SC20776 - Spillane v. Lamont ("The sole issue in this appeal is whether the doctrine of sovereign immunity bars this declaratory judgment action challenging the legality of No. 21-6 of the 2021 Public Acts (P.A. 21-6). P.A. 21-6 prospectively eliminated the long-standing religious exemption to vaccination requirements as a condition of public and private school enrollment in General Statutes § 10-204a while maintaining the existing medical exemption. The plaintiffs, Keira Spillane and Anna Kehle, are parents of minor children who challenge the elimination of the religious exemption to the school vaccination requirement. They commenced the present action against the defendants, state and municipal officials charged with oversight of public health and education, seeking injunctive relief and a declaration that P.A. 21-6 violates the constitutional rights of the plaintiffs and their children to the free exercise of religion, equal protection of the laws, and a free public education; see U.S. Const., amends. I and XIV; Conn. Const., art. I, §§ 1, 3 and 20; Conn. Const., art. 8, § 1; and violates their rights under General Statutes § 52-571b. The trial court denied the defendants' motions to dismiss the complaint on the ground that they were immune from suit, concluding that two recognized exceptions to the doctrine of sovereign immunity—a "substantial claim" of a constitutional violation and a statutory waiver—had been satisfied. The defendants appealed from that decision to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court. See General Statutes § 51-199 (c); Practice Book § 65-1. We affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the trial court.")

• Posted in:
• Declaratory Judgment Law,
• Recent Opinions

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• Posted in:
• Library Notices

The Connecticut Law Journal, Volume LXXXVI, No. 5, for July 30, 2024 is now available.

Contained in the issue is the following:

• Table of Contents
• Volume 349: Orders (Pages 919 - 919)
• Volume 349: Cumulative Table of Cases Connecticut Reports
• Volume 226: Connecticut Appellate Reports (Pages 857 - 870)
• Volume 226: Cumulative Table of Cases Connecticut Appellate Reports
• Volume 227: Connecticut Appellate Reports (Pages 1 - 113)
• Volume 227: Cumulative Table of Cases Connecticut Appellate Reports
• Miscellaneous Notices
• Supreme Court Pending Cases

• Posted in:
• Connecticut Law Journal,
• Recent Opinions

SC20839 - Wihbey v. Zoning Board of Appeals (“In this certified appeal, we must decide whether a zoning regulation that permitted the use of a property as a single-family dwelling allowed the owner to rent the property on a short-term basis. The plaintiff, Frances Wihbey, was ordered to cease and desist from renting his property to guests on a short-term basis by the Pine Orchard Association zoning enforcement officer. The plaintiff appealed to the defendant, the Zoning Board of Appeals of the Pine Orchard Association (board), which upheld the cease and desist order. The plaintiff then appealed to the trial court, which reversed the board’s decision. The board and the intervening defendants, Michael B. Hopkins and Jacqueline C. Wolff, appealed from the trial court’s judgment to the Appellate Court, which affirmed in part and reversed in part the trial court’s judgment. See Wihbey v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 218 Conn. App. 356, 396, 292 A.3d 21 (2023). We then granted the defendants’ petition for certification to appeal, limited to the following issue: ‘Did the Appellate Court correctly conclude that short-term rentals of a single-family dwelling constituted a permissible use of the subject property under the 1994 Pine Orchard Association zoning regulations?’ Wihbey v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 346 Conn. 1019, 1020, 292 A.3d 1254 (2023). We affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.”)

• Dissent

• Posted in:
• Land Use Law,
• Recent Opinions

SC20773- State v. Garrison (“The sole issue in this certified appeal is whether officers from the Vernon Police Department elicited incriminating statements from the defendant, Alexander A. Garrison, during a custodial interrogation in his hospital room without first administering Miranda warnings, in violation of his rights under the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution. The state appeals, upon our grant of its petition for certification, from the judgment of the Appellate Court, which reversed the judgment of conviction, rendered following a court trial, of assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-59 (a) (1). See State v. Garrison, 213 Conn. App. 786, 789–90, 841, 278 A.3d 1085 (2022). The state claims that the Appellate Court incorrectly determined that a new trial was required because the trial court should have suppressed the defendant’s statements on the ground that he was in custody when he spoke with the police officers in his hospital room without having received Miranda warnings. We conclude that the defendant was not in custody during any of his interactions with the police officers at the hospital and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.”)

