AC45054 - Curley v. Phoenix Ins. Co. (“In this action to recover underinsured motorist benefits, the plaintiff, Diana Curley, appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendering summary judgment for the defendant, The Phoenix Insurance Company. The court concluded that the plaintiff was not an insured within the meaning of the commercial automobile liability insurance policy issued by the defendant to the plaintiff’s employer, the University of Bridgeport (university), because she was not occupying a covered vehicle for purposes of the underinsured motorist coverage endorsement. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly rendered summary judgment for the defendant because (1) the court’s construction of the university’s policy violates General Statutes § 38a-336 (a) (2), (2) the plaintiff is entitled to underinsured motorist benefits pursuant to the policy’s business auto extension endorsement, and (3) denying the plaintiff underinsured motorist benefits would violate public policy. We agree with the plaintiff’s first claim and, therefore, reverse the judgment of the trial court.”)

• Posted in:
• Insurance Law,
• Recent Opinions

SC20718 - Roach v. Transwaste, Inc. (“The sole issue in this certified appeal is whether the jury was presented with sufficient evidence to award the plaintiff, William L. Roach, lost wages in this wrongful termination action. The defendant, Transwaste, Inc., claims that the Appellate Court improperly upheld the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion for remittitur. We disagree with the defendant and affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.”)

• Posted in:
• Employment Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC45127 - Brownstone Exploration & Discovery Park LLC v. Borodkin (“The plaintiff, Brownstone Exploration & Discovery Park, LLC (Brownstone), appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying its application to compel arbitration of a dispute involving the defendant, Diane Borodkin, who previously had filed an action against Brownstone for personal injuries (personal injury action) that she allegedly sustained when she slipped and fell on an unmarked tree root while walking on a path just past the entrance to a park owned and operated by Brownstone. Brownstone filed its application pursuant to General Statutes § 52-410 seeking to compel arbitration of the dispute in accordance with an agreement that Borodkin signed when she entered the park, which was titled ‘‘Release and Waiver of Claims Arising From Inherent Risks, Indemnity and Arbitration Agreement’’ (agreement). The trial court found the language of the arbitration provision in the agreement to be ambiguous and, as a result, concluded that the issue of arbitrability was a matter for the court to decide. The court further determined that the claim was not arbitrable because it did not fall within the scope of the agreement. Finally, the court concluded, sua sponte, that Brownstone’s application also must be denied on procedural grounds.

On appeal, Brownstone claims that (1) the court erred by concluding that the issue of arbitrability was a matter for the court, not the arbitrators, to decide, and (2) the court erred in denying its application to compel arbitration on procedural grounds. We agree with both of these claims and, thus, reverse the judgment of the court.”)

• Posted in:
• Contract Law,
• Recent Opinions,
• Tort Law

AC46194 - Lafferty v. Jones ("This writ of error was commenced by the plaintiff in error, Norman A. Pattis—a Connecticut attorney and counsel of record for the defendants, Alex Emric Jones and Free Speech Systems, LLC, in the underlying consolidated tort actions arising out of the mass shooting at Sandy Hook Elementary School. The plaintiff in error challenges the order of the second defendant in error, Honorable Barbara N. Bellis, suspending him from the practice of law for a period of six months for violating numerous provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

In response to the writ of error, the first defendant in error, the Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of misjoinder. Judge Bellis also filed a motion to dismiss the writ of error for lack of proper service of process. By separate orders dated March 1, 2023, we denied the motion to dismiss filed by the Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel and granted Judge Bellis' motion to dismiss, indicating in both orders that an opinion would follow. This opinion provides our reasons for those orders.

.....

The motion to dismiss filed by disciplinary counsel is denied; the motion to dismiss filed by Judge Bellis is granted and the writ of error as it pertains to Judge Bellis is dismissed.")

• Posted in:
• Legal Malpractice & Attorney Discipline Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC45065 - Cazenovia Creek Funding I, LLC v. White Eagle Society of Brotherly Help, Inc., Group 315, Polish National Alliance ("The named defendant, The White Eagle Society of Brotherly Help, Inc., Group 315, Polish National Alliance, appeals from the judgment of foreclosure by sale rendered by the trial court in favor of the substitute plaintiff, Benchmark Municipal Tax Services, Ltd. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly (1) rendered summary judgment against it as to liability after determining that the tax liens for the grand lists of 2012 and 2013 properly were assigned to the plaintiff and (2) found that the debt was due to the plaintiff. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

