The mission of the Connecticut Judicial Branch is to serve the interests of justice and the public by resolving matters brought before it in a fair, timely, efficient and open manner.


Criminal Law Appellate Court Opinions

   by Booth, George

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=3645

AC41496 - Berthiaume v. State (Petition for new trial; burglary in first degree; summary judgment; jurisdiction; res judicata; motion for new trial; petition for new trial based on newly discovered evidence; "This is an appeal from the summary judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of the respondent, the state of Connecticut, on a civil petition for a new criminal trial filed by the petitioner, Toby A. Berthiaume. This case presents an issue that our courts have not previously addressed: Whether res judicata precludes a civil petition for a new trial based on a claim of newly discovered evidence when that same claim previously was litigated before the criminal court that had jurisdiction over the criminal matter but nonetheless lacked the authority to adjudicate the claim under our rules of practice. We conclude that, because the criminal court lacked the authority to rule on such a claim, it could not have issued a valid final decision, and, thus, the court's rendering summary judgment on the basis of the preclusive effect of that proceeding was improper. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for further proceedings.")

AC41299 - State v. Watson (Strangulation in second degree; assault in third degree; unlawful restraint in first degree; threatening in second degree; "The defendant, James Henry Watson, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered following a jury trial, of assault in the third degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-61 (a) (1), unlawful restraint in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-95 (a), strangulation in the second degree in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 2015) § 53a-64bb (a), and threatening in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-62 (a) (1). The defendant claims that the trial court (1) improperly determined whether the charges of assault in the third degree and unlawful restraint in the first degree were "upon the same incident" as the charge of strangulation in the second degree for the purposes of § 53a-64bb (b); (2) violated § 53a-64bb (b) and his right to be free from double jeopardy when it punished him for assault in the third degree, unlawful restraint in the first degree and strangulation in the second degree; and (3) violated his right to confrontation when it restricted his cross-examination of the victim. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.")


Insurance Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Roy, Christopher

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=3650

AC41130 - Gaddy v. Mount Vernon Fire Ins. Co. ("The plaintiff, Charles H. Gaddy, appeals from the summary judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of the defendants, Mount Vernon Fire Insurance Company and United States Liability Insurance Group. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly concluded that his claims were barred by the applicable statute of limitations. We disagree.")


Family Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Roy, Christopher

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=3649

AC41155 - Boreen v. Boreen ("The plaintiff, Maya Boreen, appeals from the judgment of the trial court granting the postjudgment motion filed by the defendant, Kevin A. Boreen, to terminate alimony, to determine overpayments, and to set a repayment schedule on the ground that, under the parties' separation agreement, the defendant's alimony obligation terminated upon the court's finding that the plaintiff was 'living with another person.' The plaintiff claims that the court (1) erred in finding that she was 'living with another person' pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-86 (b), and (2) improperly concluded that the only remedy available upon a finding that she was 'living with another person' was to terminate the defendant's alimony obligation. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.")


Business Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Roy, Christopher

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=3648

AC40014 - A Better Way Wholesale Autos, Inc. v. Saint Paul ("The plaintiff, A Better Way Wholesale Autos, Inc., appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing its application to vacate an arbitration award issued in favor of the defendants, James Saint Paul and Julie J. Saint Paul, and granting the defendants' application to confirm the arbitration award. On appeal, the plaintiff contends that the court improperly (1) dismissed its application to vacate as untimely, (2) engaged thereafter in a review of the substance of the plaintiff's application to vacate and concluded that the arbitration award did not manifest an egregious or patently irrational application of the law, and (3) awarded the defendants $2185 in supplemental attorney's fees. We conclude that the court properly dismissed the plaintiff's application to vacate as untimely and did not abuse its discretion in awarding supplemental attorney's fees. In light of our conclusion that the court properly dismissed the plaintiff's application to vacate as untimely, we also conclude that the court erred by reviewing the substance of the application but that such error was harmless. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.")


