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Declaratory Judgment Law

Employment Law Appellate Court Opinions

   by Roy, Christopher

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=3427

AC40941 - Taing v. CAMRAC, LLC ("This appeal arises from a pregnancy discrimination action brought by the plaintiff, Mouy Taing, under the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act against the defendant, CAMRAC, LLC, after she was terminated from her employment with the defendant. On appeal, the plaintiff argues that the trial court improperly rendered summary judgment in favor of the defendant. Specifically, she claims that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defendant's proffered reason for her termination was pretextual. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

AC40377 - McKiernan v. Civil Service Commission ("The plaintiff, Edward McKiernan, appeals from the trial court's judgment, rendered after a trial to the court, denying his request for a declaratory judgment allowing him to retake the oral assessment portion of the city of Bridgeport's 2015 detective promotional examination and prohibiting the defendants from certifying the results of that examination or promoting candidates on the basis of those results. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial court erred by rendering judgment in favor of the defendants on the basis of its finding that the challenged examination was administered in accordance with the requirements of the charter of the city of Bridgeport. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")


Declaratory Judgment Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Roy, Christopher

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=3371

AC40546 - Kaminsky v. Commissioner of Emergency Services & Public Protection ("The plaintiff, Joseph W. Kaminsky, Jr., appeals from the trial court's judgment, rendered after a trial without a jury, denying his request for a declaratory judgment holding that certain firearms were improperly seized and withheld from him by the defendant, the Commissioner of Emergency Services and Public Protection, and thus that he is entitled to the return of those firearms. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial court erred in denying his request on the basis of its misinterpretation of the applicable statutory provisions. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")


Election Law Supreme Court Opinions

   by Roy, Christopher

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=3361

SC20165 - Independent Party of CT—State Central v. Merrill ("This appeal is the latest battle in the war for control over the state's Independent Party between its Danbury faction, which is led by the plaintiffs, the Independent Party of CT—State Central and its officers, Michael Duff, Donna L. LaFrance, and Roger Palanzo, and its Waterbury faction, which is led by two of the defendants, Michael Telesca and Rocco Frank, Jr. The plaintiffs appeal from the judgment of the trial court, rendered after a bench trial, for Telesca and Frank on the complaint and the counterclaim in the present action, which both sought declaratory and injunctive relief. Specifically, the trial court ordered the named defendant, Secretary of the State Denise W. Merrill, to accept candidate endorsements made pursuant to the Independent Party's 2010 bylaws (2010 bylaws), which, in effect, gave the Waterbury faction control over the Independent Party's statewide nominations. There are two principal issues among the plaintiffs' plethora of claims in the present appeal. First, we consider whether the trial court's order of supplemental briefing and oral argument concerning its subject matter jurisdiction, issued just prior to the 120 day decision deadline pursuant to General Statutes § 51-183b, and after the plaintiffs' objection to the trial court's request for an extension, preserved its personal jurisdiction over the parties by stopping and later restarting the decision period. The second principal issue is whether the trial court properly determined that General Statutes § 9-374, which requires the filing of party rules before the name of a candidate endorsed by a minor political party may be printed on an election ballot, rendered the 2010 bylaws controlling, as opposed to bylaws that the Danbury faction had filed with the Secretary in 2006 (2006 bylaws) prior to the Independent Party's receiving the 1 percent of statewide votes necessary to confer minor party status. Because we conclude that the order of supplemental briefing and argument opened the 120 day decision period and later restarted it, thus rendering the trial court's decision timely under § 51-183b, and also conclude that the trial court properly construed § 9-374, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

SC20160 - Independent Party of CT—State Central v. Merrill ("This writ of error is the companion case to Independent Party of CT—State Central v. Merrill, 330 Conn. ___, ___ A.3d ___ (2019), in which this court affirmed the judgment of the trial court resolving a long running dispute between the Danbury and Waterbury factions of the state's Independent Party by, inter alia, granting declaratory and injunctive relief directing the named defendant in the underlying action, Secretary of the State Denise W. Merrill (Secretary), to accept only those endorsements made pursuant to the party's 2010 bylaws. The plaintiffs in error, thirteen candidates for the state House of Representatives endorsed by the Danbury faction prior to the issuance of the trial court's decision in the underlying action, brought this writ of error to protect their rights with respect to the judgment of the trial court. The endorsed candidates now argue that their writ of error is moot given the unchallenged decision of the Secretary to accept the Danbury faction's endorsements with respect to twelve of them, thus allowing them to be on the Independent Party's ballot line for the 2018 election. Rebekah Harriman-Stites, a candidate endorsed by the Waterbury faction for the 106th assembly district, however, has appeared in the present proceeding as a defendant in error and contends that the writ of error is not moot in light of her request that we order the Secretary to print her name on the ballot in accordance with the trial court's decision. Because the writ of error is moot, and Harriman-Stites' separate request for relief is not properly before us, we dismiss this writ of error.")