AC45473 - U.S. Bank National Assn. v. Booker ("In this residential mortgage foreclosure action, the defendants Linda Booker and Ulish Booker, Jr., appeal from the trial court’s denial of their motion to open the judgment of strict foreclosure rendered in favor of the plaintiff U.S. Bank National Association as Legal Title Trustee for Truman 2016 SC6 Title Trust. The defendants claim that the court erred in denying their motion to open the judgment because the court improperly decided not to exercise its discretion and afford them relief in connection with the grounds of mistake and fraud raised therein. The plaintiff argues that this court should dismiss the appeal because (1) the defendants’ appeal is moot, as title in the mortgaged property has vested in the plaintiff, and (2) the defendants should not be allowed to raise their claim of error because it could have been raised in the defendants’ prior appeal in this action. The plaintiff also argues that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to open. We reject the plaintiff’s jurisdictional and reviewability arguments and conclude that the court properly denied the defendants’ motion to open. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court.")

• Posted in:
• Foreclosure Law,
• Property Law,
• Recent Opinions

Thursday, July 27th

• Danbury Law Library opens at 9:30 a.m. and closes at 3:30 p.m.
• New Britain Law Library opens at 9:45 a.m.
• New London Law Library opens at 11:00 a.m.
• Putnam Law Library opens at 9:30 a.m. and closes at 3:45 p.m.
• Waterbury Law Library closes at 1:00 p.m.

Friday, July 28th

• Danbury Law Library is closed.
• Putnam Law Library is closed.

Monday, July 31st

• Danbury Law Library is closed.
• Putnam Law Library is closed.

Tuesday, August 1st

• Danbury Law Library opens at 9:30 a.m. and closes at 4:00 p.m.
• Middletown Law Library is closed.
• Putnam Law Library opens at 9:30 a.m. and closes at 3:45 p.m.

Wednesday, August 2nd

• Danbury Law Library opens at 10:00 a.m. and closes at 4:00 p.m.
• Putnam Law Library closes at 4:00 p.m.
• Rockville Law Library is closed.

Thursday, August 3rd

• Danbury Law Library opens at 9:30 a.m. and closes at 3:30 p.m.
• Hartford Law Library is closed.
• Putnam Law Library opens at 10:00 a.m. and closes at 3:45 p.m.
• Torrington Law Library is closed.
• Waterbury Law Library closes at 1:00 p.m.

Friday, August 4th

• Danbury Law Library is closed.
• New Haven Law Library closes at 3:45 p.m.
• Putnam Law Library is closed.
• Torrington Law Library is closed.

Monday, August 7th

• Rockville Law Library is closes at 4:00 p.m.
• Torrington Law Library closes at 3:30 p.m.
• Waterbury Law Library closes at 2:00 p.m.

• Posted in:
• Library Notices

AC45846 - In re Kyreese L. (“The respondent mother, Naila S., appeals from the judgment of the trial court terminating her parental rights as to her minor child, Kyreese L., Jr. (Kyreese). The respondent claims that the court erred in concluding that (1) the Department of Children and Families (department) made reasonable efforts to reunify the respondent with Kyreese, (2) the respondent was unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification services, and (3) the respondent failed to achieve a sufficient degree of personal rehabilitation. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.”)

• Posted in:
• Juvenile Law,
• Recent Opinions

SC20648 - KeyBank, N.A. v. Yazar ("This certified appeal concerns this state's Emergency Mortgage Assistance Program (EMAP), General Statutes §§ 8-265cc through 8-265kk, which is designed to assist homeowners in avoiding foreclosure by providing a mechanism and funding for emergency mortgage and lien assistance payments, among other resources. See General Statutes §§ 8-265dd and 8-265ee. As part of EMAP, § 8-265ee (a) requires mortgagees to provide notice to homeowners to inform them of the resources available under the program. In this appeal, we must consider two questions relating to this notice requirement. First, we have to determine whether the EMAP notice requirement in § 8-265ee (a) is jurisdictional. Second, we must decide whether an EMAP notice sent before the commencement of a prior foreclosure action by the predecessor mortgagee is valid for a subsequent action initiated by the successor mortgagee. We conclude that the EMAP notice requirement in § 8-265ee (a), although a mandatory condition precedent, is not jurisdictional in nature. Second, we conclude that § 8-265ee (a) requires that a mortgagee provide an EMAP notice for each foreclosure action initiated. Therefore, in the present case, the plaintiff, KeyBank, N.A., was required to provide an EMAP notice to the defendant Ozlem Yazar prior to initiating a subsequent foreclosure action after a prior foreclosure action had been dismissed.")

