AC46853 - Gerald Metals, LLC v. Certain Underwriters at International Underwriting Assn. of London (“This appeal arises from a dispute over whether the plaintiffs, Gerald Metals, LLC, and Gerald Metals S.A., suffered a covered loss to their insured property under the marine cargo insurance policies issued by the defendant insurer, Certain Underwriters at International Underwriting Association of London. The plaintiffs appeal from the judgment of the trial court, rendered following its granting of the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the court improperly (1) determined that the plaintiffs were collaterally estopped from relitigating the issues of whether the insured property was stolen and/or misappropriated and seized and (2) concluded that there were no genuine issues of material fact as to whether (a) the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate ‘‘physical loss or damage’’ under the policies and (b) the loss was subject to the policies’ seizure exclusion. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.”)

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AC46494 - Bouazza v. Geico General Ins. Co. (“The plaintiff, Saadia Bouazza, appeals from the judgment of the trial court with respect to its dismissal of her claim of bad faith against the defendant, Geico General Insurance Company. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly concluded that the litigation privilege applied and deprived the court of subject matter jurisdiction and, therefore, improperly dismissed her claim of bad faith. Specifically, the plaintiff claims that (1) the litigation privilege was not applicable in this case, (2) the parties should have had an opportunity to conduct discovery prior to the court ruling on this issue, (3) the court’s ruling fails to articulate how the test set forth in Dorfman v. Smith, 342 Conn. 582, 271 A.3d 53 (2022), for determining whether the litigation privilege applies, was met in this case, and (4) the court improperly considered the offer of compromise filed by the plaintiff in support of its decision. We conclude that the court improperly granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss based on the litigation privilege and, accordingly, reverse in part the judgment of the trial court.”)

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AC45389 - Dorfman v. Liberty Mutual Fire Ins. Co. ("The plaintiff, Tamara Dorfman, appeals from the summary judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of the defendant, Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company, in this action for, inter alia, vexatious litigation. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court (1) improperly granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment as to the counts of her complaint alleging vexatious litigation on the basis of its determination that certain pleadings in a prior action between the parties were filed by the defendant with probable cause, (2) misapplied the proper standard of proof in granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment as to the vexatious litigation counts, (3) improperly denied the plaintiff the ability to obtain meaningful discovery related to her claims of vexatious litigation prior to granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment, and (4) did not engage in the proper analysis when it granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment as to the counts of her complaint alleging violations of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), General Statutes § 42-110a et seq., and the Connecticut Unfair Insurance Practices Act (CUIPA), General Statutes § 38a-815 et seq. We agree with the plaintiff's first two claims and, thus, reverse in part the judgment of the court.")

• AC45389 Concurrence & Dissent - Dorfman v. Liberty Mutual Fire Ins. Co.

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AC46589 - Grotto, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. ("The plaintiff employer, The Grotto, Inc. (Grotto), appeals from the summary judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of the defendant insurer, Liberty Mutual Insurance Company (Liberty Mutual). On appeal, Grotto claims that the court improperly concluded that the doctrine of res judicata barred the present action. We agree and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the trial court.")

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• Insurance Law,
• Recent Opinions,
• Workers' Compensation Law

AC45509, AC45510, AC45511 - Deer v. National General Ins. Co. (“These three appeals involve two consolidated actions arising from the nonrenewal of a homeowners insurance policy. The plaintiffs, Lee Deer and Keleen Deer, appeal from the judgments of the trial court granting the motions for summary judgment filed by the defendant insurance companies, National General Insurance Company (National General) and Century-National Insurance Company (Century-National) (collectively, insurance companies), and the defendant insurance agents, Kevin Trahan and The Trahan Agency, Inc. (collectively, Trahan defendants). On appeal, the plaintiffs claim, among other things, that the court improperly granted the defendants’ motions because, on the basis of the undisputed facts, the defendants failed as a matter of law to provide them with adequate notice of the nonrenewal of their policy. We affirm the judgments of the trial court”)