Declaratory Judgment Supreme Court Opinion

   by Mazur, Catherine

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=3343

SC20216, SC20217, SC20218 - Feehan v. Marcone ("These expedited public interest appeals arise from an apparent mix-up at the Bunnell High School polling place in the town of Stratford (town), where it is alleged that approximately seventy-six voters who should have received ballots for the 120th assembly district election were instead given ballots for the 122nd assembly district, rendering those voters unable to vote for their assembly district's state representative. The plaintiff, Jim Feehan, who is the Republican Party's candidate for state representative in the 120th assembly district, brought this action seeking declaratory relief, a new election, and an injunction prohibiting the defendants, Secretary of the State Denise W. Merrill, Treasurer Denise L. Nappier, and Comptroller Kevin Lembo (state defendants), from declaring the intervening defendant, Phillip L. Young III, the Democratic Party's candidate, as the winner of that election. After the Chief Justice granted the parties' separate applications for permission to appeal pursuant to General Statutes § 52-265a, the plaintiff appealed from the judgment of the trial court dismissing the complaint in part as barred by the elections clause set forth in article third, § 7, of the Connecticut constitution, and the defendants appealed from the grant of the plaintiff's application for a temporary injunction. We conclude that the elections clause gives our state House of Representatives exclusive jurisdiction over this election contest, and we disagree with the plaintiff's claims that (1) General Statutes § 9-328, which governs contested elections for 'municipal office,' confers jurisdiction on the courts over this case, and (2) under the supremacy clause of the United States constitution; see U.S. Const., art. VI, cl. 2; state courts have jurisdiction over his federal constitutional claims, notwithstanding the elections clause in the Connecticut constitution. Accordingly, we also agree with the defendants' claim that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enjoin the state defendants from canvassing the votes and declaring a winner. We, therefore, affirm the judgment of the trial court insofar as it dismissed the complaint and reverse the judgment of the trial court with respect to its issuance of a temporary injunction.")


Declaratory Judgment Appellate Court Opinion

   by Mazur, Catherine

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=3278

AC38734 - Day v. Seblatnigg ("The principal issue in this case is whether a settlor of a revocable trust who is later under a voluntary conservatorship may, while under conservatorship, acting on her own behalf, convert the trust to an irrevocable trust without action by her conservator and without her conservator obtaining Probate Court approval. The defendant, First State Fiduciaries, LLC, appeals from the judgment of the Superior Court granting the motion of the plaintiff, Margaret E. Day, coconservator of the estate of Susan D. Elia, for summary judgment and declaring that the Susan D. Elia Irrevocable Trust dated September 15, 2011 (Delaware irrevocable trust) was void ab initio and unenforceable, and that all transfers of assets from Elia's conservatorship estate to the Delaware irrevocable trust or its wholly owned limited liability company, Peace at Last, LLC, were unauthorized and improper and ordering that the assets from Elia's conservatorship estate that were transferred to the Delaware irrevocable trust to Peace at Last, LLC, shall be immediately returned to Elia's conservatorship estate.

