The mission of the Connecticut Judicial Branch is to serve the interests of justice and the public by resolving matters brought before it in a fair, timely, efficient and open manner.
Contract Law

Contract Law Appellate Court Opinions

   by Zigadto, Janet

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5181

AC43880 - Bruno v. Whipple ("The plaintiff, Lisa Bruno, appeals, and the defendant Heritage Homes Construction Company, LLC, cross appeals, from the judgment of the trial court denying their respective motions for attorney's fees. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court erred by failing to award her (1) attorney's fees pursuant to General Statutes § 42-150bb and/or (2) attorney's fees and other litigation-related costs pursuant to a fee-shifting provision of a construction contract executed by the parties. On cross appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly denied its motion for attorney's fees because the defendant, not the plaintiff, is the prevailing party in this matter. We conclude that the court did not err in denying both motions for attorney's fees. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

AC44804 - Hassett v. Secor's Auto Center, Inc. ("In this action arising from the purchase of a used motor vehicle by the plaintiff, Erin C. Hassett, from the defendant, Secor's Auto Center, Inc., a used car dealer, the trial court rendered judgment in accordance with a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff with respect to four of the five claims set forth in the complaint and awarded the plaintiff $11,000 in damages. On appeal from that judgment, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly denied her motion for additur. We disagree and affirm the judgment of the trial court.")


Tort Law Supreme Court Opinion

   by Booth, George

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5159

SC20543, SC20544 - Clinton v. Aspinwall (Action to recover damages for breach of contract and fiduciary duty; "When a court renders judgment in a multicount civil action with fewer than all counts of a plaintiff’s complaint accounted for in that judgment, jurisdictional alarm bells should ring if any party files an appeal, alerting the parties and the trial court to a potential final judgment problem. Before the parties and the appellate courts expend resources resolving the appeal, it is important to examine the rules of practice, statutes and our case law to determine whether an appeal can be taken from that judgment. See General Statutes §§ 51-197a and 52-263; Practice Book §§ 61-2 through 61-5. In Meribear Productions, Inc. v. Frank, 328 Conn. 709, 183 A.3d 1164 (2018), we held in the context of a court trial that, when legally consistent theories of recovery have been litigated but not all theories have been ruled on, there is no final judgment. The present appeals require us to determine whether the same threshold jurisdictional rule applies in the context of civil jury trials. We hold that it does and are therefore compelled to vacate the judgment of the Appellate Court and to remand this case to that court with direction to dismiss the appeals for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.")


Insurance Law Appellate Court Opinions

   by Roy, Christopher

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5144

AC44424 - Harrigan v. Fidelity National Title Ins. Co. (The plaintiff, Paul Harrigan, appeals from the judgment of the trial court, following a bench trial, rendered in part in favor of the defendant, Fidelity National Title Insurance Company, in connection with a title insurance policy (title policy) issued by the defendant to the plaintiff. On appeal, the plaintiff challenges the judgment in favor of the defendant only with respect to count two of the operative complaint, the third revised complaint, which alleges that the defendant's conduct in handling an insurance claim filed by the plaintiff pursuant to the title policy violated the Connecticut Unfair Insurance Practices Act (CUIPA); General Statutes § 38a-815 et seq.; and that such unfair and deceptive acts or practices of the defendant thereby violated the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), General Statutes § 42-110a et seq. Specifically, the plaintiff claims on appeal that (1) the court applied an incorrect standard in its analysis of whether the defendant violated CUIPA by requiring a finding of common-law bad faith by the defendant for the plaintiff to establish a violation of CUIPA, (2) when the proper standard is applied, the record sufficiently demonstrates that the defendant violated the relevant provisions of CUIPA, and (3) the evidence submitted by the plaintiff establishes that the defendant's unfair practices were part of a general business practice, as required under General Statutes § 38a-816 (6). We affirm the judgment of the court, albeit on different grounds.")

AC44560 - Pollard v. Geico General Ins. Co. (The plaintiff, Michelle J. Pollard, appeals from the summary judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of the defendant, Geico General Insurance Company, on the plaintiff's complaint seeking to recover underinsured motorist benefits. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly determined that the accidental failure of suit statute, General Statutes § 52-592 (a), did not apply so as to revive her otherwise time barred action. The defendant counters that summary judgment was appropriately rendered and asserts, as an alternative ground for affirmance of the court's judgment, that the plaintiff's action was barred because she failed under the terms of the parties' insurance policy to commence suit timely or to invoke the policy's tolling provision. We agree with the defendant's alternative argument and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court on that basis.)


