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Tort Law

Tort Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Booth, George

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5178

AC44555 - Doe v. Bemer ("The plaintiffs John Doe and Bob Doe, who had brought an action against the defendant Bruce Bemer that had been withdrawn in accordance with settlement agreements of the parties, appeal from the judgment of the trial court denying their motion for an order restoring the action to the docket (motion to restore) and from the court's denials of their motion for reargument and reconsideration and amended motion for reargument and reconsideration. The plaintiffs also filed an amended appeal challenging the court's failure to adjudicate and marking off their motion to enforce the settlement agreements, its denial of their motion for reconsideration relating to the disposition of their motion to enforce the settlement agreements, and the denial of their motion to terminate an appellate stay. On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that (1) the denial of their motion to restore constituted harmful error, (2) the denial of their motion to reconsider the denial of their motion to restore was clearly erroneous, (3) the hearing on their motion to restore was inadequate and the court improperly failed to hold a hearing "with testimony from witnesses regarding the enforceability of the agreements" in accordance with Audubon Parking Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Barclay & Stubbs, Inc., 225 Conn. 804, 626 A.2d 729 (1993) (Audubon), (4) the court did not have the authority to refuse to rule on the plaintiffs' motion to enforce the settlement agreements, and (5) the court improperly refused to grant their motion to terminate an appellate stay and to order enforcement of the settlement agreements. We disagree with the plaintiffs and affirm the judgment of the court.")


Tort Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Booth, George

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5172

AC44524 - Adams v. Aircraft Spruce & Specialty Co. (Negligent entrustment; summary judgment; "The plaintiffs, John S. Adams and Mary Lou Hanney, brought the underlying action as coadministrators of the estate of their son, Ryan Michael Adams, who was eighteen years old when he died on September 20, 2015, in the airplane crash that also claimed the life of the eighteen year old, newly licensed pilot of the airplane, Cathryn Depuy. The plaintiffs now appeal from the summary judgment rendered against them on the two counts of their complaint brought against the defendant James W. Depuy, the father of the deceased pilot, which sounded in negligence and negligent entrustment.

The plaintiffs claim on appeal that the trial court improperly rendered summary judgment with respect to the negligent entrustment count. In particular, they claim that genuine issues of material fact remain in dispute regarding the defendant's rental of the Cessna 150H airplane that his daughter was piloting when it crashed, which, the plaintiffs contend, if proven, would demonstrate that he had the requisite control over the airplane to establish that he negligently entrusted the airplane to his daughter. We conclude that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the defendant is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law on the negligent entrustment count because the undisputed facts demonstrate that, assuming he rented the airplane for his daughter's use, he nevertheless lacked the necessary control over the airplane to meet an essential element of a cause of action sounding in negligent entrustment. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court.")


Tort Law Supreme Court Opinion

   by Booth, George

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5159

SC20543, SC20544 - Clinton v. Aspinwall (Action to recover damages for breach of contract and fiduciary duty; "When a court renders judgment in a multicount civil action with fewer than all counts of a plaintiff’s complaint accounted for in that judgment, jurisdictional alarm bells should ring if any party files an appeal, alerting the parties and the trial court to a potential final judgment problem. Before the parties and the appellate courts expend resources resolving the appeal, it is important to examine the rules of practice, statutes and our case law to determine whether an appeal can be taken from that judgment. See General Statutes §§ 51-197a and 52-263; Practice Book §§ 61-2 through 61-5. In Meribear Productions, Inc. v. Frank, 328 Conn. 709, 183 A.3d 1164 (2018), we held in the context of a court trial that, when legally consistent theories of recovery have been litigated but not all theories have been ruled on, there is no final judgment. The present appeals require us to determine whether the same threshold jurisdictional rule applies in the context of civil jury trials. We hold that it does and are therefore compelled to vacate the judgment of the Appellate Court and to remand this case to that court with direction to dismiss the appeals for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.")


Tort Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Roy, Christopher

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5153

AC44100 - Ocasio v. Verdura Construction, LLC (The plaintiff, Luis Ocasio, appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered after a jury verdict in favor of the defendant Verdura Construction, LLC. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that (1) the court erred when it instructed the jury and provided it with interrogatories to answer regarding the ongoing storm doctrine and (2) such error was harmful because it likely confused and misled the jury as to the relevant law. We agree and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the trial court.")


