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Foreclosure Law

Foreclosure Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Zigadto, Janet

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5926

AC46212 - Nationstar Mortgage, LLC v. Giacomi ("The defendant Alan M. Giacomi appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying his motion to open and vacate the judgment of foreclosure by sale rendered after he was defaulted for failure to plead. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly (1) 'den[ied] [his] requests to participate in foreclosure mediation,' (2) 'sustain[ed] the plaintiff's objection to [his] request to revise on or about February 5, 2020,' and (3) denied his motion to open the default judgment pursuant to General Statutes § 52-212 (a). We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.")


Foreclosure Law Supreme Court Opinion

   by Zigadto, Janet

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5923

SC20807 - Wahba v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. ("The primary issue before us in this appeal is whether, after an appellate court has affirmed a trial court's judgment of strict foreclosure and remanded the case to the trial court to set new law days, the trial court has authority to open that judgment and render instead a judgment of foreclosure by sale based on changed market conditions. The Appellate Court, in the second appeal taken in this case, answered this question in the negative and further concluded that, even if the trial court had such authority, the plaintiff, Susanne P. Wahba, did not provide an adequate evidentiary foundation for her request that the court consider ordering a foreclosure by sale. See Wahba v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 216 Conn. App. 236, 239–40, 283 A.3d 1095 (2022) (Wahba II). We granted the plaintiff's petition for certification to appeal to this court from these rulings. See Wahba v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 346 Conn. 912, 289 A.3d 597 (2023). We conclude that, contrary to the contention of the defendant, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., the doctrine of res judicata did not bar the trial court from entertaining the plaintiff's request that the trial court consider ordering a foreclosure by sale instead of simply resetting the law days. We further conclude that the Appellate Court incorrectly determined that (1) its remand order directing the trial court to set new law days deprived the trial court of authority to entertain the plaintiff's request, and (2) even if the trial court had such authority, the plaintiff's request was not supported by an adequate evidentiary foundation. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.")


Foreclosure Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Zigadto, Janet

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5867

AC46406 - No. 2 Fraser Place Condominium Assn., Inc. v. Mathis ("More than ten years ago, the plaintiff, No. 2 Fraser Place Condominium Association, Inc., a unit owners' association of a common interest community, brought the underlying action to foreclose a statutory lien for unpaid monthly common expense assessments and late charges in accordance with General Statutes § 47-258 regarding a condominium unit (unit) owned by the defendant Sharon Mathis and occupied by her daughter, the defendant Shalonda Mathis. The court rendered a judgment of strict foreclosure on September 23, 2013, and set law days to commence on November 18, 2013. The law days passed without redemption but, to date, the plaintiff has not taken possession of the unit.

The defendants now appeal from the judgment of the court denying an application for a writ of audita querela (application) filed by Sharon Mathis, in which she argues that the latest in a series of ejectment orders obtained by the plaintiff should be enjoined on the ground that, prior to the passing of the law days in 2013, she purportedly had reached an agreement with the plaintiff to pay off the judgment amount, performed in accordance with that agreement, and, thus, effectively redeemed her ownership interest such that title to her unit never passed to the plaintiff by operation of law following the passage of the law days. The defendants claim that the court improperly (1) concluded that the evidence presented in support of the application did not support a finding that the parties had reached and performed on any agreement to satisfy the debt and redeem the property, (2) failed to conclude that the granting of the application was necessary to avoid an inequitable windfall to the plaintiff, and (3) declined to admit into evidence certain exhibits offered by the defendants' counsel at the hearing on the application. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.")


Foreclosure Law Appellate Court Opinions

   by Zigadto, Janet

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5862

AC46046 - Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Speer ("Following the unconditional withdrawal of this foreclosure action by the plaintiff, Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as trustee for HSI Asset Securitization Corporation Trust 2006-OPT4, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-OPT4, the defendant Sheri A. Speer appeals from the trial court's decisions sustaining the plaintiff's objections to the defendant's two prior requests for leave to amend her answer to assert a counterclaim. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court abused its discretion in sustaining the plaintiff's objections because her proposed amendments were timely and would not have prejudiced the plaintiff. We disagree with the defendant's claims of error and, accordingly, affirm the trial court's decisions sustaining the plaintiff's objections to the requests for leave to amend.")

