The mission of the Connecticut Judicial Branch is to serve the interests of justice and the public by resolving matters brought before it in a fair, timely, efficient and open manner.
Contract Law

Contract Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Roy, Christopher

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=3770

AC38614 - T & M Building Co. v. Hastings ("The plaintiff, T & M Building Co., Inc., appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the defendant, William Hastings. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court erred in (1) determining that the agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant violated the statute of frauds, (2) rendering judgment for the defendant on the plaintiff's unjust enrichment claim, and (3) rendering judgment for the defendant on the plaintiff's promissory estoppel claim. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")


Business Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Roy, Christopher

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=3769

AC41439 - Asselin & Vieceli Partnership, LLC v. Washburn ("The defendant, Steven T. Washburn, appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying his demand for a trial de novo following an arbitration award in favor of the plaintiff, Asselin & Vieceli Partnership, LLC. The trial court also confirmed the arbitration award upon an application filed by the plaintiff. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly confirmed the arbitration award because the arbitrator had failed to take an oath required by General Statutes § 52-414 (d), the plaintiff failed to file certain required documents required by General Statutes § 52-421 (a) and the arbitrator exceeded her powers or imperfectly executed them in violation of General Statutes § 52-418 (a) (4).We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment granting the plaintiff's application to confirm the arbitration award.")


Contract Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Roy, Christopher

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=3743

AC41814 - AC Consulting, LLC v. Alexion Pharmaceuticals, Inc. ("The plaintiff, A.C. Consulting, LLC, appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the defendant, Alexion Pharmaceuticals, Inc., following the granting of the defendant's motion to strike the plaintiff's substitute complaint. The substitute complaint contained three counts alleging, respectively, breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that, in evaluating the legal sufficiency of the allegations in the substitute complaint, the trial court improperly (1) failed both to find an ambiguity in the parties' contract regarding its operative length and to construe that ambiguity against the defendant as the drafter of the contract, (2) concluded that the plaintiff's allegation that the defendant terminated the contract without giving the plaintiff "sufficient notice under the contract" was legally insufficient to state a claim for breach of contract, and (3) concluded that the allegations that the defendant or the defendant's agent made assurances regarding the length of the contract were insufficient to plead any of the plaintiff's causes of action, including negligent misrepresentation. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")


Family Law Supreme Court Opinion

   by Roy, Christopher

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=3733

SC20078 - Bilbao v. Goodwin ("In this appeal, we are called on to determine how pre-embryos created through in vitro fertilization should be distributed upon the divorce of their progenitors. The plaintiff, Jessica Bilbao, and the defendant, Timothy R. Goodwin, were married and underwent in vitro fertilization in an effort to have children. Several pre-embryos resulting from that treatment were stored for implantation in the future. As part of a storage agreement with the fertility clinic, the parties unequivocally stated that they wanted the pre-embryos discarded if they ever divorced. Their marriage has since been dissolved, and the plaintiff now seeks to have the pre-embryos discarded in accordance with the storage agreement. The defendant argues that the agreement is unenforceable, however, and wants the pre-embryos preserved or donated. The trial court concluded that the storage agreement was unenforceable but awarded the pre-embryos to the plaintiff. We conclude that the storage agreement is enforceable and, therefore, reverse the trial court's judgment insofar as the court determined that the agreement was not enforceable.")


Landlord/Tenant Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Zigadto, Janet

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=3718

AC41398, AC41543 - Commerce Park Associates, LLC v. Robbins; Robbins Eye Center, P.C. v. Commerce Park Associates, LLC ("The present appeals and cross appeal arise from two actions involving a commercial lease that share a nucleus of operative facts and were consolidated for trial. They raise, among other issues, whether the landlord's failure to take actions to remedy recurrent sewage backups into the leased premises occupied by an eye surgery center resulted in a constructive eviction that excused the tenant from the obligation to pay rent in accordance with the terms of the lease, and whether, as a result of the alleged inaction of the landlord and its property management company, the eye surgery center was entitled to recover compensatory damages for the loss of its use of improvements it previously had made to the premises.