Tort Law Supreme Court Slip Opinion

   by Booth, George

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5151

SC20511 - Priore v. Haig (Absolute Litigation Immunity; Defamation; "This certified appeal requires us to determine whether a public hearing on a special permit application before a town's planning and zoning commission is a quasi-judicial proceeding such that public statements made during the hearing are entitled to absolute immunity. The plaintiff, Thomas Priore, brought this defamation action against the defendant, Stephanie Haig, seeking to recover damages for injuries that he claims to have sustained as a result of the defendant's allegedly defamatory statements about the plaintiff made during a hearing before the Greenwich Planning and Zoning Commission. The plaintiff appeals from the judgment of the Appellate Court, which affirmed the trial court's judgment, concluding that the defendant's statements were entitled to absolute immunity. Priore v. Haig, 196 Conn. App. 675, 695, 712, 230 A.3d 714 (2020). On appeal, the plaintiff contends that the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that the defendant's statements were entitled to absolute immunity because the hearing before the commission was not quasi-judicial and the statements concerning the plaintiff were not relevant to the subject matter of the commission's hearing. We agree with the plaintiff that the public hearing was not quasi-judicial in nature and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.")


Tort Law Supreme Court Opinion

   by Booth, George

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5129

SC20498 - Daley v. Kashmanian (Torts; General Statutes § 52-557n; Whether defendant entitled to governmental immunity for negligent operation of motor vehicle in course of conducting surveillance; "The sole issue in this certified appeal is whether a police officer who was involved in a crash while using an automobile to perform surveillance during an investigation of possible criminal activity was engaged in a discretionary act for purposes of governmental immunity under the common law or General Statutes § 52-557n (a) (2) (B). The plaintiff, Devonte Daley, appeals, upon our grant of his petition for certification, from the judgment of the Appellate Court reversing in part the judgment of the trial court, rendered in favor of the plaintiff after a jury trial, in this personal injury action against the defendants, Zachary Kashmanian, a police officer, and his employer, the city of Hartford (city). See Daley v. Kashmanian, 193 Conn. App. 171, 190, 219 A.3d 499 (2019). On appeal, the plaintiff contends that the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that Kashmanian's actions during his surveillance of the plaintiff using a "soft car," which is an unmarked vehicle lacking police equipment, were discretionary acts for purposes of governmental immunity. We conclude that Kashmanian's operation of the soft car, including following the statutory rules of the road; see General Statutes § 14-212 et seq.; was a ministerial function and that the defendants, therefore, were not entitled to discretionary act immunity for Kashmanian's negligent operation of the soft car during the surveillance operation. Accordingly, we reverse in part the judgment of the Appellate Court.")


Business Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Oumano, Emily

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5118

AC44586 - Deutsche Bank AG v. Vik (“The defendants, Alexander Vik (Alexander) and Caroline Vik (Caroline), appeal from the judgment of the trial court denying their motion to dismiss, in which they asserted that the claims brought by the plaintiff, Deutsche Bank AG, were barred by the litigation privilege. On appeal, the defendants claim that the court improperly concluded that the litigation privilege does not bar the plaintiff's claims of tortious interference with business expectancy and violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), General Statutes § 42-110a et seq. We agree and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the trial court.”)


Tort Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Townsend, Karen

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5122

AC44406 - Doe v. New Haven (“The plaintiff appeals from the trial court’s decision rendering summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the ground that the defendants were entitled to governmental immunity. The plaintiff claims that the court improperly concluded that (1) no genuine issues of material fact existed with respect to whether Johnson had a ministerial duty to report suspected child abuse under General Statutes § 17a-101 et seq., (2) Johnson’s deposition testimony did not establish the existence of two additional ministerial duties—specifically, a duty to prohibit free class periods and a duty to take attendance, and (3) the plaintiff was not an identifiable person subject to imminent harm for purposes of the identifiable person-imminent harm exception to governmental immunity for discretionary acts. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.”)


Tort Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Roy, Christopher

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5103

AC44436 - Brass Mill Center, LLC v. Subway Real Estate Corp. ("The defendant AlliedBarton Security Services, LLC, appeals from the judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of the plaintiff, Brass Mill Center, LLC, granting summary judgment as to liability and awarding damages. The defendant argues that the trial court improperly concluded that it had a contractual duty (1) to defend the plaintiff in an underlying wrongful death action brought against the plaintiff and (2) to indemnify the plaintiff in that same wrongful death action, including for attorney’s fees and costs that the plaintiff incurred in pursuing claims against third parties. We agree and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the trial court.")


