AC45933 - Liberty Ins. Corp. v. Johnson ("The defendants, Theodore Johnson (Theodore) and Kim Johnson (Kim), appeal from the judgment rendered by the trial court following its granting of a motion for summary judgment filed by the plaintiffs, Liberty Insurance Corporation (Liberty Insurance), Liberty Mutual Insurance Company (Liberty Mutual) and Safeco Insurance Company of Illinois (Safeco). The primary issue in this appeal concerns whether the trial court properly determined that there was no genuine issue of material fact that the plaintiffs do not have a duty to defend the defendants from claims asserted against them in a separate action that stemmed from a motor vehicle accident in which the defendants’ son, Aaron Johnson (Aaron), was driving a motor vehicle owned by Theodore when he lost control of the vehicle and struck a telephone pole, causing serious injuries to a passenger in the vehicle, Jordan Torres. We affirm the judgment of the court.”)

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AC44836, AC45267 - Barbara v. Colonial Surety Co. ("In Docket No. AC 44836, Colonial appeals from the denial of its motion for summary judgment in the Barbaras’ action, in which it asserted that the Barbaras’ claims were precluded pursuant to the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. In Docket No. AC 45267, the Barbaras appeal from the judgment of the trial court rendered following the granting of Colonial’s motion for summary judgment in the indemnity action. On appeal, Colonial claims that the court improperly concluded that the Barbaras’ action is not precluded by the doctrines of res judicata and/or collateral estoppel, and the Barbaras claim that the court improperly concluded that they failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact with respect to their allegations that Colonial acted in bad faith in settling the New York action. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.")

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AC45054 - Curley v. Phoenix Ins. Co. (“In this action to recover underinsured motorist benefits, the plaintiff, Diana Curley, appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendering summary judgment for the defendant, The Phoenix Insurance Company. The court concluded that the plaintiff was not an insured within the meaning of the commercial automobile liability insurance policy issued by the defendant to the plaintiff’s employer, the University of Bridgeport (university), because she was not occupying a covered vehicle for purposes of the underinsured motorist coverage endorsement. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly rendered summary judgment for the defendant because (1) the court’s construction of the university’s policy violates General Statutes § 38a-336 (a) (2), (2) the plaintiff is entitled to underinsured motorist benefits pursuant to the policy’s business auto extension endorsement, and (3) denying the plaintiff underinsured motorist benefits would violate public policy. We agree with the plaintiff’s first claim and, therefore, reverse the judgment of the trial court.”)

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AC45565 - John Hancock Life Ins. Co. v. Curtin ("On appeal, Curtin and Schalm claim that the court improperly determined that Schalm was not entitled to the insurance proceeds because a provision in the dissolution separation agreement, which required the decedent to maintain certain life insurance designating Schalm as the beneficiary, set forth Curtin’s remedy for the decedent’s failure to maintain such insurance. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

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SC20663 - Menard v. State ("This certified appeal raises questions regarding the recovery of underinsured motorist benefits by Connecticut state troopers injured in a motor vehicle accident involving an intoxicated driver. Two of the three plaintiffs in the underlying consolidated cases, Scott Menard and Darren Connolly (plaintiffs), appeal from the Appellate Court's judgment reversing the trial court's judgments in their favor and remanding the cases to the trial court with direction to render judgments for the defendant, the state of Connecticut (state). The third plaintiff, Robert Zdrojeski, withdrew his portion of the joint appeal to the Appellate Court and is not a party to this certified appeal. The plaintiffs contend that the Appellate Court improperly (1) affirmed the trial court's judgments insofar as the trial court concluded that the plaintiffs were not entitled to recover underinsured motorist benefits for alleged post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and (2) reversed the judgments insofar as the trial court determined that the state was not entitled to a reduction in the trial court's awards for sums received by the plaintiffs in settlement of a claim under Connecticut's Dram Shop Act, General Statutes § 30-102. We agree with the Appellate Court's conclusion as to the first issue, although on the basis of a different ground from the one relied on by that court. We disagree with its conclusion as to the second issue. We therefore reverse in part the judgment of the Appellate Court.")

