AC47591 - Deutsche Bank AG v. Sebastian Holdings, Inc. ("The plaintiff, Deutsche Bank AG, brought this action against the defendants, Sebastian Holdings, Inc. (SHI), and Alexander Vik, seeking to enforce an approximately $243 million foreign judgment (English judgment) rendered against SHI by an English court and to pierce the corporate veil of SHI in order to hold Vik personally liable for that judgment. The trial court, applying the substantive law of Turks and Caicos Islands (TCI), rendered judgment in favor of the defendants, and our Supreme Court affirmed that judgment. See Deutsche Bank AG v. Sebastian Holdings, Inc., 346 Conn. 564, 604, 294 A.3d 1 (2023).Thereafter, the trial court denied the defendants' postjudgment motions seeking approximately $11.5 million in prevailing party attorney's fees incurred in defense of this action, concluding that the issue of attorney's fees was a procedural matter governed by Connecticut law, which does not permit the recovery of such fees in this case. On appeal, the defendants claim that the court erred in denying their motions because the issue of whether they are entitled to attorney's fees is governed by TCI law. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

• Posted in:
• Business Law,
• Civil Procedure,
• Recent Opinions

AC48111 - Vermont Aerospace Industries, LLC v. Schwoeri (“The plaintiff, Vermont Aerospace Industries, LLC, appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying its application to ‘‘partially vacate, correct, and/or modify’’ an arbitration award and granting the motion for order confirming that award filed by the defendant, Lawrence W. Schwoeri. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly denied its application and granted the defendant’s motion for order because the arbitrator acted in manifest disregard of the law and violated public policy. The plaintiff alternatively contends that the court improperly declined to modify the manner in which the damages awarded to the defendant must be paid. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.”)

• AC48111 Appendix - Vermont Aerospace Industries, LLC v. Schwoeri

• Posted in:
• Civil Procedure,
• Contract Law,
• Employment Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC47099 - Golden v. WorldQuant Predictive Technologies, LLC ("The plaintiff, James Golden, appeals from the judgments of the trial court denying his application to vacate an arbitration award and granting an application to confirm that award filed by the defendants, WorldQuant Predictive Technologies, LLC (WorldQuant), and Jeffrey Blomberg. On appeal, we consider whether (1) the plaintiff's failure to strictly comply with the requirements of Practice Book § 61-7 (a) (1) renders this appeal moot, (2) the arbitrator exceeded the scope of the arbitration submission and acted in manifest disregard of the law in awarding attorney's fees and costs to the defendants, (3) the arbitrator acted in manifest disregard of the law in denying the plaintiff's counterclaim alleging breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, and (4) the arbitrator acted in manifest disregard of the law by misapplying the after-acquired evidence doctrine.We affirm the judgments of the trial court.")

• Posted in:
• Civil Procedure,
• Employment Law,
• Recent Opinions

SC21051 - Health Body World Supply, Inc. v. Wang ("This appeal requires us to resolve two previously unexamined issues regarding the proper construction and operation of General Statutes § 52-572o, which is the statute governing comparative responsibility and actions for contribution under the Connecticut Product Liability Act (CPLA), General Statutes § 52- 572m et seq. The plaintiffs, Health Body World Supply, Inc. (HBWS) and its insurance carrier, Landmark American Insurance Company (Landmark), brought this action for contribution against the defendant, Reed Wang, pursuant to § 52-572o (e) after paying $1.2 million to Judith Kissel in full satisfaction of the judgment in the underlying matter of Kissel v. Center for Women’s Health, P.C., Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, Docket No. FST-CV-12-6013562-S (January 3, 2019) (Kissel action), rev’d in part, 205 Conn. App. 394, 258 A.3d 677, cert. granted, 339 Conn. 916, 262 A.3d 139 (2021), and cert. granted, 339 Conn. 917, 262 A.3d 138 (2021) (appeals withdrawn January 11, 2022). The jury in the Kissel action assigned 80 percent of the responsibility for Kissel’s damages to HBWS and 20 percent of the responsibility to Wang. In the present action, HBWS seeks to recover from Wang his 20 percent share of the amount paid, including applicable interest and costs. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of HBWS.