Property Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Zigadto, Janet

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5078

AC44377 - Kazemi v. Allen ("In this vexatious litigation action, the defendants, Lawrence Allen (Allen) and Green Tree Estate Association, Inc. (Green Tree), appeal from the judgment of the trial court in favor of the plaintiffs, Hossien Kazemi and Mahvash Mirzai. On appeal, the defendants claim that the trial court improperly (1) determined that the plaintiffs established that the defendants lacked probable cause to bring the claims for adverse possession and trespass in their counterclaim, (2) denied the defendants' motion for a directed judgement, (3) determined that the defendants failed to establish their advice of counsel defense, and (4) found that the defendants acted with malice. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")


Tort Law Supreme Court Opinion

   by Agati, Taryn

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5074

SC20537 - Costanzo v. Plainfield ("The apportionment statute, General Statutes § 52-572h, allows a party sued for damages resulting from personal injury, death or property damage caused by that party's negligence to file an apportionment complaint against additional parties, not named as defendants in the plaintiff's lawsuit, whose negligence caused the alleged losses. The statute expressly prohibits apportionment claims between a party liable for negligence and a party liable, among other things, "pursuant to any cause of action created by statute, except that liability may be apportioned among parties liable for negligence in any cause of action created by statute based on negligence . . . ." General Statutes § 52-572h (o). The central issue in this certified appeal is whether the apportionment statute, by this language, permits municipal defendants whose liability is based on General Statutes § 52-557n (b) (8) to file an apportionment complaint sounding in negligence. Section 52-557n (b) (8) renders municipal actors liable for damages and injuries that occur due to the failure to inspect or the negligent or inadequate inspection of property if (1) the municipality had notice of a hazard or violation of law (first exception), or (2) the act or omission "constitutes a reckless disregard for health or safety under all the relevant circumstances" (second exception).

Resolution of this appeal thus requires us to consider whether a claim brought under § 52-557n (b) (8) is a "cause of action created by statute based on negligence," such that apportionment is allowed under § 52-572h (o). As we explain herein, because § 52-557n (b) (8) expressly abrogates the common-law doctrine of municipal immunity, and because the first exception thereunder allows for a cause of action that we determine is based on negligence, we conclude that claims brought pursuant to that exception do qualify for apportionment.

The named plaintiff, Malisa Costanzo, the administratrix of the estate of the decedent, Isabella R. Costanzo, brought claims against the defendants, the town of Plainfield (town), and two of its employees, Robert Kerr and D. Kyle Collins, Jr., under § 52-557n (b) (8), stemming from the drowning of the decedent in a pool located on privately owned property in the town. Thereafter, the defendants filed a notice of intent to seek apportionment against the owners of the property where the pool was located and an apportionment complaint against the former tenants of the property, who had the pool constructed. The plaintiff objected to the defendants' efforts to seek apportionment, claiming that her complaint set forth a cause of action alleging recklessness or an intentional act under § 52-557n (b) (8), rather than negligence, and, therefore, that the apportionment statute did not apply. The trial court agreed and concluded that, "[i]f the defendants are found liable to the [plaintiff] on [the basis of] the [plaintiff's operative] revised complaint, it will be for reckless disregard for health [or] safety under all relevant . . . circumstances, not for negligence." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Therefore, the trial court issued orders sustaining the plaintiff's objections and dismissing the defendants' apportionment complaint and notice of intent to seek apportionment. The defendants appealed to the Appellate Court, and that court reversed the orders of the trial court, concluding that the plaintiff's claims under § 52-557n (b) (8) fell within the first exception, which it held to incorporate a negligence standard. See Costanzo v. Plainfield, 200 Conn. App. 755, 770, 239 A.3d 370 (2020). Consequently, the Appellate Court determined that § 52-572h (o) authorizes apportionment in connection with such claims. See id. We agree with the Appellate Court and, accordingly, affirm its judgment.")


Tort Law Supreme and Appellate Court Opinions

   by Roy, Christopher

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5070

SC20585 - Garcia v. Cohen (Premises Liability; "After examining the entire record on appeal and considering the parties' briefs, we have determined that the appeal in this case should be dismissed on the ground that certification was improvidently granted."