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AC44925 - Stewart v. Old Republic National Title Ins. Co. (“On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the court improperly concluded that, pursuant to the plaintiffs’ title insurance policies, the defendant had no duty to defend the plaintiffs in two actions involving the plaintiffs’ properties. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.”)

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SC20617 - Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Pasiak ("This case comes to us for the second time following lengthy litigation of a declaratory judgment action brought by the plaintiffs, Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company and Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Company, against the defendant Jeffrey S. Pasiak. The action concerned whether the plaintiffs were obligated to indemnify the defendant, a business owner, under a personal umbrella insurance policy for liability arising from his false imprisonment of his company's employee at her workplace.

....

"The trial court properly applied the preponderance of the evidence standard at the trial de novo to determine the factual question of whether the plaintiffs established that the business pursuits exclusion of the umbrella insurance policy barred coverage. The defendant's argument to the contrary conflates the legal standard for construction of a policy exclusion and the burden of proof to be applied in a declaratory judgment action to determine whether, as a factual matter, a policy exclusion applies.")

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• Insurance Law,
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SC20695 - Connecticut Dermatology Group, PC v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co. (“The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether a property insurance policy providing coverage for ‘direct physical loss of or physical damage to’ covered property provides coverage for business income losses arising from the suspension of business operations during the COVID-19 pandemic. The plaintiffs, Connecticut Dermatology Group, PC (Connecticut Dermatology), Live Every Day, LLC (Live Every Day), and Ear Specialty Group of Connecticut, PC (Ear Specialty Group), own and operate healthcare facilities at various locations in Connecticut. They suspended their business operations during the COVID-19 pandemic and, as a result, lost business income and incurred other expenses. The plaintiffs filed claims for their losses with the defendants, Twin City Fire Insurance Company, Sentinel Insurance Company, Ltd., Hartford Fire Insurance Company, doing business as The Hartford, and the Hartford Financial Services Group, Inc., under insurance policies containing provisions requiring the insurance companies to ‘pay for direct physical loss of or physical damage to’ covered property caused by a covered cause of loss. The defendants denied the claims, and the plaintiffs brought this action seeking, among other things, a judgment declaring that the insurance policies covered their economic losses. The plaintiffs now appeal from the trial court’s granting of the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the ground that the claimed losses were subject to a virus exclusion in the policies. We affirm the trial court’s judgment on the alternative ground that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether the policies did not cover the plaintiffs’ claims because the plaintiffs did not suffer any direct physical loss of covered property.”)

SC20678 - Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Moda, LLC (“ The plaintiffs filed claims for their losses with the defendants, Twin City Fire Insurance Company, Sentinel Insurance Company, Ltd., Hartford Fire Insurance Company, doing business as The Hartford, and the Hartford Financial Services Group, Inc., under insurance policies containing provisions requiring the insurance companies to ‘pay for direct physical loss of or physical damage to’ covered property caused by a covered cause of loss. The defendants denied the claims, and the plaintiffs brought this action seeking, among other things, a judgment declaring that the insurance policies covered their economic losses. The plaintiffs now appeal1from the trial court’s granting of the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the ground that the claimed losses were subject to a virus exclusion in the policies. We affirm the trial court’s judgment on the alternative ground that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether the policies did not cover the plaintiffs’ claims because the plaintiffs did not suffer any direct physical loss of covered property.”)

