The mission of the Connecticut Judicial Branch is to serve the interests of justice and the public by resolving matters brought before it in a fair, timely, efficient and open manner.
AC41709 - In re Avia M. ("The respondent mother appeals from the judgment of the trial
court terminating her parental rights with respect to her daughter, Avia M.
(child). On appeal, the respondent claims that the trial court improperly
concluded that the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and Families,
proved by clear and convincing evidence that (1) the Department of Children and
Families made reasonable efforts to reunify her, (2) she was unable or
unwilling to achieve the requisite degree of personal rehabilitation, and (3)
it was in the child’s best interest to terminate her parental rights. We affirm
the judgment of the trial court.")
AC41875- In re Malachi E.
(“On appeal, the respondent claims that the court erred in determining
that the termination of her parental rights was in the best interest of the
child because (1) the court relied entirely on its adjudicatory determination that
the respondent had failed to achieve sufficient personal rehabilitation, and
(2) there was no evidence to support its determination that the termination of
her parental rights was in the best interest of the child. We affirm the
judgment of the trial court.”)
AC41819 - In re Bianca K. ("On appeal the respondent claims that the court improperly concluded
that (1) by the clear and convincing evidence adduced at the termination
hearing, she had failed to achieve sufficient personal rehabilitation within
the meaning of General Statutes § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) (i), and (2) that the
termination of her parental rights was in the best interest of the child. We
affirm the judgment of the trial court.")
AC41577 - In re Angelina M. ("The self-represented respondent mother appeals from the
judgment of the trial court terminating her parental rights as to Angelina M.,
her minor child. She contends that the court improperly concluded that (1) she failed
to achieve the requisite degree of personal rehabilitation required by General Statutes
§ 17a-112 and (2) termination of her parental rights was in the best interest
of the child. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")
AC41829 - In re Tresin J. ("On appeal, the respondent claims that the trial court erred
when it determined, pursuant to General Statutes § 17a-112 (j) (3) (D), that no
ongoing parent-child relationship exists between the respondent and Tresin. We
affirm the judgment of the trial court.")
AC40692 - Maria G. v. Commissioner of Children & Families (Whether trial court properly concluded that foreign court's judgment was not required to be enforced as matter of comity; "The petitioner, Maria G., appeals from the trial court's rendering of summary judgment in favor of the respondent, the Commissioner of Children and Families, on the petitioner's writ of habeas corpus seeking custody of the minor child, Santiago. On appeal, the petitioner claims that the court erroneously failed to credit a Guatemalan court's decree, which purportedly granted her parental guardianship rights over, and custody of, Santiago, when the court concluded that (1) public policy prohibited recognition of the decree because it was premised on a false birth certificate, and (2) the decree was obtained without notice to the respondent. We affirm the judgment of the court.")
AC41742 - In re Gabriella C.-G., et al: (Termination of parental rights; “She claims on appeal that the
court erred in (1) violating her constitutional rights by holding her to ‘unlawful,
vague, high standards of care, compared to all the other parties . . .
associated with the care and keeping’ of the five children, (2) denying ‘the
right to a comparison of the foster parents . . . and [the Department of
Children and Families (the department)] provided level of care that she was
held to,’ including not allowing an injury report from the Office of the Child
Advocate as to Dallas, (3) finding that the department made ‘reasonable
efforts’ to reunify her with any of her five children, (4) making the
statement, ‘this family can’t and won’t benefit from reunification’… and (5) stating
that ‘it’s in the best interest’… of the five minor children for her to lose her parental rights.…Having reviewed the findings of
the court as set forth in its thoughtful and thorough decision, we conclude
that under the applicable standards of review, they are sufficiently supported
by the evidence and not clearly erroneous. The judgments are affirmed.”)
AC41451 - In re Lilyana L.- (Termination of parental rights; claim of deliberate, nonaccidental assault;
"
On appeal, the respondent claims that the trial court erred
when it determined, pursuant to General Statutes § 17a-112 (j) (3) (F), that the
respondent committed an assault, through a deliberate, nonaccidental act that
resulted in serious bodily injury to another child of the parent. We affirm the
judgment of the trial court.")
