The mission of the Connecticut Judicial Branch is to serve the interests of justice and the public by resolving matters brought before it in a fair, timely, efficient and open manner.
Recent Opinions

Connecticut Law Journal - May 21, 2024

   by Agati, Taryn

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5871

The Connecticut Law Journal, Volume LXXXV, No. 47, for May 21, 2024 is now available.

Contained in the issue is the following:

  • Table of Contents
  • Volume 349: Connecticut Reports (Pages 67 - 119)
  • Volume 349: Orders (Pages 906 - 909)
  • Volume 349: Cumulative Table of Cases Connecticut Reports
  • Volume 225: Connecticut Appellate Reports (Pages 477 - 552)
  • Volume 225: Memorandum Decisions (Pages 901 - 901)
  • Volume 225: Cumulative Table of Cases Connecticut Appellate Reports


Election Law Supreme Court Opinion

   by Zigadto, Janet

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5870

SC20726 - Markley v. State Elections Enforcement Commission ("This appeal presents an issue of first impression under the first amendment to the United States constitution, namely, the extent to which the statutes and regulations governing the public funding of state elections in connection with the Citizens' Election Program (program), General Statutes § 9-700 et seq., may be applied to preclude publicly funded candidates from using their candidate committee funds to pay for campaign advertisements that, as a rhetorical device, invoke the name of a candidate in a different race to refer more broadly to the policies or political party associated with that candidate. The defendant, the State Elections Enforcement Commission (commission), imposed fines on the plaintiffs, Joe Markley and Rob Sampson, who were publicly funded candidates for state legislative office during the 2014 general election cycle, on the ground that they had violated the statutes and regulations governing the program when they utilized their candidate committee funds to pay for communications that criticized then Governor Dannel Malloy, who was seeking reelection to that office in that same election cycle, in the course of promoting their opposition to his policies. The plaintiffs now appeal from the judgment of the trial court upholding the decision of the commission, claiming that the commission's enforcement of the state election laws in that manner violated their first amendment rights. Although a compelling governmental interest is served by a condition that precludes publicly funded candidates from using program funds to support or oppose candidates in other races, we conclude that the commission violated the plaintiffs' first amendment rights with respect to the five advertisements at issue in this case because they could reasonably be understood to be something other than an appeal to vote against Governor Malloy. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.")


Foreclosure Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Zigadto, Janet

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5867

AC46406 - No. 2 Fraser Place Condominium Assn., Inc. v. Mathis ("More than ten years ago, the plaintiff, No. 2 Fraser Place Condominium Association, Inc., a unit owners' association of a common interest community, brought the underlying action to foreclose a statutory lien for unpaid monthly common expense assessments and late charges in accordance with General Statutes § 47-258 regarding a condominium unit (unit) owned by the defendant Sharon Mathis and occupied by her daughter, the defendant Shalonda Mathis. The court rendered a judgment of strict foreclosure on September 23, 2013, and set law days to commence on November 18, 2013. The law days passed without redemption but, to date, the plaintiff has not taken possession of the unit.

The defendants now appeal from the judgment of the court denying an application for a writ of audita querela (application) filed by Sharon Mathis, in which she argues that the latest in a series of ejectment orders obtained by the plaintiff should be enjoined on the ground that, prior to the passing of the law days in 2013, she purportedly had reached an agreement with the plaintiff to pay off the judgment amount, performed in accordance with that agreement, and, thus, effectively redeemed her ownership interest such that title to her unit never passed to the plaintiff by operation of law following the passage of the law days. The defendants claim that the court improperly (1) concluded that the evidence presented in support of the application did not support a finding that the parties had reached and performed on any agreement to satisfy the debt and redeem the property, (2) failed to conclude that the granting of the application was necessary to avoid an inequitable windfall to the plaintiff, and (3) declined to admit into evidence certain exhibits offered by the defendants' counsel at the hearing on the application. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.")


