SC21039- Modzelewski's Towing & Storage v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles "In this certified appeal, we consider whether the Appellate Court correctly concluded that § 14-63-36c (c) of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies prohibited the plaintiffs, Modzelewski's Towing & Storage, Inc. (MTS), and Modzelewski's Towing & Recovery, Inc., from charging additional fees based on their costs associated with the use of special equipment that was needed to conduct certain "exceptional services" in connection with the nonconsensual towing of a tractor trailer. We conclude that the Appellate Court incorrectly determined that the fees for exceptional services must be based on an hourly charge for labor. See Modzelewski's Towing & Storage, Inc. v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 225 Conn. App. 386, 401, 405–406, 316 A.3d 780 (2024). Instead, the regulatory reference in § 14-63-36c (c) to the itemization of "additional fees . . . in accordance with the hourly charge for labor posted by the licensed towing service" is more reasonably construed as a posting requirement. As a result, we also conclude that the plaintiffs may, pursuant to § 14-63-36c (c), charge additional fees for exceptional services that are based on the cost of the special equipment needed to provide the exceptional services. Accordingly, we reverse in part the judgment of the Appellate Court and remand the case for further proceedings."

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AC47637 - McHenry Solar, LLC v. Hampton ("In this tax appeal, the plaintiff, McHenry Solar, LLC, appeals from the trial court's denial of its motion for summary judgment in which it argued that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on its claim that certain personal property that it uses to generate electricity is exempt from taxation pursuant to General Statutes § 12-81 (76), which provides for the exemption of machinery and equipment used for manufacturing. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court incorrectly concluded that it was not entitled to the exemption pursuant to § 12-81 (76) because the generation of electricity is not manufacturing within the meaning of the exemption. We affirm the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.")

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• Property Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC47595- Pence v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles ("The plaintiff, Colin J. Pence, appeals from the judgment of the Superior Court rendered in favor of the defendant. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles (commissioner) dismissing his administrative appeal from the decision of the commissioner suspending his motor vehicle operator's license for forty-five days and requiring the installation of an ignition interlock device in his motor vehicle for six months pursuant to General Statutes § 14-227b (i). On appeal, the plaintiff argues that the court improperly dismissed his administrative appeal for lack of standing because he established that he is an indigent driver who does not own a motor vehicle, cannot afford a motor vehicle, and has no access to a motor vehicle in which to install an ignition interlock device, as is required by § 14-227b (i), and, therefore, there is a possibility that his legally protected interest in a motor vehicle operator's license will be adversely and unequally affected by the ignition interlock device requirement. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.")

• AC47595- Dissent

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AC47154- Cruz v. Waterbury "The plaintiff, Emmanuel Cruz, a former Waterbury police officer whose employment was terminated after he suffered a work-related injury that rendered him unable to return to full-time police work, brought the underlying combined administrative appeal and breach of contract action against the defendants, the city of Waterbury (city) and the Retirement Board of the City of Waterbury (board), challenging the denial of his application for a disability pension. The plaintiff now appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the defendants. The plaintiff claims that the trial court (1) committed plain error by failing to consider and analyze General Statutes § 31-71f (a), despite the parties' failure to raise that statute in their arguments before the court, (2) improperly denied, as to the board, and dismissed, as to the city, count one of his complaint asserting an administrative appeal from the board's denial of his application for disability retirement and pension benefits, and (3) improperly denied, as to the city, and dismissed, as to the board, count two of his complaint asserting a breach of the collective bargaining agreement that governed the terms of his employment. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the court."

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• Contract Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC47020 - Clark v. Employees' Review Board ("The self-represented plaintiff, Marilee Corr Clark, appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing her administrative appeal from the decision of the defendant Employees' Review Board (board), finding that the decision of the Department of Revenue Services (department) to terminate the plaintiff's employment was not arbitrary or taken without reasonable cause pursuant to General Statutes § 5-202 (c). On appeal, the plaintiff claims that (1) the court failed to utilize the proper "just cause" standard applicable to permanent state employees, (2) the court made certain improper factual findings that were not made by the board, and (3) the board's findings of fact were unsupported by substantial evidence in the administrative record. We affirm the judgment of the court dismissing the plaintiff's administrative appeal.")