"On appeal, the defendant claims that the court erred in granting the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment in the absence of an indispensable party, Bryn Mawr Trust Company of Delaware (Bryn Mawr). We conclude that the court properly determined that Elia could not lawfully replace the Connecticut revocable trust with the Delaware irrevocable trust while under a conservatorship. We also conclude that the court properly determined that the former conservator of Elia's estate, Renee F. Seblatnigg, could not transfer the assets of the conservatorship estate to the Delaware irrevocable trust and that this transfer was void ab initio. Finally, we conclude that Bryn Mawr was not an indispensable party. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")


Tort Law Appellate Court Opinions

   by Mazur, Catherine

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=3279

AC40813 - Fiondella v. Meriden (Fraud; "The plaintiffs, Michael J. Fiondella, Jr., trustee of the Jo-An Carabetta 1983 Irrevocable Trust (trust), and The Meriden Homestead, LLC, appeal from the judgment of the trial court dismissing the counts of the complaint alleged against the defendants, Adele G. Eberhart, Harry S. Eberhart, and Vincent T. McManus, Jr. On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the court improperly (1) applied the litigation privilege in favor of the defendants to conclude that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction and (2) construed the fraud and civil conspiracy allegations against the defendants. We agree that the court improperly applied the litigation privilege to determine that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. We, therefore, reverse the judgment of the trial court.")

AC40752 - Jolen, Inc. v. Brodie & Stone, PLC (Breach of fiduciary duty; "The plaintiff, Jolen, Inc., appeals from the summary judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of the defendant, Brodie & Stone, PLC, and Brodie & Stone International, PLC, on the plaintiff's claim of breach of fiduciary duty. The plaintiff claims on appeal that, in view of the court's unchallenged determination that an agency relationship existed between the parties, its subsequent failure to conclude that such relationship was per se fiduciary in nature was incorrect as a matter of law. We agree and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the trial court.")

AC40610 - Perez v. Metropolitan District Commisssion (Wrongful death; "This case arises from the untimely death of Andres Burgos, who drowned while swimming in Lake McDonough, a recreational area that is owned and operated by the defendant, the Metropolitan District Commission. The plaintiff, Vivian Perez, administratrix of the estate of Andres Burgos, appeals from the summary judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of the defendant on the basis of governmental immunity. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial court erred in rendering summary judgment because there is a genuine issue of material fact with respect to (1) whether Burgos' death was caused by the defendant's breach of one or more of its ministerial duties, and (2) whether Burgos was an identifiable person subject to imminent harm. We are not persuaded and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.")


Declaratory Judgment Law Supreme Court Opinion

   by Roy, Christopher

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=3101

SC19923 - Mendillo v. Tinley, Renehan & Dost, LLP ("In this appeal, we consider whether the Superior Court has subject matter jurisdiction over a declaratory judgment action brought as a collateral attack on a judgment of the Appellate Court concerning the plaintiff, George E. Mendillo. The plaintiff appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing his declaratory judgment action against the defendants, the law firm of Tinley, Renehan & Dost, LLP (law firm), and the Connecticut Appellate Court. On appeal, the plaintiff, who is an attorney, claims that the trial court improperly concluded that his challenge to the Appellate Court’s interpretation of rule 4.2 of the Rules of Professional Conduct in Sowell v. DiCara, 161 Conn. App. 102, 127 A.3d 356, cert. denied, 320 Conn. 909, 128 A.3d 953 (2015), was barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. We, however, do not reach the sovereign immunity issues raised by the plaintiff because we agree with the defendants’ alternative jurisdictional argument, and conclude that the plaintiff’s collateral attack on Sowell in this declaratory judgment action is nonjusticiable under Valvo v. Freedom of Information Commission, 294 Conn. 534, 985 A.2d 1052 (2010). Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court")


Property Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Zigadto, Janet

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=3096

AC39163 - Davis v. Property Owners Assn. at Moodus Lake Shores, Inc. ("The plaintiffs . . . appeal from the judgment of the trial court in favor of the defendant Property Owners Association at Moodus Lake Shores, Inc. The plaintiffs claim on appeal that the court erred by (1) denying their motions in limine seeking to preclude the defendants' experts from testifying and (2) not finding that the plaintiffs had an easement by implication over the defendants' property. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")


Business Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Roy, Christopher

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=3019

AC39172 - Lynn v. Bosco ("This case is about the propriety of a judicial remedy binding a company that had been cited in as a party by the plaintiffs, Jack E. Lynn and Jeffrey Lynn, for notice purposes only and against whom no allegations had been pleaded. The defendant Aerospace Techniques, Inc. (company), appeals from the January 11, 2016 judgment of the trial court ordering the company to pay the owners of 141 shares of treasury stock issued to the defendants Clyde E. Warner, Robert J. Bosco, Sr. (Bosco), Anthony Parillo, Jr., and Richard B. Polivy in exchange for the return of the 141 shares to the company. The company claims that the trial court acted beyond the scope of its authority by entering an order that imposed a remedy on the company, although neither party made any allegations against or sought relief from the company in the operative complaint. We agree and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the trial court.")