On appeal, Wang renews his arguments, unsuccessful in the trial court, that the plaintiffs’ contribution action is foreclosed because Wang was not a party to the underlying product liability action and, therefore, does not fall within the scope of the comparative responsibility or contribution provisions of § 52-572o. In the alternative, Wang argues that the contribution action is untimely because it was brought more than one year after the judgment in the Kissel action became final. See General Statutes § 52-572o (e). We reject both arguments and affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

• Posted in:
• Business Law,
• Civil Procedure,
• Insurance Law,
• Medical Malpractice Law,
• Recent Opinions,
• Tort Law

AC47069 - Barr v. MFI Management, Inc ("The sole issue in this appeal is whether the trial court improperly removed the parties' consolidated actions from the jury docket less than one month before trial was scheduled to begin and thereafter proceeded to judgment in both actions with a bench trial. The appellants, Dean S. Barr and Joseph Meehan (collectively, Barr parties), appeal from the judgments rendered against them following that trial in favor of the appellees, FIH, LLC (FIH), MFI Management, Inc. (MFI), LAZ May 10, LLC (LAZ May 10), Lazer Milstein, and Nesanel Milstein (collectively, FIH parties). The Barr parties claim that the court improperly removed the actions from the jury docket because, inter alia, they properly had been entered in the docket as a jury case upon written consent of all parties pursuant to General Statutes § 52-215. We agree, and accordingly reverse the judgments of the trial court and remand both actions for a jury trial.")

• Posted in:
• Civil Procedure,
• Recent Opinions,
• Tort Law

AC46424 - Berglass v. Dworkin ("The plaintiff, Steven Berglass, trustee of the Steven Berglass Revocable Living Trust, appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing his complaint against the defendants, Heidi Dworkin and Jay Dworkin. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly dismissed his action without providing notice and the opportunity to be heard following a hearing on the plaintiff's motion for a temporary injunction, to which the defendants had filed an objection. He further claims that the court improperly made findings of fact in the absence of any evidence. We agree with the plaintiff as to both of his claims, and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the trial court.")

• Posted in:
• Civil Procedure,
• Property Law,
• Recent Opinions

SC20906 - Ammar I. v. Dept. of Children & Families ("The sole issue in this certified appeal is whether the litigation privilege affords absolute immunity to the defendant, the Department of Children and Families, from a claim by the self-represented plaintiff, Ammar I., that the defendant had discriminated against him based on his religion during his termination of parental rights trial. The plaintiff asserts that the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that the litigation privilege barred his discrimination claim challenging the defendant's improper use of child protection proceedings to alienate him from his children. We conclude that the Appellate Court correctly held that the litigation privilege barred the plaintiff's remaining timely allegations pertaining exclusively to the defendant's actions during his termination of parental rights trial. We nevertheless reverse in part the Appellate Court's judgment to the extent that the court's remand order directed the trial court to grant the defendant's motion to dismiss in its entirety. We therefore affirm in part and reverse in part the Appellate Court's judgment.")

• Posted in:
• Civil Procedure,
• Recent Opinions,
• Tort Law

AC47097- Marks v. GLT Development Corp. ("In this personal injury action, which arose during the COVID-19 pandemic, the plaintiff, Stephen Marks, appeals from the judgment of the trial court granting the defendant GLT Development Corporation's motion to strike on statute of limitations grounds. This appeal involves the question of how to calculate, in connection with the plaintiff's negligence claim arising from an accident that occurred on May 24, 2020, the statute of limitations set forth in General Statutes § 52-584. The operability of that statute was suspended as a result of Governor Ned Lamont's Executive Order No. 7G, effective March 19, 2020, and that suspension subsequently was lifted on March 1, 2021, by Governor Lamont's Executive Order No. 10A.The plaintiff claims that the court incorrectly concluded that the two year limitations period began to run on March 1, 2021, and expired on March 1, 2023.The plaintiff argues instead that he was entitled to a suspension of 347 or 348 days, representing the total number of days that the suspension was in effect, notwithstanding the fact that the plaintiff's cause of action did not exist when the suspension began. That is, the plaintiff contends that the proper calculation of his limitations period is effectively two years plus 347 or 348 days. The defendant argues to the contrary that the court properly concluded that the statute of limitations began to run on March 1, 2021, and expired on March 1, 2023. We agree with the defendant and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