AC45854 - United Cleaning & Restoration, LLC v. Bank of America, N.A. (“The plaintiff, United Cleaning & Restoration, LLC, appeals from the judgment of the trial court granting the motion for summary judgment filed by the defendant, Bank of America, N.A., as to the plaintiff’s two count amended complaint asserting claims of breach of contract and unjust enrichment. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court erred in granting the defendant’s motion for summary judgment because the court improperly (1) considered evidence submitted by the defendant in support of its motion that failed to satisfy the evidentiary requirements of Practice Book § 17-46 and the common law, and (2) concluded that there were no genuine issues of material fact as to the plaintiff’s claims. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.”)

• Posted in:
• Contract Law,
• Insurance Law,
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SC20754 - Mercedes-Benz Financial v. 1188 Stratford Avenue, LLC ("In this certified appeal, the defendants, Aniello Dizenzo and his company, 1188 Stratford Avenue, LLC (company), appeal from the Appellate Court's judgment affirming the trial court's denial of their motion to open the judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff, Mercedes-Benz Financial. On appeal, the defendants claim that the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that the trial court had not abused its discretion by denying their motion to open as untimely and with no basis, even though the defendants timely filed their motion. We agree and, therefore, reverse the Appellate Court's judgment.")

• SC20754 Dissent - Mercedes-Benz Financial v. 1188 Stratford Avenue, LLC

AC45867 - Burr v. Grossman Chevrolet-Nissan, Inc. (“The plaintiffs, Mathew Burr, Elmer Blackwell, and MPK Property Maintenance, LLC (MPK), appeal from the judgment of the trial court, rendered in favor of the defendant, Grossman Chevrolet-Nissan, Inc. On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the court erred in (1) misinterpreting their legal claims, (2) relying on the testimony of the defendant’s representative to reach its conclusion, and (3) finding certain facts in support of its judgment for the defendant. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.”)

AC45620 - Jefferson Solar, LLC v. FuelCell Energy, Inc. (“The plaintiff, Jefferson Solar, LLC, appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing the action as to the defendants FuelCell Energy, Inc., and SCEF1 Fuel Cell, LLC (collectively, FuelCell), and the United Illuminating Company (United Illuminating). On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly concluded that the plaintiff lacked standing to assert its claims. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.”

AC45222 - Travinski v. General Ins. Co. of America (“The plaintiffs, Christoper S. Travinski and Lena L. Travinski, appeal from the summary judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of the defendants, General Insurance Company of America, Safeco Corporation, Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, and Liberty Mutual Holding Company, Inc., on the plaintiffs’ complaint. The plaintiffs claim that the court improperly (1) granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to the counts of their complaint alleging breach of contract and a violation of the Connecticut Unauthorized Insurers Act (CUIA), General Statutes § 38a-271 et seq., and (2) permitted the defendants Safeco Corporation, Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, and Liberty Mutual Holding Company, Inc., to file a motion for summary judgment without posting a bond pursuant to General Statutes § 38a-27. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.)

• Posted in:
• Civil Procedure,
• Contract Law,
• Insurance Law,
• Recent Opinions,
• Tort Law

AC45627 - Bouchard v. Wheeler (“This case concerns the proper application of General Statutes § 38a-336, commonly known as the underinsured motorist statute. See Tannone v. Amica Mutual Ins. Co., 329 Conn. 665, 676, 189 A.3d 99 (2018). The defendant Safeco Insurance Company appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered in accordance with the stipulation that it entered into with the plaintiffs Caitlyn Bouchard, Kayla Bouchard and Madalyn Bouchard. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly concluded that the automobile in question constituted an underinsured motor vehicle, as that term is used in § 38a-336. We agree and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the trial court.”)