In the action underlying AC 41398 (rent action), Commerce Park Associates, LLC (Commerce Park), sought to recover rent it alleges it was owed by a former tenant, Kim Robbins—an ophthalmologist and the owner of Robbins Eye Center, P.C. (REC). REC had occupied the lower level of a commercial property owned by Commerce Park in Bridgeport pursuant to a commercial lease but vacated the premises prior to the lease's expiration following a series of sewage backups that flooded the premises. Robbins now appeals, and Commerce Park cross appeals, from the judgment of the trial court rendered in part in favor of Commerce Park. Robbins claims that the court improperly (1) awarded Commerce Park rent for a period of time from November, 2014, through the third full week of April, 2015, and (2) miscalculated the amount of the rent that she owed for that period. Commerce Park claims by way of cross appeal that the court improperly determined that Robbins was constructively evicted from the premises after the third full week of April, 2015, by the sewage backups, and, consequently, Commerce Park was not entitled to recover any rent from Robbins after that date. We affirm the judgment of the court with the exception of its calculation of the amount of the rent awarded to Commerce Park and, accordingly, remand for a new hearing in damages in the rent action.

In the action underlying AC 41543 (tort action), REC sued Commerce Park and its property manager, RDR Management, LLC (RDR), seeking monetary damages for economic injuries that REC suffered as a result of their failure to make necessary repairs to the premises. Commerce Park now appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered in part in favor of REC and awarding REC damages of $958,041.92 against Commerce Park. Commerce Park claims that the trial court improperly (1) awarded damages on the basis of gross negligence because (a) Connecticut common law does not recognize distinctions or degrees of negligence and (b) REC never pleaded or otherwise asserted allegations of gross negligence prior to trial; and (2) miscalculated the amount of damages awarded because the court (a) utilized an incorrect measure of damages in determining REC's losses and (b) misconstrued the length of Robbins' expected tenancy under the lease, which was an integral component of the court's calculation of damages. We agree that the court improperly included two unexercised lease extension options in determining the length of Robbins' tenancy and, accordingly, reverse the amount of damages awarded; we otherwise affirm the judgment of the court in the tort action.")


Contract Law Appellate Court Opinions

   by Roy, Christopher

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=3709

AC41366, AC41365 - Kelly v. Kurtz ("In this case arising from the buyout of an oral surgery practice, the plaintiff, Dorrance T. Kelly, DDS, and the defendants, Marshall D. Kurtz, DMD, Marshall D. Kurtz, DMD, PC, and Danbury Oral and Maxillofacial Surgery Associates, LLC (DOMSA), appeal from the judgment of the trial court rendered, following a jury trial, in favor of the plaintiff, in the amount of $2,150,000.To establish the terms of the buyout, the parties executed three documents: a purchase and sale agreement, an operating agreement, and a supplementary agreement. On appeal, the defendants claim, in AC 41366, that the trial court erred in denying their motion to set aside the jury's verdict on the plaintiff's claims of breach of the supplementary agreement and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the supplementary agreement on the grounds that (1) the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to sustain the jury's finding of breach of the supplementary agreement, and (2) the jury's awards of damages on the plaintiff's claims of breach of the supplementary agreement and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the supplementary agreement were inconsistent. The plaintiff claims, in AC 41365, that the trial court erred in (1) granting the defendants' motion to set aside the jury's verdict on his claims of invasion of privacy by misappropriation of his name, tortious interference with his business expectancies, violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), General Statues § 42-110a et seq., and unjust enrichment; and (2) dismissing his claim of breach of the operating agreement and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the operating agreement on the ground that he lacked standing to bring those claims. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

AC42602 - Meribear Productions, Inc. v. Frank ("The plaintiff, Meribear Productions, Inc., filed a motion to dismiss the appeal of the defendants, Joan Frank and George Frank. The plaintiff argued that the defendants' joint appeal was untimely and, thus, subject to dismissal. See Practice Book §§ 63-1 and 66-8. In response, the defendants filed a motion for permission to file a late appeal. The defendants argued that permission to file a late appeal was warranted because they would suffer a loss of their appellate rights if the appeal was not allowed. We agreed with the defendants and, therefore, granted nunc pro tunc the defendants' motion to file a late appeal, and denied the plaintiff's motion to dismiss the appeal as untimely, indicating in our order that an opinion would follow. We write to explain our reasons for permitting this late appeal.")