• Dissent

• Posted in:
• Criminal Law & Procedure,
• Recent Opinions

AC46505 - Gateway Development/East Lyme, LLC v. Duong ("In this summary process action, the plaintiff, Gateway Development/East Lyme, LLC, leased property located at 295 Flanders Road in East Lyme (premises) and subleased the premises to the defendants, Anh Duong doing business as Daddy's Noodle Bar and Daddy's Noodle Bar 2, LLC. The defendants appeal from the trial court's judgment of possession rendered in favor of the plaintiff. It is undisputed that the defendants failed to pay rent in a timely manner. On appeal, the defendants claim that the court improperly concluded that the plaintiff was not required to provide them with a pretermination notice and an opportunity to cure their default for nonpayment of rent within ten days of such notice. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

AC46467 - Meineke Bristol, LLC v. Premier Auto, LLC ("Premier Auto, LLC (Premier Auto), and Patrick Flynn appeal from the judgments rendered by the trial court in four related civil actions that were consolidated for trial. The actions encompass various claims by multiple entities concerning the sale by Vazhayil Babu of three businesses as well as associated leases, notes, and guarantee agreements to Premier Auto. On appeal, Premier Auto and Patrick Flynn claim that the trial court abused its discretion when it precluded them from presenting certain evidence. Premier Auto also claims that the court erred in determining that Premier Auto failed to prove its breach of contract cause of action. For the reasons set forth subsequently in this opinion, we conclude that the portion of the appeal concerning the first claim is moot and must be dismissed. With respect to the remaining claim in this appeal, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.")

• Posted in:
• Business Law,
• Landlord / Tenant Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC46093 - State v. Brelsford (Denial of motion for modification of sentence; “On appeal, the defendant claims that the court abused its discretion in finding that he had failed to establish good cause to modify his sentence. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.”)

AC45685 - State v. Cruz (Assault in the first degree; criminal possession of a firearm; carrying a pistol without a permit; “On appeal, the defendant claims that the state made certain purported misrepresentations in moving to join his case with a codefendant’s case that resulted in an improper joinder of the cases and violated his constitutional rights to confrontation and to a fair trial pursuant to the sixth and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of conviction.”)

• Posted in:
• Criminal Law & Procedure,
• Recent Opinions

AC46455 - Walters v. Servidio ("In this land use dispute concerning whether the plaintiffs, Frederick J. Walters, Susan M. Walters, Michael S. Mason, and Michele A. Mason, have an easement over an approximately forty-four foot long by forty foot wide dirt section of a private road between 22 Ridge Street and 33 Cognewaugh Road in the Cos Cob section of Greenwich, known as the disputed area, the plaintiffs appeal from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the defendants, Francesco G. Servidio and Rita Servidio. On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the court improperly determined that (1) they could not prevail on their claims of (a) express easement, (b) easement by implication, and (c) obstruction of a purported easement, and (2) the defendants prevailed on their counterclaims of (a) trespass, (b) (1) slander of title, and (b) (2) a violation of General Statutes § 47-41. We agree only with the plaintiffs' claim concerning slander of title and, accordingly, reverse in part and affirm in part the judgment of the trial court.

-----

The judgment is reversed only with respect to the counterclaim of slander of title and the case is remanded with direction to render judgment in favor of the plaintiffs on that counterclaim; the judgment is affirmed in all other respects.")

• Posted in:
• Declaratory Judgment Law,
• Property Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC46167 - Bank of New York Mellon v. Horsey ("In this protracted foreclosure matter, the defendants Wade H. Horsey II and Jacquelyn Costa Horsey appeal from the judgment of the trial court denying their motion to set aside the court's judgment of strict foreclosure rendered in favor of the substitute plaintiff, The Bank of New York Mellon, as Successor Trustee for JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., as Trustee for Novastar Mortgage Funding Trust, Series 2005-2 Novastar Home Equity Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-2. The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the defendants filed 'at least two prior motions to open or other similar motion' pursuant to Practice Book § 61-11 (g), such that an automatic appellate stay did not apply to toll the running of the law days. We conclude that no automatic stay was triggered by operation of § 61-11 (g), and, thus, the law days have passed, divesting the defendants of their interest in the property, and title to the property has vested in the substitute plaintiff. Accordingly, this court can provide the defendants no practical relief, and we dismiss this appeal as moot.")