Contract Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Oumano, Emily

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5133

AC44537 - Konover Development Corp. v. Waterbury Omega, LLC (“The defendant Waterbury Omega, LLC appeals from the judgment of the trial court granting the application for a prejudgment remedy in favor of the plaintiff, Konover Development Corporation, upon a finding of probable cause that the defendant had breached an oral agreement for the plaintiff's procurement, management and accounting of building/rooftop wireless telecommunications agreements on behalf of the defendant. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly concluded that the plaintiff had established probable cause in light of its defenses that enforcement of the oral agreement was barred by (1) General Statutes § 20-325a, (2) the rule against perpetuities, and (3) the statute of frauds. We affirm the judgment of the court.”)


Tort Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Roy, Christopher

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5103

AC44436 - Brass Mill Center, LLC v. Subway Real Estate Corp. ("The defendant AlliedBarton Security Services, LLC, appeals from the judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of the plaintiff, Brass Mill Center, LLC, granting summary judgment as to liability and awarding damages. The defendant argues that the trial court improperly concluded that it had a contractual duty (1) to defend the plaintiff in an underlying wrongful death action brought against the plaintiff and (2) to indemnify the plaintiff in that same wrongful death action, including for attorney’s fees and costs that the plaintiff incurred in pursuing claims against third parties. We agree and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the trial court.")


Interpleader Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Roy, Christopher

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5094

AC44397 - Sargent, Sargent & Jacobs, LLC v. Thoele ("This interpleader action arises from a dispute between the defendant purchaser, Merwin, LLC (purchaser), and the defendant seller, Alan Thoele (seller), concerning a failed commercial real estate transaction. The seller appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the purchaser on its claims for breach of contract and return of deposit. On appeal, the seller claims that the court erred in concluding that (1) the parol evidence rule precluded consideration of a letter of intent from 2016, (2) the purchaser did not have actual knowledge of a potential sewer easement on the property, (3) the potential sewer easement was an encumbrance on the property, and (4) the seller's failure to disclose the potential sewer easement was a material breach of the purchase and sale agreement. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.")


Contract Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Zigadto, Janet

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5081

AC44380 - Reiner v. Reiner (Declaratory judgment; contract interpretation; interest; settlement agreement; "In this declaratory judgment action, the defendant Michael D. Reiner appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the plaintiff Jeffrey A. Reiner. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court erred in concluding that the term 'interest,' as used in the buyout provisions of the parties' settlement agreement (agreement), meant 'equitable interest' and, thus, that the buyout amount for the defendant's interests in certain parcels of real property is equal to his percentage interest in each property multiplied by the difference of the fair market value of the property minus any outstanding mortgage debt. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.")


Contract Law Appellate Court Opinions

   by Roy, Christopher

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5068

AC44374 - Budlong & Budlong, LLC v. Zakko ("The defendant, Angham Zakko, appeals from the judgment of the trial court, rendered following a hearing and report by an attorney fact finder, in favor of the plaintiff, Budlong & Budlong, LLC, on the plaintiff's complaint in the amount of $17,602.50. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly (1) overruled her objection to the attorney fact finder's report because the court failed to review the evidence considered by the attorney fact finder, and (2) rendered judgment in accordance with the attorney fact finder's report because the report contained insufficient factual findings. We agree with both of the defendant's claims and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the court.")

AC43463 - Mercedes-Benz Financial v. 1188 Stratford Ave, LLC ("The defendants, Aniello Dizenzo and his company, 1188 Stratford Ave, LLC (company), appeal from the judgment of the trial court denying their motion to open the default judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff, Mercedes-Benz Financial. The defendants claim that the court abused its discretion by denying their (1) motion to open and (2) oral request to continue the hearing on the motion to allow the defendants to present testimony and evidence in support of it. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")


Contract Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Oumano, Emily

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5052

AC44063 - Pointe Residential Builders BH, LLC v. TMP Construction Group, LLC (“This appeal arises out of a contract for the construction of a condominium complex in Greenwich. The defendants, TMP Construction Group, LLC (TMP), and Olin Paige III, appeal from the judgment of the trial court, rendered in favor of the plaintiff, Pointe Residential Builders BH, LLC, following a trial to the court. On appeal, the defendants claim that the court erred by rendering judgment for the plaintiff with respect to the plaintiff's count alleging a violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), General Statutes § 42-110a et seq., and the plaintiff's count alleging unjust enrichment. We conclude that the court did not improperly render judgment on the plaintiff's CUTPA claim. In light of this conclusion, we need not address the defendants' claims pertaining to the unjust enrichment claim. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.”)


