AC45662 - Speer v. Brown Jacobson P.C. ("The self-represented plaintiff, Sheri Speer, appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing, on the grounds of res judicata and collateral estoppel, her quo warranto action challenging the qualifications of the defendants Brown Jacobson P.C. (Brown Jacobson) and one of its attorneys, Aimee Wickless, to serve as corporation counsel for the defendant city of Norwich (city). On appeal, the plaintiff claims, inter alia, that the court improperly concluded that her claims are barred by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. We agree and, therefore, reverse the judgment of the trial court.")

• Posted in:
• Civil Procedure,
• Property Law,
• Recent Opinions,
• Tort Law

AC45774 - Speer v. Danjon Capital, Inc. ("The self-represented plaintiff, Sheri Speer, appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing her present action against the defendant, Danjon Capital, Inc., as a sanction for abuse of discovery. On appeal, she claims that the court (1) abused its discretion by dismissing this action as a sanction for her alleged discovery abuse, which it found that she had engaged in by insisting repeatedly that she had served the defendant with requests for admissions to which the defendant had failed to respond although the court file and her own records contradicted her claim that requests for admissions had been served; (2) improperly denied her timely motion for reassignment of all matters concerning the amount of attorney's fees she should be ordered to pay the defendant as a sanction for her discovery abuse after the court failed to decide that matter within 120 days of the parties' final court-ordered submission thereon; and (3) erred in denying her motion for summary judgment. We agree with the plaintiff that the court improperly dismissed this action as a sanction for her alleged abuse of discovery and that it improperly denied her motion for reassignment of the pending matter concerning the amount of attorney's fees that should be awarded to the defendant as a sanction for her discovery abuse, which the court failed to decide within 120 days of the last court-ordered submission on that matter. We dismiss that portion of the plaintiff's appeal challenging the purported denial of her motion for summary judgment."

________________________

"As for the plaintiff's third claim, alleging error in the denial of her motion for summary judgment, we lack jurisdiction to decide that claim because the plaintiff's motion was not, in fact, denied, or otherwise finally adjudicated. In addition, we note that the denial of a motion for summary judgment, except in limited circumstances that do not exist here, is not an appealable final judgment over which we would have jurisdiction. See, e.g., Kellogg v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co., 211 Conn. App. 335, 346–47, 272 A.3d 677 (2022).

The judgment of dismissal, the order requiring the plaintiff to pay attorney's fees to the defendant, and the denial of the plaintiff's motion for reassignment are reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion; the portion of the appeal pertaining to the purported denial of the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is dismissed.")

• Posted in:
• Civil Procedure,
• Property Law,
• Recent Opinions

The 2023 edition of our research guide on Collection of Delinquent Property Taxes in Connecticut has been added to our research guides webpage.

• Posted in:
• FYI,
• Legal Research,
• Property Law,
• Self-Help

AC45523 - Commissioner of Transportation v. ACP, LLC ("The plaintiff, the Commissioner of Transportation (commissioner), appeals from the judgment of the trial court awarding damages to the defendant ACP, LLC, for the taking by eminent domain of a portion of its real property by the commissioner. On appeal, the commissioner claims that the court improperly relied on the expert opinion of the defendant's appraiser to award the defendant temporary severance damages because that expert opinion was arbitrary and speculative. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

• Posted in:
• Property Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC45623 - Williams v. Green Power Ventures, LLC ("The plaintiffs, Davidson D. Williams and Barbara R. Williams, appeal from the judgment of the trial court on their complaint against the defendants, Green Power Ventures, LLC (Green Power), 141 Anchorage, LLC, Edward Stern and Amy Stern (Sterns), and Keith J. Manca Building Company, LLC (Manca Building), and on the counterclaim filed by Green Power and 141 Anchorage, LLC. The plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and damages for trespass and nuisance arising out of the defendants' alleged interference with the plaintiffs' use of a right-of-way easement over Green Power's property, which abuts 141 Anchorage, LLC's property. In their counterclaim, Green Power and 141 Anchorage, LLC, sought a declaratory judgment defining the permissible uses of the easement. In resolving the parties' competing claims, the court concluded that the plaintiffs' easement is limited to foot passage only, that the plaintiffs were not entitled to injunctive relief or attorney's fees, and that the plaintiffs were entitled to $500 as 'token damages' on their nuisance claim.

