AC47397, AC47399 - Spiotti v. Clarke ("In these consolidated appeals, the plaintiff, Bryan Spiotti, appeals from the judgments of the trial court granting, in part, the motions of the defendants Wendy Clarke, doing business as Rockstar Cabaret; W Ventures, LLC (Ventures); and Andrew Wielblad to strike the operative complaints in the two underlying actions. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly granted the motions to strike as to (1) the count against Ventures alleging liability under the Dram Shop Act, General Statutes § 30-102, due to the plaintiff's failure to provide timely statutory notice of that claim, (2) the reckless service of alcohol counts against the defendants (a) for the plaintiff's failure to plead the necessary elements of that cause of action and (b) because the firefighter's rule barred those counts, (3) the negligent security counts against the defendants on the grounds that they were barred by the firefighter's rule, and (4) the negligent supervision counts against the defendants on the grounds that (a) the Dram Shop Act barred those counts and (b) the allegations were insufficient to set forth a cause of action for negligent supervision. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the judgments of the trial court only with respect to the granting of the motions to strike as to the Dram Shop Act count against Ventures and as to both the reckless service of alcohol and the negligent supervision counts against the defendants. Accordingly, we reverse in part the judgments of the trial court.")

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AC46466 - Doe v. Lamb ("This civil action concerns the criminal conduct of the defendant Christopher Lamb, who, utilizing Internet services and computer devices provided by the defendant JoAnn Lohbush, hacked into the personal accounts of and harassed and exploited a number of innocent victims. The plaintiffs—Jane Doe 1, Jane Doe 2, Jane Doe 3, and John Doe 1—jointly appeal from the partial summary judgment rendered in favor of the defendant. The plaintiffs claim that the trial court improperly rendered summary judgment in favor of the defendant because she voluntarily assumed a duty of care as to the plaintiffs or, in the alternative, that the defendant owed a general duty of care arising from her affirmative conduct. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

AC46630 - Speer v. Nationstar Mortgage, LLC ("In this foreclosure and bankruptcy related action, the self-represented plaintiff, Sheri Speer, appeals from the judgment of the trial court granting the motion to dismiss her complaint in favor of the defendant, Nationstar Mortgage, LLC, doing business as Mr. Cooper, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The plaintiff contends that the court improperly concluded that she lacked standing to maintain the claim set forth in her complaint due to the fact that she commenced this action during the pendency of a bankruptcy proceeding. More specifically, the plaintiff argues that the court improperly concluded that her claim was the property of the bankruptcy estate and was not abandoned by the trustee. We agree with the plaintiff that the court improperly dismissed her complaint. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case with direction to deny the defendant's motion to dismiss.")

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SC21051 - Health Body World Supply, Inc. v. Wang ("This appeal requires us to resolve two previously unexamined issues regarding the proper construction and operation of General Statutes § 52-572o, which is the statute governing comparative responsibility and actions for contribution under the Connecticut Product Liability Act (CPLA), General Statutes § 52- 572m et seq. The plaintiffs, Health Body World Supply, Inc. (HBWS) and its insurance carrier, Landmark American Insurance Company (Landmark), brought this action for contribution against the defendant, Reed Wang, pursuant to § 52-572o (e) after paying $1.2 million to Judith Kissel in full satisfaction of the judgment in the underlying matter of Kissel v. Center for Women’s Health, P.C., Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, Docket No. FST-CV-12-6013562-S (January 3, 2019) (Kissel action), rev’d in part, 205 Conn. App. 394, 258 A.3d 677, cert. granted, 339 Conn. 916, 262 A.3d 139 (2021), and cert. granted, 339 Conn. 917, 262 A.3d 138 (2021) (appeals withdrawn January 11, 2022). The jury in the Kissel action assigned 80 percent of the responsibility for Kissel’s damages to HBWS and 20 percent of the responsibility to Wang. In the present action, HBWS seeks to recover from Wang his 20 percent share of the amount paid, including applicable interest and costs. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of HBWS.

