The mission of the Connecticut Judicial Branch is to serve the interests of justice and the public by resolving matters brought before it in a fair, timely, efficient and open manner.
AC41742 - In re Gabriella C.-G., et al: (Termination of parental rights; “She claims on appeal that the
court erred in (1) violating her constitutional rights by holding her to ‘unlawful,
vague, high standards of care, compared to all the other parties . . .
associated with the care and keeping’ of the five children, (2) denying ‘the
right to a comparison of the foster parents . . . and [the Department of
Children and Families (the department)] provided level of care that she was
held to,’ including not allowing an injury report from the Office of the Child
Advocate as to Dallas, (3) finding that the department made ‘reasonable
efforts’ to reunify her with any of her five children, (4) making the
statement, ‘this family can’t and won’t benefit from reunification’… and (5) stating
that ‘it’s in the best interest’… of the five minor children for her to lose her parental rights.…Having reviewed the findings of
the court as set forth in its thoughtful and thorough decision, we conclude
that under the applicable standards of review, they are sufficiently supported
by the evidence and not clearly erroneous. The judgments are affirmed.”)
AC41451 - In re Lilyana L.- (Termination of parental rights; claim of deliberate, nonaccidental assault;
"
On appeal, the respondent claims that the trial court erred
when it determined, pursuant to General Statutes § 17a-112 (j) (3) (F), that the
respondent committed an assault, through a deliberate, nonaccidental act that
resulted in serious bodily injury to another child of the parent. We affirm the
judgment of the trial court.")
AC41531 - In re Zakai F. ("The respondent mother, Kristi F., appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying her motion for reinstatement of guardianship of her minor son, Zakai F. The respondent claims that the court violated her fundamental right to the care and custody of Zakai under the United States constitution by denying her motion (1) without a showing that she was unfit, and (2) without a finding by clear and convincing evidence that Zakai would be at a substantial risk of physical or emotional harm if the current guardianship of him by his aunt, the respondent's sister, were terminated. The respondent additionally claims that the court abused its discretion in concluding that her reinstatement as guardian was not in Zakai's best interest. We disagree with the respondent's claims and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the court.")
AC41469 - In re Madison M. ("On appeal, the respondent claims that he was not provided
the specific steps mandated by General Statutes § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) (i) and,
consequently, was unable to achieve a level of rehabilitation that would
reasonably encourage a belief that at some future date he could assume a responsible
position in the lives of his children. Additionally, the respondent contends
that the failure to provide him with the specific steps did not constitute harmless
error. We do not agree with either argument and, therefore, affirm the
judgments of the trial court.")
AC41349 - In re Joheli V. (Termination of parental rights; "The respondent father, Luis V., appeals from the judgment of the trial court terminating his parental rights with respect to his minor child, Joheli V. On appeal, the respondent claims that the court erred when it determined, pursuant to General Statutes § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B), that he had failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of Joheli, he could assume a responsible position in her life, based solely upon the fact that he is currently incarcerated and awaiting trial for allegedly sexually assaulting Joheli. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")
AC41106 - In re Briana G.
(Termination of parental rights to three minor children; “On
appeal, the respondent claims that the court (1) prematurely determined that
the respondent failed to rehabilitate because the Department of Children and Families
(department) did not provide him with sufficient time and resources to do so,
and (2) improperly admitted into evidence transcripts of text messages obtained
by the police, although a proper chain of custody was not proved prior to their
admission. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.”)
AC41248, AC41249 - In re Katherine H., In re James H.("In these consolidated appeals, the self-represented
respondent mother, Ann C., appeals from the judgments of the trial court
finding her minor children, Katherine H. and James H., neglected and committing
them to the custody of the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and
Families. On appeal, the respondent essentially takes issue with the manner in
which the Department of Children and Families (department) performed its
responsibilities and the court’s factual findings. We affirm the judgments of the
trial court.")
AC41157- In re Zoey H. ("The respondent claims that (1) his right to procedural due
process under the United States constitution was violated by the court’s
failure to hold a hearing to determine his fitness as a parent before depriving
him of the custody and care of his child, and (2) as applied, General Statutes
§ 46b-129 (m) violates his right to substantive due process under the United
States constitution and improperly assigns the burden of proof to him. We
affirm the judgment of the trial court.")
AC40809 - In re Athena C. (Petition by the Commissioner of Children and Families to
terminate parental rights; “The respondent claims that the trial court
improperly (1) determined that the termination of his parental rights was in
the child’s best interest; and (2) denied his motion to transfer guardianship
of the child to the child’s maternal grandmother (grandmother). We affirm the
judgment of the trial court.")