Tort Law Supreme Court Opinion

   by Penn, Michele

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=3647

SC19971 - Sena v. American Medical Response of Connecticut, Inc. ("This appeal requires us to consider the nature and scope of the immunity provided to the state and its political subdivisions by General Statutes § 28-13 (a) for actions taken in connection with a civil preparedness emergency declared by the governor pursuant to General Statutes § 28-9, which, in the present case, related to a blizzard that occurred in February, 2013. The defendant city of Bridgeport (city) appeals from the trial court's denial of its motion for summary judgment in the present case, which was commenced by the plaintiff, Marinelis Sena, both individually and as administratrix of the estate of Tyrone O. Tillman. The operative complaint alleges, inter alia, that the city was negligent in (1) not following its usual practice of sending a fire truck with an emergency medical technician in addition to an ambulance to render medical care to Tillman when he experienced severe breathing difficulty on February 11, 2013, and (2) preventing the ambulance from arriving promptly by allowing snow to remain on certain public roadways. On appeal, the city claims, inter alia, that it was immune for its actions pursuant to § 28-13, and that the trial court improperly determined that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the civil preparedness emergency remained in effect on the date of Tillman's death. We conclude that (1) an appealable final judgment exists because the city's claims of immunity pursuant to § 28-13 implicate an extension of the state's sovereign immunity to the city, and (2) the trial court should have granted the city's motion for summary judgment because there was no genuine issue of material fact with respect to the applicability of § 28-13. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.")


Land Use Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Zigadto, Janet

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=3646

AC41208 - One Elmcroft Stamford, LLC v. Zoning Board of Appeals ("The plaintiff, One Elmcroft Stamford, LLC, appeals from the judgment of the Superior Court denying its appeal from the decision of the defendant Zoning Board of Appeals of the City of Stamford (board), approving the application of the defendant Pasquale Pisano (defendant) to locate the defendant used car business, Pisano Brothers Automotive, Inc. (Pisano Brothers), at 86 Elmcroft Road in Stamford. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly (1) determined that the defendant had standing to apply to the board for approval of the application, (2) upheld the board's decision, despite the board's failure to review the application in accordance with General Statutes § 14-55, and (3) searched beyond the board's stated reason for approval of the application. We disagree with the plaintiff's first claim but agree with the plaintiff's second and third claims. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Superior Court.")


Tort Law Supreme Court Opinion

   by Penn, Michele

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=3642

SC20227 - Metcalf v. Fitzgerald ("In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether the United States Bankruptcy Code provisions permitting bankruptcy courts to assess penalties and sanctions preempt state law claims for vexatious litigation and violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), General Statutes § 42-110a et seq. The plaintiff, Jonathan S. Metcalf, brought state law claims against the defendants, Michael Fitzgerald, Ion Bank (bank), Myles H. Alderman, Jr., and Alderman & Alderman, LLC (law firm), for alleged vexatious litigation and for unfair and deceptive business acts or practices during the plaintiff's underlying bankruptcy proceeding. The plaintiff appeals from the trial court's granting of the motion to dismiss filed by Alderman and the law firm, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the ground that federal bankruptcy law preempts the claims. The trial court determined that the outcome of the motion was controlled by the Appellate Court's decision in Lewis v. Chelsea G.C.A. Realty Partnership, L.P., 86 Conn. App. 596, 862 A.2d 368 (2004), cert. denied, 273 Conn. 909, 870 A.2d 1079 (2005). The court in Lewis held that the Bankruptcy Code preempted CUTPA and vexatious litigation claims for alleged abuse of the bankruptcy process. Id., 605–607. The plaintiff contends that the court in Lewis did not properly evaluate each of the three types of preemption by which Congress manifests its intent to preempt state law and failed to consider the relevant Bankruptcy Code provisions. See 11 U.S.C. § 105 (2012); Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9011. We disagree and affirm the judgment of the trial court.")


Connecticut Law Journal - August 27, 2019

   by Townsend, Karen

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=3641

The Connecticut Law Journal, Volume LXXXI, No. 9, for August 27, 2019 is now available.

Contained in the issue is the following:

  • Table of Contents
  • Volume 191 Conn. App. Replacement Pages 291 - 292
  • Volume 332: Connecticut Reports (Pages 789 - 857)
  • Volume 332: Cumulative Table of Cases Connecticut Reports
  • Volume 192: Connecticut Appellate Reports (Pages 68 - 245)
  • Volume 192: Cumulative Table of Cases Connecticut Appellate Reports
  • Miscellaneous Notices
  • Notices of Connecticut State Agencies


Law Library Hours Update - August 26th - September 2nd

   by Dowd, Jeffrey

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=3640

Monday, August 26th

  • Danbury Law Library is closed.

Tuesday, August 27th

  • Danbury Law Library is closed.
  • New Britain Law Library closes at 4:00 p.m.