• Posted in:
• Foreclosure Law,
• Recent Opinions

SC20779 - State v. Carter ("Following a jury trial, the defendant, Jacques Carter, was convicted of home invasion in violation of General Statutes § 53a-100aa (a) (2) and burglary in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-101 (a) (1) stemming from a break-in at a Danbury apartment in 2016. During the break-in, the defendant was armed with a Crosman Vigilante air gun that was loaded with pellets, but the gun had no carbon dioxide (CO2) cartridge installed, and the chamber where the CO2 cartridge would be installed was sealed off with duct tape. To obtain a conviction under either of the foregoing statutes, as charged in the information in this case, the state had to establish, among other things, that the defendant was "armed with . . . a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument." On appeal, the defendant's primary contention is that the trial court erroneously allowed the jury to determine that the air gun he carried during the break-in constituted a deadly weapon. We agree that, as a matter of law, an air gun in which a CO2 cartridge cannot be readily installed is not a deadly weapon. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.")

SC20828 - State v. Delacruz-Gomez ("In this appeal, we address two claims that the trial court improperly admitted unduly prejudicial evidence. The defendant, Raikes Y. Delacruz-Gomez, was convicted, following a jury trial, of assault of public safety personnel in violation of General Statutes (Supp. 2016) § 53a-167c (a) (1), and interfering with an officer in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 2015) § 53a-167a (a), after injuring a police officer assigned to a joint federal and state task force that was executing a warrant for his arrest. We granted certification to appeal from the judgment of the Appellate Court, which affirmed the trial court's judgment of conviction. The defendant contends that the Appellate Court incorrectly held that the trial court had not abused its discretion by admitting testimony naming the felony charges in the defendant's outstanding warrant (warrant charges) and identifying the task force that executed that warrant as the "Violent Fugitive Task Force." We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the evidence pertaining to the warrant charges. We further conclude that, although the evidence pertaining to the name of the task force should not have been admitted, that evidence did not substantially sway the jury's verdict. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.")

• Posted in:
• Criminal Law & Procedure,
• Recent Opinions

• SC20804 - FuelCell Energy, Inc. v. Groton (Tax assessment appeal; "This municipal tax appeal asks us to consider how, and whether, personal property tax exemptions should apply to fuel cell modules that produce both electricity and waste heat. It first asks whether fuel cell modules and related equipment were exempt from property taxation as a class I renewable energy source under General Statutes § 12-81. It then asks whether that same property was exempted from taxation for the October 1, 2016 grand list as ‘‘goods in [the] process of manufacture’’ pursuant to § 12-81. Last, it asks whether the taxpayers were required to formally declare their personal property pursuant to General Statutes §§12-40, 12-41 and 12-71, even if it was exempt from taxation, and what, if any, the consequences of failing to do so would be.")

• Posted in:
• Administrative Appeal Law,
• Property Law

SC20797 - Collier v. Adar Hartford Realty, LLC ("This is an interlocutory appeal from the trial court's denial of a motion for class certification. The plaintiffs, former residents of Barbour Gardens, a housing development in the city of Hartford (city), instituted this action in connection with the living conditions at Barbour Gardens during their residency. They sought compensatory and punitive damages and attorney's fees from the owner of Barbour Gardens and its property management company, and alleged various tort, contract, equitable, and statutory claims, including a claim of a violation of a provision of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), General Statutes § 42-110g. The plaintiffs filed a motion to certify a class on behalf 'of all persons who lived at Barbour Gardens for any or all of the time between June 24, 2004, and October 13, 2019,' which the trial court denied on the grounds that individualized issues would predominate over class-wide issues and that a class action is not a superior method to resolve the plaintiffs' claims. See Practice Book § 9-8 (3). In this appeal brought pursuant to General Statutes § 42-110h, the plaintiffs contend that there is sufficient evidence in the record common to the entire class to satisfy the predominance and superiority requirements. We reject this claim due to the lengthy period of time for which class certification was requested—covering all residents at Barbour Gardens at any time over a span of more than fifteen years—and the absence of generalized evidence in the record concerning the living conditions at Barbour Gardens during most of the proposed class period. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiffs' motion for class certification.")