Tort Law Appellate Court Opinions

   by Agati, Taryn

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5869

AC46231 - Cockerham v. Westphalen ("The defendant Jennifer Westphalen appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered against her and in favor of the plaintiff, Kenneth Cockerham, on counts nine, ten, and eleven of the plaintiff's complaint, asserting claims of fraudulent transfer against the defendant and her husband, Adam Westphalen (Westphalen), pursuant to the Connecticut Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (CUFTA), General Statutes § 52-552a et seq. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court erred in finding that Westphalen fraudulently transferred money to the defendant under the common law and pursuant to General Statutes § 52-552e.Specifically, the defendant argues that the court erred in finding that Westphalen possessed actual fraudulent intent, that the defendant shared in that intent, and that the transfers were made without consideration, leaving Westphalen unable to meet his financial obligations. We disagree with the arguments advanced by the defendant and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

AC46193 - Tran v. Woodworth ("The plaintiff, Cuong Kim Tran, appeals from the summary judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of the defendants, Mark Allen Woodworth and Jennifer Woodworth Sulc, coadministrators of the estate of the decedent, Nancy S. Woodworth. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment and determined that the defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law as to the plaintiff's complaint alleging negligence because (1) the documents on which the defendants relied in support of their motion did not demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue of material fact as to the allegations of negligence in the complaint and (2) the plaintiff submitted countervailing evidence demonstrating the existence of a genuine issue of material fact that precluded summary judgment. We agree with the plaintiff and, therefore, reverse the summary judgment rendered in favor of the defendants and remand the case for further proceedings.")


Habeas Appellate Court Opinion

   by Agati, Taryn

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5868

AC43186 - Holley v. Commissioner of Correction ("The petitioner, Ronnie Holley, appeals from the denial of his petition for certification to appeal from the judgment of the habeas court dismissing his petition for a writ of habeas corpus as untimely under General Statutes § 52-470 (d) and (e). On appeal, the petitioner claims that the habeas court improperly rejected his claim that his petition was timely under § 52-470 (d) because it was filed within two years of the final judgment on his prior federal habeas petition or, alternatively, that he had established good cause, under § 52-470 (e), to overcome the presumption of unreasonable delay for the filing of his untimely habeas petition in that he was unaware of the statutory time limit. We disagree and, accordingly, dismiss the appeal.")


Connecticut Law Journal - May 14, 2024

   by Agati, Taryn

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5865

The Connecticut Law Journal, Volume LXXXV, No. 46, for May 14, 2024 is now available.

Contained in the issue is the following:

  • Table of Contents
  • Volume 225: Connecticut Appellate Reports (Pages 354 - 476)
  • Volume 225: Cumulative Table of Cases Connecticut Appellate Reports
  • Miscellaneous Notices
  • Connecticut Practice Book Amendments
  • Notices of Connecticut State Agencies


Foreclosure Law Appellate Court Opinions

   by Zigadto, Janet

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5862

AC46046 - Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Speer ("Following the unconditional withdrawal of this foreclosure action by the plaintiff, Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as trustee for HSI Asset Securitization Corporation Trust 2006-OPT4, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-OPT4, the defendant Sheri A. Speer appeals from the trial court's decisions sustaining the plaintiff's objections to the defendant's two prior requests for leave to amend her answer to assert a counterclaim. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court abused its discretion in sustaining the plaintiff's objections because her proposed amendments were timely and would not have prejudiced the plaintiff. We disagree with the defendant's claims of error and, accordingly, affirm the trial court's decisions sustaining the plaintiff's objections to the requests for leave to amend.")

AC46506 - Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Bretoux ("In this foreclosure action, the defendant Lindsey S. Bretoux appeals from the trial court's judgment of foreclosure by sale in favor of the plaintiff, Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as indenture trustee for New Century Home Equity Loan Trust 2005-2. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly (1) rendered summary judgment as to liability in favor of the plaintiff because the defendant failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to his special defense of unclean hands and (2) failed to consider the defendant's estoppel defense when determining the amount of debt. We are not persuaded by the defendant's first claim, but we agree with his second claim. Accordingly, we reverse in part the judgment of the trial court.")