AC46506 - Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Bretoux ("In this foreclosure action, the defendant Lindsey S. Bretoux appeals from the trial court's judgment of foreclosure by sale in favor of the plaintiff, Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as indenture trustee for New Century Home Equity Loan Trust 2005-2. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly (1) rendered summary judgment as to liability in favor of the plaintiff because the defendant failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to his special defense of unclean hands and (2) failed to consider the defendant's estoppel defense when determining the amount of debt. We are not persuaded by the defendant's first claim, but we agree with his second claim. Accordingly, we reverse in part the judgment of the trial court.")


Foreclosure Law Supreme Court Opinion

   by Zigadto, Janet

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5849

SC20817 - M&T Bank v. Lewis ("This foreclosure appeal presents two questions, namely, (1) whether the administrative law filed rate doctrine implicates the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction, and (2) whether allegations of impropriety in a mortgagee’s force placement of property insurance arise from the making, validity or enforcement of the mortgage for purposes of a special defense to a foreclosure action. The defendant, Robert R. Lewis, appeals from the judgment of foreclosure by sale in favor of the plaintiff, M&T Bank. The defendant claims that the trial court improperly granted the plaintiff’s motion to strike two of the defendant’s special defenses arising from the plaintiff’s conduct in its force placement of flood insurance on the property at issue, alleging that the plaintiff has unclean hands and breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing on the ground that those defenses do not arise from the making, validity or enforcement of the mortgage. The plaintiff contends to the contrary, and also argues that the regulatory approval of the premium rate for the property insurance at issue renders the defendant’s special defenses moot under the filed rate doctrine. Having concluded that the filed rate doctrine does not implicate the court’s subject matter jurisdiction, we agree with the defendant’s claims with respect to his special defenses. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.")


Foreclosure Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Zigadto, Janet

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5840

AC45904 - Stonybrook Gardens Cooperative, Inc. v. Newrez, LLC ("In this omitted party action commenced pursuant to General Statutes § 49-30, the defendant, NewRez, LLC (NewRez), formerly known as New Penn Financial, LLC, doing business as Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing, appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying its motion to open and vacate the judgment of strict foreclosure rendered in favor of the plaintiff, Stonybrook Gardens Cooperative, Inc., a unit owners' association, in connection with NewRez' mortgage on a unit in Stonybrook Gardens Cooperative in Stratford. On appeal, NewRez claims that the court incorrectly determined the amount that NewRez was required to pay to exercise its right of redemption on the basis of a flawed application of § 49-30 and General Statutes § 47-258 and, therefore, improperly denied its motion to open and vacate the foreclosure judgment. We conclude that the court's calculation of NewRez' redemption amount is inconsistent with § 47-258 (b) because it includes amounts other than those expressly permitted thereunder in calculating the plaintiff's priority debt. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court as it pertains to the redemption amount.")


Foreclosure Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Zigadto, Janet

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5825

AC44582 - Green Tree Servicing, LLC v. Clark ("The self-represented defendant Charles I. Merlis appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying his motion to dismiss the foreclosure action following the judgment of strict foreclosure rendered in favor of the substitute plaintiff, Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB, doing business as Christiana Trust, not individually but as trustee for Pretium Mortgage Acquisition Trust (Wilmington). On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly denied his postjudgment motion to dismiss the action because the original plaintiff, Green Tree Servicing, LLC (Green Tree), failed to give him proper notice of the state's Emergency Mortgage Assistance Program (EMAP), as required by General Statutes § 8-265ee (a). We disagree because we conclude that the defendant waived his claim. We therefore affirm the judgment of the court.")