Thursday, August 29th

  • Bridgeport Law Library closes at 1:00 p.m.
  • Putnam Law Library closes at 3:45 p.m.

Friday, August 30th

  • Bridgeport Law Library is closed.

Monday, September 2nd

  • All Connecticut Judicial Branch Law Libraries are closed in observance of Labor Day.


Habeas Supreme Court Opinions

   by Townsend, Karen

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=3638

SC20137 - Henning v. Commissioner of Correction (Two habeas petitions; “The second habeas petition, which is the subject of this appeal, alleges, among other things, that the state deprived the petitioner of his due process right to a fair trial in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963), and its progeny, which require the state to correct any testimony by a state’s witness when the state knew or should have known that that testimony was materially false or misleading. More specifically, the petitioner claims that his right to due process was violated by virtue of the state’s failure to correct the trial testimony of the then director of the state police forensic laboratory, Henry C. Lee, that a red substance on a towel found in the victim’s home had tested positive for blood when, in fact, no such test had been conducted, and, further, a test of the substance conducted in connection with the present case proved negative for blood. The habeas court, Sferrazza, J., rejected all of the petitioner’s claims, including his claim concerning Lee’s testimony about the towel, and this appeal followed. We agree with the petitioner that, contrary to the determination of the habeas court, he is entitled to a new trial due to the state’s failure to alert the trial court and the petitioner that Lee’s testimony was incorrect, and, therefore, we reverse the judgment of the habeas court.”) See also, Henning v. State below.

SC20139 - Henning v. State ("On appeal from the denial of his petition for a new trial, the petitioner claims that the habeas court incorrectly determined that the newly discovered DNA evidence does not warrant a new trial…the petitioner claims that the three year limitation period of § 52-582 (a) simply does not apply to a petition, like the present one, in which there is newly discovered DNA evidence…In a separate opinion issued today, we have concluded, contrary to the determination of the habeas court, that the petitioner is entitled to a writ of habeas corpus granting him a new trial because the state deprived him of a fair trial in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963)... Because our opinion in that case awarding the petitioner a new trial renders moot the petitioner’s appeal from the denial of his petition for a new trial, we must dismiss the present appeal.”)

SC20136 - Birch v. Commissioner of Correction (“The second petition, which is the subject of this appeal, alleged, among other things, that the state deprived the petitioner of a fair trial in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963), and its progeny, which require the state to correct any testimony that it knows or should know is materially false or misleading. More specifically, the petitioner claims that his right to due process was violated because the assistant state’s attorney (prosecutor) failed to correct certain testimony of the then director of the state police forensic laboratory, Henry C. Lee, concerning a red substance on a towel found in the victim’s home that, according to Lee, had tested positive for blood. In fact, no such test had been conducted, and, moreover, a test of the substance that was done for purposes of the present case proved negative for blood. The habeas court, Sferrazza, J., rejected all of the petitioner’s claims, including his claim with respect to Lee’s testimony about the towel, and this appeal followed. Because we agree with the petitioner that, contrary to the conclusion of the habeas court, he is entitled to a new trial due to the state’s failure to alert the trial court and the petitioner that Lee’s testimony was incorrect, we reverse the judgment of the habeas court.”) See also, Birch v. State below.

SC20138 - Birch v. State (“On appeal from the denial of his petition for a new trial, the petitioner claims that the habeas court incorrectly determined that the newly discovered DNA evidence does not warrant a new trial. The petitioner further claims that this court, in determining whether a new trial is likely to result in a different outcome, should consider the original trial evidence together with all exculpatory evidence, even evidence that would not otherwise support a petition for a new trial because it was discovered by the petitioner after the three year limitation period for filing such a petition had expired…In a separate opinion issued today, we have concluded, contrary to the determination of the habeas court, that the petitioner is entitled to a writ of habeas corpus granting him a new trial because the state deprived him of a fair trial in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963)... Because our opinion in that case awarding the petitioner a new trial renders moot the petitioner’s appeal from the denial of his petition for a new trial, we must dismiss the present appeal.”)

