Monday, November 28th

• Danbury Law Library is closed.
• Putnam Law Library is closed.

Tuesday, November 29th

• Danbury Law Library opens at 10:15 a.m.
• Rockville Law Library is closed.
• Putnam Law Library is open from 9:45 a.m. to 3:45 p.m.

Wednesday, November 30th

• New London Law Library closes at 3:00 p.m.
• Putnam Law Library is open from 9:45 a.m. to 3:45 p.m.
• Torrington Law Library is closed from 2:00 p.m. to 3:30 p.m.

Thursday, December 1st

• Putnam Law Library is closed.
• Rockville Law Library will open at 10:00 a.m.

Friday, December 2nd

• New Britain Law Library is closed.
• Putnam Law Library is closed.
• Torrington Law Library is closed.

AC44740 - 307 White Street Realty, LLC v. Beaver Brook Group, LLC (“The present appeal arises out of an action brought by the plaintiff lessee, 307 White Street Realty, LLC, against the defendant lessor, Beaver Brook Group, LLC, to enforce an option to purchase clause in the parties' commercial lease (lease option), which included certain concomitant contractual and statutory obligations related to the Hazardous Waste Establishment Transfer Act, General Statutes § 22a-134 et seq. (Transfer Act). The plaintiff appeals from the judgment of the trial court granting the defendant's motion to dismiss the present action as moot because, after the plaintiff commenced it, the parties executed a purchase and sale agreement regarding the leased property that purportedly supersedes the lease option with respect to the sale of the property such that the court no longer can afford any practical relief to the plaintiff by adjudicating the underlying action. The plaintiff claims on appeal that the court improperly (1) determined that the defendant's motion to dismiss implicated the court's subject matter jurisdiction, (2) failed to hold an evidentiary hearing necessary to resolve disputed material facts, and (3) concluded that the execution of the purchase and sale agreement rendered the plaintiff's action moot in its entirety. For the reasons that follow, we agree with the plaintiff that the court improperly granted the motion to dismiss, and, accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court and remand for further proceedings.”)

AC45078 - Tremont Public Advisors, LLC v. Materials Innovation & Recycling Authority (“The plaintiff, Tremont Public Advisors, LLC, appeals from the judgment of the trial court, rendered following the court's decision striking the plaintiff's complaint. The plaintiff claims that the court erred in concluding that the defendant, Materials Innovation and Recycling Authority (MIRA), formerly known as Connecticut Resources Recovery Authority, is exempt from liability under the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), General Statutes § 42-110a et seq., for engaging in allegedly illegitimate bidding practices. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.”)

• Posted in:
• Contract Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC44635 - Waterbury v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act (“The plaintiff, the city of Waterbury, appeals from the judgment of the trial court, rendered in favor of the named defendant, the Administrator of the Unemployment Compensation Act (defendant), dismissing the plaintiff's appeal from the decision of the defendant Board of Review of the Employment Security Appeals Division (board). The board held that the defendant Thomas F. Eccleston II (claimant) was eligible for unemployment benefits because he was not discharged for wilful misconduct, even though he tested positive for marijuana use. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the board (1) erred in finding the Palliative Use of Marijuana Act (PUMA); see General Statutes § 21a-408 et seq.; and specifically General Statutes § 21a-408p, applicable to the present case, and (2) erroneously concluded that the claimant was not discharged for wilful misconduct. We disagree and, therefore, affirm the judgment of the court.”)

• Posted in:
• Administrative Appeal Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC45141 - L. L. v. M. B. ("The plaintiff, L. L., on behalf of her minor daughter, N. R., appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing her application for a domestic violence restraining order pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 2021) § 46b-15, as amended by Public Acts 2021, No. 21-78. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly dismissed her application on the basis that she was not eligible for relief because she did not fall within the definition of "[f]amily or household member" as set forth in General Statutes § 46b-38a (2). We reject the plaintiff's claim that the court improperly determined that she did not fall within the definition of family or household member but conclude that the form of the judgment is improper and, therefore, remand this case with direction to deny the plaintiff's application.")

• Posted in:
• Family Law,
• Recent Opinions

The 2022 edition of our research guide on Child Visitation Actions in Connecticut has been posted to our research guides webpage.

• Posted in:
• FYI,
• Legal Research,
• Self-Help

Wednesday, November 23rd

• New Haven Law Library closes at 3:30 p.m.
• New London Law Library is closed.
• Putnam Law Library is closed.

Thursday, November 24th

• All Connecticut Judicial Branch Law Libraries are closed in observance of the holiday.

Friday, November 25th

• Bridgeport Law Library is closed.
• Danbury Law Library is closed.
• Middletown Law Library closes at 2:00 p.m.
• New Britain Law Library is closed.
• New London Law Library is closed.
• Putnam Law Library is closed.
• Stamford Law Library closes at 2:00 p.m.
• Waterbury Law Library is closed.