On appeal, Wang renews his arguments, unsuccessful in the trial court, that the plaintiffs’ contribution action is foreclosed because Wang was not a party to the underlying product liability action and, therefore, does not fall within the scope of the comparative responsibility or contribution provisions of § 52-572o. In the alternative, Wang argues that the contribution action is untimely because it was brought more than one year after the judgment in the Kissel action became final. See General Statutes § 52-572o (e). We reject both arguments and affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

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• Insurance Law,
• Medical Malpractice Law,
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AC47069 - Barr v. MFI Management, Inc ("The sole issue in this appeal is whether the trial court improperly removed the parties' consolidated actions from the jury docket less than one month before trial was scheduled to begin and thereafter proceeded to judgment in both actions with a bench trial. The appellants, Dean S. Barr and Joseph Meehan (collectively, Barr parties), appeal from the judgments rendered against them following that trial in favor of the appellees, FIH, LLC (FIH), MFI Management, Inc. (MFI), LAZ May 10, LLC (LAZ May 10), Lazer Milstein, and Nesanel Milstein (collectively, FIH parties). The Barr parties claim that the court improperly removed the actions from the jury docket because, inter alia, they properly had been entered in the docket as a jury case upon written consent of all parties pursuant to General Statutes § 52-215. We agree, and accordingly reverse the judgments of the trial court and remand both actions for a jury trial.")

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AC46788 - Dushay v. Southern Connecticut Hockey League, LLC ("The plaintiff Connor Dushay appeals from the summary judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of the defendant Southern Connecticut Hockey League, LLC, on his claim of negligence relating to injuries he sustained during a hockey practice. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that (1) the court improperly concluded that the defendant did not owe him a duty of care, and (2) there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Wonderland of Ice Associates, Inc. (Wonderland), was acting as the defendant's agent or apparent agent, or with apparent authority, at the time of the incident in question. We affirm the judgment of the court.")

AC47616 - Matusz v. Wellmore Behavioral Health, Inc. ("The plaintiff, Robert P. Matusz, appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the defendant, Wellmore Behavioral Health, Inc., on his claim that a fire caused by the defendant's negligence caused damage to his rental property. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly (1) failed to provide his requested charge to the jury regarding a landlord's obligations to maintain a leased premises and (2) granted the defendant's motion in limine to preclude testimony and evidence of noneconomic damages. We conclude that the plaintiff's first claim is not reviewable due to inadequate briefing. As to his second claim, we determine that, even if we assume, arguendo, that the court erred in granting the defendant's motion in limine, any such error was harmless. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

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AC46823 - Duclos v. Hayes ("The plaintiff, Katy Duclos, appeals from the summary judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of the defendant Sylvia Hayes on count one of the plaintiff's second amended complaint sounding in premises liability arising out of her alleged slip and fall. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant (1) without providing an oral or written statement of decision and (2) because there were genuine issues of material fact. We conclude that (1) the trial court erred in failing to issue an oral or written statement of its decision granting summary judgment, but that this deficiency does not prevent our review of the plaintiff's claims on the merits, and (2) there existed no genuine issues of material fact as to whether the defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, such that the defendant was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, we affirm the summary judgment of the trial court.")

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AC47474 - Aguilar v. Eick ("The plaintiff, Marcio Rene Aguilar, appeals from the judgment of the trial court granting the special motion to dismiss filed by the defendant, Janet Eick, pursuant to General Statutes § 52-196a, Connecticut's anti-SLAPP statute. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly concluded that he failed to satisfy his burden under § 52-196a (e) (3) of establishing probable cause that he will prevail on the merits of his complaint. The court reached that conclusion following an evidentiary hearing at which three witnesses testified. In its memorandum of decision, the court expressly relied on that testimony.

Following oral argument before this court, we ordered the parties to file supplemental briefs to address whether § 52-196a authorizes the trial court to conduct an evidentiary hearing on a special motion to dismiss and to predicate its decision on evidence adduced at that hearing. We conclude that issue is dispositive of the present appeal and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the trial court.")

AC47454 - Gorbecki v. Shehu ("The plaintiffs, John Gorbecki and Joseph Gorbecki, brought the civil action underlying this appeal, which includes claims of statutory vexatious litigation, common-law vexatious litigation, and abuse of process, against the defendants Karl D. Shehu and Shehu, LLC. Following a bench trial, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the defendants, from which the plaintiffs now appeal. Having reviewed the claims that are properly before us in this appeal, we conclude that the appeal is moot because the plaintiffs have failed to challenge an independent ground that supports the judgment. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.")

AC46664 - Khan v. Khan ("These consolidated appeals involve a family trust established by the grantor, Ahmed M. Khan (grantor), and Lisa C. Khan (Khan), who is a defendant in the first action (trust action) and the plaintiff in the second action (indemnification action). Khan appeals from the judgments of the trial court in favor of the plaintiffs in the trust action and the grantor in the indemnification action. On appeal, Khan claims that the court improperly (1) found that she had breached her fiduciary duty, (2) concluded that she was liable for wilful misconduct, (3) ordered her to pay punitive damages to the plaintiffs, (4) removed her as the trustee of the trust, (5) failed to award her a reasonable trustee fee, and (6) failed to uphold the plain and unambiguous language of the trust's indemnification clause. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.")