Insurance Law Appellate Court Opinions

   by Roy, Christopher

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=3002

AC39738 - General Ins. Co. of America v. Okeke ("In this declaratory action, the defendants Agatha Okeke and her son, Michael Okeke, appeal from the summary judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of the plaintiff, General Insurance Company of America. The defendants claim that the court improperly concluded (1) that the plaintiff did not owe a duty to defend and indemnify them in certain judicial proceedings, and (2) that the plaintiff’s claim against Michael was not moot. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

AC39708 - Puente v. Progressive Northwestern Ins. Co. ("In this action to recover underinsured motorist benefits pursuant to an insurance policy issued by the defendant, Progressive Northwestern Insurance Company, to Wilson Roofing, LLC (Wilson Roofing), the plaintiff, Wilson Puente, appeals from the judgment of the trial court granting the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly granted the motion because a genuine issue of material fact existed regarding whether (1) he was a named ‘insured’ within the meaning of the policy issued to Wilson Roofing or (2) even if he was not the named insured, he is still entitled to recover pursuant to the policy because he was ‘occupying’ a vehicle covered by the policy when he sustained his injuries. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")


Property Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Zigadto, Janet

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=2978

AC39272 - Jepsen v. Camassar (Declaratory judgment; "The plaintiffs . . . appeal from the declaratory judgment rendered by the trial court in this dispute regarding the modification of a beach deed. In this opinion, we address the plaintiffs' claims that the court improperly (1) concluded that the modification in question was properly enacted, (2) concluded that they had not met their burden in establishing slander of title, and (3) declined to render an award of attorney's fees in their favor. We agree with the plaintiffs' first claim and, accordingly, affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the trial court.")


Administrative Appeal Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Roy, Christopher

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=2932

AC39371 - Metropolitan District v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities ("In this civil action, the plaintiff, The Metropolitan District, appeals from the judgment of the trial court granting the motion to dismiss filed by the defendant, the Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities (commission). On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to the plaintiff’s failure to exhaust its administrative remedies. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.")


Property Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Roy, Christopher

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=2926

AC39074 - Bueno v. Firgeleski ("'A covenant that is a servitude "runs with the land".' 1 Restatement (Third), Property, Servitudes § 1.3 (1), p. 23 (2000). 'When a change has taken place since the creation of a servitude that makes it impossible as a practical matter to accomplish the purpose for which the servitude was created, a court may modify the servitude to permit the purpose to be accomplished. If modification is not practicable, or would not be effective, a court may terminate the servitude.' 2 Restatement (Third), Property, Servitudes § 7.10 (1), p. 394 (2000).

This declaratory judgment action concerns the viability of a restrictive covenant (restriction) contained in a 1941 committee deed conveying 1.544 acres of a thirty acre farm in Darien that was once owned by Wilbur N. Waterbury (Waterbury land). The plaintiffs, Luz E. Bueno and Edward R. den Dooven, own 1.38 acres of the Waterbury land. The defendants, Michael Firgeleski, Allison Firgeleski, Pole M. Chan, Jessica M. Chan, Richard B. Myers, Margaret Q. Myers, Scott J. Cronin, and Eileen M. Cronin (collectively, Briar Brae defendants), and Kenneth S. Martin and Rachel P. Martin (Martins), own lots that were created from a portion of the remainder of the thirty acres of the Waterbury land and are adjacent to the plaintiffs’ property. The plaintiffs sought a judgment declaring the restriction void and unenforceable to permit the sale of a portion of their property. In its judgment, the court declared unenforceable the portion of the restriction that limits the plaintiffs’ use of their property to one dwelling house, prohibits the erection of any building within twenty-five feet of the southern boundary, and requires approval of the grantor before erecting a structure on the property.