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AC44393 - DAB Three, LLC v. Fitzpatrick

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• Tort Law

AC44424 - Harrigan v. Fidelity National Title Ins. Co. (The plaintiff, Paul Harrigan, appeals from the judgment of the trial court, following a bench trial, rendered in part in favor of the defendant, Fidelity National Title Insurance Company, in connection with a title insurance policy (title policy) issued by the defendant to the plaintiff. On appeal, the plaintiff challenges the judgment in favor of the defendant only with respect to count two of the operative complaint, the third revised complaint, which alleges that the defendant's conduct in handling an insurance claim filed by the plaintiff pursuant to the title policy violated the Connecticut Unfair Insurance Practices Act (CUIPA); General Statutes § 38a-815 et seq.; and that such unfair and deceptive acts or practices of the defendant thereby violated the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), General Statutes § 42-110a et seq. Specifically, the plaintiff claims on appeal that (1) the court applied an incorrect standard in its analysis of whether the defendant violated CUIPA by requiring a finding of common-law bad faith by the defendant for the plaintiff to establish a violation of CUIPA, (2) when the proper standard is applied, the record sufficiently demonstrates that the defendant violated the relevant provisions of CUIPA, and (3) the evidence submitted by the plaintiff establishes that the defendant's unfair practices were part of a general business practice, as required under General Statutes § 38a-816 (6). We affirm the judgment of the court, albeit on different grounds.")

AC44560 - Pollard v. Geico General Ins. Co. (The plaintiff, Michelle J. Pollard, appeals from the summary judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of the defendant, Geico General Insurance Company, on the plaintiff's complaint seeking to recover underinsured motorist benefits. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly determined that the accidental failure of suit statute, General Statutes § 52-592 (a), did not apply so as to revive her otherwise time barred action. The defendant counters that summary judgment was appropriately rendered and asserts, as an alternative ground for affirmance of the court's judgment, that the plaintiff's action was barred because she failed under the terms of the parties' insurance policy to commence suit timely or to invoke the policy's tolling provision. We agree with the defendant's alternative argument and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court on that basis.)

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AC44106 - Kinity v. US Bancorp ("After the trial court granted the defendants' separate motions for summary judgment on the grounds that none of the plaintiff's untimely claims was saved by the accidental failure of suit statute or the continuing course of conduct doctrine, and thus that all of them were barred by applicable statutes of limitations, and that his remaining claims failed as a matter of law, the plaintiff appealed to this court. On appeal, the plaintiff claims, inter alia, that the trial court erred in ruling that (1) the accidental failure of suit statute did not save any of his untimely claims because his original action was never 'commenced,' and thus could not be saved under the authority of that statute, (2) the continuing course of conduct doctrine did not apply to any of his untimely claims because there was no special relationship between himself and any defendant that would impose a continuing duty to him on any defendant, (3) the bank defendants and the insurance company defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the plaintiff's claims of breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing against them, and (4) the insurance company defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the plaintiff's claim of negligent misrepresentation against them.

Thereafter, while this appeal was pending, the plaintiff filed an amended appeal from a postjudgment order of the trial court granting the insurance company defendants' motion to enforce settlement agreement, claiming that (1) the court had no authority to summarily enforce such an agreement after the case it purported to settle had gone to judgment, and (2) even if it had such authority, it could not exercise that authority in this case because the parties had not entered into a clear, unambiguous, and enforceable settlement agreement. We affirm the judgment of the trial court and its postjudgment order enforcing the settlement agreement.")

AC44232 - Russbach v. Yanez-Ventura ("In this insurance coverage dispute, the substitute plaintiffs, Kristina Bakes and Marlene Esposito, coadministrators of the estate of Daniel Russbach (decedent), appeal from the judgment of the trial court in favor of the defendant Wesco Insurance Company. On appeal, the plaintiffs contend that the court improperly concluded that (1) the defendant's failure to comply with the statutory requirements of General Statutes § 38a-336 (a) (2) was excused under the particular facts of this case and (2) the insurance policy in question provided for standard, rather than conversion, insurance coverage. We affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the trial court.")

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AC43969 - Epright v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. ("In its writ of error, the plaintiff in error claims that the sanctions order issued by the trial court was improper because, among other things, (1) the plaintiff in error complied with the rules of practice governing the disclosure of expert witnesses, (2) no rule of practice prohibited the ex parte communications here at issue, and (3) the prerequisites necessary to justify imposition of a discovery sanction were not satisfied in this instance.The plaintiff in error also argues that, to the extent the rules of practice are interpreted to prohibit the ex parte communications in question, the rules are unconstitutionally vague because they fail to provide adequate notice that such communications are prohibited. Because we conclude that our rules of practice do not clearly prohibit ex parte communications between an attorney for a party and a testifying expert witness previously disclosed by an opposing party, the order of sanctions in this case cannot stand. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.")