Contract Law Supreme Court Opinion

   by Oumano, Emily

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5047

SC20516 - Winakor v. Savalle (“This appeal requires us to consider whether certain services provided by a contractor fall under the purview of the Home Improvement Act, General Statutes § 20-418 et seq. In this appeal, the plaintiff, Lee Winakor, claims that the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that the Home Improvement Act did not apply to work performed on his property by the defendant, Vincent Savalle. The defendant claims that the work falls under the new home exception of the Home Improvement Act and, therefore, that the Appellate Court's conclusion was correct. We agree with the defendant and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.”)


Contract Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Oumano, Emily

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5028

AC44777 - Jefferson Solar, LLC v. FuelCell Energy, Inc. (“The plaintiff, Jefferson Solar, LLC, appeals from the judgment of the trial court granting the motion to dismiss filed by the defendants, FuelCell Energy, Inc. FuelCell), and SCEF1 Fuel Cell, LLC (company). On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly concluded that it lacked standing to maintain an action under the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), General Statutes § 42-110a et seq. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.”)


Contract Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Oumano, Emily

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5018

AC44056 - Barclays Bank Delaware v. Bamford (“In this debt collection action, the defendant, Diana L. Bamford, appeals from the judgment of the trial court, Suarez, J., following a hearing in damages, awarding the plaintiff, Barclays Bank Delaware, monetary relief in the amount of $5661.81 plus costs of $436.20. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court: (1) abused its discretion in denying her motion to disqualify the Honorable Matthew E. Frechette, a judge of the Superior Court, and in ruling on her motions to reargue and reconsider that denial; (2) improperly granted the plaintiff's motion for default for failure to disclose a defense; and (3) improperly admitted certain documents containing hearsay statements into evidence at the hearing in damages. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.”)


Contract Law Appellate Court Opinions

   by Oumano, Emily

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5006

AC44218, AC44656 - D2E Holdings, LLC v. Corp. for Urban Home Ownership of New Haven (“These consolidated appeals arise from a dispute among the plaintiff, D2E Holdings, LLC (D2E Holdings), the defendant, third-party plaintiff, and third-party counterclaim defendant, Corporation for Urban Home Ownership of New Haven (CUHO), and the third-party defendant and third-party counterclaim plaintiff, Dragon Bridge Management, LLC (Dragon Bridge).In Docket No. AC 44218, D2E Holdings and Dragon Bridge appeal from the judgment of the trial court, rendered after a trial to the court, in favor of CUHO. In Docket No. AC 44656, D2E Holdings appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying its motion to open the judgment in favor of CUHO. The parties advance three claims in their appeals. In AC 44218, D2E Holdings claims that the court improperly rendered judgment in favor of CUHO on D2E Holdings' breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim; in the same docket, Dragon Bridge claims that the court improperly rendered judgment in favor of CUHO on Dragon Bridge's breach of contract counterclaim. In AC 44656, D2E Holdings claims that the court incorrectly determined that it failed to make a threshold showing of fraud in order to warrant limited discovery and an evidentiary hearing on its motion to open. We affirm the judgments of the court.”)

AC43957 - Li v. Yaggi (“On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the court improperly concluded that they (1) failed to exercise due diligence in obtaining a written mortgage commitment, (2) did not provide adequate notice to the defendant that they were unable to obtain a mortgage commitment, and (3) waived any right they might have had to the deposits. We conclude that the court properly determined that the plaintiffs did not provide adequate notice to the defendant that they were unable to obtain a mortgage commitment pursuant to the terms of the agreement. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.”)


Contract Law Supreme Court Opinion

   by Booth, George

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=4990

SC20526 - Centerplan Construction Co., LLC v. Hartford (Contracts; "The case before us involves a dispute over the party responsible for delays in constructing Dunkin Donuts Park, home of Hartford's minor league baseball team, the Yard Goats, and a key part of the planned economic revitalization of Connecticut's capital city. As often occurs with such projects, the parties blame one another for the delays. The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the trial court correctly concluded, as a matter of law, that the plaintiffs, the project's developer, DoNo Hartford, LLC (DoNo), and the project's design-builder, Centerplan Construction Company, LLC (Centerplan), "controlled" the architect and were therefore responsible for any mistakes in and changes to the stadium's design. Specifically, the plaintiffs claim that, in its pretrial interpretation of various agreements the plaintiffs and the defendant, the city of Hartford (city), had executed to construct the ballpark, the trial court incorrectly concluded that the agreements plainly had assigned to the plaintiffs both the power to direct the design of the ballpark as well as the responsibility for the architect's errors and omissions. After the trial court's ruling, a jury found the plaintiffs responsible for failing to complete the stadium by the contractually agreed on deadline, returned a verdict against the plaintiffs on their claim against the city, and awarded the city $335,000 in liquidated damages on its counterclaim.

Upon our careful review of the contracts at issue, we conclude that, contrary to the trial court's pretrial ruling, the parties' contracts did not unambiguously grant the plaintiffs legal control of the architect and the stadium's design across all relevant time periods. Because the trial court's pretrial ruling improperly took several questions of fact from the jury's consideration, we must reverse the judgment and remand the case for a new trial.")


Landlord/Tenant Law Supreme Court Opinion

   by Zigadto, Janet

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=4977

SC20625 - AGW Sono Partners, LLC v. Downtown Soho, LLC (Commercial lease; "In the earliest months of the COVID-19 public health emergency, Governor Ned Lamont issued numerous executive orders that closed or severely restricted the operation of various businesses, including bars and restaurants, in order to stem the spread of the virus at that time. This appeal requires us to consider how those executive orders affected the enforceability of a commercial lease agreement for premises in South Norwalk that the defendants, Downtown Soho, LLC (Downtown Soho), and Edin Ahmetaj, leased from the plaintiff, AGW Sono Partners, LLC, for their fine dining restaurant. The defendants appeal, and the plaintiff cross appeals, from the judgment of the trial court awarding the plaintiff $200,308.76 in damages for the defendants' breach of that lease agreement. In their appeal, the defendants claim, inter alia, that the trial court incorrectly concluded that the common-law doctrines of impossibility and frustration of purpose did not relieve them of their obligations under the lease agreement, given the damaging economic effects of the various executive orders on their restaurant's business. In its cross appeal, the plaintiff claims that, in calculating the damages award, the trial court improperly allocated the burden of proof in determining whether the plaintiff had mitigated its damages when it leased the premises to a new tenant at a lesser rent than the defendants had paid. We conclude that the trial court correctly determined that the economic effects of the executive orders did not relieve the defendants of their obligations under the lease agreement but that a new damages hearing is required because the trial court improperly allocated the burden of proof as to mitigation in determining the damages award. Accordingly, we reverse in part the judgment of the trial court.")


Contract Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Oumano, Emily

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=4976

AC42998 - Fiorillo v. Hartford (“This appeal and cross appeal have their origin in a breach of contract action commenced in 1999 by a group of retired Hartford firefighters (original plaintiffs) regarding their health insurance benefits. The parties reached a settlement agreement in 2003 in which the defendant, the city of Hartford, agreed to provide the original plaintiffs with a health benefits package that included medical, prescription drug, and dental benefits listed in a plan from Anthem Blue Cross Blue Shield (Anthem). The agreement provides that this package would not change without the plaintiffs' written consent or a legislative mandate. The trial court, Cohn, J., incorporated this settlement agreement into its July 15, 2003 judgment. In 2017, the plaintiffs filed a motion for contempt, alleging that the defendant had violated the court's judgment by replacing and/or changing the health benefits package administered by Anthem to a Cigna administered health insurance plan and by altering the prescription drug plan. The plaintiffs alleged that these changes occurred without their written consent.

On January 24, 2019, the court determined that the defendant had violated the 2003 judgment by changing the health insurance plan administrator from Anthem to Cigna and the prescription drug plan administrator from Anthem to CVS. In its May 14, 2019 order, the court found, however, that the defendant was not in contempt because the evidence demonstrated that all of the insurance claims of the plaintiffs made under the Cigna plan had been paid in a manner identical to the Anthem plan and, therefore, that the defendant had not wilfully violated the 2003 judgment. The plaintiffs appealed and the defendant cross appealed.

On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the court (1) improperly denied their motion for contempt and (2) effectively amended the 2003 judgment by incorporating the protocols submitted by the defendant. In its cross appeal, the defendant contends that the court incorrectly determined that it violated the 2003 judgment. We agree with the claim raised in the defendant's cross appeal and conclude that the court incorrectly determined that it violated the 2003 agreement. In the absence of a violation of the settlement agreement, there was no basis for a finding of contempt. As a result of this conclusion, we need not address the claims raised in the plaintiffs' appeal, and affirm the judgment denying the motion for contempt.”)


Tort Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Townsend, Karen

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=4970

AC43413 - Byrne v. Avery Center for Obstetrics & Gynecology, P.C. (“On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly (1) limited the testimony of its expert witness; (2) admitted into evidence a medical report, charged the jury concerning future noneconomic damages, and denied its request for a jury interrogatory differentiating between past and future damages; and (3) granted the plaintiff’s motion for offer of judgment interest pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 2005) § 52-192a.2 We affirm the judgment of the trial court.”)




Contract Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Oumano, Emily

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=4952

AC43874 - New Milford v. Standard Demolition Services, Inc. (“The defendant, Standard Demolition Services, Inc., appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the plaintiff, the town of New Milford, on the plaintiff's complaint for breach of a contract entered into by the parties and as to all counts of a counterclaim filed by the defendant. On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) the court misapplied state and federal environmental regulations, (2) the court erred in not finding that the contract was impossible to perform, (3) the court improperly determined that the plaintiff lawfully had terminated the contract, and (4) evidence of certain change orders executed by the plaintiff in connection with a subsequent contract with a different contractor, pursuant to which the plaintiff had agreed to modify terms of that contract, constituted admissions that the plaintiff's contract with the defendant was defective and could not be performed by the defendant as written. The plaintiff has cross appealed, claiming that the court erred in its award of damages to the plaintiff. We affirm the judgment of the court in favor of the plaintiff on its complaint for breach of contract and as to all counts of the defendant's counterclaim, but we reverse it in part with respect to the award of damages and remand the case for a new hearing in damages.”)


Landlord/Tenant Law Appellate Court Opinions

   by Zigadto, Janet

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=4941

AC44177 - Bernblum v. The Grove Collaborative, LLC ("In this action arising out of negotiations over a potential commercial lease, the defendants, The Grove Collaborative, LLC (The Grove), and its sole member, Slate Ballard, appeal from the judgment of the trial court, rendered following a bench trial, in favor of the plaintiff, Steven Bernblum, and from the court's denial of the defendants' motion to reconsider/reargue. The defendants claim on appeal that the court improperly (1) concluded that the plaintiff had standing to bring those counts of the complaint sounding in breach of contract, 'breach of lease,' and 'detrimental reliance' (contract counts), because he, individually, was not a party to any purported lease or the lease negotiations that underlie the allegations with respect to those counts and (2) concluded that the plaintiff had established those counts sounding in negligent misrepresentation. We conclude that the plaintiff lacked standing to bring the contract counts and that he failed to meet his burden of proof with respect to the negligent misrepresentation counts. Accordingly, we reverse in part and affirm in part the judgment of the court.")

AC44720 - Housing Authority v. Neal ("In this summary process action brought by the plaintiff, the Housing Authority of the City of New Britain, against the defendant, Calvin W. Neal, the plaintiff appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered following a hearing, denying its affidavit of noncompliance with stipulation, sustaining the objection of the defendant and requiring the parties to continue to perform their respective obligations pursuant to a stipulated agreement of the parties. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial court erred (1) in finding that the defendant was not a tenant at sufferance, (2) in concluding that the requirements of General Statutes § 47a-11 did not apply to the defendant, and (3) in concluding that the filing of an affidavit of noncompliance was not the proper vehicle for addressing the alleged serious nuisance committed by the defendant after judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff, but before the plaintiff obtained possession of the premises occupied by the defendant. We agree with the plaintiff and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the trial court.")


Contract Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Oumano, Emily

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=4932

AC44475 - Electrical Contractors, Inc. v. 50 Morgan Hospitality Group, LLC (“The plaintiff, Electrical Contractors, Inc., appeals from the summary judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of the defendant Greython Construction, LLC (Greython), regarding claims arising out of a contract between the plaintiff and Greython pursuant to which the plaintiff, as Greython's subcontractor, was to complete work on a property owned by the defendant 50 Morgan Hospitality Group, LLC (50 Morgan). On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court erred in granting Greython's motion for summary judgment (1) based on language in the contract providing that payment by 50 Morgan to Greython was a "condition precedent" to Greython's obligation to make payments to the plaintiff, and (2) because Greython failed to present any evidence demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact either that it was not the cause of 50 Morgan's failure to make payment or that it had made a substantive effort to collect payment. We disagree with the plaintiff and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the court.”)