Tort Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Agati, Taryn

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5864

AC45745 - Marafi v. El Achchabi ("The defendant Hind El Achchabi appeals from the summary judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of the plaintiff, Sadiq Marafi. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court (1) improperly determined that no genuine issue of material fact existed with respect to the plaintiff's actions for fraudulent misrepresentation, statutory theft, and unjust enrichment, and (2) committed plain error in granting the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment because those actions were predicated on adultery in contravention of General Statutes § 52-572f.We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")


Habeas Appellate Court Opinion

   by Agati, Taryn

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5863

AC41747 - Coney v. Commissioner of Correction ("This appeal returns to this court on remand from our Supreme Court with direction to further consider the claim raised by the petitioner, Paul Coney, that the habeas court erred in dismissing his petition for a writ of habeas corpus as untimely pursuant to General Statutes § 52-470 (d) and (e) because he failed to demonstrate good cause to overcome the statutory presumption of an unreasonable delay. See Coney v. Commissioner of Correction, 348 Conn. 946, 308 A.3d 35 (2024). We reverse the judgment of the habeas court and remand the matter for a new hearing and good cause determination.")


Juvenile Law Appellate Court Slip Opinion

   by Greenlee, Rebecca

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5861

AC 46612 - In re Denzel W. et al. ("The respondent mother, Stephanie B., appeals from the judgments of the trial court, rendered in favor of the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and Families, terminating her parental rights with respect to her minor children, Denzel W. and Ariel W. On appeal, the respondent claims that the court improperly (1) shifted the burden of proof on the issue of personal rehabilitation to her and (2) determined that she failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that, within a reasonable period of time and considering the ages and needs of the children, she could assume a responsible position in the children’s lives. See General Statutes § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B). We affirm the judgments of the trial court.")


Connecticut Law Journal - May 7, 2024

   by Agati, Taryn

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5859

The Connecticut Law Journal, Volume LXXXV, No. 45, for May 7, 2024 is now available.

Contained in the issue is the following:

  • Table of Contents
  • Volume 349: Connecticut Reports (Pages 35 - 66)
  • Volume 349: Orders (Pages 905 - 905)
  • Volume 349: Cumulative Table of Cases Connecticut Reports
  • Volume 225: Connecticut Appellate Reports (Pages 194 - 354)
  • Volume 225: Cumulative Table of Cases Connecticut Appellate Reports
  • Miscellaneous Notices
  • Connecticut Practice Book Amendments


Probate Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Agati, Taryn

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5858

AC46257 - Buzzard v. Fass ("The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the defendants, Laura Fass and Pamela Baker Weiss, the adopted great grandnieces of Joseph Merrow, the testator, are included within the terms "issue" and "descendants" used in a testamentary trust executed by the testator in 1946.The plaintiff, Joan Buzzard, claims that the only persons permitted to receive distributions under the subject trust are the originally named beneficiaries and their lineal blood descendants, not the adopted defendants. The plaintiff claims that the Superior Court improperly granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment and denied her motion for summary judgment because it erroneously concluded that General Statutes § 45a-731 (4), which provides that the terms "issue" and "descendants" when used in a will or trust shall include legally adopted persons, applied to the trust at issue in this case. She claims that the definitions set forth in § 45a-731 (4) do not apply to the subject trust because the exceptions to their application that are set forth in § 45a-731 (11) (A) and (B) apply in this case. For the reasons that follow, we disagree with the plaintiff and affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.")


Habeas Appellate Court Opinions

   by Agati, Taryn

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5857

AC43187 - Banks v. Commissioner of Correction ("This appeal returns to us on remand from our Supreme Court. See Banks v. Commissioner of Correction, 347 Conn. 335, 361, 297 A.3d 541 (2023).The petitioner, Harold T. Banks, Jr., appealed to this court following the denial of his petition for certification to appeal from the judgment of the habeas court dismissing his petition for a writ of habeas corpus as untimely pursuant to General Statutes § 52-470 (c) and (e). Banks v. Commissioner of Correction, 205 Conn. App. 337, 338, 256 A.3d 726 (2021), rev'd, 347 Conn. 335, 297 A.3d 541 (2023). On appeal, the petitioner asserted unpreserved claims that were not included in his petition for certification to appeal, contending that his unpreserved claims were reviewable for plain error and pursuant to State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239–40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989), as modified by In re Yasiel R., 317 Conn. 773, 781, 120 A.3d 1188 (2015).Banks v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 205 Conn. App. 342.This court dismissed the petitioner's appeal, holding that the certification requirement in § 52-470 (g) bars appellate review of unpreserved and uncertified claims whether for plain error or pursuant to Golding. Id., 343–45.