Foreclosure Law Appellate Court Opinions

   by Zigadto, Janet

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5817

AC45996 - Chase Home Finance, LLC v. Scroggin ("The defendant, Daniel J. Scroggin, who is also known as Daniel F. Scroggin or Daniel Scroggin, appeals from the judgment of strict foreclosure rendered by the trial court, for the third time, in favor of the substitute plaintiff, AJX Mortgage Trust I, a Delaware Trust, Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB, Trustee. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court (1) erred in granting summary judgment as to liability in that it improperly relied on an affidavit of a loan officer employed by the plaintiff in determining that the original plaintiff, Chase Home Finance, LLC (Chase), was the holder of the note in this case at the time the action was commenced and failed to draw an adverse inference from the plaintiff's refusal to produce witnesses and documents requested by the defendant, and (2) abused its discretion when it implicitly granted the plaintiff's motion for a protective order, which, he alleges, 'resulted in a complete denial of discovery and a denial of [his] ability to rebut the plaintiff's claims.' We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

AC45340 - Ferreira v. Ward (Foreclosure of judgment lien; "The defendant, Charles W. Ward, appeals from the judgment of foreclosure by sale rendered by the trial court in this action to foreclose a judgment lien brought by the plaintiff, Daniel Ferreira. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly rendered a judgment of foreclosure by sale without first holding an evidentiary hearing, as requested, to determine whether the homestead exemption of $250,000 set forth in General Statutes § 52-352b (21) applied. We reverse the judgment of the court.")


Foreclosure Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Zigadto, Janet

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5766

AC45810 - Cazenovia Creek Funding I, LLC v. Roman ("Louis Roman appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying his motion to dismiss this foreclosure action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Roman filed this appeal as a self-represented litigant seeking to represent the interests of the named defendant, Louis Roman, in Trust for Alexandria K. Roman and Dakota T. Roman (trust). Because Roman, who is neither a party to this action nor an attorney, has appeared without counsel on behalf of a trust, we conclude that Roman does not have the authority to represent the trust. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.")


Foreclosure Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Oumano, Emily

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5747

AC45453 - Homebridge Financial Services, Inc. v. Jakubiec (“In this foreclosure appeal, the defendant Robyn Jakubiec, the widow of the defendant Thomas M. Jakubiec (decedent), presents a myriad of challenges in an effort to overturn the judgment of strict foreclosure rendered following the granting of a motion for summary judgment as to liability in favor of the substitute plaintiff, Freedom Mortgage Corporation. We conclude that several of the defendant’s claims are inadequately briefed, and the remainder are without merit. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for the sole purpose of setting new law days.”)


Foreclosure Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Zigadto, Janet

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5733

AC46769 - DXR Finance Parent, LLC v. Theraplant, LLC ("In this foreclosure action, Shareholder Representative Services, LLC (SRS), a nonparty, appeals from the denial of its motion to intervene that was filed after the judgment of strict foreclosure was rendered but before the law days passed. Because an automatic appellate stay did not apply, title to the subject property has vested in the plaintiff, and there is no basis for this court to invoke its continuing equitable authority to afford practical relief to the proposed intervenor. We therefore grant the plaintiff's motion to dismiss this appeal as moot.")


Foreclosure Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Zigadto, Janet

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5695

AC45699 - Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Melahn ("The defendant Michael John Melahn appeals from the judgment of strict foreclosure rendered by the trial court in favor of the plaintiff, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., as Trustee for Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-6, Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2007-6. The defendant claims that the court improperly (1) declined to hold an evidentiary hearing on his motion to dismiss, which asserted that the plaintiff failed to give him proper notice of the Emergency Mortgage Assistance Program (EMAP) as required by General Statutes 8-265ee (a), (2) denied his motion to dismiss as an impermissible collateral attack on the 2010 judgment of strict foreclosure, and (3) rendered summary judgment as to liability only despite the plaintiff's failure to comply with the EMAP notice requirement. We affirm the judgment of the court.")


Foreclosure Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Zigadto, Janet

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5685

AC45836 - Finance of America Reverse, LLC v. Henry ("The present appeal concerns the proper application of Practice Book § 61-11 (h), which limits the effect of the automatic appellate stay that arises following the denial of a motion to open a foreclosure judgment if that denial occurs fewer than twenty days before a scheduled foreclosure auction. In particular, we address the interplay between Practice Book §§ 61-11 (h) and 63-1 (c) (1), the latter of which governs when and how a new appeal period is created that, by implication, also extends any existing appellate stay of execution. See Practice Book § 61-11 (a) (automatic appellate stay of action to enforce or carry out judgment exists until time to appeal judgment expires).

