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Tort Law

Tort Law Supreme Court Slip Opinion

   by Agati, Taryn

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=4351

SC20226 - Kent Literary Club of Wesleyan University v. Wesleyan University ("This appeal involves a commercial dispute arising in the unique context of an undergraduate housing program. The plaintiffs are Kent Literary Club of Wesleyan University at Middletown (Kent), which owns a Delta Kappa Epsilon fraternity house on the Wesleyan University campus (DKE House); the Gamma Phi Chapter of Delta Kappa Epsilon at Wesleyan (DKE); and Jordan Jancze, who, at the time of trial, was a Wesleyan student and DKE member. The defendants include Wesleyan University (Wesleyan or the university); Wesleyan's president, Michael S. Roth; and Wesleyan's vice president for student affairs, Michael J. Whaley. Following Wesleyan's September, 2014 announcement that all residential fraternities on campus would be required to coeducate, and following a series of unsuccessful negotiations between the parties to establish a mutually agreeable coeducation plan, Wesleyan notified Kent and DKE that they would no longer be eligible to participate in the university's program housing system as of the 2015–16 academic year and, therefore, that Wesleyan students no longer could reside in or use the DKE House. In response, the plaintiffs commenced the present action, alleging promissory estoppel, negligent misrepresentation, tortious interference with business expectancies, and violations of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), General Statutes § 42-110a et seq., and seeking damages, attorney's fees and costs, and injunctive relief. Following a jury trial, the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiffs on all counts and awarded Kent $386,000 in damages. In addition, the trial court, acting pursuant to CUTPA, awarded the plaintiffs $398,129 in attorney's fees and $13,234.44 in costs, and issued a mandatory injunction requiring, among other things, that Wesleyan enter into a new contract with Kent and DKE, resume housing Wesleyan students in the DKE House, and give DKE three years in which to coeducate.

On appeal, the defendants raise various challenges to the judgment, including claims concerning the trial court's jury instructions and the sufficiency of the evidence with respect to both liability and damages. The defendants also contend that the trial court abused its discretion or otherwise acted contrary to law in awarding the plaintiffs injunctive relief. We conclude that, although there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find the defendants liable, the trial court failed to properly instruct the jury regarding the legal effects of the parties' contract and the proper means of calculating damages. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for a new trial.")


Tort Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Agati, Taryn

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=4347

AC43011 - Pascola-Milton v. Millard ("In this case arising from a motor vehicle accident between the plaintiff Diana Pascola-Milton and the named defendant, Leroy Millard, Pascola-Milton appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying her demand for a trial de novo following an arbitration award in her favor against her insurer, the defendant Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company (Liberty), for underinsured motorist benefits. Pascola-Milton argues that she has an absolute right to a trial de novo. Clive Milton, Pascola-Milton's husband and coplaintiff, appeals from the summary judgment rendered in favor of Millard on Milton's derivative claims for loss of consortium, bystander emotional distress and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Milton claims that the court erred in rendering summary judgment in favor of Millard on the ground that those claims were barred by the applicable statute of limitations because Milton's complaint was filed more than two years after the motor vehicle accident. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")


Tort Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Agati, Taryn

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=4314

AC42498 - McCall v. Sopneski (Negligence; motion for summary judgment; whether trial court properly rendered summary judgment on ground that defendant automobile dealer was immune from liability pursuant to statute (§ 14-60) for damages allegedly caused by vehicle loaned to customer; "The plaintiff, Kyle McCall, was injured when the motorcycle he was operating was struck by a vehicle operated by the defendant Gina Sopneski and owned by the defendant Reynolds Garage & Marine, Inc., known also as Reynolds Subaru (Reynolds). The plaintiff thereafter served a two count complaint on the defendants, alleging in the first count negligence against Sopneski and in the second count vicarious liability against Reynolds pursuant to General Statutes § 14-154a. The trial court subsequently granted summary judgment in favor of Reynolds on the second count of the complaint, concluding as a matter of law that no genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether Reynolds was immune from liability for Sopneski's actions. On appeal, the plaintiff challenges the propriety of that determination.We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")


Tort Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Agati, Taryn

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=4275

AC43794 - Jan G. v. Semple ("The self-represented plaintiff, Jan G., appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing his action against the defendants, state employees of the Department of Correction (department). On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over (1) his claims against the defendants in their individual capacities on the basis of statutory immunity pursuant to General Statutes § 4-165, and (2) his claims against the defendants in their official capacities on the basis of the doctrine of sovereign immunity. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")