After granting the petitioner's petition for certification to appeal, our Supreme Court reversed the judgment of this court, holding that "§ 52-470 (g) does not restrict [a reviewing court's] authority to review unpreserved claims under the plain error doctrine or Golding following a habeas court's denial of a petition for certification to appeal, so long as the appellants' claims challenge the habeas court's handling of the habeas proceeding itself and the appellant fulfills his or her burden of establishing that the unpreserved claims" are nonfrivolous under Simms v. Warden, 230 Conn. 608, 616, 646 A.2d 126 (1994).Banks v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 347 Conn. 350.Accordingly, our Supreme Court remanded the case to this court with direction to consider "whether the petitioner fulfilled his burden of establishing that his Golding and plain error claims challenging the habeas court's handling of the habeas proceeding itself were nonfrivolous under the [Simms] criteria." Id., 360–61.Because we conclude that he has not fulfilled his burden, we dismiss the appeal.")

AC43188 - Bosque v. Commissioner of Correction ("This appeal returns to us on remand from our Supreme Court. See Bosque v. Commissioner of Correction, 347 Conn. 377, 297 A.3d 981 (2023). The petitioner, Benjamin Bosque, appealed following the denial of his petition for certification to appeal from the judgment of the habeas court dismissing his petition for a writ of habeas corpus as untimely pursuant to General Statutes § 52-470 (c) and (e).Bosque v. Commissioner of Correction, 205 Conn. App. 480, 481, 257 A.3d 972 (2021), rev'd, 347 Conn. 377, 297 A.3d 981 (2023).On appeal, the petitioner claimed that "the habeas court abused its discretion in denying his petition for certification to appeal because (1) it should have been obvious to the court that his habeas counsel had provided constitutionally ineffective assistance and (2) he was denied his constitutional right to counsel because the court had failed to intervene when his counsel did not present any evidence in support of his claim that good cause existed to rebut the presumption of unreasonable delay in the filing of his petition."Id., 481–82.Although the petitioner conceded that he neither preserved his claims before the habeas court nor included them in his petition for certification to appeal, he contended that his unpreserved and uncertified claims were reviewable under the plain error doctrine or pursuant to State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239–40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989), as modified by In re Yasiel R., 317 Conn. 773, 781, 120 A.3d 1188 (2015).Bosque v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 205 Conn. App. 486. This court dismissed the appeal, holding that the certification requirement in § 52-470 (g) bars appellate review of unpreserved claims not raised in the petition for certification, whether for plain error or pursuant to Golding. Id., 487–89.We concluded "that, if the petitioner desired appellate review of his claims of ineffective assistance of habeas counsel and/or whether the habeas court had a duty to address counsel's deficient performance to prevent prejudice to the petitioner, he was required to include those issues as grounds for appeal in his petition for certification to appeal." Id., 489.

...

Accordingly, in the present case, because this court dismissed the petitioner's appeal "without first considering whether his unpreserved claims are nonfrivolous under the Simms criteria," our Supreme Court remanded the case to this court to consider "that issue consistent with the principles set forth in Banks." Id. For the reasons stated in the companion case also released today; see Banks v. Commissioner of Correction, 225 Conn. App. ___, ___ A.3d ___ (2024); we conclude that the petitioner's unpreserved claims are frivolous under the Simms criteria and, therefore, dismiss the appeal.")

AC46237 - Davis v. Commissioner of Correction ("The petitioner, Paul Davis, appeals following the granting of his petition for certification to appeal from the judgment of the habeas court denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, in which he alleged a due process violation and ineffective assistance of his trial and appellate counsel. On appeal, the petitioner claims that the habeas court violated his constitutional right to due process and abused its discretion when it denied his motion for a continuance to afford him additional time to secure the testimony of a witness. We affirm the judgment of the habeas court.")

AC46270 - Hilton v. Commissioner of Correction ("The petitioner, James Hilton, appeals from the judgment of the habeas court denying his second petition for a writ of habeas corpus. On appeal, the petitioner claims that the habeas court (1) improperly rejected his claim that his right to the effective assistance of counsel was violated when his first habeas counsel, Attorney David B. Rozwaski, failed to present the expert testimony of a forensic pathologist in support of his claim that the petitioner's criminal trial counsel, Attorney Al Ghiroli, had provided ineffective assistance of counsel and (2) abused its discretion in denying his petition for certification to appeal as to his claim that the habeas court applied the wrong legal standard in assessing witness credibility. We affirm the judgment of the habeas court as it relates to the petitioner's first claim. We dismiss the appeal as to the petitioner's second claim.")

