SC21011 - Commonwealth Servicing Group, LLC v. Dept. of Banking ("In Persels & Associates, LLC v. Banking Commissioner, 318 Conn. 652, 122 A.3d 592 (2015) (Persels), we held that a law firm that provides debt negotiation services is presumed to be engaged in the practice of law and, thus, comes within the Judicial Branch’s exclusive authority to regulate the practice of law and falls outside of the statutory authority of the Commissioner of Banking (commissioner) to enforce Connecticut’s debt negotiation statutes, General Statutes §§ 36a-71 through 36a-671f. See id., 674–76. The primary question in this interlocutory appeal is whether a law firm and an entity that provides paraprofessional services to the law firm must exhaust their administrative remedies before seeking declaratory and injunctive relief in the Superior Court to adjudicate that threshold issue—whether the commissioner has exceeded his statutory authority by bringing an administrative enforcement action against them.

The plaintiffs, The Law Offices of Amber Florio, PLLC, doing business as Commonwealth Law Group (Commonwealth Law), and Commonwealth Servicing Group, LLC (Commonwealth Servicing), filed the underlying complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief, requesting that the trial court determine whether the administrative enforcement proceeding the commissioner had begun against Commonwealth Servicing exceeded the commissioner’s statutory enforcement authority.

The defendant, the Department of Banking, moved to dismiss the plaintiffs’ complaint on the ground that they had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies because the commissioner, not the court, must first determine the commissioner’s own authority to regulate the plaintiffs. On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court incorrectly denied its motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ complaint. We disagree and affirm the trial court’s decision.”)

• Posted in:
• Administrative Appeal Law,
• Declaratory Judgment Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC47155 - Daly v. Dept. of Children & Families ("The plaintiff, William Daly, appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing his appeal from the decision of a hearing officer of the defendant, the Department of Children and Families (department), who upheld the department's decision to substantiate allegations of sexual abuse against a child and to place the plaintiff's name on the Central Registry of Persons Responsible for Child Abuse and Neglect (central registry). See General Statutes § 17a-101k (c) (1). On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly concluded that there was substantial evidence in the record to support the hearing officer's findings that (1) he had sexually abused a child and (2) his name should be placed on the central registry by the department. We affirm the judgment of the trial court dismissing the plaintiff's administrative appeal.")

• Posted in:
• Administrative Appeal Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC47198- Idlibi v. Connecticut State Dental Commission ("The self-represented plaintiff, Ammar A. Idlibi, appeals from the judgment of the Superior Court dismissing his administrative appeal from the decision of the defendant, the Connecticut State Dental Commission (commission), finding that the plaintiff's failure to comply with sanctions imposed by a prior decision of the commission rendered him unfit or incompetent during that period of noncompliance, and, accordingly, ordering further disciplinary sanctions with respect to the plaintiff's dental license. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that (1) the commission lacked jurisdiction to suspend his dental license, (2) the court abused its discretion in denying his motion for remand to introduce additional evidence, and (3) the commission's final decision was arbitrary and capricious in that it was unsupported by substantial evidence. We affirm the judgment of the Superior Court dismissing the plaintiff's administrative appeal.")

• Posted in:
• Administrative Appeal Law,
• Recent Opinions

SC21026 - Stamford v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, Office of Public Hearings ("This public interest appeal under General Statutes § 52-265a requires us to address the relationship between the appeal provisions contained in two related statutory schemes, namely, the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act (CFEPA), General Statutes § 46a-51 et seq., and the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act (UAPA), General Statutes § 4-166 et seq., as they apply to appeals to the Superior Court from decisions made by a human rights referee (referee) of the defendant Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities (CHRO). Pursuant to the CFEPA, only 'a final order of a presiding officer' is appealable 'in accordance with [§] 4-183 [of the UAPA].' General Statutes § 46a-94a (a). The UAPA provides that an appeal to the Superior Court may be taken from either an agency's 'final decision'; General Statutes § 4-183 (a); or 'a preliminary, procedural or intermediate agency action or ruling . . . if (1) it appears likely that the person will otherwise qualify . . . to appeal from the final agency action or ruling and (2) postponement of the appeal would result in an inadequate remedy.' General Statutes § 4-183 (b). The primary issue in this appeal is whether a 'final order' under the CFEPA is limited to a 'final decision,' as defined by the UAPA, or whether it also includes an appealable 'preliminary, procedural or intermediate agency action or ruling' under § 4-183 (b). We conclude that the term 'final order' encompasses both final decisions under § 4-183 (a) and appealable interlocutory orders under § 4-183 (b). The order at issue in this case, however, was neither an appealable final decision nor an appealable interlocutory order. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's decision and remand with direction to render judgment granting the defendants' motions to dismiss the city's administrative appeal.")