• Posted in:
• Civil Procedure,
• Recent Opinions,
• Tort Law

AC46736 - Marciniszyn v. Board of Education ("The plaintiffs, Joshua Marciniszyn, who is self-represented, and his minor child D, by and through Marciniszyn as next friend, appeal from the trial court's denial of their petition for a bill of discovery (petition). On appeal, the plaintiffs argue that the court erred when it determined that they failed to establish probable cause for their claims that the defendants, the Board of Education of the Town of Southington and the town of Southington, had discriminated against D in violation of several federal civil rights laws. They also argue that the court improperly granted the defendants a continuance to file an objection to their petition and improperly limited the presentation of testimony at the hearing on the petition. We conclude that Marciniszyn lacked standing to bring this action in his individual capacity. We therefore reverse in part the court's judgment and remand the case with direction to dismiss the petition as to Marciniszyn in his individual capacity. We dismiss the appeal as to D because Marciniszyn lacks authority, as a self-represented nonattorney, to proceed in a representative capacity on D's behalf before this court.")

• Posted in:
• Civil Procedure,
• Civil Rights,
• Recent Opinions

AC47655 - J. C.-S. v. J. G. ("The self-represented plaintiff, J. C.-S., appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying his application for a civil protection order against the defendant, J. G., pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-16a. The plaintiff’s claims on appeal distill into two parts, namely, whether the court (1) erred in ruling, in the absence of a motion for protective order, that the defendant and a nonparty witness were not required to testify or produce documents pursuant to subpoenas that had issued and had been served, and (2) violated the plaintiff’s right to self-representation by limiting the manner in which he was permitted to present evidence in support of his application. We decline to address the merits of these claims because the plaintiff has failed to provide this court with an adequate record. Thus, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

AC47525 - S. S. v. J. S. ("The defendant, J. S., appeals from the judgment of the trial court granting the motion filed by the self-represented plaintiff, S. S., to extend a restraining order issued against him pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-15. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court abused its discretion in extending the order because there was insufficient evidence that, at the time the plaintiff sought the extension, the defendant posed a continuous threat of present physical pain or physical injury to her. We affirm the judgment of the court.")

• Posted in:
• Civil Procedure,
• Family Law,
• Recent Opinions

SC20797 - Collier v. Adar Hartford Realty, LLC ("This is an interlocutory appeal from the trial court's denial of a motion for class certification. The plaintiffs, former residents of Barbour Gardens, a housing development in the city of Hartford (city), instituted this action in connection with the living conditions at Barbour Gardens during their residency. They sought compensatory and punitive damages and attorney's fees from the owner of Barbour Gardens and its property management company, and alleged various tort, contract, equitable, and statutory claims, including a claim of a violation of a provision of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), General Statutes § 42-110g. The plaintiffs filed a motion to certify a class on behalf 'of all persons who lived at Barbour Gardens for any or all of the time between June 24, 2004, and October 13, 2019,' which the trial court denied on the grounds that individualized issues would predominate over class-wide issues and that a class action is not a superior method to resolve the plaintiffs' claims. See Practice Book § 9-8 (3). In this appeal brought pursuant to General Statutes § 42-110h, the plaintiffs contend that there is sufficient evidence in the record common to the entire class to satisfy the predominance and superiority requirements. We reject this claim due to the lengthy period of time for which class certification was requested—covering all residents at Barbour Gardens at any time over a span of more than fifteen years—and the absence of generalized evidence in the record concerning the living conditions at Barbour Gardens during most of the proposed class period. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiffs' motion for class certification.")

• Posted in:
• Civil Procedure,
• Contract Law,
• Landlord / Tenant Law,
• Recent Opinions,
• Tort Law

AC46333 - Palmieri v. Cirino ("The plaintiff in the underlying quiet title action, Patrick Palmieri, appeals from the judgment of the trial court awarding attorney’s fees to the defendant, Frank Cirino, following a default judgment rendered against the plaintiff on the defendant’s counterclaim. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court (1) abused its discretion in issuing the award because the affidavit in support of attorney’s fees was filed beyond the thirty day deadline set forth in Practice Book § 11-21 and (2) improperly awarded attorney’s fees that were incurred prior to the present action. We agree with the plaintiff’s second claim and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for a new hearing on the defendant’s motion for attorney’s fees.")

