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Juvenile Law

Juvenile Law Appellate Court Slip Opinion

   by Roy, Christopher

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=4989

AC45087 - In re Marcquan C. ("The respondent mother, Monica C., appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying her motion to revoke the commitment of her minor child, Marcquan C., to the custody of the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and Families (commissioner). On appeal, the respondent contends that the court erred in finding that cause for commitment continued to exist. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")


Juvenile Law Appellate Court Slip Opinion

   by Roy, Christopher

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=4987

AC45012 - In re Rabia K. (Mootness; Vacatur; "In this neglect proceeding, the respondent mother, Michelle K., appeals from the judgment of the trial court adjudicating Rabia K., the respondent’s minor daughter, neglected and committing her to the care and custody of the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and Families. On appeal, the respondent claims that the court improperly found that (1) Rabia had been neglected and (2) the Department of Children and Families (department) made reasonable efforts to prevent Rabia’s removal."

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"Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal as moot and vacate the judgment of the court.")


Juvenile Law Appellate Court Slip Opinion

   by Roy, Christopher

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=4958

AC44918, AC44923 - In re Teagan K.-O. ("In these two appeals, the respondent parents appeal from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and Families, terminating their parental rights with respect to their minor child, Teagan K.-O. (Teagan). In Docket No. AC 44918, the respondent mother claims that the trial court lacked the statutory authority to terminate her parental rights under General Statutes § 17a-112 because Teagan was not in the custody of the petitioner pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-129. Specifically, she argues that the fact that our Supreme Court ordered that the neglect petition filed with respect to Teagan be dismissed vitiated the statutory predicate for the order of temporary custody over Teagan that had been granted to the petitioner under § 46b-129. In Docket No. AC 44923, the respondent father claims that the trial court lacked jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), General Statutes § 46b-115 et seq., to adjudicate the petition for termination of parental rights because (1) the order of temporary custody was not a final custody determination for purposes of establishing jurisdiction under the UCCJEA, and (2) there is no mechanism by which the order of temporary custody could become a final custody determination. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")


Juvenile Law Appellate Court Slip Opinion

   by Roy, Christopher

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=4947

AC44831 - In re Ryder M. ("The respondent father, Phillip M., appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and Families, terminating his parental rights as to his minor son, Ryder M., on the ground that he failed to achieve a sufficient degree of personal rehabilitation pursuant to General Statutes § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) (i). On appeal, the respondent claims that the court improperly determined that (1) the Department of Children and Families (department) made reasonable efforts to reunify him with Ryder, (2) he failed to rehabilitate sufficiently, and (3) termination of his parental rights was in Ryder’s best interest. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")


Juvenile Law Supreme Court Slip Opinion

   by Roy, Christopher

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=4920

SC20624 - In re Ivory W. ("The respondent claims that the trial court's denial of her motion for a continuance violated her due process right to present a defense to the termination of her parental rights under the federal and state constitutions. The respondent further claims that, if this court determines that the denial of her motion for a continuance was constitutional, the denial was an abuse of discretion. Finally, the respondent claims that, if this court determines that the denial of her motion for a continuance was neither unconstitutional nor an abuse of discretion, this court should exercise its supervisory authority over the administration of justice to direct our trial courts to grant motions for a continuance of termination of parental rights proceedings whenever related criminal proceedings against the parent are pending. We reject the respondent's claims and affirm the judgments of the trial court.")