AC46580 - Hodge v. Commissioner of Correction ("This case returns to us following the remand ordered in Hodge v. Commissioner of Correction, 216 Conn. App. 616, 624, 285 A.3d 1194 (2022).The petitioner, Marcus Hodge, appeals, following the grant of his petition for certification to appeal, from the judgment of the habeas court dismissing, on its own motion, his amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus dated November 15, 2017 (first amended petition).On appeal, the petitioner claims that the court erred in rejecting the filing of his six count amended petition dated February 21, 2023 (second amended petition).Because there is no practical relief that we can afford the petitioner, who has fully served his underlying sentence, we dismiss the appeal as moot.")

AC43327 - Michael G. v. Commissioner of Correction ("The petitioner, Michael G., appeals following the denial of his petition for certification to appeal from the judgment of the habeas court dismissing his petition for a writ of habeas corpus as untimely pursuant to General Statutes § 52-470 (d) and (e). The respondent, the Commissioner of Correction, filed a request for an order to show cause why the petitioner's habeas petition should not be dismissed as untimely pursuant to § 52-470 (d) and (e). On appeal, the petitioner claims, inter alia, that the court erred in concluding that he failed to establish good cause for his late-filed petition. In particular, the petitioner argues that his prior habeas counsel's failure to advise him of the statutory deadline for filing a new petition prior to the withdrawal of his previously pending petition constituted ineffective assistance of counsel, which constituted good cause for the delay in filing. In accordance with our Supreme Court's recent decision in Rose v. Commissioner of Correction, 348 Conn. 333, 304 A.3d 431 (2023), and our recent decision in Hankerson v. Commissioner of Correction, 223 Conn. App. 562, 308 A.3d 1113 (2024), we conclude that the judgment of the habeas court must be reversed, and we remand the case for a new hearing and good cause determination under § 52-470 (d) and (e).

The judgment of the habeas court is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.")

AC46226 - Reed v. Commissioner of Correction ("The self-represented petitioner, Doraine Reed, appeals from the judgment of the habeas court denying her amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus.Her appeal concerns an administrative directive amended by the respondent, the Commissioner of Correction, in 2016, which changed the calculation of credit that inmates may earn under the risk reduction earned credit program established by General Statutes § 18-98e. See Conn. Dept. of Correction, Administrative Directive 4.2A (effective February 1, 2016). On appeal, the petitioner contends that the application of that administrative directive to her violates the ex post facto clause of the United States constitution.

Resolution of the petitioner's claim is controlled by Rios v. Commissioner of Correction, 224 Conn. App. 350, ___ A.3d ___ (2024).In Rios, this court concluded that, because Administrative Directive 4.2A, as amended, did not constitute a law within the meaning of the ex post facto clause, the petitioner could not establish an ex post facto violation.Id., 353, 375.Bound by that precedent; see State v. White, 215 Conn. App. 273, 304–305, 283 A.3d 542 (2022), cert. denied, 346 Conn. 918, 291 A.3d 108 (2023); the petitioner's ex post facto challenge must fail.

The judgment is affirmed.")


Juvenile Law Appellate Court Slip Opinion

   by Greenlee, Rebecca

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5856

AC 46641 - In re Wendy G.-R. ("The respondent mother, Mirian R., appeals from the judgment of the trial court terminating her parental rights as to her biological daughter, Wendy G.-R., pursuant to General Statutes § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) (i). The respondent claims that (1) she was denied her due process right to the effective assistance of counsel, (2) the court improperly determined that the Department of Children and Families (department) made reasonable efforts to reunify her with Wendy, and (3) the court improperly determined that she was unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification services. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")