• Posted in:
• Civil Procedure,
• Property Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC46294 - Torrington Tax Collector, LLC v. Riley ("The plaintiff, Torrington Tax Collector, LLC, appeals from the judgment of the trial court granting the defendant, Holly Riley, an exemption from a bank execution on an account held by the defendant. See General Statutes (Supp. 2022) § 52-367b. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly (1) determined that the plaintiff's opposition to the claim of exemption was barred by the doctrine of res judicata and/or collateral estoppel, and (2) failed to hold an evidentiary hearing before granting the defendant's claim for exemption from execution. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the court.")

• Posted in:
• Civil Procedure,
• Recent Opinions

SC20754 - Mercedes-Benz Financial v. 1188 Stratford Avenue, LLC ("In this certified appeal, the defendants, Aniello Dizenzo and his company, 1188 Stratford Avenue, LLC (company), appeal from the Appellate Court's judgment affirming the trial court's denial of their motion to open the judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff, Mercedes-Benz Financial. On appeal, the defendants claim that the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that the trial court had not abused its discretion by denying their motion to open as untimely and with no basis, even though the defendants timely filed their motion. We agree and, therefore, reverse the Appellate Court's judgment.")

• SC20754 Dissent - Mercedes-Benz Financial v. 1188 Stratford Avenue, LLC

AC45867 - Burr v. Grossman Chevrolet-Nissan, Inc. (“The plaintiffs, Mathew Burr, Elmer Blackwell, and MPK Property Maintenance, LLC (MPK), appeal from the judgment of the trial court, rendered in favor of the defendant, Grossman Chevrolet-Nissan, Inc. On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the court erred in (1) misinterpreting their legal claims, (2) relying on the testimony of the defendant’s representative to reach its conclusion, and (3) finding certain facts in support of its judgment for the defendant. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.”)

AC45620 - Jefferson Solar, LLC v. FuelCell Energy, Inc. (“The plaintiff, Jefferson Solar, LLC, appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing the action as to the defendants FuelCell Energy, Inc., and SCEF1 Fuel Cell, LLC (collectively, FuelCell), and the United Illuminating Company (United Illuminating). On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly concluded that the plaintiff lacked standing to assert its claims. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.”

AC45222 - Travinski v. General Ins. Co. of America (“The plaintiffs, Christoper S. Travinski and Lena L. Travinski, appeal from the summary judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of the defendants, General Insurance Company of America, Safeco Corporation, Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, and Liberty Mutual Holding Company, Inc., on the plaintiffs’ complaint. The plaintiffs claim that the court improperly (1) granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to the counts of their complaint alleging breach of contract and a violation of the Connecticut Unauthorized Insurers Act (CUIA), General Statutes § 38a-271 et seq., and (2) permitted the defendants Safeco Corporation, Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, and Liberty Mutual Holding Company, Inc., to file a motion for summary judgment without posting a bond pursuant to General Statutes § 38a-27. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.)

• Posted in:
• Civil Procedure,
• Contract Law,
• Insurance Law,
• Recent Opinions,
• Tort Law

AC45956 - Clark v. Quantitative Strategies Group, LLC (“In this appeal from postjudgment proceedings to obtain satisfaction of a domesticated judgment arising from an arbitration award, the defendant judgment debtor John A. Brunjes appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying his claim of exemption filed pursuant to General Statutes (Supp. 2022) § 52-367b claiming that the plaintiff judgment creditors, William Thomas Clark and TDA Construction, Inc., executed on bank accounts that did not belong to him but, rather, belonged to his mother, Josephine M. Brunjes. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly found that he was a co-owner of the bank accounts at issue and that they were not exempt from execution under § 52-367b. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.”)