• Posted in:
• Foreclosure Law,
• Recent Opinions

The Connecticut Law Journal, Volume LXXXV, No. 4, for July 25, 2023 is now available.

Contained in the issue is the following:

• Table of Contents
• Volume 347: Connecticut Reports (Pages 311 - 381)
• Volume 347: Orders (Pages 907 - 907)
• Volume 347: Cumulative Table of Cases Connecticut Reports
• Volume 220: Connecticut Appellate Reports (Pages 507 - 679)
• Volume 220: Memorandum Decisions (Pages 901 - 901)
• Volume 220: Cumulative Table of Cases Connecticut Appellate Reports
• Miscellaneous Notices
• Supreme Court Pending Cases

• Posted in:
• Connecticut Law Journal,
• Recent Opinions

SC20621- Banks v. Commissioner of Correction ("We conclude that plain error and Golding review is available to challenge the habeas court’s handling of the habeas proceeding itself, despite its denial of a petition for certification to appeal, if the appellant can demonstrate that the unpreserved claims involve issues that ‘are debatable among jurists of reason; that a court could resolve [them in a different manner]; or that [they] are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.’ (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Simms v. Warden, 230 Conn. 608, 616, 646 A.2d 126 (1994) (Simms II). We therefore reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court dismissing the appeal filed by the petitioner, Harold T. Banks, Jr., and remand the case to that court for consideration of the petitioner’s claims under the Simms II criteria.")

• Dissent

SC20622 - Bosque v. Commissioner of Correction (“In Banks v. Commissioner of Correction, 347 Conn. 335, 350–77, A.3d (2023), also released today, we held that unpreserved claims challenging the habeas court’s handling of the habeas proceeding itself are reviewable under the plain error doctrine and Golding, despite the failure to include those claims in the petition for certification to appeal, if the appellant can demonstrate that the claims are nonfrivolous because they involve issues that ‘are debatable among jurists of reason; that a court could resolve [them in a different manner]; or that [they] are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.’ (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Simms v. Warden, 230 Conn. 608, 616, 646 A.2d 126 (1994). Because the Appellate Court dismissed the petitioner’s uncertified appeal without first considering whether his unpreserved claims are nonfrivolous under the Simms criteria, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court and remand for consideration of that issue consistent with the principles set forth in Banks.”)

• Dissent

• Posted in:
• Habeas Corpus Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC45926 - Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC v. Ishikawa ("In this residential mortgage foreclosure action, the defendant Yoko Ishikawa appeals from the judgment of strict foreclosure rendered by the trial court in favor of the plaintiff, Limosa, LLC. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment as to liability only because it erred in determining that there were no genuine issues of material fact as to the defendant's special defense alleging that Robert D. Hackett, the defendant's former spouse and a co-obligor on the underlying note and mortgage, had not been given notice of default and acceleration pursuant to 24 C.F.R. § 201.50. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

AC45425, AC45426, AC45462 - Pacific Funding Trust 1002 v. Stephenson Residential Services, LLC ("In these three appeals, the named defendant in each case, Stephenson Residential Services, LLC, appeals from the judgments of foreclosure by sale rendered in favor of the plaintiff in the first case, Pacific Funding Trust 1002 (Pacific Funding), and the plaintiff in the second and third cases, PS Funding, Inc. (PS Funding), after the defendant was defaulted in each case. The defendant filed nearly identical appellate briefs and raises the same claims in all three appeals, namely, (1) that the court improperly determined that the defendant's special defenses, as set forth in a pleading it purported to file in each case titled 'defendant's answer, special defenses/matters in avoidance and setoffs' (answer and special defenses), were legally insufficient to present a valid defense to a matured mortgage, and (2) whether the special defenses, even if not properly part of the record, sufficiently apprised the court that the defendant was raising a challenge or objection to the amount of the debt, thereby requiring an evidentiary hearing and precluding the court from determining the amount of the debt by affidavit pursuant to Practice Book § 23-18 (a). We affirm the judgment in each appeal.")

AC45844 - TLOA of CT, LLC v. Taipe ("In this foreclosure action, the defendant Marcelino Taipe appeals from the judgment of foreclosure by sale rendered by the trial court in favor of the plaintiff, TLOA of CT, LLC. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court erred in granting the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment as to liability only and denying his motion for summary judgment. In particular, the defendant contends that the court improperly concluded that the city of Bridgeport (city) complied with General Statutes § 12-144b when it applied the defendant's tax payments to his current taxes owed to the city, rather than to the tax lien at issue in this appeal, which the city had already assigned to the plaintiff's predecessor in interest prior to receiving the payments at issue. We affirm the judgment of the court.")

