AC45249 - Ahern v. Board of Education (Negligence; summary judgment; final judgments; governmental immunity pursuant to statute (§ 52-557n); indemnification pursuant to statute (§ 10-235); "The plaintiff, Nicole Ahern, a former student of Coginchaug Regional High School (high school) and a former member of the high school's cheerleading squad, brought this action against the defendants, the Board of Education of Regional School District Number 13 (board); Kathryn Y. Veronesi, the superintendent of Regional School District Number 13; Paula Murphy, the high school's head cheerleading coach; and Marissa Barletta, the high school's assistant cheerleading coach. The plaintiff alleged that, due to the negligence of the defendants and the board, she was injured while attempting a stunt during the high school's cheerleading practice. The plaintiff appeals from the partial summary judgment the trial court rendered in favor of the defendants and the board on the ground that governmental immunity barred certain counts of the action.

The plaintiff claims on appeal that the court improperly rendered summary judgment because there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether she was subject to imminent and apparent harm and was an identifiable individual pursuant to the identifiable person-imminent harm exception to governmental immunity. After oral argument, this court ordered the parties to file supplemental briefs addressing whether this appeal should be dismissed, in part, for the lack of a final judgment as to the board because the trial court did not dispose of all of the counts brought against it.

We conclude that (1) the summary judgment rendered with respect to some, but not all, counts of the complaint brought against the board is not an appealable final judgment as to the board, and (2) the court properly rendered summary judgment in favor of Veronesi, Murphy, and Barletta on the ground that they are entitled to governmental immunity because there is no genuine issue of material fact that the plaintiff was not subject to imminent and apparent harm. Accordingly, we dismiss the plaintiff's appeal as it pertains to the board and affirm the court's judgment in favor of Veronesi, Murphy, and Barletta.")

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SC20731 - Robinson v. V. D. ("The defendant, V. D., appealed from the order of the trial court denying his special motion to dismiss, pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute, General Statutes § 52-196a, the action brought by the plaintiffs, Michael Robinson and Mary Robinson. The plaintiffs now move to dismiss this appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and, specifically, for lack of an appealable final judgment. In response to the plaintiffs' motion, the defendant contends that the legislature's inclusion of "interlocutory appeal" language in subsection (d) of § 52-196a, the statute's legislative history, and public policy all favor an implicit right to an immediate appeal, and the defendant further asserts that the denial of a special motion to dismiss is an appealable final judgment under the standard set forth in State v. Curcio, 191 Conn. 27, 31, 463 A.2d 566 (1983). For the reasons set forth in the companion case that we also decide today, Smith v. Supple, 346 Conn. ___, ___ A.3d ___ (2023), we conclude that a trial court's denial of a colorable special motion to dismiss under § 52-196a is an immediately appealable final judgment under the second prong of Curcio. We further conclude that the record demonstrates that the defendant has presented a colorable claim that he is entitled to a right to avoid litigation under our anti-SLAPP statute. Accordingly, we deny the plaintiffs' pending motion to dismiss this appeal for lack of a final judgment and transfer the case to the Appellate Court for further proceedings according to law.")

• SC20731 Dissent - Robinson v. V. D.

SC20730 - Smith v. Supple ("In this appeal, we must consider whether Connecticut's appellate courts have jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal from a trial court's denial of a special motion to dismiss filed pursuant to our anti-SLAPP statute, General Statutes § 52-196a. The defendants, Aaron Supple, Karen Montejo, Hendrick Xiong-Calmes, and Gianna Moreno, who were students at Trinity College in Hartford (Trinity), appealed to the Appellate Court from the trial court's denial of their special motion to dismiss the action brought against them by the plaintiffs, Gregory B. Smith, Nicholas Engstrom, and The Churchill Institute, Inc. (Churchill Institute). Thereafter, this court transferred the appeal to itself and ordered the parties, sua sponte, to brief the issue of whether the trial court's denial of the special motion to dismiss constitutes a final judgment for the purpose of an appeal.On that limited issue, the defendants argue that the trial court's denial is immediately appealable under the second prong of State v. Curcio, 191 Conn. 27, 31, 463 A.2d 566 (1983). For the reasons that follow, we agree with the defendants and conclude that the denial of a special motion to dismiss based on a colorable claim of a right to avoid litigation under § 52-196a is an appealable final judgment under the second prong of Curcio. Because the defendants' appeal presents such a colorable claim, we transfer the appeal back to the Appellate Court for further proceedings according to law.")