Business Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Booth, George

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=4268

AC43027 - Wittman v. Intense Movers, Inc. (Corporate dissolution; breach of fiduciary duty; notice to purchase shares of company pursuant to statute (§ 33-900 (b)); motion to enforce settlement agreement; "The self-represented defendants, Alexander Leute and William R. Leute III, appeal from the judgment of the trial court enforcing a signed memorandum of understanding as supplemented by an unsigned settlement document with its attachments (jointly, settlement agreement) made between the defendants and the plaintiffs, Matthew Wittman and Carol Wittman, regarding the defendants' purchase of the plaintiffs' shares of stock in Intense Movers, Inc. (company). On appeal, the defendants claim that the trial court erred in granting the plaintiffs' motion to enforce the settlement agreement because the defendants' ability to obtain third-party financing to fund the purchase of the plaintiffs' shares was a contingency of the settlement agreement. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")


Tort Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Agati, Taryn

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=4254

AC42276 - Phillips v. Hebron ("The minor plaintiff, Alexander M. Phillips, appeals from the trial court's decision granting the motion of the defendants, the town of Hebron (town), the Hebron Board of Education (board), and eight of the board's employees, to dismiss counts one through twenty of the plaintiff's complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the basis of a failure to exhaust administrative remedies. We dismiss the appeal with respect to counts two through six, eight, ten, twelve through sixteen, eighteen, and twenty for lack of a final judgment. The judgment is affirmed in all other respects.")


Tort Law Supreme Court Slip Opinion

   by Agati, Taryn

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=4251

SC20420 - Doe v. Rackliffe ("The sole issue in this appeal is whether the extended statute of limitations in General Statutes § 52-577d applies to negligence claims for personal injuries brought against the alleged perpetrator of a sexual assault. The seven plaintiffs in these six consolidated cases appeal from the decision of the trial court rendering summary judgment in favor of the defendant, William J. Forbes, as executor of the estate of Robert Rackliffe, on the ground that the plaintiffs' negligence claims were time barred. The plaintiffs, each of whom were minors at the time of the alleged assaults, contend that the trial court improperly applied the general negligence statute of limitations in General Statutes § 52-584 to their claims alleging medical negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress instead of the extended limitation period set forth in § 52-577d. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.")


Tort Law Supreme Court Slip Opinion

   by Zigadto, Janet

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=4248

SC20382 - Stone v. East Coast Swappers, LLC ("This certified appeal requires us to consider the circumstances under which a plaintiff may be denied attorney's fees under the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), General Statutes § 42-110a et seq. The plaintiff, Thomas G. Stone III, appeals from the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming the judgment of the trial court, which found that the defendant, East Coast Swappers, LLC, had violated CUTPA and awarded the plaintiff compensatory damages, but declined to award punitive damages or attorney's fees. See Stone v. East Coast Swappers, LLC, 191 Conn. App. 63, 65, 213 A.3d 499 (2019). The plaintiff contends that we should adopt a presumption whereby a plaintiff prevailing in a CUTPA action should ordinarily recover attorney's fees under General Statutes § 42-110g (d) unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust. Regardless of whether we adopt such a presumption, the plaintiff contends that the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that the trial court had not abused its discretion when it failed to award the plaintiff attorney's fees. Although we decline to adopt the plaintiff's suggested presumption, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion."

. . .

"The judgment of the Appellate Court is reversed and the case is remanded to that court with direction to reverse the judgment of the trial court insofar as it declined to award attorney's fees to the plaintiff and to remand the case to that court for its consideration of the plaintiff's request for an award of attorney's fees consistent with this opinion.")


Tort Law Supreme Court Slip Opinion

   by Agati, Taryn

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=4241

SC20405 - Klein v. Quinnipiac University ("The plaintiff, Daniel Klein, brought this premises liability action against the defendant, Quinnipiac University, for injuries he suffered while riding his bicycle on the defendant's campus. Following a trial, the jury returned a general verdict for the defendant. The plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Court, arguing that the trial court improperly declined to give a licensee instruction to the jury and that the trial court improperly admitted certain testimony regarding the plaintiff's speed. The Appellate Court concluded that the trial court properly declined to give a licensee instruction and that, even if it was error, it was harmless. The Appellate Court also concluded that the general verdict rule barred its review of the plaintiff's evidentiary claim. The plaintiff now appeals, following our grant of certification, from the judgment of the Appellate Court, affirming the judgment in favor of the defendant. Klein v. Quinnipiac University, 193 Conn. App. 469, 470–71, 219 A.3d 911 (2019). On appeal, the plaintiff's claims are solely limited to the Appellate Court's ruling on his instructional claim. Specifically, the plaintiff claims that the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that (1) the trial court did not err in failing to give the licensee instruction in the present case, and (2) any error was harmless.