• Posted in:
• Civil Procedure,
• Recent Opinions

SC20699 - Benvenuto v. Brookman ("This is an appeal from an order granting a bill of discovery and requiring the defendant, Kevin Brookman, who publishes an Internet blog known as ‘‘We The People–Hartford,’’ to submit his laptop and cell phone for a forensic analysis that will enable the plaintiff, Vincent G. Benvenuto, to ascertain the identities of persons who posted blog comments containing allegedly defamatory statements about him. ‘‘[T]o safeguard the defendant’s privacy interest,’’ the trial court’s discovery order mandates that the parties attempt to reach an agreement on the terms of a protective order and search protocols that together will govern the scope and procedures to be used in the forensic analysis, or, in the absence of an agreement, submit proposed orders so that the trial court can resolve any disputes regarding the terms of the protective order and search protocols. The court expressly retained jurisdiction until such time as the parties have filed an agreement or the court has resolved any impasse. Following oral argument, we ordered the parties to file supplemental briefs addressing whether the trial court’s order is a final judgment for purposes of appellate review. We conclude that the order is not final and dismiss the appeal.")

• Posted in:
• Civil Procedure,
• Recent Opinions,
• Tort Law

AC45810 - Cazenovia Creek Funding I, LLC v. Roman ("Louis Roman appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying his motion to dismiss this foreclosure action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Roman filed this appeal as a self-represented litigant seeking to represent the interests of the named defendant, Louis Roman, in Trust for Alexandria K. Roman and Dakota T. Roman (trust). Because Roman, who is neither a party to this action nor an attorney, has appeared without counsel on behalf of a trust, we conclude that Roman does not have the authority to represent the trust. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.")

• Posted in:
• Civil Procedure,
• Foreclosure Law,
• Recent Opinions

Law Library Services has posted a new video that discusses the basic procedures for a landlord to follow when beginning a Connecticut Residential Summary Process action. The video addresses residential evictions, not commercial evictions. The video can be found on our Representing Yourself web page under Connecticut Civil Lawsuit Videos.

• Connecticut Civil Lawsuit – Residential Summary Process (Eviction) – Landlord (Video) PDF Text

• Posted in:
• Civil Procedure,
• FYI,
• Landlord / Tenant Law,
• Self-Help

AC45836 - Finance of America Reverse, LLC v. Henry ("The present appeal concerns the proper application of Practice Book § 61-11 (h), which limits the effect of the automatic appellate stay that arises following the denial of a motion to open a foreclosure judgment if that denial occurs fewer than twenty days before a scheduled foreclosure auction. In particular, we address the interplay between Practice Book §§ 61-11 (h) and 63-1 (c) (1), the latter of which governs when and how a new appeal period is created that, by implication, also extends any existing appellate stay of execution. See Practice Book § 61-11 (a) (automatic appellate stay of action to enforce or carry out judgment exists until time to appeal judgment expires).

The defendant Stephanie Henry appeals, following the court's approval of a foreclosure sale, from the denial of her motion for an order "nullifying" that sale. The defendant claims that the foreclosure sale was conducted in violation of the automatic appellate stay that arose as a result of the denial of her motion to open and extend the sale date, and that the court improperly relied on Practice Book § 61-11 (h) as a basis for refusing to set aside the sale. In response, the substitute plaintiff, Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB, as Trustee of Finance of America Structured Securities Acquisition Trust 2019-HB1, asserts that the sale was properly conducted as ordered by the court and that the court correctly denied the defendant's motion for order and, subsequently, approved the sale. For the reasons that follow, we agree with the defendant that the property was auctioned in violation of the automatic stay. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court and remand with direction to vacate the foreclosure sale and set a new sale date.")

• Posted in:
• Civil Procedure,
• Foreclosure Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC45662 - Speer v. Brown Jacobson P.C. ("The self-represented plaintiff, Sheri Speer, appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing, on the grounds of res judicata and collateral estoppel, her quo warranto action challenging the qualifications of the defendants Brown Jacobson P.C. (Brown Jacobson) and one of its attorneys, Aimee Wickless, to serve as corporation counsel for the defendant city of Norwich (city). On appeal, the plaintiff claims, inter alia, that the court improperly concluded that her claims are barred by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. We agree and, therefore, reverse the judgment of the trial court.")

• Posted in:
• Civil Procedure,
• Property Law,
• Recent Opinions,
• Tort Law