• Posted in:
• Library Notices

SC210039 Order on Motion - State v. Pan (“The defendant, Qinxuan Pan, seeks review of the trial court’s denial of his motion for modification of the $20 million bond that was set in connection with murder charges against him. The defendant claims that the trial court, Harmon, J., abused its discretion in denying his motion to modify the $20 million bond set at his arraignment by the trial court, B. Fischer, J., because (1) the bail amount is unreasonably high, and (2) the trial court incorrectly concluded that it lacked the authority under Practice Book § 38-8 to grant the defendant’s request for a 10 percent cash option. Although we conclude that the $20 million bond amount was not an abuse of the trial court’s discretion given the extraordinary flight risk and public safety considerations presented in this case, we agree with the defendant’s second claim and conclude that remand to the trial court is necessary for that court to consider its authority to grant a 10 percent cash option. Because this case highlights the existence of several substantive and procedural issues concerning the information on which the judges of the Superior Court rely in setting reasonable bond amounts, we also address the procedures applicable to any future bond modification proceedings. Accordingly, we grant the defendant’s petition for review, and we grant the relief requested in part.”)

• Posted in:
• Criminal Law & Procedure,
• Recent Opinions

AC45427 - In re G. H. ("The respondent mother, Jessica M. H., appeals from the judgments of the trial court terminating her parental rights with respect to her minor children, G. H. (G) and N. H. (N). On appeal, the respondent claims that the trial court (1) improperly concluded that she had failed to rehabilitate to such a degree as to reasonably encourage a belief that she could assume a responsible position in the lives of her children, (2) made inconsistent statements in its memorandum of decision that require reversal, and (3) improperly concluded that the termination of her parental rights was in the best interests of the children. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.")

AC45183, AC45199, AC45369 - In re Maliyah M. ("These three appeals present the same legal claim and involve similar, though unrelated, factual and procedural histories. In each appeal, the respondent parent appeals from the judgment of the trial court terminating his or her parental rights. On appeal, each respondent asserts the same claim—that the court 'denied the respondent the due process of law under the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution' when it conducted the termination of parental rights trial, either in whole or in part, virtually, via Microsoft Teams, without first holding an evidentiary hearing to determine whether there was a compelling need for virtual testimony.

After the respondents filed their principal briefs in each appeal, this court granted the unopposed motions filed by the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and Families, requesting that her brief be due thirty days after our Supreme Court issued its decisions in In re Annessa J., 343 Conn. 642, ___ A.3d ___ (2022), and its companion cases, In re Vada V., 343 Conn. 730, 275 A.3d 1172 (2022), and In re Aisjaha N., 343 Conn. 709, 275 A.3d 1181 (2022), which involved claims similar to the claim in the present cases. Our Supreme Court issued those decisions on June 20, 2022, and we now conclude that In re Annessa J. is dispositive of the issue in the present appeals. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the trial courts.")

• Posted in:
• Juvenile Law,
• Recent Opinions

The Connecticut Law Journal, Volume LXXXIV, No. 21, for November 22, 2022 is now available.

Contained in the issue is the following:

• Table of Contents
• Volume 345: Connecticut Reports (Pages 290 - 354)
• Volume 345: Orders (Pages 919 - 922)
• Volume 345: Cumulative Table of Cases Connecticut Reports
• Volume 216: Connecticut Appellate Reports (Pages 530 - 632)
• Volume 216: Memorandum Decisions (Pages 901 - 902)
• Volume 216: Cumulative Table of Cases Connecticut Appellate Reports
• Miscellaneous Notices
• Notices of Connecticut State Agencies

• Posted in:
• Connecticut Law Journal,
• Recent Opinions

AC45241 - In re Aubrey K. ("The respondent mother, Victoria K., appeals from the judgment of the trial court, rendered in favor of the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and Families, terminating her parental rights with respect to her minor daughter, Aubrey K. (Aubrey), on the ground that the respondent’s acts of parental commission or omission denied Aubrey the care necessary for her well-being pursuant to General Statutes § 17a-112 (j) (3) (C).2 The court also found that, although the Department of Children and Families (department) had made reasonable efforts to reunify the respondent with Aubrey, the respondent was unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts; see General Statutes § 17a-112 (j) (1); and that termination of the respondent’s parental rights was in Aubrey’s best interest. See General Statutes § 17a-112 (j) (2). On appeal, the respondent’s single claim is that there was insufficient evidence for the trial court to find that the termination of her parental rights was in Aubrey’s best interest. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