AC47253 - McGee v. 456 Sackett WDS Associates, LLC ("The plaintiff, Samuel McGee, appeals from the summary judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of the defendants, 456 Sackett WDS Associates, LLC (Sackett, LLC), and Elm City Industrial Properties, Inc. (Elm City), in this premises liability action arising out of an incident in which the plaintiff allegedly was injured due to a defective wooden floorboard on property owned by the defendants. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly determined that no genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether the defendants were in possession or control of the area of the property where the plaintiff allegedly was injured. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

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SC20997 - Jamie G. v. Dept. of Children & Families ("This case arises from a tragic accident in which four year old Toni G. drowned after the Probate Court had vested her temporary custody in her maternal relatives. To assist it in determining whether to grant a full transfer of guardianship to those relatives, the Probate Court commissioned the defendant, the Department of Children and Families (DCF), to conduct a study of their home and to produce a report of its findings. DCF did so and submitted the report to the Probate Court. Before that court could hold a hearing to determine whether to transfer guardianship, however, Toni died. Her estate sought permission to bring the present action, which alleges that the negligence of DCF social workers, in investigating Toni's living situation and advising the Probate Court that the maternal relatives' home was a suitable placement for Toni, was a proximate cause of her death. After a hearing, the claims commissioner waived the state's sovereign immunity and authorized the estate to sue the state.

The primary issue presented on appeal is whether the claims commissioner's authorization to sue the state under General Statutes § 4-160 (a) and (h) not only waives the state's sovereign immunity, but also abrogates the common law to preclude the state from raising a claim of judicial or quasi-judicial immunity. We agree with the trial court that a waiver of sovereign immunity under that statute does not bar the state from raising a jurisdictional claim of absolute quasi-judicial immunity before that court. As we will explain, we are compelled to construe narrowly legislative waivers of sovereign immunity, and we will interpret a statute to have abrogated the common law only when the statutory language evidences a clear intent to do so. The latter principle applies with particular force to purported encroachments on common-law judicial and quasi-judicial immunities, the abrogation of which would raise serious separation of powers issues. Because we perceive in § 4-160 no clear and unequivocal legislative intent to abrogate DCF's quasi-judicial immunity, we reject the plaintiff's contention that the claims commissioner waived that immunity. Nevertheless, we remand the case for further proceedings because some of the allegations in the complaint appear to exceed the scope of that immunity.")

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SC21076 - White v. FCW Law Offices ("The plaintiff, Frank Charles White, brought this action against the defendants, FCW Law Offices and two John Does, seeking damages for identity theft pursuant to General Statutes § 52-571h (b) and unfair or deceptive trade practices in violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), General Statutes § 42-110a et seq. The trial court rendered a default judgment in favor of the plaintiff and awarded him compensatory damages in the amount of $150,000 on his identity theft claim and $300,000 in punitive damages on his CUTPA claim. The plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Court, claiming that the trial court had improperly failed to award him treble damages under § 52-571h (b). See White v. FCW Law Offices, 228 Conn. App. 1, 2, 323 A.3d 406 (2024). The Appellate Court agreed but concluded that the plaintiff could not recover both punitive damages under CUTPA and treble damages under § 52-571h (b) because such an award would violate the principle that a plaintiff is entitled to recover only once for losses sustained in connection with the same transaction, occurrence or event. See id., 6–7, 10. The Appellate Court reversed in part the trial court's judgment and remanded for vacatur of both the punitive and compensatory damages awards and to award the plaintiff treble damages in the amount of $450,000 for identity theft. Id., 11.

On appeal to this court, the plaintiff claims that the Appellate Court incorrectly determined that he could not recover both punitive damages under CUTPA, General Statutes § 42-110g (a), and treble damages under the identity theft statute, § 52-571h (b). We agree and, accordingly, reverse in part the judgment of the Appellate Court.")

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AC47269 - Doe v. Fasold ("The plaintiffs, three adults and four minors, in seven underlying consolidated tort actions, appeal from the judgments of the trial court, Morgan, J., rendered in favor of the defendant town of Plainville following the granting of its motions for summary judgment as to the third and fourth counts of the plaintiffs' respective complaints in each action. The plaintiffs' sole claim on appeal is that the court improperly rendered summary judgments despite the existence of a genuine issue of material fact as to whether a work order request for maintenance, made by an employee of the defendant, created a ministerial duty to perform the maintenance in a prescribed way, thereby abrogating the defendant's governmental immunity protection and exposing the defendant to liability pursuant to General Statutes § 52-557n for its alleged failure to do so. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgments of the trial court.")