Business Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Roy, Christopher

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=3703

AC39388 - Alpha Beta Capital Partners, L.P. v. Pursuit Investment Management, LLC ("This appeal arises out of a dispute between the plaintiff, Alpha Beta Capital Partners, L.P., and the defendants Pursuit Opportunity Fund I, L.P. (POF), Pursuit Opportunity Fund I Master Ltd. (POF Master), Pursuit Capital Management Fund I, L.P. (PCM), Pursuit Capital Master (Cayman) Ltd. (PCM Master), Pursuit Partners, LLC (Pursuit Partners), Pursuit Investment Management, LLC (PIM), Northeast Capital Management, LLC (Northeast), Anthony Schepis, and Frank Canelas, Jr. The central issue of this appeal is the defendants' claim that the court improperly interpreted the agreements between the parties to hold that certain defendants were liable for their failure to distribute to the plaintiff its share of a substantial contingent asset in which it had an interest.

The defendants appeal, and the plaintiff cross appeals, from the judgment of the trial court, rendered after a bench trial, partially in favor of the plaintiff as to certain defendants on its complaint and in favor of the plaintiff on the defendants' counterclaim. The defendants also appeal from the orders of the trial court granting the plaintiff's postjudgment motion to increase the amount of a previously secured prejudgment remedy, and granting the plaintiff's motion for discovery to secure the additional prejudgment remedy attachment.

Addressing the parties' various contentions, we conclude that (1) the court properly interpreted the agreements between the parties in concluding that the plaintiff prevailed on its breach of contract claim, (2) the court properly rejected the defendants' breach of contract counterclaim, (3) the court properly concluded that the plaintiff prevailed on its breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim, (4) the court properly concluded that the plaintiff could not prevail on its conversion claim, (5) the court properly struck the plaintiff's Connecticut statutory causes of action, (6) the court improperly concluded that all of the defendants who had signed the settlement agreement were liable for breach of contract and for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, (7) the court properly determined the amount of damages awarded to the plaintiff, (8) the court properly granted the plaintiff's motion to increase the amount of the prejudgment remedy, and (9) the defendants' claim that the court improperly granted the plaintiff's motion for postjudgment discovery was not properly preserved, and, thus, we decline to review it. Accordingly, we affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the trial court.")


Contract Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Roy, Christopher

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=3694

AC41528 - Francini v. Riggione ("This appeal arises from a breach of contract and private nuisance action brought by the plaintiffs, Peter J. Francini, Trustee, and Donald W. Anderson, Trustee, on behalf of the Peter J. Francini 1992 Revocable Family Trust, against the defendant, Nicholas A. Riggione. After a five day trial to the court, the court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs on their breach of contract claims, but denied their request for injunctive and equitable relief on their private nuisance claim.The defendant appeals from the court's subsequent award, after determining that the plaintiffs were the prevailing party, of approximately $90,000 in attorney's fees. On appeal, the defendant essentially claims that the court abused its discretion in calculating the award of attorney's fees (1) because in awarding fees to the plaintiffs on their claims related to a breach of contract between the parties, a proper analysis of the factors listed in rule 1.5 (a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct would compel a significant downward departure from the plaintiffs' initial lodestar calculation; and (2) when it awarded fees for a private nuisance claim on which the plaintiffs did not prevail. We agree with the defendant that the court abused its discretion in awarding attorney's fees for a claim on which the plaintiffs did not prevail. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court in part and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.")