• Posted in:
• Juvenile Law,
• Recent Opinions

SC20505 - Adams v. Aircraft Spruce & Specialty Co. ("This appeal requires us to revisit the requirements for a forum to exercise specific personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation in the wake of the United States Supreme Court's recent decisions considering this issue in the context of product liability actions. More particularly, we consider whether the corporation's contacts with the forum can sufficiently "relate to" such a cause of action, such that the forum's exercise of specific personal jurisdiction would be consonant with due process, in the absence of any activity or occurrence in the forum concerning either the specific product or product model that allegedly malfunctioned. The plaintiffs, John S. Adams and Mary Lou Hanney, coadministrators of the estate of Ryan Michael Adams, appeal from the trial court's judgment in favor of the named defendant, Aircraft Spruce & Specialty Co., rendered after the granting of the defendant's motion to dismiss the product liability claim brought against it. The plaintiffs contend that the trial court improperly failed to recognize that, as long as the plaintiffs' cause of action is not materially different from an action that might have directly resulted from a person's use of the defendant's product in Connecticut, exercising personal jurisdiction over the defendant would satisfy both Connecticut's applicable long arm statute and due process. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

• Posted in:
• Recent Opinions,
• Tort Law

AC44665 - Taylor v. Commissioner of Correction (“On appeal, the petitioner claims that the court incorrectly dismissed his claims that the respondent, the Commissioner of Correction, violated his constitutional rights to (1) procedural due process, (2) equal protection of the law, and (3) freedom from cruel and unusual punishment. We disagree that the court improperly dismissed the petitioner’s first claim. We agree, however, that the court improperly dismissed his second and third claims. We therefore affirm, in part, and reverse, in part, the judgment of the habeas court and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.”)

AC42852 - Stenner v. Commissioner of Correction and AC43779 - Greenfield v. Commissioner of Correction (“On appeal, the petitioners claim that the habeas courts erred in concluding that the petitioners failed to establish ‘good cause’ pursuant to General Statutes § 52-470 (d) and (e) to overcome the rebuttable presumption of unreasonable delay stemming from the untimely filing of their respective habeas petitions. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgments of the habeas courts.”)

AC41627 - Hodge v. Commissioner of Correction (“On appeal, the dispositive claim raised by the petitioner is that the court improperly dismissed his amended habeas petition under § 23-29 without notice and a hearing.1 In light of our Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Brown v. Commissioner of Correction, 345 Conn. 1, 282 A.3d 959 (2022), and in Brown’s companion case, Boria v. Commissioner of Correction, 345 Conn. 39, 282 A.3d 433 (2022), we conclude that the habeas court committed error in dismissing the amended habeas petition pursuant to § 23-29 without providing to the pettioner prior notice of its intention to dismiss, on its own motion, the amended habeas petition and an opportunity to submit a brief or a written response addressing the proposed basis for dismissal. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the habeas court.”)

• Posted in:
• Habeas Corpus Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC43857 - Atlantic St. Heritage Associates, LLC v. Atlantic Realty Co. ("The defendants, Atlantic Realty Company, 200 Atlantic, LLC, 210 Atlantic, LLC, 252 Atlantic Street, LLC, and Safavieh Atlantic, LLC, appeal from the judgment of the trial court granting a motion for summary judgment filed by the plaintiff, Atlantic St. Heritage Associates, LLC, and denying their cross motion for summary judgment vis-a-vis the plaintiff's second amended complaint claiming a prescriptive easement over certain property at issue. As to the summary judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff, the defendants claim that the court (1) lacked the authority to grant the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment because, in moving for summary judgment, the plaintiff failed to address their special defenses, and (2) improperly determined that no genuine issues of material fact exist as to the plaintiff's prescriptive easement claim. We agree in part with the defendants' first claim that the court lacked the authority to grant the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, such that we reverse the summary judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff and remand the case for further proceedings. Additionally, because it is sufficiently likely to arise on remand, we will address the defendants' second claim that the court incorrectly determined that there are no genuine issues of material fact regarding the plaintiff's prescriptive easement claim. As to the denial of their cross motion for summary judgment, the defendants claim that, as a matter of law, the plaintiff is precluded from asserting both deeded and prescriptive easement rights simultaneously. This claim is untenable. Accordingly, insofar as the defendants appeal from the denial of their cross motion for summary judgment, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

• Posted in:
• Property Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC45191 - Lawrence v. Gude ("The plaintiff, Dawson Lawrence, appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered following a court trial in an action for damages arising from a residential lease against the married defendants, Roberto Gude (Roberto) and Adriana Gude (Adriana). On appeal, the plaintiff argues that the court improperly found that Adriana was not liable for back rent and use and occupancy under the lease pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-37 (b) (3). We agree and, accordingly, reverse in part the judgment of the court.")