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AC47670 - Connecticut Novelty Co. v. Graichen ("The defendant, Christine Graichen, appeals from the judgment of the trial court granting the application for a prejudgment remedy filed by the plaintiff, The Connecticut Novelty Company, doing business as Malloves Jewelers, a family operated jewelry store. The court granted the application after finding probable cause to sustain the validity of the plaintiff's claims against the defendant for breach of fiduciary duty, statutory theft, conversion, unjust enrichment, and violations of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), General Statutes § 42-110a et seq., which stemmed from the defendant's alleged theft and misappropriation of the plaintiff's funds for her own personal use. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly granted the plaintiff's application for a prejudgment remedy and ordered that the plaintiff could attach, garnish or encumber any real or personal property of the defendant to the amount of $554,260.35 because it failed to consider and to apply the homestead exemption set forth in General Statutes § 52-352b (21), which exempts from the claims of creditors the value of the debtor's homestead up to the amount of $250,000. Because we conclude that the defendant did not properly preserve her claim for appellate review and, further, that the record is inadequate for our review of this claim, we decline to review it and affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

AC47983 - Speer v. Brown Jacobson P.C. ("The self-represented plaintiff, Sheri Speer, appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing her quo warranto action challenging the qualifications of the defendants Brown Jacobson P.C. (Brown Jacobson) and one of its attorneys, Aimee Wickless, to serve as corporation counsel for the defendant city of Norwich (city) due to her failure to appear at the trial management conference. The plaintiff claims that (1) dismissal was a disproportionate sanction for her failure to appear at the trial management conference "due to medical inability"; (2) the court "abused its discretion in finding facts to conclude that a default existed or should have entered"; (3) the court "denied [her] procedural and substantive due process in dismissing the action without a hearing and notice"; and (4) the court abused its discretion in denying her motion for reconsideration. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

AC47116 - Stanford v. Nogiec ("In this personal injury action arising out of an accident involving a driver of a rental car and a pedestrian, the plaintiffs, Hope Stanford, Sarah Stanford, and Liam Stanford, individually and as next friend for his two minor children, appeal from the trial court's rendering of summary judgment in favor of the defendant EAN Holdings, LLC, also known as Enterprise Rental Car. The plaintiffs claim that the court improperly concluded that the defendant did not have a duty to determine whether the driver's license of a renter of a motor vehicle was subject to restrictions before renting him a vehicle. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the court.")

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AC47452 - Birch Hill Recovery Center, LLC v. High Watch Recovery Center, Inc. (“On appeal, the plaintiff does not argue that the court erred in its determination that the defendant met its initial burden under the first prong of § 52-196a (e) (3). See footnote 2 of this opinion. Instead, the plaintiff claims that the court erred by dismissing the action because it established that there is probable cause that it will prevail on its claims against the defendant. Specifically, the plaintiff contends that (1) the defendant’s efforts to challenge the facility in court and administrative proceedings constituted ‘‘sham’’ litigation that is not protected by the first amendment to the federal constitution or the state constitution, (2) the absolute litigation privilege does not bar the plaintiff’s claims, and (3) the complaint sufficiently alleged that the defendant’s conduct amounted to tortious interference with business relations. We disagree with the plaintiff’s claim that it established probable cause that it will prevail on its claim that the defendant’s challenges to the facility constituted sham litigation. We, therefore, conclude that the court did not err in its determination that the defendant’s conduct was protected by the first amendment. Because that conclusion is sufficient to uphold the dismissal of the complaint, we need not address the plaintiff’s other challenges to the judgment of dismissal. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.”)

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• Business Law,
• Recent Opinions,
• Tort Law

AC47244 - Beger v. Bristol (Personal injury; municipal highway defect statute § 13a-149; "On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to the first count of her complaint, which asserted a claim against the city under General Statutes § 13a-149, also known as the municipal highway defect statute. We disagree and affirm the judgment of the court.”)

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AC47533 - Gibson v. Denmo's Original Drive-In, LLC (Negligence; premises liability; “On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial court abused its discretion by denying her motion to set aside the verdict because the court provided the jury with an incorrect version of the interrogatories and the jury’s use of those interrogatories precluded the jury from fully evaluating the essential elements of the cause of action. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.”)