AC40760 - In re Mariana A. ("The petitioner claims that the court improperly (1)
concluded that she had not met her burden of proving by clear and convincing
evidence that the mother had failed to rehabilitate in accordance with General
Statutes § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) (i), and (2) failed to analyze properly whether
the father had abandoned Mariana pursuant to § 17a-112 (j) (3) (A). We disagree
with the petitioner’s claims and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial
court.")
AC40437 - In re Kyllan V. (Termination of parental rights; collateral estoppel; "The respondent father appeals from the judgment of the trial court terminating his parental rights with respect to his biological daughter, K, pursuant to General Statutes § 45a-717 (g). The respondent claims on appeal that the trial court improperly relied on the adjudicatory findings from a prior proceeding involving two of his other children to support the adjudicatory ground in the present case, namely, that because of a parental act of commission or omission, K was denied care, guidance, or control necessary for her physical, educational, moral, or emotional well-being as required by the statute. We agree with the respondent that the trial court improperly applied collateral estoppel in determining that K was denied the care, guidance, or control necessary for her physical, educational, moral, or emotional well-being as a result of the respondent's act of commission or omission. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment and remand the case for a new trial.")
SC19913, SC19914 - In Re Egypt E. (Termination of parental rights; "This case chiefly concerns the scope of the ground for
termination of parental rights contemplated by General Statutes § 17a-112 (j)
(3) (C), regarding acts of parental commission or omission that deny a child
the care necessary for the child’s physical or emotional well-being… The
respondents claim, therefore, that the termination of their parental rights improperly
was based on a finding of predictive harm, a type of harm not contemplated by §
17a-112 (j) (3) (C). We agree with the respondents that a termination of parental rights pursuant to § 17a- 112
(j) (3) (C) may not be based upon predictive harm. Under the unusual procedural
circumstances underlying this appeal, however, we conclude that the court properly
found that § 17a-112 (j) (3) (C) was proven on the basis that Egypt had been
harmed by the respondents’ postremoval acts of parental commission or omission.
Specifically, because the petitions to terminate the respondents’ parental
rights were amended, and, therefore, the adjudicatory date was extended to encompass
events subsequent to the filing of the original petitions, the court properly
considered the conduct following the removal of the children, which had an actual,
harmful effect on the well-being of Egypt. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments
of the trial court.")
SC19907 - In re Henrry P. B. - P. ("In this certified appeal, we consider whether the Probate Court retains the statutory authority to make findings pursuant to General Statutes § 45a-608n (b) in connection with a petition for special immigrant juvenile status (juvenile status) under 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (27) (J), when the minor child who is the subject of the petition reaches the age of eighteen years old during the pendency of the petition. The petitioner, Reyna P. A., and her son, Henrry P. B.-P., appeal, upon our grant of their petition for certification, from the judgment of the Appellate Court, which affirmed the judgments of the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters dismissing their appeals from the decisions of the Probate Court. In re Henrry P. B.-P., 171 Conn. App. 393, 415, 156 A.3d 673 (2017). We agree with their dispositive claim in this appeal, and conclude that the Probate Court did not lose its authority to make juvenile status findings pursuant to § 45a-608n (b) when Henrry turned eighteen years old during the pendency of the petition. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.")
AC40202 - In re Jacob W. (Termination of parental rights; "On appeal, the petitioner challenges the trial court’s
conclusion that she had failed to prove the nonexistence of an ongoing parent-child
relationship by clear and convincing evidence as required by General Statutes §
45a-717 (g) (2) (C).3 The petitioner argues, inter alia, that the trial court
applied the incorrect legal test to determine whether such a relationship
exists by focusing on the respondent’s actions rather than the children’s
feelings.4 We agree that the trial court applied the incorrect test because the
court legally and logically cannot have found both that a parent-child relationship
exists and that the custodians prevented such a relationship from existing. Moreover,
even under the test as applied, the trial court’s conclusions are inconsistent.
Accordingly, we reverse the judgments of the trial court and remand the case
for a new trial.")
AC40517 - In re Damian G.
(Termination of parental rights; “The respondent claims that
the court erroneously found that: (1) she failed to rehabilitate and (2) the termination
of her parental rights was in the best interests of the children. We affirm the
judgments of the trial court... The respondent has failed to demonstrate that
any of the court’s findings were clearly erroneous. The court’s best interest
determination rests on a variety of findings, several of which are not
challenged on appeal.”)
