The mission of the Connecticut Judicial Branch is to serve the interests of justice and the public by resolving matters brought before it in a fair, timely, efficient and open manner.
SC20947 - State v. Mieles (“This appeal requires us to clarify the standards that
apply to a trial court’s determination to impose a postsentencing standing
criminal protective order pursuant to General Statutes § 53a-40e (a). The defendant,
Juan Mieles, appeals from the judgment of the Appellate Court, which affirmed
the trial court’s imposition of a standing criminal protective order against
him more than nine years after he was sentenced. The defendant claims that the
Appellate Court (1) incorrectly concluded that he did not challenge the imposition
of the standing criminal protective order on the basis that the trial court had
failed to abide by the standard applicable to such orders set forth in § 53a-40e
(a), and (2) improperly issued the protective order in the absence of a finding
of changed circumstances. We agree with the defendant that he adequately
briefed his claim before the Appellate Court that the trial court had employed
an incorrect legal standard in issuing the postsentencing criminal protective
order. Although we disagree with his characterization that § 53a-40e (a)
requires a finding of changed circumstances, we conclude that, when a standing
criminal protective order is issued postsentencing, in addition to its express
requirements, § 53a-40e also requires the issuing court to find that additional
evidence, which had not been presented to the sentencing court, demonstrates
that the issuance of the protective order would ‘best serve the interest of the
victim and the public . . . .’ General Statutes § 53a-40e (a). Accordingly, we
reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court and remand the case to that court
with direction to vacate the trial court’s order.”)
AC46253 - State v. Overstreet (“On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress evidence seized from his vehicle, (2) § 29-38 violates his right to bear arms under the second amendment to the United States constitution, (3) § 29-38 is unconstitutionally vague as applied to him, in violation of his due process rights, and (4) § 29-38 is unconstitutionally overinclusive in violation of his due process rights. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.”)
AC46807 - State v. William G. (“On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly (1) instructed the jury not to consider that the victim delayed reporting the sexual assault in evaluating her credibility, and (2) denied his request to instruct the jury that, in evaluating evidence of uncharged misconduct offered by the state to prove the defendant’s propensity to commit the charged crimes, it must first determine whether the state proved that the defendant had engaged in such conduct by a preponderance of the evidence. We agree that the court’s delayed reporting instruction was improper and harmful, and, accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court.”)
AC47242 - State v. Sharpley (“On appeal, the defendant claims that the court erred in denying his motion to dismiss because the state’s delay in the execution of the arrest warrant violated his due process rights under the Connecticut constitution and the United States constitution. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.”)
AC46428 - State v. Colon (“The defendant, Luis E. Colon, appeals from the judgments
of conviction, rendered following a jury trial, of possession of a controlled
substance in violation of General Statutes § 21a-279 (a) (1) (count one) and
operation of a motor vehicle while having an elevated blood alcohol content in
violation of General Statutes § 14-227a (a) (2) (count two). The defendant
claims that (1) the trial court committed plain error in failing, sua sponte,
to sever the two offenses joined in the same information and (2) the evidence
was insufficient to support his conviction with respect to count two. We
disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgments of the court.”)
AC46810 - State v. Makins (Burglary in the first degree; attempt to commit sexual
assault in the first degree; ‘On appeal, the defendant claims that the court
improperly denied his motion for a judgment of acquittal, made at the close of
all the evidence, because the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to
establish beyond a reasonable doubt his identity as the perpetrator of the
crimes of which he was convicted. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the
judgment of the court.”)
SC20983 - State v. Wade (“In this certified appeal, the defendant, Jaquan Wade, appeals from the Appellate Court’s judgment affirming the trial court’s revocation of his probation and imposition of a thirteen year term of incarceration. The defendant claims that the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that, at his probation revocation hearing, he had abandoned his argument that the trial court should engage in a due process balancing under State v. Crespo, 190 Conn. App. 639, 646–48, 211 A.3d 1027 (2019), before admitting into evidence a witness’ out-of-court identification when that witness was not present and available for cross-examination. We agree and reverse the Appellate Court’s judgment.”)
AC45916 - State v. Abdulaziz (Health insurance fraud; “The defendant claims that his
conviction of health insurance fraud cannot be reconciled with his simultaneous
acquittal, based upon the same alleged underlying conduct, of larceny in the
first degree by defrauding a public community in violation of General Statutes
(Rev. to 2017) § 53a-122 (a) (4). Specifically, he argues that the court had
acquitted him of larceny in the first degree based upon the state’s failure to
prove the ‘obtaining’ and ‘value’ elements of that offense beyond a reasonable
doubt and, thus, that it should also have acquitted him of health insurance
fraud, which he claims required proof of those same elements to convict him in
this case. He further argues that the court later compounded its initial error
by reversing his ‘acquittal on the “value” element of larceny in the first
degree when it ruled on the state’s [posttrial] motion to correct an illegal
sentence.’ On that basis, he claims on appeal that the court (1) violated the
prohibition against successive prosecutions under the fifth and fourteenth
amendments to the United States constitution by reversing his acquittal on the
value element of the larceny charge, and (2) violated his constitutional right
to due process by convicting him of health insurance fraud ‘without finding
every fact necessary to constitute the crime.’ We reject the defendant’s claims
and affirm his challenged conviction of health insurance fraud.”)