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SC21107- High Watch Recovery Center, Inc. v Department of Public Health ("The sole issue in this appeal is whether the plaintiff, High Watch Recovery Center, Inc., is aggrieved by, and therefore has standing to contest, on appeal to the Superior Court, the administrative decision of the defendant, the Department of Public Health (department), approving, pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 2017) § 19a-639 (a), the certificate of need application of the plaintiff's competitor, the defendant, Birch Hill Recovery Center, LLC (Birch Hill). After two public hearings, in which the plaintiff participated as an intervenor, the department entered into a settlement agreement with Birch Hill pursuant to which the department approved the certificate of need application. The plaintiff claims that the court incorrectly determined that it was not aggrieved by the department's decision to approve Birch Hill's certificate of need application. We disagree and affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.")

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AC47147 - Hornish v. Suffield "The plaintiffs, Maryanne Hornish and Neil Hornish, appeal from the judgment of the Superior Court dismissing their administrative appeal from the final decision of the defendant Department of Agriculture (department). The final decision affirmed a disposal order, issued by an animal control officer for the defendant town of Suffield (town), to euthanize the plaintiffs' dog pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 2019) § 22-358, as amended by Public Acts 2019, No. 19-197, § 1. On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that (1) § 22-358 (c) is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority in violation of the separation of powers doctrine, and (2) procedural irregularities deprived them of a fair hearing. We affirm the judgment of the Superior Court dismissing the plaintiffs' appeal."

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SC21010- Aquarion Water Co. of Connecticut v. Public Utilities Regulatory Authority ("The plaintiff, Aquarion Water Company of Connecticut (Aquarion), appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing in part its appeal from the final decision of the defendant, the Public Utility Regulatory Authority (PURA), on the rate application submitted by Aquarion in 2022. Aquarion claims that PURA acted arbitrarily, capriciously, and in abuse of its discretion by denying its requests (1) to include in its rate base $42,136,826 million in capital improvements, and (2) to recover from ratepayers certain operating costs, namely, $2,222,298 million in employee incentive compensation and $1,498,051 million in deferred conservation expenses. Aquarion also claims that the total effect of PURA's rate order was confiscatory, in violation of the takings clause of the fifth amendment to the United States constitution and General Statutes § 16-19e (a). We conclude that PURA erred in rejecting Aquarion's request to recover $1,498,051 million in deferred conservation expenses but that its final decision on Aquarion's rate application was not otherwise improper or unconstitutional. Accordingly, we reverse in part the judgment of the trial court.")

SC21010 Appendix

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AC46825- Greenwich Retail, LLC. v. Greenwich (" The principal issue in this municipal tax appeal is whether the requirement of General Statutes (Rev. to 2019) § 12-63c (a) that a municipal tax assessor "provide" an owner of real property that generates rental income with a form on which to submit income and expense information is satisfied when that form is timely mailed to, but not actually received by, the property owner and/or its agent. The plaintiff, Greenwich Retail, LLC, appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the defendant, the town of Greenwich, challenging a municipal tax assessment of a penalty pursuant to General Statutes §§ 12-117a and 12-119. On appeal, the plaintiff first claims that the court incorrectly determined that the word "provided" in § 12-63c (a) does not require that an income and expense form actually be received by the property owner and/or its agent. The plaintiff argues, to the extent that the word "provided" is ambiguous, the court should have strictly construed the statute in its favor. The plaintiff also claims that the trial court erred in concluding that the mailing of the form to the plaintiff by the defendant's assessor (assessor) to its last known address satisfied § 12-63c (a). We disagree and affirm the judgment of the court."

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SC21011 - Commonwealth Servicing Group, LLC v. Dept. of Banking ("In Persels & Associates, LLC v. Banking Commissioner, 318 Conn. 652, 122 A.3d 592 (2015) (Persels), we held that a law firm that provides debt negotiation services is presumed to be engaged in the practice of law and, thus, comes within the Judicial Branch’s exclusive authority to regulate the practice of law and falls outside of the statutory authority of the Commissioner of Banking (commissioner) to enforce Connecticut’s debt negotiation statutes, General Statutes §§ 36a-71 through 36a-671f. See id., 674–76. The primary question in this interlocutory appeal is whether a law firm and an entity that provides paraprofessional services to the law firm must exhaust their administrative remedies before seeking declaratory and injunctive relief in the Superior Court to adjudicate that threshold issue—whether the commissioner has exceeded his statutory authority by bringing an administrative enforcement action against them.

The plaintiffs, The Law Offices of Amber Florio, PLLC, doing business as Commonwealth Law Group (Commonwealth Law), and Commonwealth Servicing Group, LLC (Commonwealth Servicing), filed the underlying complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief, requesting that the trial court determine whether the administrative enforcement proceeding the commissioner had begun against Commonwealth Servicing exceeded the commissioner’s statutory enforcement authority.