After examining the entire record on appeal and considering the briefs and oral arguments of the parties, we have determined that the appeal should be dismissed on the ground that certification was improvidently granted.

The appeal is dismissed.")


Tort Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Agati, Taryn

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=4238

AC42951 - Vaccaro v. Loscalzo ("The plaintiffs, Enrico Vaccaro (Attorney Vaccaro), acting as the administrator of the estate of Marie J. Vaccaro (decedent), and Enrico F. Vaccaro, the now deceased husband of Marie J. Vaccaro, appeal from the judgment of the trial court dismissing for failure to prosecute with due diligence their substitute complaint against the defendants, Christopher P. Loscalzo, Cardiology Associates of New Haven, P.C., Yale Medical Group, Yale University School of Medicine, and Yale New Haven Hospital, Inc. The plaintiffs claim that the court abused its discretion in dismissing the substitute complaint. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")


Tort Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Agati, Taryn

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=4230

AC42031 - Tunick v. Tunick ("This case concerns a dispute among family members over the administration of assets held in a trust created by the family patriarch. The plaintiff Stephen M. Tunick appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the defendants, Barbara Tunick, Roberta G. Tunick, and Richard S. DiPreta, administrator of the estate of Sylvia G. Tunick (estate). On appeal, the plaintiff contends that (1) the court improperly granted DiPreta's motion to strike a breach of contract count, (2) the court improperly rejected the plaintiff's claim that his causes of action as a remainder beneficiary did not become ripe until the death of the primary beneficiary, (3) genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether the plaintiff's claims are time barred under General Statutes § 52-577, and (4) the court abused its discretion in declining to grant the plaintiff's motion to open the judgment. We dismiss the appeal in part and affirm the judgment of the trial court in all other respects.")


Tort Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Roy, Christopher

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=4223

AC42567 - Doe v. Flanigan ("This appeal arises out of an incident in which a third party, Charles Fullenwiley, assaulted the plaintiff, John Doe, by placing a sex toy against his buttocks after the named defendant, Stephen Flanigan, at the time a police officer employed by the defendant city of Waterbury, allegedly pushed the plaintiff to the ground and handcuffed him. The plaintiff appeals from the summary judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of the defendant on the fourth count of the plaintiff's second amended complaint, which alleged that, pursuant to General Statutes § 52-557n, the defendant was liable to the plaintiff for the injuries he sustained arising out of Flanigan's negligent conduct. The fourth count of the plaintiff's complaint incorporated the allegations of the third count, which alleged that Flanigan acted negligently when he (1) pushed the plaintiff to the ground and handcuffed him, (2) failed to protect the plaintiff from Fullenwiley's assault, and (3) failed to report Fullenwiley's assault. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court erred in concluding that there were no genuine issues of material fact as to whether (1) Flanigan engaged in wilful, rather than negligent, misconduct when he pushed the plaintiff to the ground and handcuffed him, and (2) the identifiable victim subject to imminent harm exception to governmental immunity did not apply to the plaintiff's allegation that Flanigan failed to protect the plaintiff from being sexually assaulted by Fullenwiley. Additionally, the defendant argues that we can affirm the judgment of the trial court on the alternative ground that Flanigan was not acting within the scope of his employment, and, therefore, the defendant could not be liable.

As to the first issue raised by the plaintiff, we conclude that there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether Flanigan's conduct was wilful or negligent. We also reject the defendant's claimed alternative ground for affirmance because there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether Flanigan, in fact, was acting within the scope of his employment when he pushed the plaintiff to the ground and handcuffed him. As to the second issue raised by the plaintiff, we conclude that the court improperly rendered summary judgment on a ground not argued before it. Consequently, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.")


Tort Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Agati, Taryn

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=4213

AC42686 - Wright v. Giles ("The plaintiff, Ian Wright, appeals from the judgment of the trial court granting the motion of the defendants, Carlton Giles, Richard Sparraco, Scott Semple, and George Jepsen, to dismiss the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly granted the defendants' motion to dismiss. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.")