• SC20730 Dissent - Smith v. Supple

• Posted in:
• Civil Procedure,
• Recent Opinions,
• Tort Law

AC44542 - Stanziale v. Hunt (Negligence; contributory negligence; general verdict rule; "In this negligence action arising out of a motorcycle accident on Great Hill Road in Oxford on July 24, 2015, the plaintiff, Leonard Stanziale, appeals from the judgment of the trial court in favor of the defendants, Betty A. Hunt and Harold W. Hunt, which was rendered upon the general verdict of a jury following the denial of the plaintiff's motion to set aside the verdict. On appeal, as in his motion to set aside, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly (1) denied his pretrial motion in limine to redact from his medical records all statements as to the speed at which he was operating his motorcycle at the time of the accident, and (2) overruled his foundation and relevancy objection to the testimony of Harold Hunt, the owner of the motor vehicle that was allegedly being driven by his wife, Betty Hunt, at the time and place of the accident, as to the length of a skid mark he allegedly found, measured, and photographed in that location when he went there approximately three hours after the accident.

In response to the plaintiff's claims, the defendants argue first that the general verdict rule precludes our review of those claims, and, second, if we conclude that the general verdict rule does not bar our review of those claims, neither such claim requires the reversal of the judgment. For the reasons that follow, although we disagree with the defendants' contention that the general verdict rule bars our review of the plaintiff's claims, we agree with the defendants that neither such claim requires us to reverse the judgment of the trial court in this action.")

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SC20663 - Menard v. State ("This certified appeal raises questions regarding the recovery of underinsured motorist benefits by Connecticut state troopers injured in a motor vehicle accident involving an intoxicated driver. Two of the three plaintiffs in the underlying consolidated cases, Scott Menard and Darren Connolly (plaintiffs), appeal from the Appellate Court's judgment reversing the trial court's judgments in their favor and remanding the cases to the trial court with direction to render judgments for the defendant, the state of Connecticut (state). The third plaintiff, Robert Zdrojeski, withdrew his portion of the joint appeal to the Appellate Court and is not a party to this certified appeal. The plaintiffs contend that the Appellate Court improperly (1) affirmed the trial court's judgments insofar as the trial court concluded that the plaintiffs were not entitled to recover underinsured motorist benefits for alleged post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and (2) reversed the judgments insofar as the trial court determined that the state was not entitled to a reduction in the trial court's awards for sums received by the plaintiffs in settlement of a claim under Connecticut's Dram Shop Act, General Statutes § 30-102. We agree with the Appellate Court's conclusion as to the first issue, although on the basis of a different ground from the one relied on by that court. We disagree with its conclusion as to the second issue. We therefore reverse in part the judgment of the Appellate Court.")

• Posted in:
• Insurance Law,
• Recent Opinions,
• Tort Law

SC20623 - Dobie v. New Haven ("In this certified appeal, we are asked to decide whether an open manhole on a public roadway, uncovered after a snowplow driver negligently knocked off its cover only seconds before a motorist drove into the manhole, constitutes a "highway defect," making General Statutes § 13a-149, our highway defect statute, the motorist's exclusive remedy for injuries he sustained as a result. The plaintiff, William Dobie, appeals from the judgment of the Appellate Court, which reversed the trial court's judgment, rendered after a jury verdict in his favor, on one count of negligence as against the named defendant, the city of New Haven. The Appellate Court held that the highway defect statute was in fact the plaintiff's exclusive remedy. Dobie v. New Haven, 204 Conn. App. 583, 595, 254 A.3d 321 (2021). We affirm the Appellate Court's judgment.")