• Posted in:
• Landlord / Tenant Law,
• Recent Opinions

SC20367 - State v. Ares ( Criminal; Whether evidence insufficient for conviction under act prong of risk of injury to a child in violation of General Statutes § 53-21 (a) (1); Whether risk of injury statute unconstitutionally vague as applied; Whether defendant improperly convicted under situation prong of risk of injury statute for which he was not charged; "After a bench trial, the defendant, Angel Ares, was convicted of one count of arson in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-111, eight counts of reckless endangerment in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-63, and four counts of risk of injury to a child in violation of General Statutes § 53-21 (a) (1). In the present appeal, the defendant challenges only his convictions of risk of injury to a child by raising the following three claims of error: (1) there was insufficient evidence to support a conviction under the act prong of § 53-21 (a) (1) because the state had failed to adduce any proof that he had "perpetrated an act directly on the person of a minor" as required by the judicial gloss first imposed by this court in State v. Schriver, 207 Conn. 456, 542 A.2d 686 (1988); (2) the act prong of § 53-21 (a) (1) is unconstitutionally vague as applied to him because the conduct proven by the state falls outside of that very same gloss; and (3) the trial court improperly convicted him under the situation prong of § 53-21 (a) (1) when the state's allegations against him were limited to only the act prong of that statute. Although our reading of Schriver and its progeny leads us to reject the defendant's first two claims on this record, we agree with the defendant that the trial court committed reversible error by applying the incorrect elements and convicting the defendant under the situation prong, a provision he was not formally charged with violating. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's judgment of conviction with respect to the counts of risk of injury to a child and remand the case for a new trial only as to those four counts.")

• Posted in:
• Criminal Law & Procedure,
• Recent Opinions

Wednesday, November 16th

• Danbury Law Library opens at 10:30 a.m.
• New Britain Law Library opens at 10:30 a.m.
• Waterbury Law Library opens at 10:30 a.m.

Thursday, November 17th

• Middletown Law Library opens at noon.
• Waterbury Law Library closes at 2:00 p.m.

Friday, November 18th

• Danbury Law Library closes at 3:30 p.m.

• Posted in:
• Library Notices

The Connecticut Law Journal, Volume LXXXIV, No. 20, for November 15, 2022 is now available.

Contained in the issue is the following:

• Table of Contents
• Volume 345: Connecticut Reports (Pages 258 - 289)
• Volume 345: Orders (Pages 916 - 919)
• Volume 345: Cumulative Table of Cases Connecticut Reports
• Volume 216: Connecticut Appellate Reports (Pages 491 - 529)
• Volume 216: Cumulative Table of Cases Connecticut Appellate Reports
• Miscellaneous Notices

• Posted in:
• Connecticut Law Journal,
• Recent Opinions

SC20495 - State v. Washington (“On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) the trial court erred when it in admitted into evidence recordings of phone calls that the defendant made while incarcerated, thereby permitting the state to use the defendant’s postarrest silence against him, (2) the trial court erred when it instructed the jury regarding adoptive admissions and combat by agreement, respectively, (3) the prosecutor committed improprieties during certain portions of his closing argument, and (4) the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion for a new trial, in light of fact that the COVID-19 pandemic impacted the jury’s deliberations. Although we conclude that the majority of the defendant’s claims are without merit, we agree with his contention that the trial court improperly instructed the jury on combat by agreement, as there was insufficient evidence presented at trial to warrant the instruction. We nevertheless conclude that the error was harmless and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of conviction.”)

• Posted in:
• Criminal Law & Procedure,
• Recent Opinions

AC44902 - Speer v. U.S. Bank Trust, N.A. ("The self-represented plaintiff, Sheri Speer, appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the defendant U.S. Bank Trust, N.A. (U.S. Bank). The plaintiff claims on appeal that the trial court (1) erred in granting U.S. Bank's motion to strike dated February 26, 2021, because the motion to strike (a) "did not comply with Practice Book § 10-41" and (b) was not directed to the operative complaint and (2) erred in granting U.S. Bank's motion for judgment dated September 21, 2021, because it was filed while an automatic appellate stay was in effect. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

• Posted in:
• Foreclosure Law,
• Property Law,
• Recent Opinions,
• Tort Law

AC44491 - Parnoff v. Stratford ("The plaintiff, Laurence V. Parnoff, appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered following the granting of motions to strike filed by the defendants, the town of Stratford (town), Melinda Fonda, Berchem Moses PC (Berchem Moses), and Laura Hoydick. On appeal, the plaintiff argues that (1) his claims under the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), General Statutes § 42-110a et seq., and his negligent infliction of emotional distress claims, all stemming from a public records request he made pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (act), General Statutes § 1-200 et seq., were improperly stricken because he pleaded allegations sufficient to support those claims, and (2) the court improperly granted the motions to strike with prejudice. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

• Posted in:
• Administrative Appeal Law,
• Freedom of Information Law,
• Recent Opinions,
• Tort Law