AC41677 - Haywood v. Commissioner of Correction (“On appeal, the petitioner claims that the habeas court abused its discretion in denying his petition for certification to appeal and improperly concluded that he was not denied the effective assistance of previous habeas counsel, Attorney Mark Diamond, with respect to Attorney Diamond’s efforts to establish the ineffective assistance of original appellate counsel, Attorney Glenn W. Falk… The petitioner argues in this appeal that Attorney Falk performed deficiently in the petitioner’s direct appeal because, when he addressed in the petition for certification to appeal to our Supreme Court this court’s decision that the petitioner’s robbery conviction should be modified, he failed to include a citation to State v. Sanseverino, 287 Conn. 608, 949 A.2d 1156 (2008) (Sanseverino I), and failed, while the petition for certification was pending in our Supreme Court, to file a motion for reconsideration in this court regarding the modification issue after our Supreme Court officially released its decision in Sanseverino I. He further argues that Attorney Diamond performed deficiently in the petitioner’s first habeas trial because he failed to point out sufficiently Attorney Falk’s errors”.)

• Posted in:
• Habeas Corpus Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC40899 - Dombrowski v. New Haven (Denial of motion to open parties' stipulation that settled claims; reviewability of claims not presented to commissioner; settlement contingent upon approval of the city; claim that opening the stipulation not warranted due to failure of offering any evidence of “fraud, misrepresentation, accident, or mistake”; "On appeal, the plaintiff raises a number of claims that, in essence, challenge the propriety of the board’s decision affirming the commissioner’s denial of his motion to open. We affirm the decision of the board.")

• Posted in:
• Recent Opinions,
• Workers' Compensation Law

AC42149 - M. B. v. S. A. ("The self-represented plaintiff, M. B., appeals from the trial court's order denying his application for relief from abuse seeking the issuance of a domestic violence restraining order against the defendant, S. A., whom he alleges has engaged in a 'continuous pattern of stalking and harassment.' Specifically, the plaintiff contends that the court abused its discretion in (1) denying his application for relief from abuse and (2) issuing sanctions against him pursuant to Practice Book § 1-25 for filing a frivolous application for relief from abuse. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

AC42237 - M. B. v. S. A. ("The self-represented plaintiff, M. B., appeals from the trial court's orders, rendered in a child custody action, granting certain postjudgment motions for contempt filed by the defendant, S. A., and awarding her attorney's fees as a sanction against the plaintiff. Specifically, the plaintiff contends that the court erred in (1) finding him in contempt for nonpayment of support orders when the support orders were on appeal, (2) prioritizing the resolution of motions for contempt over a simultaneously pending motion pertaining to child visitation (3) failing to consider financial affidavits he had submitted, (4) awarding the defendant attorney's fees in connection with the granted contempt motions, and (5) accepting the defendant's affidavits of fees with incorrect docket numbers. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

• Posted in:
• Family Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC40592 - R.D. Clark & Sons, Inc. v. Clark ("In this case involving the buyout of minority shares of a closely held corporation, the plaintiff, R.D. Clark & Sons, Inc. (corporation), appeals, and the defendant James Clark cross appeals, from the judgment of the trial court determining the fair value of those shares, establishing the terms of payment for the purchase of those shares, and awarding attorney's fees to the defendant. On appeal, the corporation asserts that the trial court erred in determining the value of the defendant's shares by (1) not tax affecting the corporation's earnings in analyzing its valuation, (2) not applying a minority discount to the value of the defendant's shares, and awarding the defendant attorney's and expert witness fees and costs, on the ground that the defendant suffered minority oppression at the hands of the plaintiffs, (3) not applying a marketability discount to the value of the defendant's shares, and (4) incorrectly accounting for a certain loan due to the corporation from the defendant and ordering that certain sums be paid to the defendant within thirty days of the date of judgment. On cross appeal, the defendant claims that the court erred by not awarding him attorney's fees in the amount of one third of the value of his shares in the corporation in accordance with the retainer agreement that he had signed with his counsel. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

• Posted in:
• Business Law,
• Recent Opinions

The Connecticut Law Journal, Volume LXXXI, No. 23, for December 3, 2019 is now available.