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• Tort Law

AC45090 - Worth v. Picard ("The plaintiff, Keyin Worth, brought the underlying civil action against the defendant Christopher Picard. The plaintiff appeals from the judgment rendered in the defendant's favor after the court granted his motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff claims that the court improperly concluded as a matter of law that, pursuant to the litigation privilege, the plaintiff's claims were barred by absolute immunity. We dismiss the appeal as moot.")

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• Tort Law

AC44938 - Doe v. Quinnipiac University ("The plaintiff, Jane Doe, brought the underlying action against the defendants, Alpha Sigma Phi Fraternity, Inc. (fraternity), and Quinnipiac University (Quinnipiac), pursuant to two savings statutes, General Statutes §§ 52-592 (accidental failure of suit statute) and 52-593 (wrong defendant statute).In her complaint, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants were negligent in that they failed to prevent members of the fraternity from sexually assaulting her.The plaintiff appeals from the judgment of the trial court granting the motions to dismiss filed by the defendants.On review of the arguments presented on appeal, we interpret the plaintiff's claims to be that the trial court erred in concluding that (1) the process filed with the court never was served on the defendants, (2) the plaintiff's service of process and filing of process violated General Statutes §§ 52-46 and 52-46a, and (3) § 52-592 does not save the plaintiff's action. We dismiss the plaintiff's appeal as moot.")

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• Tort Law

AC45568- Houghtaling v. Benevides ("The plaintiff, Aurora Houghtaling, appeals from the judgment of the trial court granting the motion for summary judgment filed by the defendant Jakub Micengendler in this tort action, commenced pursuant to General Statutes § 22-357, commonly known as the dog bite statute. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court erred in rendering summary judgment because the underlying facts do not support the court's conclusion that there was no genuine issue of material fact that the plaintiff was a "keeper" of the dog that allegedly caused her to sustain an injury, thus precluding her from recovery pursuant to § 22-357. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

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• Tort Law

AC44949 - Herrera v. Meadow Hill, Inc. ("The plaintiff, Byron Herrera, appeals from the summary judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of the defendants, Meadow Hill, Inc. (Meadow Hill), and Imagineers, LLC, in this premises liability action arising out of the plaintiff's alleged slip and fall on ice on property possessed and controlled by the defendants.On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly rendered summary judgment in favor of the defendants because the documents submitted in support of the defendants' motion for summary judgment did not eliminate all questions of material fact about (1) whether they had a reasonable time to remediate the snowy or icy condition prior to the plaintiff's fall, or (2) whether, if they did have a reasonable time to remediate that condition before the plaintiff's fall, they failed to do so or did so negligently. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

• Posted in:
• Recent Opinions,
• Tort Law

AC45070 - Russo v. Thornton ("The defendants, Brett W. Thornton (Brett), ProxySoft Worldwide, Inc. (ProxySoft Worldwide), and ProxySoft Direct, Inc. (ProxySoft Direct), appeal from the judgment of the trial court (1) granting an application for a turnover and charging order filed by the plaintiffs, Home Dental Care, Inc., Thornton International, Inc., and Robert D. Russo, acting in his capacity as executor of the estate of Thomas F. Thornton, and (2) denying Brett's motion to vacate a judgment lien and a financial institution execution. On appeal, the defendants claim that the court (1) incorrectly concluded that it had rendered a final judgment that gave rise to the postjudgment enforcement remedies pursued by the plaintiffs, and (2) improperly ordered injunctive relief and continued a receivership as part of the turnover and charging order. We conclude that ProxySoft Direct is not aggrieved by the judgment from which the defendants have appealed, and, therefore, we dismiss the portion of the appeal filed by ProxySoft Direct. As to the remainder of the appeal, filed by Brett and ProxySoft Worldwide, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.)