AC44127 - Ghio v. Liberty Ins. Underwriters, Inc. ("In this writ of error, the insureds claim that the court improperly concluded that they waived the attorney-client privilege because (1) the communications were produced pursuant to a court order, (2) Liberty had a duty to preserve the privilege and, therefore, could not have waived the insureds' privilege by producing the communications, and (3) the court abused its discretion in finding that the privilege was waived without holding an evidentiary hearing or reviewing the relevant communications. We agree with the insureds' final claim and, accordingly, grant the writ of error and remand the case for an evidentiary hearing.")

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AC44292 - Kling v. Hartford Casualty Ins. Co. ("The plaintiff, Michael Kling, appeals from the judgment of the trial court in favor of the defendant, Hartford Casualty Insurance Company. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court erred in concluding that the defendant did not owe a duty to defend its insured, Newton Carroll doing business as Elm City Kettle Corn Company (Elm City), in connection with injuries that the plaintiff suffered as a result of Carroll's and Elm City's negligence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

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SC20556 - Dorfman v. Smith ("This appeal requires that we examine the scope of the litigation privilege, which provides absolute immunity from suit, in relation to alleged misconduct by an insurance company. The plaintiff, Tamara Dorfman, appeals from that part of the trial court's judgment dismissing her claims against the defendant Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA); General Statutes § 42-110a et seq.; based on a violation of the Connecticut Unfair Insurance Practices Act (CUIPA), General Statutes § 38a-815 et seq. The trial court dismissed these claims on the ground that the litigation privilege deprived the court of subject matter jurisdiction over these claims. The plaintiff argues that, because these claims were the functional equivalent of claims for vexatious litigation, the litigation privilege did not apply. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

SC20556 Concurrence & Dissent - Dorfman v. Smith

AC43956 - Pizzoferrato v. Community Renewal Team, Inc. ("The plaintiff, Gail Pizzoferrato, appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying her motion to open and vacate the judgment of the court rendered in favor of the defendant, Community Renewal Team, Inc., in accordance with a decision of an arbitrator that resulted from court-annexed arbitration.On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly denied her motion because the language of both General Statutes § 52-549z and Practice Book § 23-66 require that a decision of an arbitrator be sent to the parties both electronically and by mail before it can become a judgment of the court. Because notice of the arbitrator's decision was never sent to the parties or their counsel by mail in the present case, the plaintiff argues that the judgment of the court, rendered on the basis of the arbitrator's decision, should be vacated. We disagree and affirm the judgment of the court.")

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• Tort Law

AC43421 - Kellogg v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co. ("The defendant, Middlesex Mutual Assurance Company, appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying its motion for summary judgment on the second revised and amended complaint filed by the plaintiff, Sally Kellogg, in which she raised claims of breach of contract, a violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), General Statutes § 42-110a et seq., arising from a violation of the Connecticut Unfair Insurance Practices Act (CUIPA), General Statutes § 38a-815 et seq., and promissory estoppel. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly denied its motion for summary judgment because (1) the breach of contract claim was barred pursuant to (a) the doctrine of res judicata and (b) the suit limitation provision of a "restorationist" property insurance policy issued by the defendant, (2) the CUTPA/CUIPA claim (a) was barred pursuant to General Statutes § 42-110g (f), the applicable statute of limitations, and (b) failed as a matter of law, and (3) the promissory estoppel claim (a) was barred pursuant to the suit limitation provision of the policy and (b) failed as a matter of law. We reverse the judgment of the trial court.")