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• Recent Opinions

AC45057 - Glory Chapel International Cathedral v. Philadelphia Indemnity Ins. Co. ("The plaintiff, Glory Chapel International Cathedral (Glory Chapel), appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the defendant Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Company (Philadelphia Indemnity), striking all counts of Glory Chapel's complaint against Philadelphia Indemnity. On appeal, Glory Chapel claims that (1) the court erred in striking its original complaint on the basis of misjoinder, (2) even if the claims in its original complaint were properly stricken, the court erred by rejecting the substitute complaint that it filed pursuant to Practice Book § 10-44, and (3) the court erred by sustaining Philadelphia Indemnity's objection to an offer of compromise that Glory Chapel filed during the pendency of this appeal. For the reasons that follow, we agree with Glory Chapel on its second claim that the trial court improperly rejected its substitute complaint, but we disagree with it on its other claims. Accordingly, we affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the trial court.")

AC45600 - Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Nation v. Factory Mutual Ins. Co. ("The issue at the core of this appeal is, in the context of a dispute regarding insurance coverage for business losses suffered as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, whether the operative complaint contained sufficient allegations to withstand a motion to strike pursuant to Practice Book § 10-39. The plaintiff, Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Nation, appeals from the judgment rendered in favor of the defendant, Factory Mutual Insurance Company, following the partial granting of its motion to strike and the subsequent withdrawal of the remaining claims set forth in the plaintiff's operative complaint. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that (1) the court improperly concluded that a policy exclusion for contamination caused by a virus applied to the majority of its claims for coverage and (2) our Supreme Court's decisions in Connecticut Dermatology Group, PC v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 346 Conn. 33, 288 A.3d 187 (2023) (CT Dermatology), and Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Moda, LLC, 346 Conn. 64, 288 A.3d 206 (2023) (Moda), both of which were released subsequent to the trial court's decision in the present case, do not provide an alternative basis to affirm the trial court's granting of the motion to strike. We disagree with both of the plaintiff's claims and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the court.")

AC45433 - Westchester Modular Homes of Fairfield County, Inc. v. Arbella Protection Ins. Co. ("The plaintiff, Westchester Modular Homes of Fairfield County, Inc., appeals from the summary judgment rendered in favor of the defendant, Arbella Protection Insurance Company. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly concluded that, pursuant to a commercial general liability policy, the defendant had no duty to defend the plaintiff against a counterclaim filed by a third party in an action arising out of a contract for the construction of a modular home. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

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• Insurance Law,
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AC45933 - Liberty Ins. Corp. v. Johnson ("The defendants, Theodore Johnson (Theodore) and Kim Johnson (Kim), appeal from the judgment rendered by the trial court following its granting of a motion for summary judgment filed by the plaintiffs, Liberty Insurance Corporation (Liberty Insurance), Liberty Mutual Insurance Company (Liberty Mutual) and Safeco Insurance Company of Illinois (Safeco). The primary issue in this appeal concerns whether the trial court properly determined that there was no genuine issue of material fact that the plaintiffs do not have a duty to defend the defendants from claims asserted against them in a separate action that stemmed from a motor vehicle accident in which the defendants’ son, Aaron Johnson (Aaron), was driving a motor vehicle owned by Theodore when he lost control of the vehicle and struck a telephone pole, causing serious injuries to a passenger in the vehicle, Jordan Torres. We affirm the judgment of the court.”)

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• Recent Opinions

AC44836, AC45267 - Barbara v. Colonial Surety Co. ("In Docket No. AC 44836, Colonial appeals from the denial of its motion for summary judgment in the Barbaras’ action, in which it asserted that the Barbaras’ claims were precluded pursuant to the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. In Docket No. AC 45267, the Barbaras appeal from the judgment of the trial court rendered following the granting of Colonial’s motion for summary judgment in the indemnity action. On appeal, Colonial claims that the court improperly concluded that the Barbaras’ action is not precluded by the doctrines of res judicata and/or collateral estoppel, and the Barbaras claim that the court improperly concluded that they failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact with respect to their allegations that Colonial acted in bad faith in settling the New York action. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.")