• Posted in:
• Business Law,
• Recent Opinions,
• Tort Law

AC45094 - Booth v. Park Terrace II Mutual Housing Ltd. Partnership (Premises liability; negligence; summary judgment; request for admission pursuant to rule of practice (§ 13-22); "The plaintiff, Joseph M. Booth, appeals from the judgment of the trial court granting motions for summary judgment filed by the defendants, Park Terrace II Mutual Housing Limited Partnership and Mutual Housing Association of Greater Hartford, Inc. (collectively, owner defendants), and Crosskey Architects, LLC, and TO Design, LLC (collectively, design defendants), and denying the plaintiff's request to amend his complaint and his motion to preclude expert testimony. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court (1) improperly rendered summary judgment because genuine issues of material fact exist, (2) abused its discretion in denying his request to amend his complaint, and (3) abused its discretion in denying his motion to preclude the expert affidavit offered in support of the owner defendants' motion for summary judgment. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

AC44587 - Aviles v. Barnhill (Premises liability; negligence; motion for summary judgment; "The plaintiffs, Dominique Aviles, individually and on behalf of her minor child, Xavier Bauza, appeal from the summary judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of the defendant landlord, H-Squared Construction, LLC, on two counts of the plaintiffs' complaint asserting negligence against the defendant arising from an off premises attack by a dog owned by one of its tenants. On appeal, the plaintiffs argue that the court incorrectly determined that the defendant could not be held liable as a matter of law because, contrary to the court's conclusion, Connecticut case law provides that a landlord has a duty of care under a premises liability theory to use reasonable care to prevent injuries to third parties from known vicious dogs housed on the property by a tenant, including, in certain circumstances, from a dog attack occurring off of the landlord's property. The plaintiffs also argue that this court should adopt § 379A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (§ 379A), which, if its elements are met, would extend liability to the defendant regardless of where the attack took place. We disagree with the plaintiffs' first claim and conclude that, within the specific context of off premises dog attacks, landlords do not owe a duty of care to injured third parties under a theory of premises liability. We also decline to adopt § 379A for this particular context because we determine that doing so would be contrary to our appellate precedent. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

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• Tort Law

SC20633 - Devine v. Fusaro ("On July 24, 2012, the decedent, Timothy Devine, fatally shot himself with a handgun after state police officers fired nonlethal ammunition at him in an unsuccessful effort to cause him to drop or to surrender his weapon. The plaintiff, Michael Devine, as administrator of the decedent’s estate, filed a wrongful death action against four state police officers—the defendants, Louis Fusaro, Jr., Steven Rief, Michael Avery, and Kevin Cook—alleging that their intentional, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct caused the death of the decedent. The defendants moved to dismiss the action, claiming that it was barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity or, alternatively, the statutory grant of immunity set forth in General Statutes § 4-165. The trial court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, concluding that the plaintiff’s action was barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity pursuant to the four factor test set forth in Spring v. Constantino, 168 Conn. 563, 568, 362 A.2d 871 (1975). See id. (articulating ‘‘the following criteria for determining whether [a] suit is, in effect, one against the state and cannot be maintained without its consent: (1) a state official has been sued; (2) the suit concerns some matter in which that official represents the state; (3) the state is the real party against whom relief is sought; and (4) the judgment, though nominally against the official, will operate to control the activities of the state or subject it to liability’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)).

The Appellate Court reversed the judgment of the trial court, reasoning that the Spring test does not apply because the operative complaint unequivocally stated that ‘‘[t]he defendants are sued in their individual capacit[ies].’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Devine v. Fusaro, 205 Conn. App. 554, 576, 259 A.3d 655 (2021); see id., 585. Alternatively, the Appellate Court determined that the trial court misapplied the third factor of the Spring test because it ‘‘was required to give far greater weight to the fact that the plaintiff specifically pleaded that he brought the action against the defendants in their individual capacities.’’ Id., 582–83. Accordingly, the Appellate Court reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded the case with direction to ‘‘consider the remaining ground raised in the motion [to dismiss], namely, whether the plaintiff’s complaint sufficiently alleges reckless, wanton, or malicious conduct such that, if proven, the defendants would not be entitled to statutory immunity under § 4-165.’’ Id., 585. We granted the defendants’ petition for certification to appeal, limited to the following issue: ‘‘Did the Appellate Court correctly conclude that, when a court determines whether sovereign immunity bars a claim against state officials or employees for actions taken in the exercise of their duties, the [Spring] test . . . ‘has no applicability’ when a plaintiff designates that the state officials or employees have been sued in their individual capacities?’’ Devine v. Fusaro, 339 Conn. 904, 260 A.3d 1224 (2021).