SC20179 - Griffin v. Commissioner of Correction (Public Act 15-183; transfer to criminal docket from juvenile docket; Public Act 15-84; eligibility for parole; evolution of ‘standards of decency’ for punishments for children; “The issue presented in this appeal is whether the transfer of a fourteen year old defendant’s case to the regular criminal docket and his subsequent sentence of forty years imprisonment violate the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment enshrined in the dual due process provisions of the constitution of Connecticut, article first, §§ 8 and 9… We agree that recent statutory changes to the juvenile justice system—which significantly limit, but do not entirely prohibit, the transfer of a fourteen year old defendant’s case to the regular criminal docket—do not evidence a change in contemporary standards of decency for purposes of the constitutional claim raised by the petitioner in the present case. We also conclude that, because the petitioner is eligible for parole pursuant to P.A. 15-84, his forty year sentence complies with established constitutional safe-guards. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the habeas court.”)


Criminal Law Supreme Court Opinions

   by Roy, Christopher

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=3639

SC20081 - State v. McCleese ("Under the federal constitution's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments, a juvenile offender cannot serve a sentence of imprisonment for life, or its functional equivalent, without the possibility of parole, unless his age and the hallmarks of adolescence have been considered as mitigating factors. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 476–77, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 183 L. Ed. 2d 407 (2012); Casiano v. Commissioner of Correction, 317 Conn. 52, 60–61, 115 A.3d 1031 (2015), cert. denied sub nom. Semple v. Casiano, ___ U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 1364, 194 L. Ed. 2d 376 (2016); State v. Riley, 315 Conn. 637, 641, 110 A.3d 1205 (2015), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 1361, 194 L. Ed. 2d 376 (2016). The defendant, William McCleese, a juvenile offender, was originally serving a sentence of imprisonment for the functional equivalent of his life without the possibility of parole, in violation of this constitutional mandate. Because of subsequent legislation, however, he will be eligible for parole in or about 2033. This appeal requires us to decide whether the legislature may remedy the constitutional violation with parole eligibility. We conclude that it may and has done so.")

SC19954 - State v. Williams-Bey ("Under the federal constitution's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments, a juvenile offender cannot serve a sentence of imprisonment for life, or its functional equivalent, without the possibility of parole, unless his age and the hallmarks of adolescence have been considered as mitigating factors. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 476–77, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 183 L. Ed. 2d 407 (2012); Casiano v. Commissioner of Correction, 317 Conn. 52, 60–61, 115 A.3d 1031 (2015), cert. denied sub nom. Semple v. Casiano, ___ U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 1364, 194 L. Ed. 2d 376 (2016); State v. Riley, 315 Conn. 637, 641, 110 A.3d 1205 (2015), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 1361, 194 L. Ed. 2d 376 (2016). The defendant, Tauren Williams-Bey, is presently serving a sentence of thirty-five years imprisonment, and, pursuant to No. 15-84 of the 2015 Public Acts (P.A. 15-84), codified at General Statutes § 54-125a, has the possibility of parole after twenty-one years in prison. His original sentence of thirty-five years without parole was imposed without consideration of his age or the hallmarks of adolescence. The defendant does not claim that this sentence violates the federal constitution. Rather, he claims that it violates the Connecticut constitution and that he must be resentenced, even after P.A. 15-84 later made him parole eligible. On the basis of our decision in State v. McCleese, 333 Conn. ___, ___ A.3d ___ (2019), which we also release today, we conclude that the defendant is not entitled to resentencing.")


Criminal Law Appellate Court Opinions

   by Booth, George

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=3634

AC42130 - State v. Moon (Felony murder; robbery in first degree; conspiracy to commit robbery in first degree; jury instructions; "The defendant, Rashad Moon, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of felony murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54c, robbery in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-134 (a) (2), and conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-48 and 53a-134 (a) (2). On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court improperly (1) instructed the jury on accomplice liability, (2) failed to poll the jurors on the defendant's affirmative defense, (3) admitted into evidence two spent shell casings that were unconnected to the crime, and (4) instructed the jury on conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree without instructing it on the intent required for robbery in the first degree. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

AC40837 - State v. Rodriguez (Public indecency; breach of peace; improper use of marker, registration, or license; illegal operation of motor vehicle while driver's license was under suspension; failure to appear in second degree; "The defendant, Jose Luis Rodriguez, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered following a jury trial, of public indecency in violation of General Statutes § 53a-186 (a) (2), breach of the peace in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-181 (a) (5), improper use of a marker, registration, or license in violation of General Statutes § 14-147 (c), illegal operation of a motor vehicle while his driver's license was under suspension in violation of General Statutes § 14-215 (a), and two counts of failure to appear in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-173 (a) (1). The defendant claims on appeal that the court improperly (1) admitted evidence of uncharged misconduct, (2) instructed the jury on the uncharged misconduct evidence, and (3) denied his motion to sever the public indecency, breach of the peace, and motor vehicle charges from the failure to appear charges. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