On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the court improperly (1) concluded that their easement is limited to foot passage only, (2) found that the fence and gate that the defendants placed across the right-of-way did not constitute an unreasonable interference with the plaintiffs' use of the easement, (3) found that the defendants did not engage in brazen and wanton conduct in connection with the planning, permitting, and development of their project that interferes with the plaintiffs' use of the easement, and (4) failed to consider evidence that the defendants are altering the location and dimensions of the easement. We agree with the plaintiffs' first claim and, accordingly, reverse in part the judgment of the trial court.")

• Posted in:
• Declaratory Judgment Law,
• Property Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC45645 - Miriam v. Summit Saugatuck, LLC ("In this action to enforce a restrictive covenant, the plaintiffs Selma Miriam and Leslie Ogilvy appeal from the judgment rendered by the trial court following its granting of a motion for summary judgment filed by the defendant, Summit Saugatuck, LLC, and denial of their motion for summary judgment. On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the court improperly determined, as a matter of law, that a common plan of development does not exist for certain lots of real property located within the historic Saugatuck neighborhood area of Westport, where both plaintiffs reside. We disagree and affirm the judgment of the court.")

• Posted in:
• Land Use Law,
• Property Law

The 2023 edition of the research guide on Abandoned, Lost or Unclaimed Property in Connecticut has been added to our research guides webpage.

• Posted in:
• FYI,
• Legal Research,
• Property Law,
• Self-Help

AC45065 - Cazenovia Creek Funding I, LLC v. White Eagle Society of Brotherly Help, Inc., Group 315, Polish National Alliance ("The named defendant, The White Eagle Society of Brotherly Help, Inc., Group 315, Polish National Alliance, appeals from the judgment of foreclosure by sale rendered by the trial court in favor of the substitute plaintiff, Benchmark Municipal Tax Services, Ltd. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly (1) rendered summary judgment against it as to liability after determining that the tax liens for the grand lists of 2012 and 2013 properly were assigned to the plaintiff and (2) found that the debt was due to the plaintiff. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

AC45473 - U.S. Bank National Assn. v. Booker ("In this residential mortgage foreclosure action, the defendants Linda Booker and Ulish Booker, Jr., appeal from the trial court’s denial of their motion to open the judgment of strict foreclosure rendered in favor of the plaintiff U.S. Bank National Association as Legal Title Trustee for Truman 2016 SC6 Title Trust. The defendants claim that the court erred in denying their motion to open the judgment because the court improperly decided not to exercise its discretion and afford them relief in connection with the grounds of mistake and fraud raised therein. The plaintiff argues that this court should dismiss the appeal because (1) the defendants’ appeal is moot, as title in the mortgaged property has vested in the plaintiff, and (2) the defendants should not be allowed to raise their claim of error because it could have been raised in the defendants’ prior appeal in this action. The plaintiff also argues that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to open. We reject the plaintiff’s jurisdictional and reviewability arguments and conclude that the court properly denied the defendants’ motion to open. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court.")

• Posted in:
• Foreclosure Law,
• Property Law,
• Recent Opinions

SC20746 - In re Cole (“In 1993, the legislature, for the first time, enacted a so-called ‘homestead act,’ whereby a debtor could protect up to $75,000 of the value of a primary residence from attachment in postjudgment proceedings or bankruptcy. See Public Acts 1993, No. 93-301, § 2 (P.A. 93-301). Although P.A. 93-301 had an effective date of October 1, 1993, and thus applied to any proceedings initiated on or after that date, the act included a special carve-out: the homestead exemption could not be claimed for debts accrued prior to the effective date. See P.A. 93-301, § 3. In 2021, the legislature amended the homestead act and replaced it with a new version that included several changes from the prior version of the act. For purposes of this appeal, the relevant change made by the legislature was to increase the exemption from $75,000 to $250,000, but this time the legislature did not include any carve-out for preexisting debts. See Public Acts 2021, No. 21-161, § 1 (P.A. 21-161). The primary question presented by this appeal, which reaches us in the form of a certified question in a bankruptcy appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, is whether we should nevertheless read a carve-out into the 2021 public act. We decline to do so.”

“The District Court therefore certified to this court the question of ‘[w]hether [P.A.] 21-161 applies retroactively to debts incurred by the debtor before [P.A.] 21- 161 took effect or prospectively.’ We accepted certification but, pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199b (k), and for the reasons discussed in part II B 3 of this opinion, we will answer a slightly modified version of the certified question: does the expanded homestead exemption contained in P.A. 21-161, § 1, apply in bankruptcy proceedings filed on or after the effective date of the act to debts that accrued prior to that date? We answer that question in the affirmative.”

• Posted in:
• Civil Procedure,
• Contract Law,
• Property Law

The 2023 edition of our research guide on Foreclosure of Mortgages has been posted to our research guides webpage.