• Posted in:
• Foreclosure Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC45232 - Crocker v. Commissioner of Correction (“The petitioner claims on appeal that the court improperly rejected his claims that counsel in two previous habeas actions provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to raise claims that his criminal trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by not conducting a proper investigation to identify exculpatory witnesses and/or by failing to call exculpatory witnesses to testify at his criminal trial. We disagree. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the habeas court.”)

• Posted in:
• Habeas Corpus Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC45471 - Marrero v. Hoffman of Simsbury, Inc. (“In this employment discrimination action, the plaintiff, Janetta Marrero, claims on appeal that the trial court improperly rendered summary judgment in favor of the defendant, Hoffman of Simsbury, Inc., her former employer, on her complaint sounding in pregnancy discrimination and gender discrimination in violation of the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act, General Statutes § 46a-51 et seq. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.”

“The undisputed evidence shows that the plaintiff received multiple warnings regarding her attitude, conduct, and insubordination and, in April, 2018, received notice that, upon another incident of insubordination, her employment could be terminated. The plaintiff does not dispute that, on October 18, 2018, she criticized Berube’s management of his department and refused to leave his office for more than one hour. Consistent with the April, 2018 warning, the defendant terminated the plaintiff’s employment. In sum, we agree with the trial court that ‘there is a dearth of evidence, other than the plaintiff’s speculation, that her pregnancy had anything to do with her termination.’ Because the defendant presented uncontroverted evidence of a nondiscriminatory reason for its employment termination decision and the plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact that that reason was pretextual, the court properly granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

The judgment is affirmed.”

• Posted in:
• Employment Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC45400 - Stevens v. Khalily (“On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly struck counts nine and twelve, which alleged defamation against Shahram and Diana respectively, for failure to plead defamation with the requisite specificity. The plaintiff argues that counts nine and twelve of the operative complaint ‘‘adequately identify the alleged defamatory statements, who made them and to whom they were made, which is what is required of defamation pleadings under Connecticut law and practice.’’ We conclude that the court properly granted the motion to strike counts nine and twelve because the plaintiff has failed to plead reputational harm, an element required to establish a prima facie case of defamation at common law. Because the plaintiff has failed to plead all four elements of defamation, we need not reach the plaintiff’s claim that the court improperly granted the motion to strike on the grounds that he failed to plead the elements of defamation with the requisite specificity. We affirm the judgment of the court.”)

• Posted in:
• Family Law,
• Recent Opinions,
• Tort Law

AC45288 - State v. King (“On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly denied that motion, which challenged the sentencing court’s imposition of a special condition of probation that he register as a sex offender pursuant to General Statutes § 54-254 (a). In response, the state argues, inter alia, that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the defendant’s motion to correct because the requirement that the defendant register as a sex offender was not part of his sentence. We agree with the state and, accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case with direction to dismiss the motion to correct.”)

AC45614 - State v. Despres (“On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to hear his motion. Specifically, the defendant argues that the court improperly determined that his claims regarding the sentencing court’s denial of his motion to represent himself at that proceeding and his attorney’s failure to turn over documents did not fall within the ambit of Practice Book § 43-22. We agree with the defendant that the trial court improperly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction with respect to his claim regarding the denial of his request for self-representation and disagree with respect to his claim regarding his attorney’s failure to turn over the aforementioned documents. Accordingly, we affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the court.”)

• Posted in:
• Criminal Law & Procedure,
• Recent Opinions

Friday, July 21st

• Danbury Law Library is closed.
• Putnam Law Library closes at 12:15 p.m.
• Torrington Law Library is closed.

Monday, July 24th

• Danbury Law Library is closed.
• Putnam Law Library is closed.
• Torrington Law Library opens at 9:15 p.m. and closes at 3:45 p.m.

Tuesday, July 25th

• Danbury Law Library opens at 9:30 a.m. and closes at 3:30 p.m.
• Putnam Law Library opens at 10:00 a.m. and closes at 3:45 p.m.
• Waterbury Law Library opens at 10:00 a.m.

Wednesday, July 26th

• Danbury Law Library opens at 10:00 a.m. and closes at 4:00 p.m.
• Putnam Law Library opens at 9:30 a.m. and closes at 3:45 p.m.
• Waterbury Law Library will be closed between noon and 2:00 p.m.

Thursday, July 27th

• Danbury Law Library opens at 9:30 a.m. and closes at 3:30 p.m.
• New Britain Law Library opens at 9:45 a.m.
• New London Law Library opens at 11:00 a.m.
• Putnam Law Library opens at 9:30 a.m. and closes at 3:45 p.m.
• Waterbury Law Library closes at 1:00 p.m.