Contained in the issue is the following:

• Table of Contents
• Volume 333: Connecticut Reports (Pages 816 - 846)
• Volume 333: Orders (Pages 946 - 948)
• Volume 333: Cumulative Table of Cases Connecticut Reports
• Volume 194: Connecticut Appellate Reports (Pages 598 - 689)
• Volume 194: Memorandum Decisions (Pages 904 - 904)
• Volume 194: Cumulative Table of Cases Connecticut Appellate Reports
• Miscellaneous Notices

• Posted in:
• Connecticut Law Journal,
• Recent Opinions

AC41379 - State v. Joseph ("The defendant, Kenyon Joseph, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of assault of a correction officer in violation of General Statutes § 53a-167c (a). On appeal, the defendant asserts that the jury's rejection of his affirmative defense of mental disease or defect was not reasonably supported by the evidence. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

AC41597 - State v. Salters ("The defendant, Gaylord Salters, appeals from the judgment of the trial court . . . denying his motion to correct an illegal sentence. On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion to correct an illegal sentence because the sentencing court substantially relied on the state's materially inaccurate information at sentencing, (2) the trial court applied an incorrect legal standard regarding the reliability of testimonial evidence, (3) the use of materially inaccurate information at the defendant's sentencing hearing was structural error, and (4) the prosecutor's use of the allegedly inaccurate information constituted prosecutorial impropriety. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

AC41053 - State v. Michael T. ("The defendant, Michael T., appeals from the judgments of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-59 (a) (2), five counts of risk of injury to a child in violation of General Statutes § 53-21 (a) (1), two counts of unlawful restraint in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-95 (a), criminal attempt to commit assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-49 (a) (2) and 53a-59 (a) (2), and assault in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-60 (a) (2). On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court (1) abused its discretion by admitting into evidence the forensic interviews of the two minor victims, (2) improperly denied his motions for a judgment of acquittal with respect to two counts of risk of injury to a child and (3) improperly precluded the defendant from presenting evidence of third-party culpability. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgments of conviction.")

• Posted in:
• Criminal Law & Procedure,
• Recent Opinions

SC20129 - Osborn v. Waterbury (Negligence; public school playground supervision; "This appeal arises from an action filed by the plaintiffs, Tatayana Osborn (child), a minor child, by and through her mother, Tacarra Smith, alleging negligence on the part of the defendant city of Waterbury (city) and the defendant Waterbury Board of Education (board) for injuries sustained by the child during an altercation with other students during recess at a Waterbury public school. In this certified appeal, we must determine whether the Appellate Court correctly concluded that expert testimony was necessary to establish the standard of care in this negligence action. We conclude that, under the facts of the present case, expert testimony was not necessary. Accordingly, we reverse the Appellate Court's judgment and remand the case to that court for consideration of the remaining issues on appeal.")

• SC20129 Dissent- Osborn v. Waterbury

AC41801 - Stevens v. Khalily (Intentional infliction of emotional distress; "The plaintiff, Eric Stevens, appeals from the judgment of the trial court granting the motion to dismiss filed by the defendants Tiffany Khalily and Edward Khalily, which was based on lack of personal jurisdiction due to improper service of process in that the plaintiff did not serve the defendants at their last known addresses. Specifically, the plaintiff argues that the trial court improperly relied on 'conclusory and self-serving affidavits of the defendants which were insufficient to rebut the presumption of proper service.' We disagree and affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

• Posted in:
• Recent Opinions,
• Tort Law

AC42678 - In re Cameron W. (Termination of parental rights petition pursuant to § 17a-112 (j) (3) (E), on the ground that the respondent failed to rehabilitate; “The respondent claims that the court improperly found that (1) she was unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts and (2) the Department of Children and Families (department) made reasonable efforts to reunify her with her child. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.”).

• Posted in:
• Juvenile Law,
• Recent Opinions

The Connecticut Law Journal, Volume LXXXI, No. 22, for November 26, 2019 is now available.

Contained in the issue is the following:

• Table of Contents
• Volume 333: Connecticut Reports (Pages 731 - 816)
• Volume 333: Orders (Pages 942 - 945)
• Volume 333: Cumulative Table of Cases Connecticut Reports
• Volume 194: Connecticut Appellate Reports (Pages 473 - 597)
• Volume 194: Memorandum Decisions (Pages 902 - 903)
• Volume 194: Cumulative Table of Cases Connecticut Appellate Reports
• Miscellaneous Notices
• Notices of Connecticut State Agencies

• Posted in:
• Connecticut Law Journal,
• Recent Opinions

AC41186 - Saunders v. Commissioner of Correction (Dismissal of petition on the grounds “his due process claims, predicated on allegations that he was incompetent to stand trial and that the state and the trial court failed to comply with General Statutes § 54-56d, were procedurally defaulted. On appeal, the petitioner claims that the court improperly dismissed the petition because (1) his due process claims were not subject to the procedural default rule, or (2) alternatively, he sufficiently pleaded cause and prejudice to overcome the procedural defaults and allow judicial review of his claims. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the habeas court”.)