After examining the entire record on appeal and considering the briefs and oral arguments of the parties, we have determined that that the appeal should be dismissed on the ground that certification was improvidently granted.

The appeal is dismissed.")

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AC44600 - King v. Hubbard ("The defendant, Matthew Hubbard, appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying his motion to restore to the active docket a civil action that was brought against him by the plaintiffs, Laura King and Richard King, and later voluntarily withdrawn. The defendant claims that (1) the court abused its discretion when it denied his motion to restore the action to the active docket and (2) this court should fashion a procedural mechanism to guide trial courts when a plaintiff withdraws an action in response to a special motion to dismiss pursuant to General Statutes § 52-196a, which affords protection against so-called SLAPP lawsuits. We affirm the judgment of the court.")

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SC20597 - Solon v. Slater ("This appeal requires us to decide the scope of the preclusive effect, in a subsequent tort action in the Superior Court, of an unappealed Probate Court decree admitting a will to probate. The plaintiff, Linda Yoffe Solon, filed the present lawsuit against the defendants, Joseph M. Slater and Joshua Solon, alleging that they tortiously interfered with her contractual relations and right of inheritance by exercising undue influence over her husband, Michael Solon (decedent), with respect to two different legal instruments, a proposed amendment to an antenuptial agreement and a testamentary will. The trial court rendered summary judgment in favor of the defendants, concluding in pertinent part that both of the plaintiff’s tortious interference claims were barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel because the Probate Court previously had admitted the decedent’s will to probate after rejecting the plaintiff’s claim that the decedent executed the will as a result of the defendants’ undue influence. The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court. See Solon v. Slater, 204 Conn. App. 647, 665, 253 A.3d 503 (2021).

The issue before us is whether both of the plaintiff’s tortious interference claims in her civil tort action are barred by either the doctrine of collateral estoppel, as the courts below concluded, or the doctrine of res judicata, which the defendants have raised as an alternative ground for affirmance. We conclude that neither preclusion doctrine bars the plaintiff from litigating her tortious interference with contractual relations claim, which relates to the proposed amended antenuptial agreement, because the Probate Court did not actually or necessarily determine whether the defendants tortiously interfered with that contract and the plaintiff lacked an opportunity to litigate her claim in the Probate Court. We arrive at a different conclusion with respect to the plaintiff’s tortious interference with her right of inheritance claim because the Probate Court actually and necessarily determined that the defendants had not tortiously interfered with the execution, alteration, or revocation of the will admitted to probate, and the plaintiff therefore is collaterally estopped from relitigating that claim. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court in part and remand the case for further proceedings on the plaintiff’s tortious interference with contractual relations claim.")

• Posted in:
• Probate Law,
• Recent Opinions,
• Tort Law

AC45238 - Murphy v. Clinton (Municipal defective highway statute (§ 13a-149); subject matter jurisdiction; "The plaintiff, Catherine Murphy, appeals from the judgment of the trial court granting the motion to dismiss filed by the defendant, the town of Clinton, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff's complaint on the basis that she failed to comply with the requirements of the notice provision of the municipal defective highway statute, General Statutes § 13a-149. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly granted the defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the written notice and the accompanying photographs that she sent to the defendant sufficiently described the cause of her injury in compliance with the requirements of § 13a-149. We agree and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the trial court")

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• Recent Opinions,
• Tort Law

AC45085 - Tunick v. Tunick ("The plaintiff, Stephen M. Tunick, appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the defendant Barbara Tunick. On appeal, the plaintiff contends that the court improperly granted the defendant's (1) motion to strike and (2) motion for summary judgment. We agree with the first claim and disagree with the second claim. Accordingly, we reverse in part and affirm in part the judgment of the trial court.")