Friday, July 28th

• Danbury Law Library is closed.
• Putnam Law Library is closed.

• Posted in:
• Library Notices

The Office of Legislative Research has published its summary of the 2023 Acts Affecting Municipalities. Selected new acts are listed below.

• State and Local Enforcement of Blight Violations - (P.A. 23-62, effective October 1, 2023)
• Negligent Use of Municipal Motor Vehicles - (P.A. 23-83, effective upon passage).
• Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Violations s (P.A. 23-200, effective October 1, 2023)
• Tenement Rent Receivership Proceedings (P.A. 23-33, § 9, effective October 1, 2023)
• Access to Juvenile Delinquency Records (P.A. 23-25, effective July 1, 2023)
• Animal Control Officers and Temporary Animal Care Expenses (P.A. 23-17, §1, effective upon passage)

• Posted in:
• FYI,
• New Legislation

AC45979,AC46006 - In re Ryan C. (“The respondent father, Chester C., and his minor child, Ryan C., appeal from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of Ryan C.’s intervening foster parent, Jeanette P., denying motions to revoke commitment filed by the respondent and the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and Families, and granting Jeanette P.’s motion to transfer guardianship of Ryan C. to herself. The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the court properly allowed Jeanette P. to intervene in the dispositional phase of the neglect proceeding for the purposes of objecting to the motions to revoke commitment and filing the motion to transfer guardianship.4 We conclude that, in the circumstances of the present case, the court improperly allowed Jeanette P. to intervene and to file a motion to transfer guardianship and that her intervention improperly tainted the court’s adjudication of the motions to revoke commitment. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court and remand the case for a new trial on the motions to revoke commitment.”)

• Posted in:
• Juvenile Law,
• Recent Opinions

• SC20666 - High Watch Recovery Center, Inc. v. Dept. of Public Health (Contested hearing; subject matter jurisdiction "Held that the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that the plaintiff’s petition requesting intervenor status in the public hearing on B Co.’s certificate of need application was not a legally sufficient request for a public hearing for purposes of § 19a-639a (e), and, accordingly, the department’s decision to approve B Co.’s application was a final decision in a contested case: Contrary to the defendants’ contention that, to satisfy § 19a-639a (e), the plaintiff was required to expressly state in its petition to intervene that it was an entity with five or more people, that statute does not impose such a requirement but merely provides that an entity must be an entity with five or more people to be entitled to a hearing, and it was undisputed that the plaintiff satisfied that numerical requirement and that the OHCA was fully aware of that fact.

Furthermore, given the undisputed fact that the OHCA had already scheduled a public hearing on B Co.’s application, this court discerned no ambiguity with respect to the plaintiff’s request because, when the OHCA has already scheduled a public hearing, it is only logical that a party wanting to oppose the application would request intervenor status in that hearing, not request another or a different hearing, and that was precisely what the public notice instructed the plaintiff to do if it wanted to be heard on the plaintiff’s application.")

• Posted in:
• Administrative Appeal Law

SC20745 - In re Paulo T. (“This certified appeal arises from the motion of the petitioner mother, Mae T., to reinstate her guardianship rights with respect to her minor child, Paulo T. In the course of its oral decision granting the motion, the trial court stated that parents are entitled to a presumption that reinstatement of guardianship rights is in the best interests of the child. The respondent father, Horace W., appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court, contending, among other things, that this presumption does not apply in cases between two parents. In re Paulo T., 213 Conn. App. 858, 860, 866, 279 A.3d 766 (2022). The Appellate Court agreed with the respondent but nevertheless affirmed the judgment because, after reviewing the record as a whole, it discerned no indication that the trial court had in fact applied the presumption. See id., 866, 877–78, 892. The respondent filed a petition for certification to appeal from the judgment of the Appellate Court, which we granted, limited to the following questions: (1) ‘‘Did the Appellate Court correctly conclude that the presumption that reinstatement of guardianship is in the best interest of the child does not apply in cases in which both parties are the parents of the minor child?’’ And (2) ‘‘[d]id the Appellate Court correctly conclude that, notwithstanding the trial court’s statement that a presumption applies, the trial court did not apply the presumption but, rather, correctly applied the proper best interest balancing test?’’ In re Paulo T., 344 Conn. 904, 281 A.3d 460 (2022). Under the circumstances in which this case is presented to us, we need not address the first certified question, and we answer the second question in the affirmative. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.”)

• Posted in:
• Family Law,
• Juvenile Law,
• Recent Opinions