AC42049 - Watts v. Commissioner of Correction (“In his two underlying criminal cases, the petitioner rejected a plea offer from the court, Clifford, J., to resolve the two cases because he allegedly was not properly advised of the charges, defenses, and best course of action regarding the offer, and, therefore, was unaware of ‘the consequences of rejecting [the offer].’ Following a jury trial, the petitioner was convicted and sentenced to ninety-five years in prison, the functional equivalent of a life sentence.1 The petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in which he alleged (1) that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel regarding the plea offer he rejected, and (2) that his sentence violated the eighth amendment to the United States constitution and article first, §§ 8 and 9, of the constitution of Connecticut. The habeas court denied the petitioner’s first claim on the grounds that trial counsel’s representation was not deficient and that the petitioner failed to prove prejudice. The court dismissed the cruel and unusual punishment claims ‘without prejudice,’ reasoning that, if it ruled on the merits of the claim, it would be bound to follow this court’s decision in State v. Williams-Bey, 167 Conn. App. 744, 144 A.3d 467, cert. granted, 326 Conn. 920, 169 A.3d 793 (2017), which, at the time, was under review by our Supreme Court”).

AC41052 - Crawley v. Commissioner of Correction (Habeas appeal “dismissing in part and denying in part his amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus. He contends that the court improperly rejected his claims of ineffective assistance on the part of both his criminal trial counsel and his first habeas counsel. We affirm the judgment of the habeas court... This appeal concerns the petitioner’s convictions on two counts of possession of narcotics with the intent to sell by a person who is not drug-dependent in violation of General Statutes § 21a-278 (b)”)

• Posted in:
• Habeas Corpus Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC42330 - State v. Ramos (Motion to correct illegal sentence; subject matter jurisdiction; "The self-represented defendant, Jose E. Ramos, appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying his motion to correct an illegal sentence. In 2016, following a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a. Thereafter, the court, A. Hadden, J., imposed a sentence of sixty years of incarceration. In his motion to correct, filed on September 5, 2018, the defendant asked the court to reverse or vacate the judgment of conviction on the ground that the court lacked jurisdiction over him because he "is not the defendant named in the charging instrument." The defendant also presented the court with a memorandum of law that, in his view, supported his claim. The court, Strackbein, J., heard argument on the motion on October 12, 2018. In its October 16, 2018 memorandum of decision, the court, noting that the defendant's arguments in support of the motion generally were incomprehensible, nonetheless accurately distilled his arguments to be his assertion that he is a "sovereign citizen," and, therefore, his conviction was illegal because he was not subject to the jurisdiction of the court. The court reasoned that the arguments raised by the defendant in the motion to correct did not challenge the legality of the sentence imposed, assert a violation of his double jeopardy rights, or implicate any of the established criteria on which it could afford him any relief with respect to the sentence imposed. The court denied the motion to correct, and this appeal followed.

On the basis of our review of the record and the arguments advanced by the defendant before this court, we conclude that the trial court correctly determined that the defendant's motion to correct was not the proper procedural vehicle to raise the claim set forth therein because, properly construed, it attacks the validity of the defendant's underlying conviction. We conclude, however, that the court should have dismissed, rather than denied, the motion. As we previously have determined, a trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and, therefore, should dismiss claims raised in a motion to correct that do not challenge the legality of the sentence imposed or disposition made during a sentencing proceeding. See, e.g., State v. Brown, 192 Conn. App. 147, 155, ___ A.3d ___ (2019); State v. Walker, 187 Conn. App. 776, 794–95, 204 A.3d 38, cert. denied, 331 Conn. 914, 204 A.3d 703 (2019); State v. Gemmell, 155 Conn. App. 789, 791, 110 A.3d 1234, cert. denied, 316 Conn. 913, 111 A.3d 886 (2015); State v. Smith, 150 Conn. App. 623, 636–37, 92 A.3d 975, cert. denied, 314 Conn. 904, 99 A.3d 1169 (2014).

The form of the judgment is improper, the judgment denying the defendant's motion to correct an illegal sentence is reversed and the case is remanded with direction to render judgment dismissing the motion for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.")