The defendants appealed, claiming that three of the court’s factual findings are erroneous in that they are not supported by the evidence. With respect to the court’s legal conclusions, the defendants claim that the court (1) improperly looked beyond the four corners of the deeds and (2) misapplied the facts of the present case to Fidelity Title & Trust Co. v. Lomas & Nettleton Co., 125 Conn. 373, 5 A.2d 700 (1939) (restriction’s purpose frustrated) and Shippan Point Assn., Inc. v. McManus, 34 Conn. App. 209, 215, 641 A.2d 144 (same), cert. denied, 229 Conn. 923, 642 A.2d 1215 (1994). We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")


Declaratory Judgment Law Supreme Court Opinion

   by Roy, Christopher

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=1907

SC19843 - Glastonbury v. Metropolitan District Commission ("After examining the record and briefs and considering the arguments of the parties, we are persuaded that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. The issues raised by the parties in their motions for summary judgment were resolved properly in the thoughtful and comprehensive memorandum of decision filed by the trial court. Because that memorandum of decision also fully addresses the arguments raised in the present appeal, we adopt the trial court’s well reasoned decision as a statement of the facts and the applicable law on those issues. See Glastonbury v. Metropolitan District Commission, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. HHD-CV-14-6049007-S (May 12, 2016) (reprinted at 328 Conn. 326, 330, A.3d [2018]). It would serve no useful purpose for us to repeat that discussion here. See, e.g., Tzovolos v. Wiseman, 300 Conn. 247, 253–54, 12 A.3d 563 (2011).")

  • SC19843 Appendix - Glastonbury v. Metropolitan District Commission ("This case concerns an action brought pursuant to General Statutes § 52-29 by the plaintiff, the town of Glastonbury, against the defendant, the Metropolitan District Commission, on February 21, 2014. The plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment to establish that a surcharge imposed by the defendant on the plaintiff and other nonmember towns for water usage prior to October 1, 2014, was illegal.")


Property Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Zigadto, Janet

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=818

AC39006, AC39011- Deane v. Kahn (Declaratory judgment; implied easement; "Since at least 2001, the parties in this case have been engaged in a lengthy legal dispute regarding abutting properties that sit along the bonny banks of the Connecticut River in Lyme. The defendants Amy Day Kahn, Robert Kahn, and John Gorman appeal from the judgment of the trial court finding that an easement exists in favor of the plaintiff, Curtis D. Deane, over the parcels of real property owned by Amy Day Kahn (Kahn property) and Gorman (Gorman property). The defendants' principal claim is that the evidence was insufficient to support the court's ultimate legal conclusion that an easement by implication exists over the Kahn property and, correspondingly, that an easement by deed continues to exist over the Gorman property. We affirm the judgment of the court.")


Property Law Supreme Court Opinion

   by Zigadto, Janet

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=813

SC19705 - Francini v. Goodspeed Airport, LLC (Declaratory judgment; easement by necessity; "In this certified appeal, we are tasked with determining whether easements by necessity can be granted for commercial utilities. More specifically, we consider whether an easement that affords ingress and egress to an abutting property can later be expanded, by necessity, for utilities. The plaintiff, William Francini, commenced the present action seeking, inter alia, a judgment declaring that he is entitled to an easement by necessity for underground utility lines across the property of the named defendant, Goodspeed Airport, LLC, and an injunction permitting use of the easement. The defendant appeals from the judgment of the Appellate Court, which reversed trial court's award of summary judgment in favor of the defendant. We affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.")


Insurance Law Supreme Court Opinion

   by Roy, Christopher

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=793

SC19618 - Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Pasiak ("This declaratory judgment action concerns whether an insurer is obligated to indemnify a business owner under a personal insurance policy for liability arising from his false imprisonment of his company’s employee at her workplace and the evidentiary basis on which such a determination is to be made. In this certified appeal, the defendant Jeffrey S. Pasiak challenges the Appellate Court’s determination that such liability fell under the business pursuits exclusion to coverage under his personal umbrella policy. The plaintiffs, Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company and Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Company, contend that coverage not only is barred under the business pursuits exclusion, but also that (1) coverage is barred under policy exclusions for workers’ compensation obligations and for mental abuse, (2) construing the policy to provide indemnification for common-law punitive damages arising from intentional wrongdoing violates public policy, and (3) the trial court improperly limited the scope of discovery and the declaratory judgment trial, depriving the plaintiffs of a trial de novo on coverage issues that they could not litigate in the underlying tort action.