• Posted in:
• Administrative Appeal Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC46950 - Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities v. Dance Right, LLC ("The plaintiff, the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities (commission), appeals from the order of the trial court remanding its administrative appeal from the decision of the commission's human rights referee (referee). In the administrative proceedings before the commission, the referee found that the defendant Dance Right, LLC (Dance Right), discriminated against the complainant, Amber Frazier Manning, on the basis of her disability by failing to provide her with a reasonable accommodation, but that the complainant failed to establish that she had been constructively discharged. In the commission's administrative appeal, the trial court, following oral argument, issued an order (remand order) in which it determined that the referee's findings with respect to the reasonable accommodation claim conflicted with the finding that Dance Right did not constructively discharge the complainant and remanded the matter to the referee to issue an amended opinion addressing that conflict. On appeal, the commission claims that the trial court erred by (1) remanding the matter to the referee without sustaining the appeal, and (2) failing to conclude that Dance Right's failure to provide the complainant with a reasonable accommodation established, as a matter of law, that the complainant was constructively discharged. We agree that the trial court's remand order was improper, but conclude that substantial evidence supported the referee's finding that the complainant was not constructively discharged. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case with direction to dismiss the commission's appeal.")

• Posted in:
• Administrative Appeal Law,
• Employment Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC46660 - Cetran v. Wethersfield ("The plaintiff, James L. Cetran, appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the defendant, the town of Wethersfield, following the granting of the defendant's motion to dismiss the plaintiff's cause of action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff's cause of action, which was captioned "Appeal," because the appeal was moot. We affirm the judgment on the alternative ground that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiff named and served the incorrect party.")

• Posted in:
• Administrative Appeal Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC46493 - 1st Alliance Lending, LLC v. Dept. of Banking ("The plaintiff, 1st Alliance Lending, LLC, appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing the plaintiff's administrative appeal from the decision of the defendant Commissioner of Banking (commissioner) revoking the plaintiff's license to do business as a mortgage lender and ordering the plaintiff to pay a civil penalty. The plaintiff claims that (1) the commissioner did not have authority to revoke the plaintiff's license that already had been revoked in a separate administrative action, (2) the court improperly deferred to the incorrect interpretation of General Statutes § 36a-485 by the defendant Department of Banking (department), (3) the commissioner improperly applied General Statutes § 36a-498e (b) (1) retroactively, (4) substantial evidence does not support the commissioner's finding that the plaintiff failed to cooperate with the investigation, (5) the court and the department violated the plaintiff's due process rights, (6) the commissioner imposed penalties that are unconstitutionally excessive, and (7) if any of the commissioner's findings of violation were made in error, we must remand the matter for a new penalty hearing. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

• Posted in:
• Administrative Appeal Law,
• Recent Opinions

SC20795 - United Illuminating Co. v. Public Utilities Regulatory Authority" (In this appeal, the plaintiff, The United Illuminating Company, appeals from the judgments of the Superior Court dismissing its consolidated administrative appeals from two final decisions of the defendant, the Public Utilities Regulatory Authority (PURA). The plaintiff challenges PURA's determination that the plaintiff had violated its statutory obligations with respect to its emergency planning, storm recovery performance, and other actions taken in August, 2020, in connection with Tropical Storm Isaias and its aftermath. The plaintiff further contends that PURA improperly reduced the plaintiff's authorized return on equity (ROE) and imposed various civil penalties, including more than $1.2 million in fines. We conclude that the plaintiff's challenge to the ROE reduction is moot, insofar as the reduction was never implemented. We also conclude that PURA miscalculated the fines it imposed for the plaintiff's delayed reporting of two minor accidents. Otherwise, we find no error and thus affirm the trial court's judgments in all other respects.")

• Posted in:
• Administrative Appeal Law,
• Recent Opinions

• SC20804 - FuelCell Energy, Inc. v. Groton (Tax assessment appeal; "This municipal tax appeal asks us to consider how, and whether, personal property tax exemptions should apply to fuel cell modules that produce both electricity and waste heat. It first asks whether fuel cell modules and related equipment were exempt from property taxation as a class I renewable energy source under General Statutes § 12-81. It then asks whether that same property was exempted from taxation for the October 1, 2016 grand list as ‘‘goods in [the] process of manufacture’’ pursuant to § 12-81. Last, it asks whether the taxpayers were required to formally declare their personal property pursuant to General Statutes §§12-40, 12-41 and 12-71, even if it was exempt from taxation, and what, if any, the consequences of failing to do so would be.")