The defendant Stephanie Henry appeals, following the court's approval of a foreclosure sale, from the denial of her motion for an order "nullifying" that sale. The defendant claims that the foreclosure sale was conducted in violation of the automatic appellate stay that arose as a result of the denial of her motion to open and extend the sale date, and that the court improperly relied on Practice Book § 61-11 (h) as a basis for refusing to set aside the sale. In response, the substitute plaintiff, Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB, as Trustee of Finance of America Structured Securities Acquisition Trust 2019-HB1, asserts that the sale was properly conducted as ordered by the court and that the court correctly denied the defendant's motion for order and, subsequently, approved the sale. For the reasons that follow, we agree with the defendant that the property was auctioned in violation of the automatic stay. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court and remand with direction to vacate the foreclosure sale and set a new sale date.")


Foreclosure Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Oumano, Emily

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5663

AC46007 - U.S. Bank, National Assn. v. Rose (“Rahman Rose, the proposed intervenor in this action to foreclose a mortgage on certain real property owned by his father, the defendant Paul Rose, who died subsequent to the commencement of the foreclosure action, filed this appeal in a self-represented capacity challenging various rulings of the trial court, including its denial of his motion to open the foreclosure judgment to extend the sale date, its granting of the motion of the plaintiff, U.S. Bank, National Association, as custodian for Tower DBW IV Trust 2014-1, to strike an appearance that Rahman Rose filed to appear on behalf of the estate of Paul Rose, and its denial of his motion to intervene. On appeal, he asserts that, because he is the sole beneficiary of his father's estate, he has a substantial interest in the foreclosure matter and should have been made a party thereto. We dismiss the appeal.”)


Foreclosure Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Zigadto, Janet

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5594

AC45109 - JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Assn. v. Essaghof ("This foreclosure action returns to us on remand from the Supreme Court. In our prior opinion, this court rejected the various claims raised by the defendants, Roger Essaghof and Katherine Marr-Essaghof, who had appealed from the judgment of the trial court granting the motion of the plaintiff, JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association, to reset the law days in accordance with a previous remand order of our Supreme Court. See JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Assn. v. Essaghof, 217 Conn. App. 93, 95, 287 A.3d 1124 (2022), vacated, 346 Conn. 909, 288 A.3d 1031 (2023). The defendants thereafter filed a petition for certification with the Supreme Court, in which they challenged only this court’s conclusion that the trial court properly had denied their motion to dismiss predicated on the plaintiff’s alleged noncompliance with the notice requirement of the Emergency Mortgage Assistance Program (EMAP) set forth in General Statutes § 8- 265ee (a).

By order dated February 16, 2023, our Supreme Court granted that petition, vacated the judgment of this court, and remanded the case to us ‘with direction to reconsider in light of [its] decision in Bank of New York Mellon v. Tope, 345 Conn. 662, 286 A.3d 891 (2022).’ See JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Assn. v. Essaghof, 346 Conn. 909, 288 A.3d 1031 (2023). This court then ordered the parties to file supplemental briefs on the impact of that decision on the present appeal and heard argument from the parties on April 25, 2023. On August 1, 2023, our Supreme Court released its decision in KeyBank, N.A. v. Yazar, 347 Conn. 381, 297 A.3d 968 (2023), which concerns the proper statutory construction of the EMAP notice requirement codified in § 8- 265ee (a). Accordingly, this court ordered the parties to file supplemental briefs on the impact of KeyBank, N.A. v. Yazar, supra, 381, on this appeal. Having considered the defendants’ claim in light of the foregoing, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.")


Foreclosure Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Zigadto, Janet

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5587

AC45036 - Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Amelio ("The defendant Carmine Amelio appeals from the judgment of strict foreclosure rendered by the trial court in favor of the plaintiff, Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as Trustee for Residential Asset Securitization Trust 2007-A6 Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2007-F. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly denied his motion for an order to allow inspection of the original promissory note in accordance with Practice Book § 23-18. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")



Foreclosure Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Zigadto, Janet

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5568

AC45332 - GMAT Legal Title Trust 2014-1, U.S. Bank, National Assn. v. Catale ("This residential mortgage foreclosure action returns to this court for a second time. This time, the defendants Vito Catale (Vito) and Maria Catale appeal from the judgment of strict foreclosure rendered by the trial court in favor of the substitute plaintiff RMS Series Trust 2020-1. They claim that the judgment of strict foreclosure must be reversed because (1) the plaintiff did not 'lay the foundation required to rely on the hearsay evidence of the loan's history provided by the plaintiff's predecessors in interest' and, therefore, the judgment is premised entirely on inadmissible evidence, and (2) the court improperly struck their 'key special defenses,' including, inter alia, their defenses of unclean hands, bad faith settlement practices, and the inapplicability of the accidental failure of suit statute. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the judgment of the trial court only with respect to the granting of the motion to strike the defendants' special defense claiming the inapplicability of the accidental failure of suit statute because that special defense was not ripe for adjudication. We affirm the judgment in all other respects.")