Contract Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Roy, Christopher

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=3673

AC41467 - Weinshel, Wynnick & Associates, LLC v. Bongiorno ("The plaintiff, Weinshel, Wynnick & Associates, LLC, appeals from the trial court's judgment in favor of the defendants, Marie Bongiorno, individually (Marie Bongiorno), and Marie Bongiorno, executrix of the estate of George Bongiorno (Marie Bongiorno, executrix), on its claims of successor liability and breach of contract. On appeal, the plaintiff argues that the court improperly (1) concluded that Marie Bongiorno could not be held personally liable for the plaintiff's damages pursuant to a theory of successor liability, and (2) rendered judgment in favor of Marie Bongiorno, executrix, on the basis of General Statutes 52-599 (b). We affirm the judgment in favor of Marie Bongiorno, and reverse the judgment in favor of Marie Bongiorno, executrix.")


Business Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Roy, Christopher

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=3664

AC40693 - Crosskey Architects, LLC v. POKO Partners, LLC ("The defendants POKO Partners, LLC, POKO Reservoir Yaremich Developers, LLC, POKO Cape Loom Managers, LLC, One Morningside Group, LLC, One Morningside Managers, LLC, One Morningside Owners, LLC, Capehart Ventures, LLC, POKO Management Corp., Richard K. Olson, and Pamela Olson, as executrix of the estate of Kenneth M. Olson, appeal from the judgment of the trial court rendered in part in favor of the plaintiff, Crosskey Architects, LLC. On appeal, the defendants claim that the court (1) improperly pierced the corporate veil, (2) improperly found that the plaintiff was entitled to damages on the theory of quantum meruit and (3) abused its discretion in awarding statutory prejudgment interest pursuant to General Statutes § 37-3a on the theory of quantum meruit. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")


Contract Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Roy, Christopher

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=3665

AC39898 - Pasco Common Condominium Assn., Inc. v. Benson ("The defendants, Benson Enterprises, Inc. (declarant), and Paul D. Benson, appeal from the judgment of the trial court, rendered after a bench trial, in favor of the plaintiffs, Pasco Common Condominium Association, Inc. (association), and eighteen individual members of the association. On appeal, the defendants claim that (1) the court incorrectly concluded that the statute of limitations governing the plaintiffs' claims was tolled until the commencement of the present action because the period of declarant control had not terminated, (2) the plaintiffs' action was time barred pursuant to General Statutes § 52-577, the three year statute of limitations applicable to tort actions, (3) the court improperly awarded the association damages on the plaintiffs' claim that the defendants improperly assessed common charges, and (4) the court improperly determined that Benson individually was liable. We agree with the defendants' first, third, and fourth claims, but we disagree in part with the defendants' second claim. Accordingly, we affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the trial court.")


Insurance Law Supreme Court Opinion

   by Roy, Christopher

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=3653

SC19968 - Riley v. Travelers Home & Marine Ins. Co. ("This appeal concerns a question of civil procedure arising when a jury returns a verdict in favor of the plaintiff that the defendant claims was not supported by sufficient evidence presented during the plaintiff's case-in-chief. Under what has come to be known as the waiver rule, 'when a trial court denies a defendant's motion for a directed verdict at the close of the plaintiff's case, the defendant, by opting to introduce evidence in his or her own behalf, waives the right to appeal the trial court's ruling.' Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Board of Tax Review, 241 Conn. 749, 756–57, 699 A.2d 81 (1997). The defendant, The Traveler's Home and Marine Insurance Company, contends that the waiver rule is inapplicable to civil cases in which a trial court reserves decision on a motion for a directed verdict pursuant to Practice Book § 16-37. We disagree and conclude that the waiver rule is applicable regardless of whether a motion for a directed verdict has been reserved for decision or denied. Thus, a court reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a jury's verdict must consider all of the evidence considered by the jury returning the verdict, not just the evidence presented in the plaintiff's case-in-chief.