• Posted in:
• Administrative Appeal Law,
• Property Law

• SC20805 - The William W. Backus Hospital v. Stonington (Tax appeal; application for tax exemption "We conclude, therefore, that the personal property owned by the plaintiff and used 'incident to the rendering of health care services’ at the rehabilitation facility, which is located in a suite, subleased to the plaintiff, of a building that Hartford Healthcare acquired by lease, is rendered taxable by §12-66a, even if otherwise exempt from taxation under §12-81 (7) or (16). General Statutes § 12-66a. Accordingly, the trial court improperly granted the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.")

• Posted in:
• Administrative Appeal Law

SC20816 - Newton Neighborhood Environmental Trust v. Connecticut Siting Council (Administrative appeal; standing, "The present appeal relates to the proposed construction of a 100 foot tall cell phone tower (tower) on a residentially zoned parcel of real property located in the town of Woodbridge (town). ...There is no inherently obvious connection between a facility’s adverse impact on property values and the probable environmental impact of the facility or the listed significant adverse effects. We cannot conclude, therefore, that a facility’s impact on property values will always be relevant to the council’s inquiry pursuant to § 16-50p (a) (3) (B), and, accordingly, it is an unenumerated significant adverse effect required to be considered by the council.")

• Posted in:
• Administrative Appeal Law

SC20838 - 9 Pettipaug, LLC v. Planning & Zoning Commission (Administrative appeal; Zoning appeal, constructive notice, "This certified appeal requires us to consider a significant question in this time of great change in the local journalism industry, namely, how a publication qualifies as "a newspaper having a substantial circulation in the municipality" for purposes of providing constructive notice of that municipality's promulgation of zoning regulations under General Statutes § 8-3 (d). The defendant, the Planning and Zoning Commission of the Borough of Fenwick (commission), appeals, upon our grant of its petition for certification, from the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming the judgment of the trial court in favor of the plaintiffs, 9 Pettipaug, LLC, and Eniotna, LLP. 9 Pettipaug, LLC v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 217 Conn. App. 714, 717, 737, 290 A.3d 853 (2023). On appeal, the commission claims that the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that its publication of notice in The Middletown Press (Press) of an amended zoning regulation did not comply with § 8-3 (d) because none of Fenwick's fourteen year-round households subscribes to the Press and it is not sold anywhere in Fenwick. Given the Press' focus on news items of general interest, its ready availability for purchase in the commercial area of the town of Old Saybrook, in which the borough of Fenwick is located, the fact that the Press' website allows free access to legal notices, and the deference that we afford the commission's long history of using the Press for its legal notices, we conclude that the Press is a newspaper having a substantial circulation in the municipality of Fenwick under § 8-3 (d). Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.")

• Posted in:
• Administrative Appeal Law,
• Property Law

• SC20717 - Dept. of Public Health v. Estrada (Administrative appeal; Whistle-blower complaint, (1) "Did the Appellate Court correctly conclude that Estrada's disclosure was not a protected disclosure under ...§4-61dd?" (A) "Specifically, does §4-61dd apply to purported misconduct in municipal government?" (B) "Can an employee seek whistleblower protection for reporting her own error?" (2) "Did Estrada establish a causal connection between any alleged whistleblower disclosure and the complained of personnel actions?" And (3) "[t]o the extent that an actual violation of state law is required to establish a prima facie claim of retaliation under ...§4-61dd, did the Appellate Court correctly conclude that there were no required qualifications for acting directors of public health under ...§19a-200?")

• Posted in:
• Administrative Appeal Law,
• Employment Law

AC45560 - Romanelli v. Department of Social Services (Administrative appeal; "The plaintiff, Antoinetta Romanelli, executor of the estate of her husband, Antonio Romanelli (applicant), appeals from the judgment of the Superior Court dismissing her appeal from the decision of the defendant, the Department of Social Services, denying long-term care Medicaid benefits to the applicant. The plaintiff claims that (1) certain real property, which was contained in a trust and which the defendant used in its calculations to determine that the applicant was over the asset limit for Medicaid eligibility, was not actually available to the applicant due to his alleged incapacity to revoke the trust and therefore should not have been used to calculate his Medicaid eligibility and (2) the defendant violated due process by failing to provide notice to the applicant and/or his personal representative that the revocability of the trust was at issue in calculating the applicant’s Medicaid eligibility. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.")