Foreclosure Law Supreme Court Opinion

   by Zigadto, Janet

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5561

SC20715 - JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Assn. v. Lakner ("The sole issue in this foreclosure appeal is whether the trial court properly granted a motion for a protective order in favor of the plaintiff mortgagee, thereby resulting in the denial of all document discovery sought by the defendant mortgagor. The defendant, George S. Lakner, appeals from the judgment of the trial court in favor of the substitute plaintiff, MTGLQ Investors, L.P. On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court improperly granted MTGLQ's motion for a protective order regarding the production of MTGLQ's mortgage file. We agree with the defendant.")


Foreclosure Law Appellate Court Opinions

   by Zigadto, Janet

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5547

AC45065 - Cazenovia Creek Funding I, LLC v. White Eagle Society of Brotherly Help, Inc., Group 315, Polish National Alliance ("The named defendant, The White Eagle Society of Brotherly Help, Inc., Group 315, Polish National Alliance, appeals from the judgment of foreclosure by sale rendered by the trial court in favor of the substitute plaintiff, Benchmark Municipal Tax Services, Ltd. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly (1) rendered summary judgment against it as to liability after determining that the tax liens for the grand lists of 2012 and 2013 properly were assigned to the plaintiff and (2) found that the debt was due to the plaintiff. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

AC45473 - U.S. Bank National Assn. v. Booker ("In this residential mortgage foreclosure action, the defendants Linda Booker and Ulish Booker, Jr., appeal from the trial court’s denial of their motion to open the judgment of strict foreclosure rendered in favor of the plaintiff U.S. Bank National Association as Legal Title Trustee for Truman 2016 SC6 Title Trust. The defendants claim that the court erred in denying their motion to open the judgment because the court improperly decided not to exercise its discretion and afford them relief in connection with the grounds of mistake and fraud raised therein. The plaintiff argues that this court should dismiss the appeal because (1) the defendants’ appeal is moot, as title in the mortgaged property has vested in the plaintiff, and (2) the defendants should not be allowed to raise their claim of error because it could have been raised in the defendants’ prior appeal in this action. The plaintiff also argues that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to open. We reject the plaintiff’s jurisdictional and reviewability arguments and conclude that the court properly denied the defendants’ motion to open. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court.")


Foreclosure Law Supreme Court Opinion

   by Zigadto, Janet

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5544

SC20648 - KeyBank, N.A. v. Yazar ("This certified appeal concerns this state's Emergency Mortgage Assistance Program (EMAP), General Statutes §§ 8-265cc through 8-265kk, which is designed to assist homeowners in avoiding foreclosure by providing a mechanism and funding for emergency mortgage and lien assistance payments, among other resources. See General Statutes §§ 8-265dd and 8-265ee. As part of EMAP, § 8-265ee (a) requires mortgagees to provide notice to homeowners to inform them of the resources available under the program. In this appeal, we must consider two questions relating to this notice requirement. First, we have to determine whether the EMAP notice requirement in § 8-265ee (a) is jurisdictional. Second, we must decide whether an EMAP notice sent before the commencement of a prior foreclosure action by the predecessor mortgagee is valid for a subsequent action initiated by the successor mortgagee. We conclude that the EMAP notice requirement in § 8-265ee (a), although a mandatory condition precedent, is not jurisdictional in nature. Second, we conclude that § 8-265ee (a) requires that a mortgagee provide an EMAP notice for each foreclosure action initiated. Therefore, in the present case, the plaintiff, KeyBank, N.A., was required to provide an EMAP notice to the defendant Ozlem Yazar prior to initiating a subsequent foreclosure action after a prior foreclosure action had been dismissed.")