• Posted in:
• Criminal Law & Procedure,
• Recent Opinions

AC42215 - Sempey v. Stamford Hospital ("The plaintiff, Merinda J. Sempey, a former employee of the defendant, Stamford Hospital, appeals from the judgment of the trial court, rendered following the court's decision striking all four counts of the plaintiff's operative complaint. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court committed error because she sufficiently had pleaded causes of action for wrongful discharge, defamation, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and a violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), General Statutes § 42-110a et seq.We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

• Posted in:
• Employment Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC38614 - T & M Building Co. v. Hastings ("The plaintiff, T & M Building Co., Inc., appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the defendant, William Hastings. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court erred in (1) determining that the agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant violated the statute of frauds, (2) rendering judgment for the defendant on the plaintiff's unjust enrichment claim, and (3) rendering judgment for the defendant on the plaintiff's promissory estoppel claim. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

• Posted in:
• Contract Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC41439 - Asselin & Vieceli Partnership, LLC v. Washburn ("The defendant, Steven T. Washburn, appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying his demand for a trial de novo following an arbitration award in favor of the plaintiff, Asselin & Vieceli Partnership, LLC. The trial court also confirmed the arbitration award upon an application filed by the plaintiff. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly confirmed the arbitration award because the arbitrator had failed to take an oath required by General Statutes § 52-414 (d), the plaintiff failed to file certain required documents required by General Statutes § 52-421 (a) and the arbitrator exceeded her powers or imperfectly executed them in violation of General Statutes § 52-418 (a) (4).We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment granting the plaintiff's application to confirm the arbitration award.")

• Posted in:
• Business Law,
• Contract Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC41606 - Dubinsky v. Riccio ("In 2016, the plaintiff, David Dubinsky, brought a civil action against the defendant attorney, Joyce Riccio, in which he set forth claims sounding in legal malpractice and breach of contract. The plaintiff appeals from the summary judgment rendered in favor of the defendant with respect to the legal malpractice count of his complaint. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

• Appendix.

• Posted in:
• Legal Malpractice & Attorney Discipline Law,
• Recent Opinions

SC20150 - Cenatiempo v. Bank of America, N.A. ("This appeal requires us to determine whether allegations that a residential loan servicer engaged in systematic misrepresentations, delays and evasiveness over several years of postdefault loan modification negotiations with the mortgagors can suffice to state a claim for a violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), General Statutes § 42-110a et seq., and a claim for negligence. The plaintiffs, mortgagors Sandra Cenatiempo and Carmine Cenatiempo, appeal from the judgment of the trial court, which granted the motion of the defendant loan servicer, Bank of America, N.A., to strike the plaintiffs' complaint. The plaintiffs' principal contention is that their allegations were legally sufficient to support their CUTPA and negligence claims because the defendant's pattern of misconduct violated clearly defined standards and policies reflected in Connecticut, federal, and national statutory and regulatory requirements aimed at preventing foreclosure that were binding on the defendant and that this conduct caused them substantial financial and emotional injury. We agree with the plaintiffs that the alleged facts could support a claim under CUTPA. We disagree with the plaintiffs, however, that the alleged facts would support a claim of negligence. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court insofar as it struck the CUTPA claim.")

• Posted in:
• Foreclosure Law,
• Recent Opinions,
• Tort Law

SC19903 - U.S. Bank National Assn. v. Crawford ("The primary issue raised by this writ of error is whether the automatic stay provision of the federal bankruptcy code, 11 U.S.C. § 362 (a) (1), precludes a committee for sale from recovering fees and expenses from a plaintiff in a foreclosure action that has been stayed because the defendant has filed for bankruptcy. The plaintiff, the U.S. Bank National Association, brought the underlying foreclosure action against the defendant Jacquelyn N. Crawford. The trial court ultimately ordered a foreclosure by sale and appointed the plaintiff in error, Douglas M. Evans, as the committee for sale. Before the sale could be completed, however, Crawford declared bankruptcy, and the foreclosure action was stayed pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362 (a) (1). Thereafter, the plaintiff in error filed a motion pursuant to General Statutes § 49-25, seeking to recover, from the bank, the fees and expenses that he had incurred in preparing for the sale. Relying on an Appellate Court decision; see Equity One, Inc. v. Shivers, 150 Conn. App. 745, 755, 93 A.3d 1167 (2014) (when defendant in foreclosure action has declared bankruptcy, automatic stay provision applies to motions for fees and expenses by committee for sale against nondebtor plaintiff); the trial court concluded that the plaintiff in error's motion for fees and expenses was stayed and issued an order denying the motion on that ground. This writ of error was then filed pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199 (b) (10) and Practice Book § 72-1. Specifically, the plaintiff in error contends that this court should overrule Shivers because the Appellate Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to extend the automatic stay provision to motions to recover fees and expenses from nondebtor plaintiffs in foreclosure actions. In the alternative, the plaintiff in error contends that we should overrule Shivers on the merits because it is in conflict with the decisions of federal bankruptcy courts addressing this issue. We conclude that state courts lack jurisdiction to extend the automatic stay provision to proceedings against nondebtors and that Shivers must be overruled on that ground. Accordingly, we grant the writ of error and remand the case to the trial court with direction to vacate the order denying the plaintiff in error's motion for fees and expenses and to entertain the motion.")