Tort Law Supreme Court Slip Opinion

   by Agati, Taryn

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=4210

SC20333 - Fisk v. Town of Redding ("This certified appeal requires us to consider whether the jury's verdict in this case contains a fatal inconsistency between two special interrogatories relating to a count alleging absolute public nuisance, one finding that a particular condition on the land was inherently dangerous and the other finding that the defendant's use of the land was reasonable. The plaintiff, Gregg Fisk, brought the present action against the named defendant, the town of Redding, alleging that a specific retaining wall located outside of a local pub should have been guarded by a fence and that the absence of such a fence constituted a public nuisance and caused him to sustain personal injuries. The defendant appeals from the judgment of the Appellate Court, which reversed the judgment rendered in favor of the defendant and remanded the case for a new trial. Fisk v. Redding, 190 Conn. App. 99, 113, 210 A.3d 73 (2019). Specifically, the defendant claims that the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied the plaintiff's motion to set aside the verdict, which had claimed that the jury's response to the first special interrogatory—that the unfenced retaining wall was inherently dangerous—was fatally inconsistent with its response to the third special interrogatory that the defendant's use of the land was reasonable. Id., 103, 112. Because we conclude that the jury's answers to the first and third special interrogatories can be harmonized in light of our established nuisance jurisprudence, we conclude that the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that the trial court had abused its discretion by denying the plaintiff's motion to set aside the verdict. We, therefore, reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.")


Tort Law Supreme Court Slip Opinion

   by Agati, Taryn

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=4188

SC20425 - Cole v. City of New Haven ("This appeal requires us to consider the limits of our recent decision in Borelli v. Renaldi, ___ Conn. ___, ___ A.3d ___ (2020), with respect to whether applicable state and municipal policies render a police officer's acts during a pursuit of a motorist ministerial, rather than discretionary, for purposes of governmental immunity. The plaintiff, Amaadi Cole, brought this negligence action against the defendants, the city of New Haven (city) and one of its police officers, Nikki Curry, seeking damages for personal injuries sustained when Curry pulled her police cruiser directly into an oncoming traffic lane in which the plaintiff was traveling on his dirt bike, causing him to swerve and strike a tree. The plaintiff appeals from the granting of summary judgment by the trial court in favor of the defendants on the ground that they were entitled to governmental immunity for discretionary acts pursuant to General Statutes § 52-557n (a) (2) (B). On appeal, the plaintiff claims, inter alia, that the trial court incorrectly determined that Curry's decision to drive her cruiser into the oncoming traffic lane was a discretionary act because her actions violated several policies that imposed ministerial duties regarding roadblocks, the operation of police vehicles, and pursuits. We agree with the plaintiff and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the trial court.")


Tort Law Supreme Court Slip Opinion

   by Agati, Taryn

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=4183

SC20325 - Harvey v. Dept. of Correction ("The nub of the question before us is whether the limitations period for a claim against the state brought by the representative of a decedent is controlled by General Statutes § 52-555 (a) regarding wrongful death claims, General Statutes § 4-160 regarding actions authorized by the Claims Commissioner, or both. The plaintiff, Sandra Harvey, administratrix of the estate of Isaiah Boucher, appeals from the judgment of the Appellate Court, which affirmed the trial court's judgment dismissing the action against the defendants, the Department of Correction and the University of Connecticut Health Center Correctional Managed Health Care, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The plaintiff argues that the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that her action was time barred by § 4-160 (d). She argues that, instead, § 52-555 (a) provides the controlling statute of limitations. We conclude that a plaintiff in the unusual posture of the one here, who brings a wrongful death action against the state after having previously obtained permission to sue for medical negligence from the Claims Commissioner, must comply with both the two year time limitation for a wrongful death action articulated in § 52-555 (a) and the one year time limitation on the Claims Commissioner's authorization to sue articulated in § 4-160 (d). Because the plaintiff only complied with the statute of limitations contained in § 52-555 (a) and not with the limitation period articulated in § 4-160 (d), we affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.")


Tort Law Appellate Court Opinions

   by Agati, Taryn

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=4179

AC42869 - Autry v. Hosey ("The defendants, Brendan Hosey and the city of New Haven, appeal from the judgment of the trial court rendered, following a trial to the court, in favor of the plaintiff, La Tanya Autry. The plaintiff brought the underlying negligence action against the defendants seeking compensation for damages that she sustained when she was struck by Hosey's police cruiser while she was a pedestrian crossing a city street. On appeal, the defendants claim that the trial court, in its order, improperly calculated noneconomic damages for emotional trauma because the court lacked the necessary evidence to find that pedestrians suffer greater emotional trauma when struck by a vehicle than occupants of a vehicle. We agree with the defendants and, accordingly, reverse in part the judgment of the court and remand the matter for a new hearing in damages.")