AC40578 - State v. Battle (Violation of probation; "The defendant, Reggie Battle, appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing his motion to correct an illegal sentence. On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) the court improperly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to consider his motion to correct an illegal sentence, (2) the court improperly concluded that the use of special parole following the finding of a probation violation did not constitute an illegal sentence and (3) he was denied due process of law when his motion to correct an illegal sentence was not acted upon by the judge who had sentenced him. We conclude that the trial court had jurisdiction to consider the defendant's motion to correct an illegal sentence but are not persuaded by his second and third claims. Accordingly, the form of the judgment is improper, and we reverse the judgment dismissing the defendant's motion to correct an illegal sentence and remand the case with direction to render judgment denying the defendant's motion.")

AC41845 - State v. Brown (Assault in second degree; threatening in first degree; "The self-represented defendant, Kenya Brown, appeals from the trial court's denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence. On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) General Statutes §§ 53a-37 and 53a-38 are ambiguous and contradictory, and (2) § 53a-38 is unconstitutional because it violates his constitutional rights to due process, to be free from double jeopardy, and to equal protection. We reverse the judgment of the trial court only as it relates to the portion of the defendant's motion to correct that advances arguments that do not implicate the sentencing proceeding itself. The court should have dismissed, rather than denied, this portion of the motion. We affirm the judgment of the trial court in all other respects.")

AC41362 - State v. Tarasiuk (Assault of public safety personnel; criminal trespass; "The defendant, Jacek Tarasiuk, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered following a jury trial, of one count of assault of public safety personnel in violation of General Statutes § 53a-167c (a) (1) and one count of criminal trespass in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-107 (a) (1). On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting into evidence the defendant's May 24, 2006 unnamed felony conviction for the limited purpose of impeaching the defendant's credibility. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

AC41009 - State v. Fox (Home invasion; conspiracy to commit home invasion; assault in first degree; conspiracy to commit assault in first degree; "The defendant, Michael Fox, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of home invasion in violation of General Statutes § 53a-100aa (a) (1), conspiracy to commit home invasion in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-48 and 53a-100aa (a) (1), assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-59 (a) (4), and conspiracy to commit assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-48 and 53a-59 (a) (4). On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) the trial court violated the double jeopardy clause of the United States constitution by sentencing the defendant on two counts of conspiracy on the basis of a single agreement with multiple criminal objectives, (2) the state violated the defendant's right to due process under the Connecticut constitution as a result of the destruction or loss of photographs depicting the crime scene, and (3) the trial court erred in denying the defendant's request for an adverse inference jury instruction. We agree with the defendant's first claim only and, accordingly, affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the trial court.")


Family Law Supreme and Appellate Court Opinions

   by Roy, Christopher

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=3637

SC20016 - Lederle v. Spivey ("In this dissolution of marriage action, the plaintiff, Catherine Lederle, appeals, following our grant of certification, from the judgment of the Appellate Court reversing the decision of the trial court, which had awarded appellate attorney's fees to the plaintiff under the bad faith exception to the American rule. The plaintiff contends that the Appellate Court did not accord the proper level of deference in determining that the trial court's findings lacked sufficient specificity. The defendant, Stevan Spivey, responds that the Appellate Court properly applied the abuse of discretion standard and also correctly concluded that, in determining that the appellate claims lacked color, the trial court improperly assessed the conduct of the defendant's attorney rather than that of the defendant. The defendant claims that the amount of the award was unreasonable and excessive because (1) the plaintiff's success in the appeal for which fees were awarded was not due to the efforts of the plaintiff's counsel, and (2) the defendant's attorney charged him a significantly lower amount of fees for representing him in that appeal. We reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court and conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in setting the amount of the fees.")

AC41240 - Wilson v. Di Iulio ("The defendant, Michael Di Iulio, appeals from the judgment of the trial court dissolving his marriage to the plaintiff, Heather Wilson, and entering related financial orders. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court erred by (1) failing to award him more than nominal alimony despite the substantial disparity in the parties' incomes and ability to afford expenses and (2) making a property award enforceable by a modifiable alimony award. We disagree with the defendant and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.")