The defendant, the Department of Banking, moved to dismiss the plaintiffs’ complaint on the ground that they had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies because the commissioner, not the court, must first determine the commissioner’s own authority to regulate the plaintiffs. On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court incorrectly denied its motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ complaint. We disagree and affirm the trial court’s decision.”)

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• Declaratory Judgment Law,
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AC47155 - Daly v. Dept. of Children & Families ("The plaintiff, William Daly, appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing his appeal from the decision of a hearing officer of the defendant, the Department of Children and Families (department), who upheld the department's decision to substantiate allegations of sexual abuse against a child and to place the plaintiff's name on the Central Registry of Persons Responsible for Child Abuse and Neglect (central registry). See General Statutes § 17a-101k (c) (1). On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly concluded that there was substantial evidence in the record to support the hearing officer's findings that (1) he had sexually abused a child and (2) his name should be placed on the central registry by the department. We affirm the judgment of the trial court dismissing the plaintiff's administrative appeal.")

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AC47198- Idlibi v. Connecticut State Dental Commission ("The self-represented plaintiff, Ammar A. Idlibi, appeals from the judgment of the Superior Court dismissing his administrative appeal from the decision of the defendant, the Connecticut State Dental Commission (commission), finding that the plaintiff's failure to comply with sanctions imposed by a prior decision of the commission rendered him unfit or incompetent during that period of noncompliance, and, accordingly, ordering further disciplinary sanctions with respect to the plaintiff's dental license. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that (1) the commission lacked jurisdiction to suspend his dental license, (2) the court abused its discretion in denying his motion for remand to introduce additional evidence, and (3) the commission's final decision was arbitrary and capricious in that it was unsupported by substantial evidence. We affirm the judgment of the Superior Court dismissing the plaintiff's administrative appeal.")

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SC21026 - Stamford v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, Office of Public Hearings ("This public interest appeal under General Statutes § 52-265a requires us to address the relationship between the appeal provisions contained in two related statutory schemes, namely, the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act (CFEPA), General Statutes § 46a-51 et seq., and the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act (UAPA), General Statutes § 4-166 et seq., as they apply to appeals to the Superior Court from decisions made by a human rights referee (referee) of the defendant Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities (CHRO). Pursuant to the CFEPA, only 'a final order of a presiding officer' is appealable 'in accordance with [§] 4-183 [of the UAPA].' General Statutes § 46a-94a (a). The UAPA provides that an appeal to the Superior Court may be taken from either an agency's 'final decision'; General Statutes § 4-183 (a); or 'a preliminary, procedural or intermediate agency action or ruling . . . if (1) it appears likely that the person will otherwise qualify . . . to appeal from the final agency action or ruling and (2) postponement of the appeal would result in an inadequate remedy.' General Statutes § 4-183 (b). The primary issue in this appeal is whether a 'final order' under the CFEPA is limited to a 'final decision,' as defined by the UAPA, or whether it also includes an appealable 'preliminary, procedural or intermediate agency action or ruling' under § 4-183 (b). We conclude that the term 'final order' encompasses both final decisions under § 4-183 (a) and appealable interlocutory orders under § 4-183 (b). The order at issue in this case, however, was neither an appealable final decision nor an appealable interlocutory order. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's decision and remand with direction to render judgment granting the defendants' motions to dismiss the city's administrative appeal.")

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AC46950 - Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities v. Dance Right, LLC ("The plaintiff, the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities (commission), appeals from the order of the trial court remanding its administrative appeal from the decision of the commission's human rights referee (referee). In the administrative proceedings before the commission, the referee found that the defendant Dance Right, LLC (Dance Right), discriminated against the complainant, Amber Frazier Manning, on the basis of her disability by failing to provide her with a reasonable accommodation, but that the complainant failed to establish that she had been constructively discharged. In the commission's administrative appeal, the trial court, following oral argument, issued an order (remand order) in which it determined that the referee's findings with respect to the reasonable accommodation claim conflicted with the finding that Dance Right did not constructively discharge the complainant and remanded the matter to the referee to issue an amended opinion addressing that conflict. On appeal, the commission claims that the trial court erred by (1) remanding the matter to the referee without sustaining the appeal, and (2) failing to conclude that Dance Right's failure to provide the complainant with a reasonable accommodation established, as a matter of law, that the complainant was constructively discharged. We agree that the trial court's remand order was improper, but conclude that substantial evidence supported the referee's finding that the complainant was not constructively discharged. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case with direction to dismiss the commission's appeal.")