AC44798 - Ferri v. Powell-Ferri ("In this action alleging vexatious litigation, the plaintiff, Paul John Ferri, appeals from the judgment of the trial court, rendered following a court trial, in favor of the defendant Nancy Powell-Ferri. On appeal, Ferri claims that the trial court incorrectly concluded that Powell-Ferri had probable cause to initiate and pursue her cross complaint filed against Ferri in a prior lawsuit. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")


Tort Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Booth, George

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5049

AC44465 - Lavette v. Stanley Black & Decker Inc. (Intentional tort; motion to strike; whether plaintiff employee's pleading was legally sufficient to bring claim within intentional tort exception to exclusivity provision (§ 31-284) of Workers' Compensation Act (§ 31-275 et seq.); whether plaintiff's allegations were legally sufficient to establish that supervisory employee acted as defendant employer's alter ego; "The plaintiff, Henry Lavette III, a former employee of the defendant, Stanley Black & Decker, Inc., appeals from the judgment of the trial court, rendered in favor of the defendant following the court's decision to strike count one of his fourth amended complaint with prejudice. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly concluded that he had failed to allege sufficient facts to establish that his claim came within the intentional tort exception to the exclusivity provision of the Workers' Compensation Act (act), General Statutes § 31-275 et seq. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.")


Tort Law Supreme Court Opinion

   by Agati, Taryn

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5020

SC20607 - Glover v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc. ("This case presents two questions of law certified to us by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199b (d), regarding the interpretation the Connecticut Product Liability Act (CPLA), General Statutes § 52-572m et seq., and the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), General Statutes § 42-110a et seq. The plaintiff, Marjorie Glover, brought this action in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, alleging that she had been injured by defective artificial lenses manufactured and marketed by the defendants, Bausch & Lomb, Inc., Bausch & Lomb Holdings, Inc., Valeant Pharmaceuticals International, Valeant Pharmaceuticals International, Inc., Valeant Pharmaceuticals North America, LLC, and the "Doe defendants." The plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that the defendants had violated the CPLA by failing to warn her of the inherent dangers of the artificial lenses, thereby causing injuries to her eyes. After the operative complaint was filed, the plaintiff filed a motion for leave to amend the complaint to add a claim that the defendants had violated CUTPA by engaging in deceptive advertising. The District Court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the plaintiff's claims pursuant to the CPLA on the ground that they were preempted by federal law. The court also denied the plaintiff's motion for leave to amend the complaint to add a CUTPA claim on the ground that the amendment would be futile because federal law would also preempt that claim.

The plaintiff appealed from the judgment of dismissal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. That court determined that the resolution of the plaintiff's claims depended on the interpretation of Connecticut law for which there was no controlling precedent in this court's decisions, and it requested certification of the following questions of law for our consideration: (1) "[w]hether a cause of action exists under the negligence or failure-to-warn provisions of the [CPLA, General Statutes §] 52-572q, or elsewhere in Connecticut law, based on a manufacturer's alleged failure to report adverse events to a regulator like the [United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA)] following approval of the device, or to comply with a regulator's [postapproval] requirements." And (2) "[w]hether the [CPLA's] exclusivity provision, [General Statutes] § 52-572n, bars a claim under [CUTPA] based on allegations that a manufacturer deceptively and aggressively marketed and promoted a product despite knowing that it presented a substantial risk of injury." Glover v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 6 F.4th 229, 244 (2d Cir. 2021). We accepted the certified questions of law and answer "yes" to both."


Tort Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Booth, George

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5015

AC44153, AC44122 - Doe v. Board of Education (Negligence; recklessness; respondeat superior liability; motion for summary judgment; "These appeals involve consolidated actions concerning complaints of the bullying of two minor children by some of their classmates, which occurred while they attended Coleytown Middle School (middle school) in the town of Westport, and the alleged failures of school staff and administration in addressing those bullying complaints. In Docket No. AC 44153, the plaintiffs, John Doe 1, Jane Doe 1, and Jack Doe 1, appeal from the judgment of the trial court granting, in part, the motion for summary judgment filed by the defendants, the Board of Education of the Town of Westport (board); Micah Lawrence, the vice principal of the middle school; Elliott Landon, the superintendent of schools for the Westport school system; Richard Quiricone, a physical education teacher at the middle school; and the town of Westport (town). On appeal, the Doe 1 plaintiffs claim that the court erred in granting the Doe 1 defendants' motion for summary judgment. Specifically, the Doe 1 plaintiffs claim that the court improperly (1) failed to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the Doe 1 plaintiffs, (2) determined that the Doe 1 defendants are immune from liability under General Statutes § 10-222l because (a) the allegations of negligence in counts three, four, five, eight, and nine involve issues relating to whether the Doe 1 defendants acted in good faith and adequately reported and investigated the bullying allegations, which are factual issues and should not have been decided on a motion for summary judgment, and (b) the Doe 1 defendants failed to respond to six bullying complaints, (3) rendered summary judgment in favor of Lawrence, Landon, and Quiricone with respect to the claim of recklessness in count six because the claim requires a determination of their intent, which is a question of fact, (4) granted the motion for summary judgment as to count ten, which alleges a claim of respondeat superior liability against the board and the town, and (5) granted the motion for summary judgment when a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Landon or the board retaliated against the Doe 1 plaintiffs, as alleged in counts five, six, and nine. We disagree and affirm the judgment of the trial court in AC 44153.