Administrative Appeal Supreme Court Opinion

   by Dowd, Jeffrey

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5855

SC20769 - Northland Investment Corp. v. Public Utilities Regulatory Authority (Administrative appeal; Declaratory ruling; "This case resolves the question of whether a landlord of a multiunit residential building may recoup from its tenants the costs for utility services that it is liable to pay to a utility provider when the building does not have individual meters for each unit but, rather, has only a master meter. The plaintiff, Northland Investment Corporation, manages and owns multiunit residential buildings throughout the United States, including Connecticut. In its buildings that have only a master meter for the entire building, the plaintiff employs, or seeks to employ, a recoupment method it refers to as "ratio utility billing" (RUB). Under the RUB method, as developed by the plaintiff, it pays the utility company directly for the building's entire utility bill and then recoups the cost from the tenants in the form of a variable utility payment each month. Under this form of billing, the plaintiff bills each tenant directly for what the plaintiff contends is the tenant's "proportionate share" of utilities based on factors it has chosen (which it can modify in its sole discretion), such as a unit's square footage, number of occupants, number of bedrooms and bathrooms, or a combination of these. This method of utility billing is included in a provision of the plaintiff's lease agreements.

The plaintiff sought a declaratory ruling from the defendant, the Public Utilities Regulatory Authority (PURA), that it may use RUB in recouping its costs for utility services from tenants. PURA concluded that the plaintiff was not authorized to do so. In the administrative appeal that followed, the trial court upheld PURA's decision. Both of the parties rely on General Statutes § 16-262e (c) in support of their respective arguments. Section 16-262e (c) governs the liability for payment of utility services provided to residential dwellings. The plaintiff argues that the plain meaning of § 16-262e (c) does not expressly prohibit the use of RUB. Because RUB is not expressly prohibited by law, the plaintiff argues, the method qualifies as a payment of "rent" under General Statutes (Supp. 2024) § 47a-1 (h). PURA disagrees and instead argues that RUB violates the plain meaning of § 16-262e (c) because the provision allows a tenant to be liable for utility costs only if the tenant's unit is individually metered and he or she has exclusively used the utilities so provided. We agree with PURA and conclude that § 16-262e (c) precludes a landlord's use of RUB to recoup utility service charges from tenants.")

  • SC20769 Dissent - Northland Investment Corp. v. Public Utilities Regulatory Authority


Connecticut Law Journal - April 30, 2024

   by Agati, Taryn

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5853

The Connecticut Law Journal, Volume LXXXV, No. 44, for April 30, 2024 is now available.

Contained in the issue is the following:

  • Table of Contents
  • Volume 349: Connecticut Reports (Pages 9 - 108)
  • Volume 349: Orders (Pages 903 - 905)
  • Volume 349: Cumulative Table of Cases Connecticut Reports
  • Volume 225: Connecticut Appellate Reports (Pages 108 - 194)
  • Volume 225: Memorandum Decisions (Pages 901 - 901)
  • Volume 225: Cumulative Table of Cases Connecticut Appellate Reports
  • Miscellaneous Notices
  • Connecticut Practice Book Amendments
  • Notices of Connecticut State Agencies


Land Use Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Zigadto, Janet

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5850

AC46146, AC46159 - Lepkowski v. Planning Commission ("The defendants, the Planning Commission of the Town of East Lyme (commission) and Real Estate Service of Conn., Inc. (RESC), each appeal from the judgment of the Superior Court sustaining in part the appeal brought by the plaintiff, Brian Lepkowski, from the commission's decision approving a resubdivision application filed by RESC. The dispositive claim asserted by the defendants is that the court incorrectly determined that § 4-14-3 of the East Lyme Subdivision Regulations (subdivision regulations) required the completion of an Environmental Review Team (ERT) evaluation in connection with RESC's application and that, consequently, the court improperly concluded that the commission illegally waived § 4-14-3 in granting RESC's application without an ERT evaluation having been performed. We agree with the defendants and, accordingly, reverse in part the judgment of the Superior Court.")


Habeas Appellate Court Opinion

   by Agati, Taryn

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5852

AC46059 - Kukucka v. Commissioner of Correction ("The petitioner, Dale Kukucka, appeals from the judgment of the habeas court denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. On appeal, the petitioner claims that the court improperly denied his freestanding due process claim on the basis of procedural default. Specifically, he argues that the court erroneously concluded that the only way he could overcome procedural default was by showing ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, and, in so concluding, it improperly rejected his claim that he satisfied the cause and prejudice test set forth in Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 13–15, 104 S. Ct. 2901, 82 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1984).We affirm the judgment of the habeas court.")