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AC43826 - Epright v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. ("The plaintiff, Jacqueline Epright, appeals from the trial court's granting of the motion to disqualify James W. Depuy as an expert witness, filed by the defendant, Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, as a motion for order to show cause. Because such an interlocutory order does not satisfy either prong of the test set forth in State v. Curcio, 191 Conn. 27, 31, 463 A.2d 566 (1983), and, therefore, is not a final judgment for purposes of appeal, the plaintiff's appeal is dismissed.")

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SC20586 - Allstate Ins. Co. v. Tenn ("The question in this case is whether the plaintiff, Allstate Insurance Company (Allstate), can use a plea of nolo contendere entered by the named defendant, Donte Tenn, to trigger a criminal acts exclusion in a homeowners insurance policy governed by Connecticut law. Allstate commenced the present action against Tenn and another defendant, Tailan Moscaritolo, in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, seeking a judgment declaring that it has no contractual duty either to defend or to indemnify Tenn in a civil action brought against Tenn by Moscaritolo in Connecticut Superior Court. Allstate subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment in this declaratory judgment action, arguing that Tenn’s plea of nolo contendere relieved it of its duty both to defend and to indemnify him as a matter of law. The parties agreed that a ruling on Allstate’s motion with respect to indemnification would be premature, and, as a result, the District Court denied Allstate’s motion with respect to that issue without prejudice. The only remaining question, which the District Court, in turn, certified to this court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199b (d) and Practice Book § 82-1, is whether Tenn’s plea of nolo contendere relieved Allstate of its duty to defend by triggering the policy’s criminal acts exclusion as a matter of law. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that Tenn’s plea of nolo contendere is inadmissible to prove the occurrence of a criminal act and, therefore, cannot be used to trigger the policy’s criminal acts exclusion.")

• SC20586 Concurrence & Dissent - Allstate Ins. Co. v. Tenn

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• Insurance Law,
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AC44215 - O'Donnell v. Axa Equitable Life Ins., Co. ("In this putative class action, the plaintiff, Richard T. O'Donnell, appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered after it granted the motion filed by the defendant, AXA Equitable Life Insurance Company, for entry of judgment on the plaintiff's stricken complaint. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly concluded that his amended complaint (1) was not 'materially different' from his original complaint and (2) failed to adequately allege that the defendant's actions caused him damages. We agree with the plaintiff, and, accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.")

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AC44114 - DiTullio v. LM General Ins. Co. ("This appeal concerns an arbitration award (award) that arose out of an underinsured motorist cause of action. The plaintiff, Gabrielle DiTullio, appeals from the judgment of the trial court 'confirming the arbitration award with a deduction for the $20,000 offset to clarify the amount to be awarded is $12,500 in accordance with the law.' (Emphasis added.) On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly deducted $20,000 from the award because the court (1) lacked statutory authority to do so, as the defendant, LM General Insurance Company, failed to file a motion to modify, correct, or vacate the award pursuant to General Statutes § 52-407tt, § 52-407xx, or § 52-407ww, and also (2) lacked common-law authority to do so. We conclude that the deduction was proper, but on different grounds than those relied upon by the court. The court had authority to deduct the $20,000 settlement from the tortfeasor from the full value arbitration award to conform the award to the parties' written agreement. The court, however, miscalculated the amount of the judgment, and thus, we affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the trial court.")

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SC20451 - Klass v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. ("Connecticut's insurance law provides that, '[w]hen a covered loss for real property requires the replacement of an item or items and the replacement item or items do not match adjacent items in quality, color or size, the insurer shall replace all such items with material of like kind and quality so as to conform to a reasonably uniform appearance.' General Statutes § 38a-316e (a) (matching statute). The principal issue in this case is whether a dispute as to the extent of an insurer's replacement obligation under the matching statute is a question properly relegated to the appraisal arbitral process or a question of coverage to be resolved by the court in the first instance before appraisal may proceed. The defendant, Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, appeals from the trial court's judgment granting the application of the plaintiff, Karl Klass, to compel appraisal with regard to such a dispute. We affirm the trial court's judgment.")

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