AC47093 - State v. Toste (Murder; sentence modification; “The defendant, William
Toste, appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying his application for
a sentence modification pursuant to General Statutes § 53a-39. On appeal, the
defendant claims that the court abused its discretion in finding that he had
failed to establish good cause to modify his sentence. We disagree and affirm
the judgment of the trial court.”)
AC46412 - State v. Edwin B. (“The defendant, Edwin B., appeals from the judgment of
conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of manslaughter in the second degree
in violation of General Statutes § 53a-56 (a) (1) and risk of injury to a child
in violation of General Statutes § 53-21 (a) (1). He claims that the court’s
failure to give specific unanimity instructions as to counts one and two violated
his right to jury unanimity under the sixth amendment to the United States
constitution. We agree with the defendant that the court’s failure to give
specific unanimity instructions violated his right to jury unanimity.
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of conviction and remand for a new trial.”)
SC20853 - State v. Petteway (“The defendant appeals from the judgment of conviction,
rendered after a jury trial, of murder in violation of General Statutes §
53a-54a and criminal violation of a standing criminal protective order in
violation of General Statutes § 53a-223a. He claims that he is entitled to a
new trial because the trial court violated his right to self-representation
under the federal and state constitutions. Because the defendant’s conduct
functioned as a forfeiture of his right to self-representation, we disagree and
affirm the judgment of the trial court.”)
AC46582 - State v. Joseph E. (“Following a conditional plea of nolo contendere, entered
pursuant to General Statutes § 54-94a, the defendant, Joseph E., appeals from
the judgment of conviction of criminal possession of a firearm in violation of
General Statutes (Rev. to 2021) § 53a-217. The defendant entered his
conditional plea following the court’s denial of his motion to suppress certain
evidence seized from his home. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court
improperly denied his motion to suppress because the search warrant application
and affidavit failed to establish probable cause for the search of his home and
the seizure of his property therein. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.”)
AC46753 - State v. Marciano (Operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of
alcohol; motion to suppress; “On appeal, the state claims that no constitutional
violation occurred because, at all relevant times, the arresting officer was
acting in his community caretaking capacity. Alternatively, the state argues
that, even if the officer was not acting in his community caretaking capacity,
the defendant was not unlawfully seized because the officer’s conduct did not
constitute a show of authority sufficient to cause a reasonable person in the
defendant’s position to believe that he was not free to leave. We affirm the
judgment of the trial court.”)
SC20749 - State v. Dabate ("A jury found the defendant, Richard G. Dabate, guilty of, among other offenses, murdering his wife in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a in connection with a staged invasion of their home in Ellington. The defendant appeals from the judgment of conviction, claiming that he is entitled to a new trial for the following reasons: (1) multiple instances of prosecutorial impropriety deprived him of his right to a fair trial; (2) the prosecutorial impropriety was so deliberate and flagrant that this court should exercise its supervisory authority over the administration of justice to reverse his conviction; (3) the trial court erred in admitting data obtained from the victim's Fitbit; and (4) the trial court should have suppressed a statement given to the police because it was obtained in violation of his Miranda rights. Although we agree with the defendant that the prosecutor engaged in multiple acts of impropriety at trial that we consider troubling, we conclude that those improprieties did not deprive the defendant of a fair trial. We also reject the defendant's other claims of error. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.")
AC46871 - State v. Thompson-Baker (Assault on judicial marshal; “On appeal, the defendant claims that the evidence was
insufficient to support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that, when he
assaulted a judicial marshal, the marshal was acting in the performance of his
official duties. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.”)
SC20792 - State v. Marcello E. (“On appeal, the defendant asks us to reject the Appellate
Court’s conclusion that the prior misconduct evidence was admissible and
instead to conclude that it was not relevant to a material fact in the case,
and, even if it were relevant, that its probative value did not outweigh its
prejudicial effect. We agree with the defendant to the extent that the evidence
was unduly prejudicial and harmful and therefore reverse the judgment of the
Appellate Court and order a remand of the case for a new trial.”)
SC20840 - State v. Jones (“On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court (1) improperly admitted into evidence testimony related to the defendant’s alleged gang affiliation, and (2) abused its discretion in admitting into evidence the defendant’s actions after law enforcement attempted to arrest him in Louisiana to establish his consciousness of guilt. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.”)
AC43796 - State v. Garrison (Assault in the first degree; motion to suppress; “The
remaining issues on appeal are whether the trial court improperly denied (1)
the defendant’s motion to suppress because, contrary to the determination of
the court, his statements to the police were not voluntary, and therefore their
admission at trial violated his right to due process, and (2) his motion for
sanctions in which he claimed that the state had failed to comply with the
court’s discovery orders and its constitutional obligation to disclose
impeachment evidence pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83
S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963). We are not persuaded by these claims and
therefore affirm the judgment of conviction.”)