• Posted in:
• Civil Procedure,
• Contract Law,
• Landlord / Tenant Law,
• Recent Opinions,
• Tort Law

The regularly scheduled hours for the law libraries are 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., unless noted below.

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• Middletown Law Library is open from 9:30 a.m. to 4:00 p.m.
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• Danbury Law Library is closed.
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• Bridgeport Law Library closes at 4:00 p.m.
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• Posted in:
• Library Notices

The Connecticut Law Journal, Volume LXXXVI, No. 4, for July 23, 2024 is now available.

Contained in the issue is the following:

• Table of Contents
• Replacement Pages 349 Conn. 507, 508
• Volume 349: Orders (Pages 918 - 919)
• Volume 349: Cumulative Table of Cases Connecticut Reports
• Volume 226: Connecticut Appellate Reports (Pages 736 - 857)
• Volume 226: Cumulative Table of Cases Connecticut Appellate Reports
• Supreme Court Pending Cases

• Posted in:
• Connecticut Law Journal,
• Recent Opinions

AC 47122 - In re M. S. ("This appeal, brought by the minor child, M. S., arises from the trial court’s judgment sustaining an ex parte order granting temporary custody of the child to the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and Families, and adjudicating the child neglected. On appeal, the child challenges only the sustaining of the order of temporary custody and claims that the court erred in making that decision without finding that she was at risk of immediate physical harm. The respondent mother, Stephanie S., is not participating in this appeal. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

• Posted in:
• Juvenile Law,
• Recent Opinions

SC20742 - State v. Honsch ("In this appeal, we must consider the extent of the state's territorial jurisdiction to prosecute a defendant when the defendant disputes whether the crime occurred within Connecticut's geographical boundaries. The defendant, Robert Honsch, appeals from his conviction of murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a (a). On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) the trial court incorrectly denied his pretrial motion to dismiss for lack of territorial jurisdiction because the state had failed to establish that the murder occurred in Connecticut, (2) the evidence was insufficient to establish his identity as the perpetrator of the murder, and (3) the trial court erroneously declined his request to provide the jury with an instruction on fingerprint evidence. We disagree with all three of the defendant's claims and affirm the trial court's judgment.")

• SC20742 Concurrence - State v. Honsch

• Posted in:
• Criminal Law & Procedure,
• Recent Opinions

AC45890 - Iadanza v. Toor ("This appeal arises from a stipulated judgment in an action by the plaintiff landlord, Cosmo Iadanza, against the defendant tenant, Mohammed Toor, for breach of contract, serious nonpayment of rent, and fraudulent misrepresentation relative to the defendant's tenancy at the residential property known as 501 Woodbine Road in Stamford (property). According to the stipulation, judgment of possession entered in favor of the plaintiff 'with a final stay of execution based upon' several conditions pertaining to an option the defendant had to purchase the property. The conditions established, among other things, that the defendant would be able to purchase the property for $950,000, provided that he deposited 'with [his counsel] in trust pursuant to the terms of agreement the sum of $47,500 by August 26 [2022] [at] 4 p.m. eastern daylight time' and then satisfied certain conditions with respect to obtaining financing and closing by a date certain, and that time was of the essence 'for all actions and requirements in the stipulated agreement.' They further established that '[f]ailing to make the deposit will null and void the defendant's right to purchase the property, and the plaintiff may immediately file an affidavit stating this fact and immediately obtain a summary process execution for possession without any additional court hearings.'

The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the trial court properly ordered a summary process execution for possession to issue after the defendant failed to make the $47,500 deposit in accordance with the terms of the stipulated judgment. The defendant claims that the plaintiff materially breached the stipulated judgment prior to the August 26, 2022 deadline and that, consequently, the defendant's obligation to make the deposit by that time had been excused. As such, he maintains that the plaintiff was not entitled to the execution. We disagree with the defendant and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court ordering the summary process execution.")