Tort Law Appellate Court Opinions

   by Agati, Taryn

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5851

AC45775 - C. W. v. Warzecha ("The defendant, Keith J. Warzecha, appeals from the judgment of the trial court in favor of the plaintiff, C. W., on her claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) the trial court abused its discretion by asking him questions during the trial, sua sponte, that went beyond the scope of what was permissible, (2) the evidence presented at trial did not support a finding of negligent infliction of emotional distress, and (3) 'this court [should] grant [his] motion to dismiss when the trial court did not act on it.' We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

AC46339 - Harvin v. Yale New Haven Health Services Corp. ("In this civil action, the plaintiff, Marcus T. Harvin, a former inmate, asserts claims of, inter alia, negligence per se and negligent infliction of emotional distress against the defendant Lawrence + Memorial Hospital on the basis of its allegedly unlawful disclosure of his confidential health information during his criminal prosecution. The plaintiff alleges that the defendant unlawfully disclosed his confidential health information in two ways. First, he alleges that the defendant unlawfully provided certain unspecified confidential health records, including a psychiatric evaluation, to members of the Office of the Chief State's Attorney. Second, he alleges that two of the defendant's agents disclosed confidential health information during their testimony at his criminal trial. The defendant appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying its motion to dismiss the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the theory that the defendant is entitled to absolute immunity from suit under the litigation privilege because any and all disclosures of the plaintiff's confidential health information, whether by itself or its agents, occurred in the course of the criminal litigation and in response to a valid subpoena and court order. The defendant specifically claims that the court improperly determined that it lacked a sufficient evidentiary basis on which to determine if the litigation privilege applied under the circumstances of this case.

At oral argument before this court, the plaintiff's attorney conceded, and we agree, that the litigation privilege does bar those portions of the underlying action premised on the testimony provided by the defendant's agents at the plaintiff's criminal trial. We disagree, however, that the defendant demonstrated on this record that it is entitled to litigation privilege with respect to the allegations of unlawful disclosure of confidential health information to members of the Office of the Chief State's Attorney. Accordingly, for the reasons that follow, we reverse in part and affirm in part the judgment of the trial court and remand the case with direction to grant the motion to dismiss to the extent that the remaining counts are premised on the testimony given by the defendant's agents at the plaintiff's criminal trial.")

AC46348 - Rubin v. Brodie ("The issues before this court are whether an application to confirm an arbitration award filed in a pending civil action survives the dismissal of the civil action and, if so, whether an appeal from the judgment dismissing the civil action operates to automatically stay proceedings on the application to confirm the arbitration award. We reject the argument that the application to confirm did not survive the dismissal of the complaint and conclude that this appeal does not automatically stay proceedings before the Superior Court on the pending application to confirm an arbitration award filed by the named defendant, Barnett Brodie. Accordingly, we grant the motion for review filed by Brodie and other defendants and grant the relief requested in accordance with this court's February 14, 2024 order.")


Foreclosure Law Supreme Court Opinion

   by Zigadto, Janet

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5849

SC20817 - M&T Bank v. Lewis ("This foreclosure appeal presents two questions, namely, (1) whether the administrative law filed rate doctrine implicates the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction, and (2) whether allegations of impropriety in a mortgagee’s force placement of property insurance arise from the making, validity or enforcement of the mortgage for purposes of a special defense to a foreclosure action. The defendant, Robert R. Lewis, appeals from the judgment of foreclosure by sale in favor of the plaintiff, M&T Bank. The defendant claims that the trial court improperly granted the plaintiff’s motion to strike two of the defendant’s special defenses arising from the plaintiff’s conduct in its force placement of flood insurance on the property at issue, alleging that the plaintiff has unclean hands and breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing on the ground that those defenses do not arise from the making, validity or enforcement of the mortgage. The plaintiff contends to the contrary, and also argues that the regulatory approval of the premium rate for the property insurance at issue renders the defendant’s special defenses moot under the filed rate doctrine. Having concluded that the filed rate doctrine does not implicate the court’s subject matter jurisdiction, we agree with the defendant’s claims with respect to his special defenses. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.")