AC41531 - In re Zakai F. ("The respondent mother, Kristi F., appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying her motion for reinstatement of guardianship of her minor son, Zakai F. The respondent claims that the court violated her fundamental right to the care and custody of Zakai under the United States constitution by denying her motion (1) without a showing that she was unfit, and (2) without a finding by clear and convincing evidence that Zakai would be at a substantial risk of physical or emotional harm if the current guardianship of him by his aunt, the respondent's sister, were terminated. The respondent additionally claims that the court abused its discretion in concluding that her reinstatement as guardian was not in Zakai's best interest. We disagree with the respondent's claims and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the court.")
AC41469 - In re Madison M. ("On appeal, the respondent claims that he was not provided
the specific steps mandated by General Statutes § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) (i) and,
consequently, was unable to achieve a level of rehabilitation that would
reasonably encourage a belief that at some future date he could assume a responsible
position in the lives of his children. Additionally, the respondent contends
that the failure to provide him with the specific steps did not constitute harmless
error. We do not agree with either argument and, therefore, affirm the
judgments of the trial court.")
AC41349 - In re Joheli V. (Termination of parental rights; "The respondent father, Luis V., appeals from the judgment of the trial court terminating his parental rights with respect to his minor child, Joheli V. On appeal, the respondent claims that the court erred when it determined, pursuant to General Statutes § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B), that he had failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of Joheli, he could assume a responsible position in her life, based solely upon the fact that he is currently incarcerated and awaiting trial for allegedly sexually assaulting Joheli. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")
AC41106 - In re Briana G.
(Termination of parental rights to three minor children; “On
appeal, the respondent claims that the court (1) prematurely determined that
the respondent failed to rehabilitate because the Department of Children and Families
(department) did not provide him with sufficient time and resources to do so,
and (2) improperly admitted into evidence transcripts of text messages obtained
by the police, although a proper chain of custody was not proved prior to their
admission. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.”)
AC41248, AC41249 - In re Katherine H., In re James H.("In these consolidated appeals, the self-represented
respondent mother, Ann C., appeals from the judgments of the trial court
finding her minor children, Katherine H. and James H., neglected and committing
them to the custody of the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and
Families. On appeal, the respondent essentially takes issue with the manner in
which the Department of Children and Families (department) performed its
responsibilities and the court’s factual findings. We affirm the judgments of the
trial court.")
AC41157- In re Zoey H. ("The respondent claims that (1) his right to procedural due
process under the United States constitution was violated by the court’s
failure to hold a hearing to determine his fitness as a parent before depriving
him of the custody and care of his child, and (2) as applied, General Statutes
§ 46b-129 (m) violates his right to substantive due process under the United
States constitution and improperly assigns the burden of proof to him. We
affirm the judgment of the trial court.")
AC40809 - In re Athena C. (Petition by the Commissioner of Children and Families to
terminate parental rights; “The respondent claims that the trial court
improperly (1) determined that the termination of his parental rights was in
the child’s best interest; and (2) denied his motion to transfer guardianship
of the child to the child’s maternal grandmother (grandmother). We affirm the
judgment of the trial court.")
AC40760 - In re Mariana A. ("The petitioner claims that the court improperly (1)
concluded that she had not met her burden of proving by clear and convincing
evidence that the mother had failed to rehabilitate in accordance with General
Statutes § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) (i), and (2) failed to analyze properly whether
the father had abandoned Mariana pursuant to § 17a-112 (j) (3) (A). We disagree
with the petitioner’s claims and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial
court.")
AC40437 - In re Kyllan V. (Termination of parental rights; collateral estoppel; "The respondent father appeals from the judgment of the trial court terminating his parental rights with respect to his biological daughter, K, pursuant to General Statutes § 45a-717 (g). The respondent claims on appeal that the trial court improperly relied on the adjudicatory findings from a prior proceeding involving two of his other children to support the adjudicatory ground in the present case, namely, that because of a parental act of commission or omission, K was denied care, guidance, or control necessary for her physical, educational, moral, or emotional well-being as required by the statute. We agree with the respondent that the trial court improperly applied collateral estoppel in determining that K was denied the care, guidance, or control necessary for her physical, educational, moral, or emotional well-being as a result of the respondent's act of commission or omission. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment and remand the case for a new trial.")