• Posted in:
• Landlord / Tenant Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC 45329 - Wald v. Cortland-Wald ("The defendant, Anne Louise Cortland-Wald, appeals from the judgment of the trial court dissolving her marriage to the plaintiff, Francis Mark Wald, and from certain postjudgment financial orders. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly (1) deviated from the child support guidelines in entering its support orders, (2) found that the defendant had an annual earning capacity of $60,000, (3) modified pendente lite support orders, (4) failed to adjudicate the plaintiff in contempt for violating the court’s pendente lite and automatic orders, (5) failed to award reasonable attorney’s fees after adjudicating the plaintiff in contempt for failing to comply with discovery orders, (6) failed to award attorney’s fees to the defendant to prosecute her appeal, and (7) issued a postjudgment modification of the dissolution judgment. We conclude that the court improperly deviated from the child support guidelines to calculate its child support orders and, accordingly, reverse in part the judgment of the court and remand the matter for a new trial on all financial orders. We affirm the judgment of the court as to the defendant’s motions for contempt.")

AC 46247 - Trent v. Trent ("In this postdissolution matter, the plaintiff, David L. Trent, appeals from certain judgments of the trial court stemming from two postdissolution motions filed by him and one postdissolution motion filed by the defendant, Katia R. Trent. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly (1) granted the defendant’s motion for contempt, which alleged that the plaintiff failed to pay his share of child care expenses, (2) denied his motion for contempt, which claimed that the defendant failed to comply with a discovery order, and (3) denied his motion to modify alimony and child support. We agree with the plaintiff on his first and third claims but disagree with him on his second claim. Accordingly, we reverse the court’s judgment of contempt and the judgment denying the plaintiff’s motion for modification as to alimony and child support. We affirm the judgment denying the defendant’s motion for contempt.")

AC 45654 - Nedder v. Nedder ("In this appeal from a marital dissolution judgment, the defendant, Lauren E. Nedder, claims that the trial court erred in (1) ordering that the plaintiff, Ernest J. Nedder, use specific assets to pay certain expenses and debt, (2) failing to assign a value to a quasi-pension account prior to dividing the parties’ property, and (3) fashioning its alimony orders. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

• Posted in:
• Family Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC46052 - Angel C. v. Commissioner of Correction ("Upon a grant of certification to appeal, the petitioner, Angel C., appeals from the judgment of the habeas court denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The petitioner claims that the habeas court (1) abused its discretion in precluding him from presenting the testimony of his adult children at the habeas trial, and (2) improperly concluded that he had not established that his trial counsel was ineffective for having failed to contact and call his children as witnesses at the underlying criminal trial. We affirm the judgment of the habeas court.")

• Posted in:
• Habeas Corpus Law,
• Recent Opinions

SC20927 - Centrix Management Co., LLC v. Fosberg ("When a consumer contract or lease includes a unilateral attorney's fees provision benefitting the commercial party, a consumer who successfully prosecutes or defends an action based on the contract is entitled as a matter of law to attorney's fees, and 'the size of the attorney's fee awarded to the consumer shall be based as far as practicable upon the terms governing the size of the fee for the commercial party.' General Statutes § 42-150bb. In this appeal, the plaintiff landlord, Centrix Management Co., LLC, challenges the trial court's award of reasonable attorney's fees in the amount of $3500, following the judgment rendered in favor of the defendant tenant, Donald W. Fosberg. The plaintiff contends that, because doing so would be 'practicable' pursuant to § 42-150bb, the court had discretion to award the defendant only up to $750, which was the maximum amount of attorney's fees that the plaintiff could have recovered pursuant to the terms of the lease agreement. The defendant responds that the plaintiff's claim rests on an overly narrow construction of two key statutory terms in § 42-150bb, 'based . . . upon' and 'practicable.' Consistent with the equitable purpose of the statute, the defendant contends, the trial court had discretion to award him reasonable attorney's fees in excess of $750. Although we conclude that trial courts have discretion to award a prevailing consumer reasonable attorney's fees pursuant to § 42-150bb when the court determines that it is not practicable to base the award upon the contractual terms governing the commercial party's recovery, in the present case, the trial court did not make this threshold determination. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court's award of attorney's fees and remand the case with direction to conduct a new hearing on the defendant's motion for attorney's fees consistent with this opinion.")

• Posted in:
• Landlord / Tenant Law,
• Recent Opinions