We hold that the case must be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings, limited to the issue of whether the business pursuits exclusion applies. We conclude that neither the Appellate Court nor the trial court employed the correct standard for determining whether the defendant’s tortious conduct was an occurrence 'arising out of' the business pursuits of the insured and that further factual findings would be necessary to determine whether this exception applies under the correct standard. We further conclude that the plaintiffs cannot prevail on their alternative grounds regarding the other exclusions and public policy as a matter of law. Finally, we conclude that the plaintiffs are not limited to the evidentiary record in the underlying tort action to establish that the business pursuits exclusion barred coverage. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court with direction to remand the case to the trial court for a trial de novo on that issue.")

  • SC19618 Concurrence & Dissent - Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Pasiak


Insurance Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Roy, Christopher

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=738

AC39060 - 21st Century North American Ins. Co. v. Perez ("This appeal concerns the cancellation of an automobile insurance policy. The plaintiff, 21st Century North America Insurance Company, appeals from the judgment of the trial court in favor of the defendants, Glenda Perez, Ariel Seda, Gregory C. Norsiegian, the administrator of the estate of Leoner Negron (administrator), Orlando Soto, Carmello Pacheco, Edgardo Contreras, Eric Valentin, John Skouloudis, and PV Holding Corporation (corporation). Because it allegedly complied with all applicable cancellation requirements contained in both the insurance policy and the General Statutes, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly failed to conclude that it validly had cancelled that policy. The plaintiff further claims that the court improperly applied the doctrine of substantial compliance to excuse nonpayment of the amount due to avert cancellation. We agree and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the trial court.")


Declaratory Judgment Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Roy, Christopher

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=636

AC38585 - Sosa v. Commissioner of Correction ("The self-represented, incarcerated plaintiff, Andres R. Sosa, brought this action for monetary damages and declaratory and injunctive relief, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against employees of the Department of Correction, including Commissioner of Correction Scott Semple, Warden Carol Chapdelaine, and District Administrator Angel Quiros, individually and in their official capacities. The plaintiff claimed that the defendants wrongly revoked his visitation privileges in violation of his rights under the first and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution. The trial court granted in part and denied in part a motion to dismiss filed by the defendants. The court granted the motion to dismiss as to all claims for monetary damages as to all of the defendants in their official and individual capacities. The court also granted the motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s claims for injunctive and declaratory relief against the defendants in their individual capacities, but denied the motion to dismiss his claims for prospective declarative and injunctive relief against the defendants in their official capacities. The plaintiff appeals from the judgment of dismissal of all of his claims against the defendants in their individual capacities and his claim for monetary damages in their official capacities. Because there is no final judgment as to the plaintiff’s claims against the defendants in their official capacities, we dismiss the plaintiff’s appeal from the judgment of the trial court dismissing his claim for monetary damages against the defendants in their official capacities. We affirm the judgment of the trial court dismissing all of the claims against the defendants in their individual capacities.")


Declaratory Judgment Law Supreme Court Opinion

   by Roy, Christopher

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=604

SC19432, SC19433 - Ferri v. Powell-Ferri ("These appeals arise from a declaratory judgment action filed by the plaintiffs, Michael J. Ferri and Anthony J. Medaglia, who are the trustees of a trust created by Paul John Ferri, Sr., in 1983 (1983 trust) solely for the benefit of his son, the defendant, Paul John Ferri, Jr. (Ferri). Specifically, the plaintiffs sought a judgment declaring that they were authorized to decant certain assets from the 1983 trust and that the named defendant, Nancy Powell-Ferri, had no right, title, or interest in those assets. On appeal, the plaintiffs and Ferri assert, inter alia, that the trial court incorrectly concluded that the plaintiffs did not have authority to decant the 1983 trust because Ferri had a vested and irrevocable interest in its assets. We disagree. In light of the opinion issued by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in response to this court’s certified questions; see Ferri v. Powell-Ferri, 476 Mass. 651, 72 N.E.3d 541 (2017); we conclude that, under Massachusetts law, it was proper for the plaintiffs to have decanted assets from the 1983 trust, and, therefore, we reverse the judgment of the trial court on that issue. We also reverse the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees to Powell-Ferri in this matter. We affirm the judgment of the trial court in all other aspects.")


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