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• Insurance Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC45054 - Curley v. Phoenix Ins. Co. (“In this action to recover underinsured motorist benefits, the plaintiff, Diana Curley, appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendering summary judgment for the defendant, The Phoenix Insurance Company. The court concluded that the plaintiff was not an insured within the meaning of the commercial automobile liability insurance policy issued by the defendant to the plaintiff’s employer, the University of Bridgeport (university), because she was not occupying a covered vehicle for purposes of the underinsured motorist coverage endorsement. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly rendered summary judgment for the defendant because (1) the court’s construction of the university’s policy violates General Statutes § 38a-336 (a) (2), (2) the plaintiff is entitled to underinsured motorist benefits pursuant to the policy’s business auto extension endorsement, and (3) denying the plaintiff underinsured motorist benefits would violate public policy. We agree with the plaintiff’s first claim and, therefore, reverse the judgment of the trial court.”)

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• Recent Opinions

AC45565 - John Hancock Life Ins. Co. v. Curtin ("On appeal, Curtin and Schalm claim that the court improperly determined that Schalm was not entitled to the insurance proceeds because a provision in the dissolution separation agreement, which required the decedent to maintain certain life insurance designating Schalm as the beneficiary, set forth Curtin’s remedy for the decedent’s failure to maintain such insurance. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

• Posted in:
• Family Law,
• Insurance Law,
• Recent Opinions

SC20663 - Menard v. State ("This certified appeal raises questions regarding the recovery of underinsured motorist benefits by Connecticut state troopers injured in a motor vehicle accident involving an intoxicated driver. Two of the three plaintiffs in the underlying consolidated cases, Scott Menard and Darren Connolly (plaintiffs), appeal from the Appellate Court's judgment reversing the trial court's judgments in their favor and remanding the cases to the trial court with direction to render judgments for the defendant, the state of Connecticut (state). The third plaintiff, Robert Zdrojeski, withdrew his portion of the joint appeal to the Appellate Court and is not a party to this certified appeal. The plaintiffs contend that the Appellate Court improperly (1) affirmed the trial court's judgments insofar as the trial court concluded that the plaintiffs were not entitled to recover underinsured motorist benefits for alleged post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and (2) reversed the judgments insofar as the trial court determined that the state was not entitled to a reduction in the trial court's awards for sums received by the plaintiffs in settlement of a claim under Connecticut's Dram Shop Act, General Statutes § 30-102. We agree with the Appellate Court's conclusion as to the first issue, although on the basis of a different ground from the one relied on by that court. We disagree with its conclusion as to the second issue. We therefore reverse in part the judgment of the Appellate Court.")

• Posted in:
• Insurance Law,
• Recent Opinions,
• Tort Law

AC44925 - Stewart v. Old Republic National Title Ins. Co. (“On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the court improperly concluded that, pursuant to the plaintiffs’ title insurance policies, the defendant had no duty to defend the plaintiffs in two actions involving the plaintiffs’ properties. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.”)

• Posted in:
• Contract Law,
• Insurance Law,
• Recent Opinions

SC20617 - Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Pasiak ("This case comes to us for the second time following lengthy litigation of a declaratory judgment action brought by the plaintiffs, Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company and Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Company, against the defendant Jeffrey S. Pasiak. The action concerned whether the plaintiffs were obligated to indemnify the defendant, a business owner, under a personal umbrella insurance policy for liability arising from his false imprisonment of his company's employee at her workplace.

....

"The trial court properly applied the preponderance of the evidence standard at the trial de novo to determine the factual question of whether the plaintiffs established that the business pursuits exclusion of the umbrella insurance policy barred coverage. The defendant's argument to the contrary conflates the legal standard for construction of a policy exclusion and the burden of proof to be applied in a declaratory judgment action to determine whether, as a factual matter, a policy exclusion applies.")