SC19902 Order on Motion- In Re Elianah T.-T. ("Following the release of our decision in In re Elianah T.-T., 326 Conn. 614, 165 A.3d 1236 (2017), in which this court concluded that General Statutes § 17a-10 (c) did not authorize the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and Families (commissioner), to vaccinate a child placed in her temporary custody over the objection of that child's parents, the commissioner moved for reconsideration pursuant to Practice Book § 71-5. In this motion for reconsideration, the commissioner states that, in briefing this case, she should have claimed that General Statutes § 17a-10 (c) should be interpreted in the context of General Statutes §§ 17a-93 and 17a-98. Specifically, the commissioner contends that the operation of General Statutes § 17a-10 (c) is limited to custody over juveniles who have been adjudicated delinquent, and that General Statutes §§ 17a-93 and 17a-98 confer broader guardianship authority that permits her to vaccinate minor children in her custody. The commissioner candidly acknowledges that she did not advance her arguments concerning the effect of General Statutes §§ 17a-93 and 17a-98 until the filing of this motion for reconsideration. As this argument was not previously advanced to this court, we grant the motion for reconsideration, but deny the relief requested.")
SC19695 - In re Elijah C. (Termination of parental rights; dismissal of appeal by Appellate Court as moot; certification from Appellate Court; "In this certified appeal, the respondent, Marquita C., appeals from the judgment of Appellate Court, which dismissed her appeal from the judgment of the trial court terminating her parental rights as to her son, Elijah C.[1] See In re Elijah C., 164 Conn. App. 518, 519, 137 A.3d 944 (2016). The respondent claims that the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that she had failed to adequately brief one of the two independent grounds for reversing the judgment of the trial court and, consequently, that her appeal was moot. She further claims that the trial court incorrectly determined, first, that the Department of Children and Families (department) made reasonable efforts to reunify her with Elijah and, second, that she was unable to benefit from those efforts.[2] We agree with the respondent that the Appellate Court improperly dismissed her appeal as moot. We further conclude, however, that the evidence supports the trial court's determination that the respondent was unable to benefit from reunification efforts. Because our resolution of that issue constitutes an independent basis for affirming the trial court's judgment, we need not address the respondent's claim that the trial court incorrectly concluded that the department made reasonable efforts to reunify her with Elijah. We therefore vacate the judgment of the Appellate Court and remand the case to that court with direction to affirm the trial court's judgment.")
AC39953 - In re Luis N. (Termination of parental rights; mother; "On appeal, the respondent claims that the court (1) violated
her right to due process by meeting with the children ex parte, (2) failed timely
to canvass her pursuant to In re Yasiel R., (3) erred by concluding that she
had failed to rehabilitate to the degree that she could not be restored as a
responsible parent within a reasonable time, and (4) erred by finding that it
was in the best interests of the children to terminate her parental rights in
them. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.")
AC39934- In re Luis N. (Termination of parental rights; father; "On appeal, the respondent claims that the judgments should
be reversed because the court met with the children ex parte in the presence of
a Department of Children and Families visitation supervisor, failed to make a
record of its observations regarding the children, and failed to declare a
mistrial. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.")
The Judicial Branch has announced that it is now publishing a syllabus (headnote) at the top of each Supreme and Appellate Court opinion:
The Judicial Branch is now posting online headnotes for both Supreme and Appellate Court opinions. These headnotes, which accompany individual Supreme and Appellate Court decisions, include a short summary of the ruling and the procedural history of a case. The Reporter of Judicial Decisions prepares the headnotes, which are not part of the opinion. As such, the opinion alone should be relied upon for the reasoning behind the decision [Emphasis added].
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SC19707 - In re Natalie S. ("On appeal to this court, the respondent asserts that the
Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that the Department of Children and Families
(department) was not required to provide reunification efforts to her in the
present case because the father was awarded temporary guardianship of Natalie. The
petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and Families, asserts that the
department was not required to continue providing reunification efforts to the respondent
because the trial court granted custody and guardianship to the father. We
affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.")
SC19844- In re Natalie S. ("On appeal to this court, the mother asserts that the trial
court incorrectly determined that North Carolina was the appropriate forum to
adjudicate the issues raised in her motion for visitation. The respondent
father, Matthew B. (father), asserts that the trial court properly denied the
mother’s motion for visitation on the ground that North Carolina is the more
appropriate forum to decide the issues raised therein. We affirm the judgment
of the trial court.")
SC19798 - In re Santiago G. (Termination of parental rights; "The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the denial of a third party's motion to intervene in a proceeding brought to terminate the parental rights of a minor child's biological mother is an appealable final judgment. The proposed intervenor, Maria G., appeals from the judgment of the trial court, Hon. Barbara M. Quinn, judge trial referee, denying her motion to intervene as of right and permissively. On appeal, Maria G. claims that her guardianship interests over the minor child, Santiago G., will effectively be extinguished if the court terminates the parental rights of the respondent Melissa E., who is Santiago's biological mother. As such, she claims to have a right to intervene or, in the alternative, that she should be granted permissive intervention. We disagree, and conclude that Maria G. does not have a colorable claim of intervention as of right and, as such, is not appealing from a final judgment. Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.")