The plaintiff, C. Andrew Riley, commenced this action against the defendant for breach of contract and negligent infliction of emotional distress stemming from the defendant's handling of the plaintiff's homeowner's insurance claim. At the close of the plaintiff's case-in-chief, the defendant moved for a directed verdict on the plaintiff's negligent infliction of emotional distress claim, and the trial court reserved decision on that motion. The defendant then presented evidence in its defense, some of which supported the plaintiff's contention that the defendant had been negligent in its investigation of his homeowner's insurance claim. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff on both counts. The defendant timely moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, renewing its motion for a directed verdict and requesting the court to set aside the verdict on the claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress and render judgment for the defendant. The trial court, relying primarily on evidence that emerged during the defendant's case, determined that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict and denied the defendant's motion. The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's judgment; Riley v. Travelers Home & Marine Ins. Co., 173 Conn. App. 422, 462, 163 A.3d 1246 (2017); and we affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.")


Contract Law Supreme Court Opinion

   by Booth, George

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=3622

SC20131 - Dept. of Transportation v. White Oak Corp. (Arbitration; "After an arbitration proceeding, the defendant, White Oak Corporation (White Oak), was awarded a money judgment against the plaintiff, the Department of Transportation (department) in the amount of $8,362,308.41 plus interest. In paying that judgment on behalf of the department, the Office of the State Comptroller (comptroller) withheld $1,642,312.14 for taxes White Oak had owed to the state. As a result of this withholding, White Oak filed a motion with the trial court seeking a determination as to whether the judgment had been satisfied. In its motion, White Oak asserted that the department did not fully satisfy its judgment because, during a prior arbitration proceeding between the parties, the department had alleged but failed to prove its claim for taxes owed to the state and that, thus, the doctrine of collateral estoppel precluded the comptroller from reducing the payment by any amount for taxes owed.

The trial court rejected White Oak's claim and determined that the judgment had been satisfied. The defendant now appeals from the trial court's determination, again alleging that collateral estoppel precluded the comptroller from withholding the taxes owed to the state. We agree with the trial court that the department satisfied its judgment to White Oak because General Statutes § 12-39g imposed a mandatory obligation on the comptroller to reduce the amount paid to White Oak by the amount of taxes owed to the state as those taxes were not the subject of a timely filed administrative appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.")


Business Law Supreme Court Opinion

   by Booth, George

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=3599

SC20133 - Reclaimant Corp. v. Deutsch (Conflict of laws; unjust enrichment; statutes of limitations (§§ 52-576 and 52-577); motion for summary judgment on ground that plaintiff failed to timely commence action; claim that plaintiff failed to commence action within three year limitation period set forth in § 17-607 (c) of Delaware Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act; claim that trial court incorrectly determined that Delaware law rather than Connecticut law governed issue of whether plaintiff's unjust enrichment claims were time barred; "The narrow issue presented by this appeal is whether the statute of limitations of the state of Connecticut or the state of Delaware governs the unjust enrichment claims brought by the plaintiff, Reclaimant Corp., against the defendants, William J. Deutsch and Laurence B. Simon, seeking recovery for alleged overpayments issued to the defendants by the plaintiff's putative predecessor in interest pursuant to a limited partnership agreement. The trial court rendered summary judgment in favor of the defendants, concluding that the plaintiff's unjust enrichment claims were governed by Delaware law and were time-barred under the three-year statute of limitations in the Delaware Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act (DRULPA), Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 17-607 (c) (2005). On appeal, the plaintiff contends that summary judgment was improper because Connecticut law governs the timeliness of its unjust enrichment claims and that those claims timely were filed under Connecticut law.

We conclude that Delaware law governs the substantive rights and liabilities of the parties arising out of the limited partnership agreement but that Connecticut law governs matters of judicial administration and procedure. We further conclude that, because the plaintiff's unjust enrichment claims have a common-law origin, the limitation period properly is "characterized as procedural because it functions only as a qualification on the remedy to enforce the preexisting right." Baxter v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 230 Conn. 335, 347, 644 A.2d 1297 (1994). Thus, Connecticut law, rather than Delaware law, controls the timeliness of the plaintiff's claims. We therefore reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for further proceedings.")