• Posted in:
• Declaratory Judgment Law,
• Insurance Law,
• Recent Opinions

SC20695 - Connecticut Dermatology Group, PC v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co. (“The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether a property insurance policy providing coverage for ‘direct physical loss of or physical damage to’ covered property provides coverage for business income losses arising from the suspension of business operations during the COVID-19 pandemic. The plaintiffs, Connecticut Dermatology Group, PC (Connecticut Dermatology), Live Every Day, LLC (Live Every Day), and Ear Specialty Group of Connecticut, PC (Ear Specialty Group), own and operate healthcare facilities at various locations in Connecticut. They suspended their business operations during the COVID-19 pandemic and, as a result, lost business income and incurred other expenses. The plaintiffs filed claims for their losses with the defendants, Twin City Fire Insurance Company, Sentinel Insurance Company, Ltd., Hartford Fire Insurance Company, doing business as The Hartford, and the Hartford Financial Services Group, Inc., under insurance policies containing provisions requiring the insurance companies to ‘pay for direct physical loss of or physical damage to’ covered property caused by a covered cause of loss. The defendants denied the claims, and the plaintiffs brought this action seeking, among other things, a judgment declaring that the insurance policies covered their economic losses. The plaintiffs now appeal from the trial court’s granting of the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the ground that the claimed losses were subject to a virus exclusion in the policies. We affirm the trial court’s judgment on the alternative ground that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether the policies did not cover the plaintiffs’ claims because the plaintiffs did not suffer any direct physical loss of covered property.”)

SC20678 - Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Moda, LLC (“ The plaintiffs filed claims for their losses with the defendants, Twin City Fire Insurance Company, Sentinel Insurance Company, Ltd., Hartford Fire Insurance Company, doing business as The Hartford, and the Hartford Financial Services Group, Inc., under insurance policies containing provisions requiring the insurance companies to ‘pay for direct physical loss of or physical damage to’ covered property caused by a covered cause of loss. The defendants denied the claims, and the plaintiffs brought this action seeking, among other things, a judgment declaring that the insurance policies covered their economic losses. The plaintiffs now appeal1from the trial court’s granting of the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the ground that the claimed losses were subject to a virus exclusion in the policies. We affirm the trial court’s judgment on the alternative ground that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether the policies did not cover the plaintiffs’ claims because the plaintiffs did not suffer any direct physical loss of covered property.”)

• Posted in:
• Insurance Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC44393 - DAB Three, LLC v. Fitzpatrick

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• Insurance Law,
• Recent Opinions,
• Tort Law

AC44424 - Harrigan v. Fidelity National Title Ins. Co. (The plaintiff, Paul Harrigan, appeals from the judgment of the trial court, following a bench trial, rendered in part in favor of the defendant, Fidelity National Title Insurance Company, in connection with a title insurance policy (title policy) issued by the defendant to the plaintiff. On appeal, the plaintiff challenges the judgment in favor of the defendant only with respect to count two of the operative complaint, the third revised complaint, which alleges that the defendant's conduct in handling an insurance claim filed by the plaintiff pursuant to the title policy violated the Connecticut Unfair Insurance Practices Act (CUIPA); General Statutes § 38a-815 et seq.; and that such unfair and deceptive acts or practices of the defendant thereby violated the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), General Statutes § 42-110a et seq. Specifically, the plaintiff claims on appeal that (1) the court applied an incorrect standard in its analysis of whether the defendant violated CUIPA by requiring a finding of common-law bad faith by the defendant for the plaintiff to establish a violation of CUIPA, (2) when the proper standard is applied, the record sufficiently demonstrates that the defendant violated the relevant provisions of CUIPA, and (3) the evidence submitted by the plaintiff establishes that the defendant's unfair practices were part of a general business practice, as required under General Statutes § 38a-816 (6). We affirm the judgment of the court, albeit on different grounds.")