SC19913, SC19914 - In Re Egypt E. (Termination of parental rights; "This case chiefly concerns the scope of the ground for
termination of parental rights contemplated by General Statutes § 17a-112 (j)
(3) (C), regarding acts of parental commission or omission that deny a child
the care necessary for the child’s physical or emotional well-being… The
respondents claim, therefore, that the termination of their parental rights improperly
was based on a finding of predictive harm, a type of harm not contemplated by §
17a-112 (j) (3) (C). We agree with the respondents that a termination of parental rights pursuant to § 17a- 112
(j) (3) (C) may not be based upon predictive harm. Under the unusual procedural
circumstances underlying this appeal, however, we conclude that the court properly
found that § 17a-112 (j) (3) (C) was proven on the basis that Egypt had been
harmed by the respondents’ postremoval acts of parental commission or omission.
Specifically, because the petitions to terminate the respondents’ parental
rights were amended, and, therefore, the adjudicatory date was extended to encompass
events subsequent to the filing of the original petitions, the court properly
considered the conduct following the removal of the children, which had an actual,
harmful effect on the well-being of Egypt. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments
of the trial court.")
SC19907 - In re Henrry P. B. - P. ("In this certified appeal, we consider whether the Probate Court retains the statutory authority to make findings pursuant to General Statutes § 45a-608n (b) in connection with a petition for special immigrant juvenile status (juvenile status) under 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (27) (J), when the minor child who is the subject of the petition reaches the age of eighteen years old during the pendency of the petition. The petitioner, Reyna P. A., and her son, Henrry P. B.-P., appeal, upon our grant of their petition for certification, from the judgment of the Appellate Court, which affirmed the judgments of the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters dismissing their appeals from the decisions of the Probate Court. In re Henrry P. B.-P., 171 Conn. App. 393, 415, 156 A.3d 673 (2017). We agree with their dispositive claim in this appeal, and conclude that the Probate Court did not lose its authority to make juvenile status findings pursuant to § 45a-608n (b) when Henrry turned eighteen years old during the pendency of the petition. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.")
AC40202 - In re Jacob W. (Termination of parental rights; "On appeal, the petitioner challenges the trial court’s
conclusion that she had failed to prove the nonexistence of an ongoing parent-child
relationship by clear and convincing evidence as required by General Statutes §
45a-717 (g) (2) (C).3 The petitioner argues, inter alia, that the trial court
applied the incorrect legal test to determine whether such a relationship
exists by focusing on the respondent’s actions rather than the children’s
feelings.4 We agree that the trial court applied the incorrect test because the
court legally and logically cannot have found both that a parent-child relationship
exists and that the custodians prevented such a relationship from existing. Moreover,
even under the test as applied, the trial court’s conclusions are inconsistent.
Accordingly, we reverse the judgments of the trial court and remand the case
for a new trial.")
AC40517 - In re Damian G.
(Termination of parental rights; “The respondent claims that
the court erroneously found that: (1) she failed to rehabilitate and (2) the termination
of her parental rights was in the best interests of the children. We affirm the
judgments of the trial court... The respondent has failed to demonstrate that
any of the court’s findings were clearly erroneous. The court’s best interest
determination rests on a variety of findings, several of which are not
challenged on appeal.”)
SC19902 Order on Motion- In Re Elianah T.-T. ("Following the release of our decision in In re Elianah T.-T., 326 Conn. 614, 165 A.3d 1236 (2017), in which this court concluded that General Statutes § 17a-10 (c) did not authorize the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and Families (commissioner), to vaccinate a child placed in her temporary custody over the objection of that child's parents, the commissioner moved for reconsideration pursuant to Practice Book § 71-5. In this motion for reconsideration, the commissioner states that, in briefing this case, she should have claimed that General Statutes § 17a-10 (c) should be interpreted in the context of General Statutes §§ 17a-93 and 17a-98. Specifically, the commissioner contends that the operation of General Statutes § 17a-10 (c) is limited to custody over juveniles who have been adjudicated delinquent, and that General Statutes §§ 17a-93 and 17a-98 confer broader guardianship authority that permits her to vaccinate minor children in her custody. The commissioner candidly acknowledges that she did not advance her arguments concerning the effect of General Statutes §§ 17a-93 and 17a-98 until the filing of this motion for reconsideration. As this argument was not previously advanced to this court, we grant the motion for reconsideration, but deny the relief requested.")