SC20849 - State v. Adam P. (Five counts of sexual assault in the first degree; four
counts of risk of injury to a child; four counts of risk of injury to a child; violation
of due process rights; “We conclude that we must overrule Daniel W. E.,
to the extent that it modified our constancy of accusation doctrine set forth
in State v. Troupe, 237 Conn. 284, 304–305, 677 A.2d 917 (1996), so that
jurors understand more precisely the parameters for when and how they may
consider a victim’s delayed reporting when assessing the victim’s credibility.
Further, we hold that the alleged instructional error was nonconstitutional in
nature and that, based on the charges against the defendant and the record in
its entirety, it was not reasonably probable that the trial court’s Daniel
W. E. instruction misled the jury in arriving at its verdict. Finally, we
reject the defendant’s second claim and conclude that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion by permitting D to testify that the defendant had told her
that he played the same sexual ‘games’ with A that he had with the victims. We
therefore affirm the trial court’s judgment.”)
AC47066 - Ramos v. State (“The self-represented plaintiff, Jose Ramos, who previously
had been convicted of murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a and
sentenced to sixty years of imprisonment, appeals from the judgment of the
trial court dismissing his action against the defendant, the state of
Connecticut (state), in which he sought declaratory and injunctive relief,
punitive damages, and to have his conviction vacated and a new criminal trial.
On appeal, he claims that the court improperly (1) granted the state’s motion
to dismiss the action and (2) did so without oral argument on the motion. We
conclude that the plaintiff’s claims are inadequately briefed and, thus,
decline to review them. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court.”)
SC20801 - State v. Ziolkowski ("Following a trial, the jury found the defendant, Karin Ziolkowski, guilty of murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a (a) and arson in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-112 (a) (1) (B). For those crimes, the trial court sentenced the defendant to forty years of imprisonment. In this direct appeal, pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199 (b) (3), the defendant asserts that (1) her amnesia during a twenty-four to thirty-six hour period around the time of the incident in question prevented her from receiving a fair trial, (2) the trial court improperly admitted into evidence several postings on a Twitter (now X) account, and (3) there was insufficient evidence to find her guilty of murder and of arson in the second degree. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")
SC21008 - State v. Inzitari (One count of possessing child pornography in the first degree; fifty or more visual depictions of child pornography; artifacts of deleted images; “On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, (2) the court improperly instructed the jury that it could consider the so-called Dost factors in determining whether the images introduced by the state constituted a lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area, (3) the court erred in not giving a unanimity instruction, and (4) the court abused its discretion in admitting two of the state’s exhibits. We disagree and affirm the judgment of the trial court.”)
AC46442 - State v. Ardizzone (Discharge from the jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Security
Review Board. “On appeal, the acquittee claims that (1) the court improperly
found that, if he were discharged, he would present a danger to himself or
others and (2) § 17a-593 is unconstitutionally vague as applied to him. We
disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.”)
AC46988 - State v. Marcu (Misconduct with a motor vehicle; “On appeal, the defendant
claims that (1) there was insufficient evidence to demonstrate that his conduct
was committed with the mens rea of criminal negligence, and (2) the finding
that he was criminally negligent was not supported by the trial court’s factual
findings. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.”)
SC20778 - State v. Johnson (“The jury rejected the defendant’s justification defenses
and found him guilty of the crimes of murder, assault in the first degree,
criminal use of a firearm, criminal possession of a firearm, and carrying a
pistol without a permit. In this direct appeal, the defendant contends that (1)
the evidence was insufficient to defeat his claims of self-defense and defense
of others with respect to Wooten, and (2) the trial court improperly excluded
evidence of Taylor’s violent character under § 4-4 (a) (2) of the Connecticut
Code of Evidence. We affirm the judgment.”)
AC46522 - State v. Artis (“On appeal, the defendant claims that, before he entered his plea on the manslaughter charge, the court was required, in accordance with Practice Book § 39- 19, to inform him that, by statute, an individual convicted of manslaughter in the first degree is disqualified from earning any risk reduction credits toward a reduction of his sentence but failed to do so. He avers that he ‘was not aware . . . when he pleaded guilty or at sentencing . . . that he was statutorily prohibited from being eligible to earn the good time credits because of the manslaughter charge’ and that, consequently, his ‘sentence is akin to being a mandatory minimum,’ and his plea was not knowingly or voluntarily made. As a remedy for this, he requests that we ‘provide [him] with a right to earn good time credit on his manslaughter conviction’ in accordance with the trial court’s suggestion at his sentencing hearing that he ‘may accumulate good time credits,’ notwithstanding its inaccuracy.
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It is the role of the General Assembly to legislate and the role of the judiciary to adjudicate. For this court to accede to the defendant’s request would amount to an invasion of the General Assembly’s domain in violation of principles of separation of powers among the various branches of government. This we will not do. Stated simply, this court cannot provide the defendant with the only relief he requests and, therefore, we affirm the trial court’s judgment on that basis.”)