AC44560 - Pollard v. Geico General Ins. Co. (The plaintiff, Michelle J. Pollard, appeals from the summary judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of the defendant, Geico General Insurance Company, on the plaintiff's complaint seeking to recover underinsured motorist benefits. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly determined that the accidental failure of suit statute, General Statutes § 52-592 (a), did not apply so as to revive her otherwise time barred action. The defendant counters that summary judgment was appropriately rendered and asserts, as an alternative ground for affirmance of the court's judgment, that the plaintiff's action was barred because she failed under the terms of the parties' insurance policy to commence suit timely or to invoke the policy's tolling provision. We agree with the defendant's alternative argument and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court on that basis.)

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• Insurance Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC44106 - Kinity v. US Bancorp ("After the trial court granted the defendants' separate motions for summary judgment on the grounds that none of the plaintiff's untimely claims was saved by the accidental failure of suit statute or the continuing course of conduct doctrine, and thus that all of them were barred by applicable statutes of limitations, and that his remaining claims failed as a matter of law, the plaintiff appealed to this court. On appeal, the plaintiff claims, inter alia, that the trial court erred in ruling that (1) the accidental failure of suit statute did not save any of his untimely claims because his original action was never 'commenced,' and thus could not be saved under the authority of that statute, (2) the continuing course of conduct doctrine did not apply to any of his untimely claims because there was no special relationship between himself and any defendant that would impose a continuing duty to him on any defendant, (3) the bank defendants and the insurance company defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the plaintiff's claims of breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing against them, and (4) the insurance company defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the plaintiff's claim of negligent misrepresentation against them.

Thereafter, while this appeal was pending, the plaintiff filed an amended appeal from a postjudgment order of the trial court granting the insurance company defendants' motion to enforce settlement agreement, claiming that (1) the court had no authority to summarily enforce such an agreement after the case it purported to settle had gone to judgment, and (2) even if it had such authority, it could not exercise that authority in this case because the parties had not entered into a clear, unambiguous, and enforceable settlement agreement. We affirm the judgment of the trial court and its postjudgment order enforcing the settlement agreement.")

AC44232 - Russbach v. Yanez-Ventura ("In this insurance coverage dispute, the substitute plaintiffs, Kristina Bakes and Marlene Esposito, coadministrators of the estate of Daniel Russbach (decedent), appeal from the judgment of the trial court in favor of the defendant Wesco Insurance Company. On appeal, the plaintiffs contend that the court improperly concluded that (1) the defendant's failure to comply with the statutory requirements of General Statutes § 38a-336 (a) (2) was excused under the particular facts of this case and (2) the insurance policy in question provided for standard, rather than conversion, insurance coverage. We affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the trial court.")

• Posted in:
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• Recent Opinions

AC43969 - Epright v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. ("In its writ of error, the plaintiff in error claims that the sanctions order issued by the trial court was improper because, among other things, (1) the plaintiff in error complied with the rules of practice governing the disclosure of expert witnesses, (2) no rule of practice prohibited the ex parte communications here at issue, and (3) the prerequisites necessary to justify imposition of a discovery sanction were not satisfied in this instance.The plaintiff in error also argues that, to the extent the rules of practice are interpreted to prohibit the ex parte communications in question, the rules are unconstitutionally vague because they fail to provide adequate notice that such communications are prohibited. Because we conclude that our rules of practice do not clearly prohibit ex parte communications between an attorney for a party and a testifying expert witness previously disclosed by an opposing party, the order of sanctions in this case cannot stand. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.")

AC44127 - Ghio v. Liberty Ins. Underwriters, Inc. ("In this writ of error, the insureds claim that the court improperly concluded that they waived the attorney-client privilege because (1) the communications were produced pursuant to a court order, (2) Liberty had a duty to preserve the privilege and, therefore, could not have waived the insureds' privilege by producing the communications, and (3) the court abused its discretion in finding that the privilege was waived without holding an evidentiary hearing or reviewing the relevant communications. We agree with the insureds' final claim and, accordingly, grant the writ of error and remand the case for an evidentiary hearing.")

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• Recent Opinions