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• Administrative Appeal Law,
• Employment Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC46660 - Cetran v. Wethersfield ("The plaintiff, James L. Cetran, appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the defendant, the town of Wethersfield, following the granting of the defendant's motion to dismiss the plaintiff's cause of action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff's cause of action, which was captioned "Appeal," because the appeal was moot. We affirm the judgment on the alternative ground that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiff named and served the incorrect party.")

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AC46493 - 1st Alliance Lending, LLC v. Dept. of Banking ("The plaintiff, 1st Alliance Lending, LLC, appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing the plaintiff's administrative appeal from the decision of the defendant Commissioner of Banking (commissioner) revoking the plaintiff's license to do business as a mortgage lender and ordering the plaintiff to pay a civil penalty. The plaintiff claims that (1) the commissioner did not have authority to revoke the plaintiff's license that already had been revoked in a separate administrative action, (2) the court improperly deferred to the incorrect interpretation of General Statutes § 36a-485 by the defendant Department of Banking (department), (3) the commissioner improperly applied General Statutes § 36a-498e (b) (1) retroactively, (4) substantial evidence does not support the commissioner's finding that the plaintiff failed to cooperate with the investigation, (5) the court and the department violated the plaintiff's due process rights, (6) the commissioner imposed penalties that are unconstitutionally excessive, and (7) if any of the commissioner's findings of violation were made in error, we must remand the matter for a new penalty hearing. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

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SC20795 - United Illuminating Co. v. Public Utilities Regulatory Authority" (In this appeal, the plaintiff, The United Illuminating Company, appeals from the judgments of the Superior Court dismissing its consolidated administrative appeals from two final decisions of the defendant, the Public Utilities Regulatory Authority (PURA). The plaintiff challenges PURA's determination that the plaintiff had violated its statutory obligations with respect to its emergency planning, storm recovery performance, and other actions taken in August, 2020, in connection with Tropical Storm Isaias and its aftermath. The plaintiff further contends that PURA improperly reduced the plaintiff's authorized return on equity (ROE) and imposed various civil penalties, including more than $1.2 million in fines. We conclude that the plaintiff's challenge to the ROE reduction is moot, insofar as the reduction was never implemented. We also conclude that PURA miscalculated the fines it imposed for the plaintiff's delayed reporting of two minor accidents. Otherwise, we find no error and thus affirm the trial court's judgments in all other respects.")

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• SC20804 - FuelCell Energy, Inc. v. Groton (Tax assessment appeal; "This municipal tax appeal asks us to consider how, and whether, personal property tax exemptions should apply to fuel cell modules that produce both electricity and waste heat. It first asks whether fuel cell modules and related equipment were exempt from property taxation as a class I renewable energy source under General Statutes § 12-81. It then asks whether that same property was exempted from taxation for the October 1, 2016 grand list as ‘‘goods in [the] process of manufacture’’ pursuant to § 12-81. Last, it asks whether the taxpayers were required to formally declare their personal property pursuant to General Statutes §§12-40, 12-41 and 12-71, even if it was exempt from taxation, and what, if any, the consequences of failing to do so would be.")

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• Property Law

• SC20805 - The William W. Backus Hospital v. Stonington (Tax appeal; application for tax exemption "We conclude, therefore, that the personal property owned by the plaintiff and used 'incident to the rendering of health care services’ at the rehabilitation facility, which is located in a suite, subleased to the plaintiff, of a building that Hartford Healthcare acquired by lease, is rendered taxable by §12-66a, even if otherwise exempt from taxation under §12-81 (7) or (16). General Statutes § 12-66a. Accordingly, the trial court improperly granted the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.")

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SC20816 - Newton Neighborhood Environmental Trust v. Connecticut Siting Council (Administrative appeal; standing, "The present appeal relates to the proposed construction of a 100 foot tall cell phone tower (tower) on a residentially zoned parcel of real property located in the town of Woodbridge (town). ...There is no inherently obvious connection between a facility’s adverse impact on property values and the probable environmental impact of the facility or the listed significant adverse effects. We cannot conclude, therefore, that a facility’s impact on property values will always be relevant to the council’s inquiry pursuant to § 16-50p (a) (3) (B), and, accordingly, it is an unenumerated significant adverse effect required to be considered by the council.")

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