• Posted in:
• Probate Law,
• Recent Opinions,
• Tort Law

AC44977 - Idlibi v. Hartford Courant Co. ("The self-represented plaintiff, Ammar Idlibi, a pediatric dentist, appeals from the summary judgment rendered in favor of the defendant, Hartford Courant Company, on his claims of defamation and intentional misrepresentation. This appeal arises from two articles the defendant published reporting on the plaintiff's disciplinary proceedings before the Department of Public Health (DPH) and the Connecticut State Dental Commission (commission). On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court erroneously (1) concluded that the fair report privilege applied to the allegedly defamatory statements made by the defendant, and (2) rendered summary judgment on the plaintiff's intentional misrepresentation claim. We disagree and, therefore, affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

AC45039 - Westry v. Litchfield Visitation Center ("The self-represented plaintiff, Eric Westry, appeals from the trial court's judgment granting the motion to dismiss filed by the defendant, Litchfield Visitation Center. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial court erred in (1) setting aside a default that had been entered against the defendant and (2) granting the defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to commence the action within the ninety day time limitation set forth in General Statutes § 46a-101 (e).We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

• Posted in:
• Recent Opinions,
• Tort Law

SC20505 - Adams v. Aircraft Spruce & Specialty Co. ("This appeal requires us to revisit the requirements for a forum to exercise specific personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation in the wake of the United States Supreme Court's recent decisions considering this issue in the context of product liability actions. More particularly, we consider whether the corporation's contacts with the forum can sufficiently "relate to" such a cause of action, such that the forum's exercise of specific personal jurisdiction would be consonant with due process, in the absence of any activity or occurrence in the forum concerning either the specific product or product model that allegedly malfunctioned. The plaintiffs, John S. Adams and Mary Lou Hanney, coadministrators of the estate of Ryan Michael Adams, appeal from the trial court's judgment in favor of the named defendant, Aircraft Spruce & Specialty Co., rendered after the granting of the defendant's motion to dismiss the product liability claim brought against it. The plaintiffs contend that the trial court improperly failed to recognize that, as long as the plaintiffs' cause of action is not materially different from an action that might have directly resulted from a person's use of the defendant's product in Connecticut, exercising personal jurisdiction over the defendant would satisfy both Connecticut's applicable long arm statute and due process. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

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• Recent Opinions,
• Tort Law

AC44902 - Speer v. U.S. Bank Trust, N.A. ("The self-represented plaintiff, Sheri Speer, appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the defendant U.S. Bank Trust, N.A. (U.S. Bank). The plaintiff claims on appeal that the trial court (1) erred in granting U.S. Bank's motion to strike dated February 26, 2021, because the motion to strike (a) "did not comply with Practice Book § 10-41" and (b) was not directed to the operative complaint and (2) erred in granting U.S. Bank's motion for judgment dated September 21, 2021, because it was filed while an automatic appellate stay was in effect. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

• Posted in:
• Foreclosure Law,
• Property Law,
• Recent Opinions,
• Tort Law

AC44491 - Parnoff v. Stratford ("The plaintiff, Laurence V. Parnoff, appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered following the granting of motions to strike filed by the defendants, the town of Stratford (town), Melinda Fonda, Berchem Moses PC (Berchem Moses), and Laura Hoydick. On appeal, the plaintiff argues that (1) his claims under the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), General Statutes § 42-110a et seq., and his negligent infliction of emotional distress claims, all stemming from a public records request he made pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (act), General Statutes § 1-200 et seq., were improperly stricken because he pleaded allegations sufficient to support those claims, and (2) the court improperly granted the motions to strike with prejudice. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

• Posted in:
• Administrative Appeal Law,
• Freedom of Information Law,
• Recent Opinions,
• Tort Law