In Docket No. AC 44122, the plaintiffs, John Doe 2, Jane Doe 2, and Jack Doe 2, appeal from the judgment of the trial court granting the motion for summary judgment filed by the defendants, the board, Kris Szabo, Lawrence, Landon, Quiricone, and the town. On appeal, the Doe 2 plaintiffs claim that the court improperly granted the Doe 2 defendants' motion for summary judgment. Specifically, the Doe 2 plaintiffs claim that (1) the court improperly failed to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the Doe 2 plaintiffs, (2) the allegations of negligence involve factual issues that are not susceptible to summary adjudication, (3) the claim of recklessness against Lawrence, Landon, Szabo, and Quiricone in count five requires a determination of their intent, which is a question of fact, (4) the court improperly granted the motion for summary judgment as to the claim of respondeat superior liability against the board and the town in count nine, and (5) a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Landon or the board retaliated against the Doe 2 plaintiffs, as alleged in counts four, five, and eight. We disagree and affirm the judgment of the trial court in AC 44122.")


Tort Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Booth, George

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=4992

AC44871 - Bennetta v. Derby (Public nuisance; motion to strike; claim that trial court erred in granting defendant city's motion to strike; "In this public nuisance action, the plaintiff, Arlene Bennetta, appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered after it granted the motion filed by the defendant, the city of Derby, to strike the plaintiff's substitute complaint. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court erred in striking her complaint because she properly alleged that the defendant created the nuisance by a positive act as required by General Statutes § 52-557n. We disagree and, therefore, affirm the judgment of the court.")


Tort Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Agati, Taryn

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=4982

AC44539 - Nardozzi v. Perez ("The defendant city of Bridgeport appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying in part its motion to dismiss the action of the plaintiff, James Nardozzi. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly denied its motion to dismiss the ninth count of the plaintiff's complaint on the ground of absolute immunity arising from the litigation privilege. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")


Landlord/Tenant Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Zigadto, Janet

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=4975

AC44657 - Robbins Eye Center, P.C. v. Commerce Park Associates, LLC ("The defendants, Commerce Park Associates, LLC (Commerce Park), and RDR Management, LLC (RDR), appeal from the judgment of the trial court granting a postjudgment motion of the plaintiff, Robbins Eye Center, P.C., seeking an order compelling Commerce Park to deliver to the plaintiff's counsel certain escrowed funds and future payments received by Commerce Park vis-a-vis an account receivable. The dispositive issue raised by the defendants on appeal is whether a provision in a commercial lease executed by Commerce Park and Kim Robbins, who owns the plaintiff and is a nonparty to this matter, precludes the plaintiff from collecting the escrowed funds and payments at issue. We conclude that the lease provision does not bar the plaintiff's collection efforts, and, therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.")


Tort Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Townsend, Karen

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=4970

AC43413 - Byrne v. Avery Center for Obstetrics & Gynecology, P.C. (“On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly (1) limited the testimony of its expert witness; (2) admitted into evidence a medical report, charged the jury concerning future noneconomic damages, and denied its request for a jury interrogatory differentiating between past and future damages; and (3) granted the plaintiff’s motion for offer of judgment interest pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 2005) § 52-192a.2 We affirm the judgment of the trial court.”)




Tort Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Agati, Taryn

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=4961

AC43128 - Chapnick v. DiLauro ("The plaintiff Dominica Chapnick, individually and as administratrix of the estate of Randall Chapnick, appeals from the portion of the judgment of the trial court dismissing, pursuant to Connecticut's anti-SLAPP statute, General Statutes § 52-196a, the counts of the complaint against the defendants Cynthia Flaherty and John Popolizio, Jr., alleging nuisance and seeking injunctive relief. We reverse in part the judgment of the trial court.")