AC42765 - Costanzo v. Plainfield ("This case arises out of the tragic drowning of a young child in an aboveground swimming pool.The defendants, the town of Plainfield (town), Robert Kerr and D. Kyle Collins, Jr., appeal from the trial court's orders sustaining the objections of the plaintiff Malisa Costanzo, as administratrix of the estate of the decedent, Isabella R. Costanzo, to the defendants' efforts to commence apportionment actions against the owners of the property where the pool was located and their former tenants who had the pool constructed.We agree with the defendants that the court improperly sustained the plaintiff's objections, and therefore we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for further proceedings.")


Tort Law Appellate Court Opinions

   by Roy, Christopher

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=4171

AC42647 - Larmel v. Metro North Commuter Railroad Co. ("The plaintiff, Phyllis Larmel, commenced the present personal injury action (second action) against the defendant, Metro North Commuter Railroad Company (Metro North), pursuant to the accidental failure of suit statute, General Statutes § 52-592 (a). Metro North responded by filing a motion to dismiss the second action on the ground that it was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The trial court, S. Richards, J., dismissed the second action. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly (1) dismissed the second action, (2) held that the doctrine of res judicata applies to an arbitrator's decision rendered pursuant to 'informal compulsory arbitration' under General Statutes § 52-549u, (3) failed to hold that a judgment rendered pursuant to General Statutes § 52-549z is a matter of form, (4) failed to hold that the second action was viable pursuant to § 52-592 (a), and (5) failed to hold that the plaintiff's failure to file a demand for a trial de novo constituted mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect. The defendant claims that the second action is barred by the doctrine of res judicata or, in the alternative, that § 52-592 (a) does not save the second action. We conclude that the accidental failure of suit statute does not save the second action. The form of the judgment is improper. We, therefore, reverse the judgment of dismissal and remand the case with direction to render judgment in favor of Metro North.")

AC42259 - Goody v. Bedard ("The plaintiff, Robert Goody, administrator of the estate of Richard Goody (decedent), appeals from the summary judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of the defendant Flori Schmoegner. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court erred by (1) effectively denying his motion for an extension of time to conduct additional discovery when it rendered summary judgment, and (2) determining that the defendant did not owe a duty of care to the decedent in rendering summary judgment. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.")


Property Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Zigadto, Janet

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=4162

AC42570 - Rider v. Rider (Quiet title; fraud; breach of fiduciary duty; "This appeal stems from a family dispute among a father and his two sons. In an effort to revive his claims to ownership of a campground parcel, the plaintiff, Patrick Rider, has created an appellate argument reminiscent of Frankenstein's monster, as he has stitched together aspects of four separate matters: a probate proceeding, a bankruptcy action, a separate 2017 civil action (2017 action) and the underlying action in an effort to reverse the judgment of the trial court. The plaintiff appeals from the judgment of the trial court granting the motions to dismiss filed by the defendants, Brian Rider, individually and in his capacities as the executor and conservator of the estate of Leigh H. Rider, Jr. (Leigh Rider), Lake Williams Campground, Inc., Lake Williams Campground Association, Inc. (Association), Charles D. Houlihan, Jr., and Franklin G. Pilicy. The plaintiff and Brian Rider are the sons of Leigh Rider. On appeal, the plaintiff presents, for the first time, a collateral challenge to the appointment by the Probate Court of North Central Connecticut (Probate Court) of Brian Rider as conservator for Leigh Rider and the subsequent conveyance of a campground property from the conserved Leigh Rider to the Association. The plaintiff further contends that the trial court improperly dismissed his complaint on the ground that he lacked standing. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")


Tort Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Agati, Taryn

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=4152

AC41832 - Sosa v. Robinson (Alleged deprivation of plaintiff's federal constitutional rights; "The plaintiff, Andres Sosa, appeals from the judgment of the trial court, dismissing certain counts of his complaint in which he sought compensatory relief from the defendant, Dave Robinson, a correctional commissary lead operator at the MacDougall-Walker Correctional Institution (MacDougall), in his individual capacity and rendering summary judgment on the remainder of the complaint in favor of the defendant. The plaintiff claims that the court erred in concluding that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over his claims seeking compensatory relief against the defendant in his individual capacity and erred in concluding that the defendant was entitled to summary judgment on the remainder of the plaintiff's complaint due to the plaintiff's failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. In addition to arguing that the court's subject matter jurisdiction analysis was correct, the defendant argues in the alternative that the court correctly rendered summary judgment in his favor because the plaintiff's claims fail as a matter of law. We agree with the plaintiff that the court had jurisdiction over the claims in which he seeks compensatory relief against the defendant in his individual capacity. We agree, however, with the defendant's alternative argument that the plaintiff's claims fail on their merits as a matter of law. Therefore, we reverse in part and affirm in part the judgment of the trial court.")


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