Foreclosure Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Penn, Michele

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=3635

AC41593 - Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Fratarcangeli ("The defendant, Nicole M. Fratarcangeli, appeals from the judgment of strict foreclosure rendered after a court trial in favor of the substitute plaintiff, MTGLQ Investors, LP. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court erred when it granted the substitute plaintiff's motion to strike as to her first and second special defenses of (1) illegal attestation of the mortgage deed and (2) unclean hands as to the attestation of the mortgage deed. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.")



Tort Law Appellate Court Opinions

   by Penn, Michele

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=3636

AC41721 - Kusy v. Norwich ("This is a personal injury action brought by the plaintiff, Andrzej Kusy, against the defendants, the city of Norwich, its board of education, and certain municipal employees, seeking to recover damages for injuries he sustained after he slipped and fell on snow or ice while delivering milk for his employer, Guida's Dairy (Guida's), at a Norwich school. The plaintiff appeals from the trial court's summary judgment rendered in favor of the defendants on the ground that they are entitled to governmental immunity.

On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly rendered summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the ground of governmental immunity because he adequately raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether (1) the removal of snow and ice at a school is a ministerial rather than a discretionary act, and (2) the plaintiff was an identifiable victim because he had a contractual duty to deliver milk to the school. We disagree with both claims and, therefore, affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

AC40963 - Sen v. Tsiongas ("In this premises liability action, the plaintiff, Isha Sen, appeals from the summary judgment rendered in favor of the defendant, Kostas Tsiongas. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial court erred in rendering summary judgment in favor of the defendant, who was the landlord of the apartment building in which the plaintiff lived, because there was a disputed issue of material fact as to whether the defendant should have known that the dog of one of the other tenants had vicious propensities. We agree with the plaintiff and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the trial court.")




Law Library Hours Update - August 19th - August 27th

   by Dowd, Jeffrey

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=3628

Thursday, August 22nd

  • Danbury Law Library is closed.
  • New Britain Law Library is open until 3:00 p.m.

Friday, August 23rd

  • Bridgeport Law Library opens at noon.
  • New Britain Law Library is open until 4:00 p.m.
  • Torrington Law Library is open until 2:30 p.m.

Monday, August 26th

  • Danbury Law Library is closed.

Tuesday, August 27th

  • Danbury Law Library is closed.



Medical Malpractice Supreme Court Opinion

   by Penn, Michele

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=3632

SC19977 - Traylor v. State ("This appeal arises from the most recent in a series of civil actions that the plaintiff, Sylvester Traylor, has brought in state and federal court relating to the suicide of his wife, Roberta Mae Traylor (Roberta). The plaintiff, who is self-represented, brought the present case against the defendants, who are (1) the state of Connecticut, numerous current and former Superior Court judges, and the Appellate Court (state defendants); (2) Roberta's treating psychiatrist, Bassam Awwa, and his employer, Connecticut Behavioral Health Associates, P.C. (Awwa defendants); and (3) Robert Knowles and Neil Knowles, and their business, Advanced Telemessaging (Knowles defendants). The plaintiff now appeals from the judgment of the trial court, Moll, J., rendered in accordance with its granting of the defendants' motions to dismiss and for summary judgment. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that General Statutes § 52-190a, which requires a plaintiff to append a good faith certificate and supporting opinion letter to the complaint in cases of medical negligence, is unconstitutional. Although the plaintiff fully briefed his attack on the constitutionality of § 52-190a, we cannot reach the merits of that claim because of his failure to challenge the trial court's threshold conclusions that his claims against all of the defendants are barred by, inter alia, the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.")



Criminal Law Supreme Court Opinion

   by Booth, George

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=3630

SC19934 - State v. Tony M. (Murder; risk of injury to child; "The defendant, Tony M., appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a and risk of injury to a child in violation of General Statutes § 53-21 (a) (1). On appeal, the defendant makes three claims. First, he claims that the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress certain evidence arising from statements that he had made to the police while in the hospital on the ground that any waiver of his Miranda rights prior to making those statements was involuntary. In connection with that claim, he argues that his statements were made involuntarily due to his weakened physical condition at the time he made them. Second, he claims that evidence regarding his statements was also inadmissible because the interview was not recorded, as required by General Statutes § 54-1o.Third, he claims that the trial court improperly precluded him from introducing into evidence a letter in which he offered to plead guilty to manslaughter in exchange for twenty-five years incarceration. We disagree with the defendant's claims and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.")


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