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AC47206 - One Eighty-Five Stagg Associates v. Linwood Avenue III, LLC (Negligence; motion for directed verdict; sufficiency of evidence; "On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court erred in (1) granting the defendants’ motion for a directed verdict on the basis that the plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence in support of its claims, and (2) ordering the redaction of certain statements contained in a documentary exhibit presented by the plaintiff. We agree with the plaintiff with respect to both claims and, accordingly, reverse in part the judgment of the trial court.")

• Posted in:
• Property Law,
• Recent Opinions,
• Tort Law

AC47140 - Ready v. New Canaan (“The plaintiffs, Scott Ready and Veronica Ready, appeal from the judgment of the trial court granting the motion for summary judgment filed by the defendant, the town of New Canaan, as to the plaintiffs’ complaint alleging breach of contract. On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the court improperly rendered summary judgment in favor of the defendant on the ground that the plaintiffs’ claim sounded in tort rather than in breach of contract and, therefore, was barred by the doctrine of governmental immunity. We reverse the judgment of the court.”)

• Posted in:
• Contract Law,
• Recent Opinions,
• Tort Law

AC46590 - Bethel Baseball Assn., Inc. v. Dyer ("The self-represented defendant, Kurt R. Dyer, appeals from the judgment, rendered after a court trial, in favor of the plaintiff, Bethel Baseball Association, Inc., on its counts alleging conversion and statutory theft. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court (1) erroneously concluded that he had committed conversion and statutory theft and (2) abused its discretion by not addressing the plaintiff's failures to properly respond to his discovery requests. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

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SC20906 - Ammar I. v. Dept. of Children & Families ("The sole issue in this certified appeal is whether the litigation privilege affords absolute immunity to the defendant, the Department of Children and Families, from a claim by the self-represented plaintiff, Ammar I., that the defendant had discriminated against him based on his religion during his termination of parental rights trial. The plaintiff asserts that the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that the litigation privilege barred his discrimination claim challenging the defendant's improper use of child protection proceedings to alienate him from his children. We conclude that the Appellate Court correctly held that the litigation privilege barred the plaintiff's remaining timely allegations pertaining exclusively to the defendant's actions during his termination of parental rights trial. We nevertheless reverse in part the Appellate Court's judgment to the extent that the court's remand order directed the trial court to grant the defendant's motion to dismiss in its entirety. We therefore affirm in part and reverse in part the Appellate Court's judgment.")

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• Civil Procedure,
• Recent Opinions,
• Tort Law

AC47007 - DiSpazio v. Pacapelli ("The plaintiffs, Paul DiSpazio and Maltby Street, LLC (Maltby Street), appeal from the trial court's rendering of summary judgment in favor of the defendants, Eugene Pacapelli and other officers and members of the board of directors of West Cove Marina Coop, Inc. (West Cove), and from its granting of the defendants' motion for sanctions. The plaintiffs claim that the court improperly granted (1) the defendants' motion for summary judgment because a release of liability entered into by the plaintiffs for the benefit of West Cove in connection with prior litigation (2015 release) did not preclude the present action; and (2) the defendants' motion for sanctions because the plaintiffs' claims were not without basis in law or fact and the court did not make a requisite finding of bad faith. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the court.")

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AC47097- Marks v. GLT Development Corp. ("In this personal injury action, which arose during the COVID-19 pandemic, the plaintiff, Stephen Marks, appeals from the judgment of the trial court granting the defendant GLT Development Corporation's motion to strike on statute of limitations grounds. This appeal involves the question of how to calculate, in connection with the plaintiff's negligence claim arising from an accident that occurred on May 24, 2020, the statute of limitations set forth in General Statutes § 52-584. The operability of that statute was suspended as a result of Governor Ned Lamont's Executive Order No. 7G, effective March 19, 2020, and that suspension subsequently was lifted on March 1, 2021, by Governor Lamont's Executive Order No. 10A.The plaintiff claims that the court incorrectly concluded that the two year limitations period began to run on March 1, 2021, and expired on March 1, 2023.The plaintiff argues instead that he was entitled to a suspension of 347 or 348 days, representing the total number of days that the suspension was in effect, notwithstanding the fact that the plaintiff's cause of action did not exist when the suspension began. That is, the plaintiff contends that the proper calculation of his limitations period is effectively two years plus 347 or 348 days. The defendant argues to the contrary that the court properly concluded that the statute of limitations began to run on March 1, 2021, and expired on March 1, 2023. We agree with the defendant and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

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• Civil Procedure,
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