• Posted in:
• Administrative Appeal Law

AC46003, AC46064 - Town of Greenwich v. Freedom of Information Commission ("On appeal, the defendants claim that the court improperly substituted its judgment for that of the commission by concluding that the requested records are preliminary drafts that are exempt from disclosure under § 1-210 (b) (1). We agree with the defendants. We also are not persuaded by the plaintiffs’ proffered alternative ground for affirmance, namely, that the requested records are exempt from disclosure under § 1-210 (b) (20).")

• Posted in:
• Administrative Appeal Law,
• Freedom of Information Law

SC20726 - Markley v. State Elections Enforcement Commission ("This appeal presents an issue of first impression under the first amendment to the United States constitution, namely, the extent to which the statutes and regulations governing the public funding of state elections in connection with the Citizens' Election Program (program), General Statutes § 9-700 et seq., may be applied to preclude publicly funded candidates from using their candidate committee funds to pay for campaign advertisements that, as a rhetorical device, invoke the name of a candidate in a different race to refer more broadly to the policies or political party associated with that candidate. The defendant, the State Elections Enforcement Commission (commission), imposed fines on the plaintiffs, Joe Markley and Rob Sampson, who were publicly funded candidates for state legislative office during the 2014 general election cycle, on the ground that they had violated the statutes and regulations governing the program when they utilized their candidate committee funds to pay for communications that criticized then Governor Dannel Malloy, who was seeking reelection to that office in that same election cycle, in the course of promoting their opposition to his policies. The plaintiffs now appeal from the judgment of the trial court upholding the decision of the commission, claiming that the commission's enforcement of the state election laws in that manner violated their first amendment rights. Although a compelling governmental interest is served by a condition that precludes publicly funded candidates from using program funds to support or oppose candidates in other races, we conclude that the commission violated the plaintiffs' first amendment rights with respect to the five advertisements at issue in this case because they could reasonably be understood to be something other than an appeal to vote against Governor Malloy. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.")

• Posted in:
• Administrative Appeal Law,
• Recent Opinions

SC20769 - Northland Investment Corp. v. Public Utilities Regulatory Authority (Administrative appeal; Declaratory ruling; "This case resolves the question of whether a landlord of a multiunit residential building may recoup from its tenants the costs for utility services that it is liable to pay to a utility provider when the building does not have individual meters for each unit but, rather, has only a master meter. The plaintiff, Northland Investment Corporation, manages and owns multiunit residential buildings throughout the United States, including Connecticut. In its buildings that have only a master meter for the entire building, the plaintiff employs, or seeks to employ, a recoupment method it refers to as "ratio utility billing" (RUB). Under the RUB method, as developed by the plaintiff, it pays the utility company directly for the building's entire utility bill and then recoups the cost from the tenants in the form of a variable utility payment each month. Under this form of billing, the plaintiff bills each tenant directly for what the plaintiff contends is the tenant's "proportionate share" of utilities based on factors it has chosen (which it can modify in its sole discretion), such as a unit's square footage, number of occupants, number of bedrooms and bathrooms, or a combination of these. This method of utility billing is included in a provision of the plaintiff's lease agreements.

The plaintiff sought a declaratory ruling from the defendant, the Public Utilities Regulatory Authority (PURA), that it may use RUB in recouping its costs for utility services from tenants. PURA concluded that the plaintiff was not authorized to do so. In the administrative appeal that followed, the trial court upheld PURA's decision. Both of the parties rely on General Statutes § 16-262e (c) in support of their respective arguments. Section 16-262e (c) governs the liability for payment of utility services provided to residential dwellings. The plaintiff argues that the plain meaning of § 16-262e (c) does not expressly prohibit the use of RUB. Because RUB is not expressly prohibited by law, the plaintiff argues, the method qualifies as a payment of "rent" under General Statutes (Supp. 2024) § 47a-1 (h). PURA disagrees and instead argues that RUB violates the plain meaning of § 16-262e (c) because the provision allows a tenant to be liable for utility costs only if the tenant's unit is individually metered and he or she has exclusively used the utilities so provided. We agree with PURA and conclude that § 16-262e (c) precludes a landlord's use of RUB to recoup utility service charges from tenants.")

• SC20769 Dissent - