AC46927 - Torrington v. Council 4, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Local 442 ("The defendants, Council 4, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Local 442 (union), and Gerald Peters, appeal from the judgment of the trial court vacating an arbitration award that ordered the plaintiff, the city of Torrington (city), to, inter alia, reinstate Peters as a sergeant in the Torrington Police Department (department).On appeal, the defendants argue that the trial court (1) improperly concluded that the arbitration panel manifestly disregarded the law, (2) improperly concluded that the award violated public policy, and (3) abused its discretion by remanding the case to a new arbitration panel. We agree with the defendants' first two claims. We therefore reverse the judgment of the court and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. In light of our disposition of the defendants' first two claims, we do not reach the merits of their third claim.")

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AC47153 - Lalli v. New Haven (“The plaintiffs, thirty-seven retired New Haven police officers, appeal from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the defendant, the city of New Haven. On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the court improperly determined that the defendant did not breach the terms of a 2016 collective bargaining agreement by determining that the plaintiffs, as retirees and not active employees, were not entitled to retroactive wages. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the court.”

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AC47260 - Elm City Local, CACP v. New Haven (“On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly concluded that the arbitration panel did not exceed its powers when it determined that the defendant had just cause to terminate the employment of Jason Santiago, one of the plaintiff’s members, with the New Haven Police Department (department). In particular, the plaintiff claims that the court should have vacated the arbitration award because (1) the award failed to conform to the parties’ submission, and (2) the arbitration panel manifestly disregarded the law. We affirm the judgment of the court.”)

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AC46868 - Eldridge v. Hospital of Central Connecticut (“The plaintiff, Kimberly Eldridge, appeals from the summary judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of the defendant, the Hospital of Central Connecticut, with respect to her claims under the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act (CFEPA), General Statutes § 46a-51 et seq., for disability discrimination, failure to accommodate, and retaliation. The plaintiff raises two claims. First, with respect to her allegation of disability discrimination, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly concluded that a genuine issue of material fact did not exist with respect to whether the defendant’s reasons for the termination of her employment were pretextual in nature. Second, in connection with her claim that the defendant failed to provide her with a reasonable accommodation for her disability, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly concluded that a genuine issue of material fact did not exist with respect to whether she made a good faith request for an accommodation. We affirm the judgment of the court.”)

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AC46950 - Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities v. Dance Right, LLC (“The plaintiff, the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities (commission), appeals from the order of the trial court remanding its administrative appeal from the decision of the commission’s human rights referee (referee). In the administrative proceedings before the commission, the referee found that the defendant Dance Right, LLC (Dance Right), discriminated against the complainant, Amber Frazier Manning, on the basis of her disability by failing to provide her with a reasonable accommodation, but that the complainant failed to establish that she had been constructively discharged. In the commission’s administrative appeal, the trial court, following oral argument, issued an order (remand order) in which it determined that the referee’s findings with respect to the reasonable accommodation claim conflicted with the finding that Dance Right did not constructively discharge the complainant and remanded the matter to the referee to issue an amended opinion addressing that conflict. On appeal, the commission claims that the trial court erred by (1) remanding the matter to the referee without sustaining the appeal, and (2) failing to conclude that Dance Right’s failure to provide the complainant with a reasonable accommodation established, as a matter of law, that the complainant was constructively discharged. We agree that the trial court’s remand order was improper, but conclude that substantial evidence supported the referee’s finding that the complainant was not constructively discharged. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case with direction to dismiss the commission’s appeal.”)

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AC46950 - Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities v. Dance Right, LLC ("The plaintiff, the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities (commission), appeals from the order of the trial court remanding its administrative appeal from the decision of the commission's human rights referee (referee). In the administrative proceedings before the commission, the referee found that the defendant Dance Right, LLC (Dance Right), discriminated against the complainant, Amber Frazier Manning, on the basis of her disability by failing to provide her with a reasonable accommodation, but that the complainant failed to establish that she had been constructively discharged. In the commission's administrative appeal, the trial court, following oral argument, issued an order (remand order) in which it determined that the referee's findings with respect to the reasonable accommodation claim conflicted with the finding that Dance Right did not constructively discharge the complainant and remanded the matter to the referee to issue an amended opinion addressing that conflict. On appeal, the commission claims that the trial court erred by (1) remanding the matter to the referee without sustaining the appeal, and (2) failing to conclude that Dance Right's failure to provide the complainant with a reasonable accommodation established, as a matter of law, that the complainant was constructively discharged. We agree that the trial court's remand order was improper, but conclude that substantial evidence supported the referee's finding that the complainant was not constructively discharged. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case with direction to dismiss the commission's appeal.")

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AC46477 - Robinson v. V. D. ("The defendant, V. D., appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying his special motion to dismiss the underlying civil action pursuant to General Statutes § 52-196a, our state's anti-SLAPP statute. The civil action filed by the plaintiffs, Michael Robinson and Mary Robinson, seeks compensatory damages and injunctive relief for defamation, invasion of privacy by false light, statutory and common-law vexatious litigation, and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The defendant claims that (1) the court improperly denied his special motion to dismiss the action on the ground that his alleged conduct did not relate to an exercise of a protected right in connection with a matter of public concern and, thus, fell outside the scope of § 52-196a, and, (2) even if he is not entitled to a dismissal of the action pursuant to § 52-196a, the trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this action because the defendant is entitled to absolute immunity under the litigation privilege for his alleged conduct, all of which occurred in the course of judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings. In addition to disputing the defendant's claims, the plaintiffs raise as an alternative ground for affirming the denial of the special motion to dismiss that § 52-196a violates both the state and federal constitutions. We conclude that the question of whether the plaintiffs' action is barred by absolute immunity under the litigation privilege implicates the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction and, thus, must be considered prior to addressing the merits of the special motion to dismiss. We agree with the defendant that, with the exception of those counts sounding in vexatious litigation, the complaint is barred by absolute immunity. With respect to the remaining vexatious litigation counts, we affirm in part and reverse in part the court's decision to deny the special motion to dismiss, we reject the plaintiffs' alternative ground for affirmance, and we remand the matter for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.")

AC46645 - Vu v. N. L. ("The plaintiff, Nhan Vu, appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying his motion to open the judgment of dismissal rendered in favor of the self-represented defendant, N. L. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court abused its discretion in denying his motion to open. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

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• Tort Law

AC46677 - Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities v. Travelers Indemnity Co. (“These two appeals, although not consolidated, involve closely related claims. In Docket No. AC 46677, the plaintiff, the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities (CHRO), appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing its administrative appeal brought against the defendant Travelers Indemnity Company (Travelers). The plaintiff claims that the trial court erred in concluding that Travelers had not engaged in age discrimination per se, in violation of General Statutes § 46a-60 (b) (6), by means of posting a job advertisement that contained the phrase ‘‘recent college graduate.’’ In Docket No. AC 46678, the CHRO appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing its administrative appeal brought against the defendant Yale University (Yale). The plaintiff claims that the court erred in rejecting its claim that Yale had engaged in age discrimination per se, in violation of § 46a-60 (b) (6), by means of posting a job advertisement that contained the phrase ‘‘recent graduate.’’ We affirm the judgments of the trial court.”)

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SC20847 - O'Reggio v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities (“This certified appeal raises the question of who qualifies as a ‘‘supervisor’’ and renders an employer vicariously liable for the creation of a hostile work environment in violation of the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act (state act), General Statutes § 46a-51 et seq. The named defendant, the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities (commission), concluded in an administrative decision that the defendant employer, the Department of Labor (department), was not vicariously liable for the creation of a hostile work environment in the office where it employed the plaintiff, Tenisha O’Reggio. The decision was upheld by the trial court, and the Appellate Court affirmed that judgment. See O’Reggio v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 219 Conn. App. 1, 4–5, 20, 293 A.3d 955 (2023). We granted the plaintiff’s petition for certification to appeal, limited to the following issue: ‘Did the Appellate Court correctly conclude that the legal standard adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Vance v. Ball State University, 570 U.S. 421, 133 S. Ct. 2434, 186 L. Ed. 2d 565 (2013), applied to the plaintiff’s claim under the [state act] . . . that the [department] was vicariously liable for the hostile work environment allegedly created by one of the [department’s] employees?’ O’Reggio v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 346 Conn. 1029, 295 A.3d 944 (2023). Following our well established use of federal case law applying Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (Title VII), to guide our interpretation and application of the state act, we conclude that the Appellate Court’s comprehensive and well reasoned opinion correctly adopted the Vance definition of the term ‘supervisor.’ Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.”

SC20847 Dissent - O'Reggio v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities

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SC20821, SC20823 - Dur-A-Flex, Inc. v. Dy (“These appeals arise from a dispute over whether the defendants misappropriated the trade secrets of the plaintiff, Dur-A-Flex, Inc., in violation of the Connecticut Uniform Trade Secrets Act (CUTSA), General Statutes § 35-50 et seq. After a bench trial, the trial court rendered judgment for the plaintiff on certain of its claims and for several defendants on other claims.” The plaintiff appeals from the judgment in favor of the defendants Indue Sales and Services, Inc. (Indue), Christopher Krone, Engineered Coatings, Inc. (ECI), and Merrifield Paint Company, Inc. (Merrifield). The defendants Steven Lipman, Durafloor Industrial Flooring & Coating, Inc. (Durafloor), and ProRez Performance Resins and Coatings, LLC (ProRez), appeal from the judgment against them in favor of the plaintiff. In turn, the plaintiff cross appeals, challenging a number of adverse rulings. We conclude that the trial court incorrectly determined that the plaintiff was not required to prove that Lipman and, through him, Durafloor and ProRez, had knowledge of the plaintiff’s trade secrets and used that knowledge in order to establish the elements of misappropriation under General Statutes § 35-51 (b) (2) (B) (iii). The case must therefore be remanded for a new trial limited to that issue. We further conclude that the trial court applied an incorrect standard when it crafted the monetary and injunctive relief as to Lipman, Durafloor, and ProRez. If the trial court determines on remand that those defendants had knowledge of and used the plaintiff’s trade secrets, it must then apply the correct standard. Finally, we conclude that the trial court incorrectly determined that the noncompete agreement between the plaintiff and the named defendant, Samet Dy (Samet), was unenforceable because continued employment can never constitute consideration for a noncompete agreement. The judgment as to the breach of the noncompete agreement claim must herefore be reversed, and the trial court must determine on remand whether there was sufficient consideration for the noncompete agreement and, if so, whether Samet breached the agreement. We affirm the judgment of the trial court in all other respects.”)

SC20822 - Dur-A-Flex, Inc. v. Dy (“This appeal arises from a dispute between the plaintiff, Dur-A-Flex, Inc., a manufacturer of resinous flooring systems, and the named defendant, Samet Dy, a former employee of the plaintiff, over whether the defendant misappropriated the plaintiff’s trade secrets in violation of the Connecticut Uniform Trade Secrets Act (CUTSA), General Statutes § 35-50 et seq. The plaintiff brought this action, claiming that the defendant had breached his noncompete agreement with the plaintiff, misappropriated the plaintiff’s trade secrets in violation of CUTSA, and breached his duty of confidentiality. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the breach of the noncompete agreement and breach of the duty of confidentiality claims. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that (1) the trial court improperly rendered judgment for the defendant on the breach of the noncompete agreement claim on the ground that it was unenforceable for lack of consideration, (2) even if the noncompete agreement was invalid, it became enforceable when the defendant orally reaffirmed his promise not to compete, and (3) the trial court improperly rendered judgment for the defendant on the breach of the duty of confidentiality claim on the ground that it was preempted by CUTSA. With respect to the plaintiff’s first claim, we conclude that the trial court incorrectly determined that the noncompete agreement was unenforceable as a matter of law and that the case must be remanded for further proceedings on that issue. We reject the plaintiff’s second and third claims. We therefore reverse in part and affirm in part the judgment of the trial court.”

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AC46099 - Demarco v. Charter Oak Temple Restoration Assn., Inc. (“The plaintiff, James Demarco, appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the defendant, Charter Oak Temple Restoration Association, Inc., following the granting of the defendant’s motion to strike the plaintiff’s revised complaint. The revised complaint alleged that the defendant violated General Statutes § 46a-60 (b) (1), a provision of the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act (CFEPA), General Statutes § 46a-51 et seq., by terminating the plaintiff’s employment because of his association with a disabled individual. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly concluded that his allegations failed to state a valid cause of action under CFEPA because, as the court determined, CFEPA does not recognize claims for associational discrimination on the basis of disability. We disagree with the plaintiff and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.”)

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• SC20717 - Dept. of Public Health v. Estrada (Administrative appeal; Whistle-blower complaint, (1) "Did the Appellate Court correctly conclude that Estrada's disclosure was not a protected disclosure under ...§4-61dd?" (A) "Specifically, does §4-61dd apply to purported misconduct in municipal government?" (B) "Can an employee seek whistleblower protection for reporting her own error?" (2) "Did Estrada establish a causal connection between any alleged whistleblower disclosure and the complained of personnel actions?" And (3) "[t]o the extent that an actual violation of state law is required to establish a prima facie claim of retaliation under ...§4-61dd, did the Appellate Court correctly conclude that there were no required qualifications for acting directors of public health under ...§19a-200?")

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AC45563 - Michel v. Hartford (“The plaintiff, Sean Michel, appeals from the judgment rendered in favor of the defendant, the city of Hartford, following the partial granting of its motion to strike and the subsequent withdrawal of the remaining count set forth in the plaintiff’s operative complaint. On appeal, the plaintiff contends that the court improperly granted the defendant’s motion to strike as to counts one, two, and three of that complaint, which alleged free speech retaliation claims pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 2019) § 31-51q and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We agree with the plaintiff as to counts two and three of the operative complaint, which set forth the plaintiff’s claims under § 31-51q, and, accordingly, reverse in part the judgment of the trial court.”)

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• Civil Rights,
• Employment Law,
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SC20628 - State v. Connecticut State University Organization of Administrative Faculty, AFSCME, Council 4, Local 2836, AFL-CIO (“This case presents the question of whether the public policy of this state is violated by an arbitration award ordering the reinstatement of a public sector employee whose employment was terminated after being arrested and charged with crimes involving off-duty conduct. The defendant, the Connecticut State University Organization of Administrative Faculty, AFSCME, Council 4, Local 2836, AFL-CIO (union), appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered following the court’s denial of the union’s motion to confirm an arbitration award that reinstated the grievant, a union member, to his employment at Central Connecticut State University (university). The court denied the union’s motion to confirm the award, granted an application to vacate the award filed by the plaintiff, the state of Connecticut (state), and rendered judgment thereon, after concluding that the award violated public policy. We disagree that the arbitration award, which reinstated the grievant, violated an explicit, well-defined and dominant public policy and, therefore, reverse the judgment of the trial court.”)

SC20628 Dissent - State v. Connecticut State University Organization of Administrative Faculty, AFSCME, Council 4, Local 2836, AFL-CIO

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AC46091 - Bartolotta v. Human Resources Agency of New Britain, Inc. (“The plaintiff, Alyssa Bartolotta, appeals from the summary judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of the defendant, Human Resources Agency of New Britain, Inc., in this employment discrimination action. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly concluded that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on all four counts of her complaint. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.”)

AC46927 - Torrington v. Council 4, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Local 442 (“This appeal presents a matter of first impression: whether a judgment of the Superior Court vacating an arbitration award and remanding the matter for a new arbitration hearing is a final judgment for purposes of an appeal pursuant to applicable statutes governing arbitration proceedings and municipal collective bargaining. We conclude that the defendants, Gerald Peters (Peters) and Council 4, AFSCME, AFLCIO, Local 442 (union), have appealed from a final judgment in this case and, accordingly, deny the motion to dismiss the appeal filed by the plaintiff, the city of Torrington (city).”)

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SC20803 - Stiegler v. Meriden ("The plaintiffs are three firefighters who retired during ongoing contract negotiations between their municipal employer and their union regarding a wage reopener to their collective bargaining agreement. After the effective dates of their retirements, an arbitration panel issued an interest arbitration award pursuant to the provisions of General Statutes § 7-473c of the Municipal Employee Relations Act, General Statutes § 7-460 et seq., granting all firefighters in that municipality a retroactive wage increase. The plaintiffs filed a breach of contract action, alleging, among other things, that they were entitled to a recalculation of their pension benefits to reflect the retroactive wage increase. The trial court agreed with the plaintiffs and rendered judgment in their favor on the breach of contract claims. On appeal, the defendants claim that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiffs had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies and, on the merits, that the trial court had incorrectly concluded that the plaintiffs were entitled to a recalculation of their pension benefits. We conclude that the trial court properly exercised jurisdiction but erroneously determined that the plaintiffs are entitled to receive a retroactive increase in their pension benefits and, therefore, reverse in part the judgment of the trial court.")

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• Contract Law,
• Employment Law,
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AC45969 - Twerdahl v. Wilton Public Schools (“The plaintiff, Robin Twerdahl, appeals from the judgment of the trial court, rendered following the court’s decision striking her complaint against the defendant, Wilton Public Schools, in which she claimed that she was constructively discharged from her employment with the defendant. The plaintiff claims that the court erred in granting the motion to strike filed by the defendant on the grounds that the filing of her complaint alleging age discrimination to the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities (CHRO) was untimely and she failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted. We agree that the plaintiff’s complaint to the CHRO was untimely and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.”)

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AC46206 - Roman v. A&S Innersprings USA, LLC (“In this employment discrimination action, the plaintiff, Jessica Roman, appeals from the summary judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of the defendant, A&S Innersprings USA, LLC. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly determined that (1) no genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether certain claims of pregnancy discrimination were time barred, as they occurred outside the 180 day limitation period contained in General Statutes (Rev. to 2017) § 46a-82 (f), (2) the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination on her claim that the defendant failed to rehire her on or after December 2, 2018, and (3) the continuing course of conduct doctrine did not toll the statute of limitations contained in § 46a-82 (f) with respect to any untimely claims. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.”)

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AC45548 - Forestier v. Bridgeport (“This appeal arises out of an action by the plaintiffs, Jonathan Forestier and Stephen Vitka, against the defendant city of Bridgeport (city) and the defendant Board of Education of the City of Bridgeport (board) alleging that the plaintiffs wrongfully had been laid off from their employment as special police officers with the board for having exercised their rights to workers’ compensation benefits, in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 2015) § 31-290a (a). The trial court granted motions for summary judgment filed by the defendants and rendered judgment in their favor, from which the plaintiffs have appealed. On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the court improperly granted the defendants’ motions for summary judgment because genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether (1) the plaintiffs established a prima facie case of discrimination, and (2) the defendants’ proffered nondiscriminatory reason for the elimination of the plaintiffs’ positions and their layoffs was a pretext for discrimination. We affirm the judgment of the court.”)

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AC45802 - Lassen v. Hartford (“The plaintiff, Alfred Lassen, appeals from the summary judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of the defendant, the city of Hartford, on his two count complaint, alleging disability discrimination and retaliation in violation of General Statutes § 46a-60 of the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act (act), General Statutes § 46a-51 et seq., in connection with the defendant’s failure to rehire him as a police officer. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court erred in rendering summary judgment in favor of the defendant because it improperly concluded that no genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether (1) the plaintiff had failed to make out a prima facie case of disability discrimination and retaliation, and (2) the defendant’s proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for not rehiring1 him was pretextual. For the reasons that follow, we disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.”)

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