Contract Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Roy, Christopher

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=3573

AC42007 - Mosby v. Board of Education ("The self-represented plaintiff, John Mosby, appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the defendants, the Board of Education of the City of Norwalk (board), and United Public Services Employees Union (union), following the granting of the board's motion to dismiss and the union's motion for summary judgment. On appeal, Mosby claims that the court erred in (1) granting the motion to dismiss in favor of the board on the ground of improper service of process, and (2) granting the motion for summary judgment in favor of the union on the ground that Mosby lacked standing to commence this action against the union. We affirm the judgment of the court.")


Contract Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Roy, Christopher

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=3562

AC41463 - Clasby v. Zimmerman ("The defendant, Bradford Estates, LLC, is a general contracting business hired by the plaintiffs, Robert Clasby and Krista Clasby, to raise and remodel their shoreline home, which was extensively damaged by Hurricane Sandy.The parties agreed to arbitrate disputes that arose during the construction project, and the defendant now appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying its application to confirm a February 4, 2017 arbitration award. The defendant contends that the February 4, 2017 award conclusively established that the defendant was entitled to collect from the plaintiffs a balance of $51,856.65 in materials and labor for certain cabinetry work."

"....For the reasons that follow, we affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the trial court, and remand the matter with direction to grant the application to confirm the February 4, 2017 award, but to deny the remainder of the relief requested in the application.")


Contract Law Supreme Court Opinions

   by Roy, Christopher

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=3536

SC20032, SC20033, SC20036 - Girolametti v. Michael Horton Associates, Inc. ("This certified appeal poses the question of whether and under what circumstances arbitration of a construction dispute between a property owner and a general contractor is res judicata as to the claims of subcontractors that did not participate in the arbitration. We agree with the Appellate Court that, in the absence of clear evidence of contrary intent by the parties, subcontractors are presumptively in privity with the general contractor on a construction project for purposes of res judicata. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.")

SC0034, SC20035 - Girolametti v. VP Buildings, Inc.


Contract Law Supreme Court Opinions

   by Roy, Christopher

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=3525

SC20047 - Geriatrics, Inc. v. McGee ("The plaintiff appeals from the judgment of the trial court insofar as it rendered judgment in the defendant’s favor on counts alleging fraudulent transfer under CUFTA and unjust enrichment. We conclude that the trial court, in rejecting the plaintiff's CUFTA claim, improperly failed to consider and apply agency principles when it decided that Helen's assets had been transferred by a 'third party,' the defendant, and not by the debtor, Helen. We further conclude that, in light of certain unrebutted evidence, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting the plaintiff’s unjust enrichment claim. Therefore, we reverse in part and affirm in part the trial court's judgment.")


Insurance Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Roy, Christopher

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=3508

AC41429 - Hilario Truck Center, LLC v. Kohn ("The plaintiff, Hilario Truck Center, LLC, appeals from the judgment of dismissal of the third count of its operative complaint following the granting of the motion to dismiss filed by the defendant Allstate Insurance Company (Allstate). The plaintiff argues that the court erred when it concluded that the plaintiff lacked standing to bring a claim as a third-party beneficiary against Allstate pursuant to an automobile insurance policy issued to the defendant Kevin E. Kohn. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")


Contract Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Roy, Christopher

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=3504

AC41028 - Rosenthal Law Firm, LLC v. Cohen ("This action between the plaintiff, Rosenthal Law Firm, LLC, and its former client, the defendant, James Cohen, arises out of a fee dispute that had been resolved in the plaintiff's favor during a prior arbitration proceeding. Following the confirmation of the arbitration award, the plaintiff commenced the present action seeking attorney's fees, pursuant to a contract between it and the defendant, for its prosecution of the fee dispute. After a trial to the court, the trial court rendered judgment in the defendant's favor, from which the plaintiff now appeals. The plaintiff claims on appeal that the court erred in concluding that it was not entitled to attorney's fees because it had represented itself, through its sole member, in the arbitration and award confirmation proceedings. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.")


1 2 3 4 5 6