• SC19903 Dissent - U.S. Bank National Assn. v. Crawford

• Posted in:
• Foreclosure Law,
• Recent Opinions

The Connecticut Law Journal, Volume LXXXI, No. 21, for November 19, 2019 is now available.

Contained in the issue is the following:

• Table of Contents
• Volume 333: Connecticut Reports (Pages 712 - 730)
• Volume 333: Orders (Pages 937 - 942)
• Volume 333: Cumulative Table of Cases Connecticut Reports
• Volume 194: Connecticut Appellate Reports (Pages 351 - 472)
• Volume 194: Cumulative Table of Cases Connecticut Appellate Reports
• Miscellaneous Notices

• Posted in:
• Connecticut Law Journal,
• Recent Opinions

SC20215 - Sobel v. Commissioner of Revenue Services (Income tax; administrative appeal; "This appeal arises from a dispute as to whether the income of a general partner who lives in Connecticut and manages intangible property owned by limited partnerships operating in New York constitutes income derived from trading intangible property for the general partner's own account, in which case it would be taxable in this state or, instead, constitutes income from a trade or business, in which case it would be taxable in New York. The plaintiff, Jonathan A. Sobel, who resided in Connecticut and worked in New York, was a member of a limited liability company that was the managing partner of two limited partnerships that operated as hedge funds. The plaintiff reported his income derived from the two partnerships on his Connecticut tax returns in 1997 and 1998, and sought a credit pursuant to General Statutes § 12-704 (a) (1) for income taxes that he had paid on the income as a nonresident in New York. The defendant, the Commissioner of Revenue Services (commissioner), disallowed the credit after conducting an audit. Specifically, the commissioner concluded that the plaintiff was not entitled to a credit because (1) the plaintiff's income must be treated as if it derived from trading intangible property for his own account because the limited partnerships were trading their own intangible property and the character of the partnerships' income passed through to the income of their general partner; see General Statutes §§ 12-712 (c) (1) and 12-715 (b); (2) Connecticut does not tax the income of nonresidents from trading intangible property for their own accounts; see General Statutes § 12-711 (f); and (3) residents of this state are not entitled to a credit for income taxes paid in other states unless Connecticut would tax nonresident income of the same character. See General Statutes § 12-704 (a) (1). The plaintiff then filed a protest against the proposed income tax assessment. The commissioner denied the protest in relevant part. The plaintiff appealed from that denial to the trial court, which, after conducting a trial de novo, concluded on two independent grounds that the plaintiff was not trading intangible property for his own account but was engaged in the trade or business of trading intangible property owned by the limited partnerships. Accordingly, the court concluded that the plaintiff was entitled to a credit for the income tax that he paid in New York. The commissioner then filed this appeal, in which he challenged only one of the two independent bases for the trial court's decision. After oral argument, this court, sua sponte, ordered the parties to submit supplemental briefs on the issue of whether the appeal was moot as a consequence of the commissioner's failure to challenge both grounds for the trial court's decision. See, e.g., State v. Lester, 324 Conn. 519, 526–27, 153 A.3d 647 (2017) ("[w]here an appellant fails to challenge all bases for a trial court's adverse ruling on his claim, even if this court were to agree with the appellant on the issues that he does raise, we still would not be able to provide [him] any relief in light of the binding adverse finding[s] [not raised] with respect to those claims," and, therefore, appeal is moot [internal quotation marks omitted]). The commissioner contended in his supplemental brief that the appeal is not moot because there was only one basis for the trial court's ruling that the plaintiff was engaged in a trade or business, which he had challenged on appeal. The plaintiff contended in his supplemental brief that the appeal is moot. We agree with the plaintiff that the appeal is moot because the commissioner failed to challenge an independent basis for the trial court's ruling and that the appeal must therefore be dismissed.")

• Posted in:
• Administrative Appeal Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC41599 - Telman v. Hoyt ("The plaintiff, Kathleen Telman, appeals from the trial court's judgment denying her motion to set aside the verdict as to damages and for additur. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court abused its discretion in denying her motion to 'set aside [the] verdict' as to damages and for additur because the court's award of attorney's fees to the plaintiff was so low that it shocks the conscience. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiff's motion for additur as to attorney's fees and, therefore, affirm the judgment.")

• Posted in:
• Property Law,
• Recent Opinions,
• Tort Law