncertain, and ambiguous. We agree with the plaintiff and reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.”

• Posted in:
• Contract Law,
• Declaratory Judgment Law,
• Recent Opinions,
• Workers' Compensation Law

AC46539 - Larobina v. Altice Media Solutions, LLC (“The self-represented plaintiff, Vincent P. Larobina, appeals from the judgment of the trial court, rendered after a bench trial, in favor of the defendant, Altice Media Solutions, LLC. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court incorrectly concluded that (1) his request for a declaratory judgment—to the extent it sought to invalidate the arbitration provision incorporated into his services agreement with the defendant on the basis that it contained an improper, so-called ‘‘infinite arbitration clause’’—was nonjusticiable, (2) the services agreement was lawfully formed, and (3) insofar as the arbitration provision applied to the parties’ underlying telephone service dispute, the provision was not unconscionable. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm in part the judgment of the trial court; we reverse in part the judgment to correct its form.”

“The form of the judgment with respect to the plaintiff’s claim for a declaratory ruling pertaining to the infinite arbitration clause is improper, the judgment is reversed only as to that claim and the case is remanded with direction to render judgment dismissing that claim; the judgment is affirmed in all other respects.”)

• Posted in:
• Contract Law,
• Declaratory Judgment Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC46508 - Civic Mind, LLC v. Hartford (“In this action concerning the redevelopment of Dillon Stadium (stadium) in Hartford, the plaintiff, Civic Mind, LLC, appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing its complaint against the nineteen defendants, including the city of Hartford (city) and the Capital Region Development Authority (CRDA). On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly granted motions to dismiss filed by the defendants on the ground that the plaintiff lacked standing to pursue its claims against the defendants. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.”)

• Posted in:
• Contract Law,
• Recent Opinions,
• Tort Law

AC46370 - Sicignano v. Pearce (“The plaintiff, Robert J. Sicignano, Jr., appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing his complaint against the defendants, Barbara Pearce and Connecticut Hospice, Inc. (Connecticut Hospice), pursuant to Connecticut’s anti-SLAPP statute, General Statutes § 52-196a. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial court erred by: (1) ‘concluding [that] the plaintiff’s claims against the defendants fall within the ambit of protected constitutional conduct as defined by . . .§ 52-196a’; (2) ‘adopting language in the California anti-SLAPP statute and California case law not contained in the Connecticut anti-SLAPP statute in violation of the separation of powers under the constitution’; and (3) ‘adopting definitions of language in the Connecticut anti-SLAPP statute based upon California case law [interpreting] the California statute in violation of the rule against ex post facto legislation as applied to the courts through the due process clause.’ We affirm the judgment of the trial court.”)

• Posted in:
• Contract Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC45832 - Mystic Oil Co. v. Shaukat, LLC (“The defendants Shaukat, LLC (Shaukat), and Raja Shaukat Ali appeal from the judgment of the trial court rendered after a hearing in damages following the rendering of summary judgment as to liability only in favor of the plaintiff, Mystic Oil Company, Inc., with respect to its claims for breach of contract and breach of guarantee. Specifically, the defendants challenge on appeal (1) the court’s award of certain damages and (2) the court’s granting of the plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s fees and costs without an evidentiary hearing. We affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the trial court.”)

• Posted in:
• Contract Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC46512 - JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Durant (“The defendant, Fred N. Durante, also known as Fred N. Durante, Jr., appeals from the judgment of the trial court granting the motion for approval of trial court and appellate costs and attorney’s fees filed by the plaintiff, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly granted the plaintiff’s motion because it was untimely under Practice Book § 11-21 and was made without any showing of excusable neglect to permit the late filing. We agree and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the trial court.”)

• Posted in:
• Contract Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC46128 - Ryder v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Assn. ("The plaintiff, Gary Ryder, appeals from the judgment of the trial court, rendered after a jury trial, in favor of the defendant, JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly (1) denied his motions to set aside the jury's verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict 'to the extent that the verdict awarded no damages to the plaintiff,' (2) precluded the plaintiff from presenting evidence relevant to the damages incurred after November, 2014, when he transferred title to the property to a trust, (3) denied his motions to set aside the verdict as inadequate and for additur, and (4) denied his postjudgment motion to consolidate the underlying action with the defendant's related foreclosure action against the plaintiff. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

• Posted in:
• Contract Law,
• Foreclosure Law,
• Property Law

SC20797 - Collier v. Adar Hartford Realty, LLC ("This is an interlocutory appeal from the trial court's denial of a motion for class certification. The plaintiffs, former residents of Barbour Gardens, a housing development in the city of Hartford (city), instituted this action in connection with the living conditions at Barbour Gardens during their residency. They sought compensatory and punitive damages and attorney's fees from the owner of Barbour Gardens and its property management company, and alleged various tort, contract, equitable, and statutory claims, including a claim of a violation of a provision of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), General Statutes § 42-110g. The plaintiffs filed a motion to certify a class on behalf 'of all persons who lived at Barbour Gardens for any or all of the time between June 24, 2004, and October 13, 2019,' which the trial court denied on the grounds that individualized issues would predominate over class-wide issues and that a class action is not a superior method to resolve the plaintiffs' claims. See Practice Book § 9-8 (3). In this appeal brought pursuant to General Statutes § 42-110h, the plaintiffs contend that there is sufficient evidence in the record common to the entire class to satisfy the predominance and superiority requirements. We reject this claim due to the lengthy period of time for which class certification was requested—covering all residents at Barbour Gardens at any time over a span of more than fifteen years—and the absence of generalized evidence in the record concerning the living conditions at Barbour Gardens during most of the proposed class period. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiffs' motion for class certification.")

• Posted in:
• Civil Procedure,
• Contract Law,
• Landlord / Tenant Law,
• Recent Opinions,
• Tort Law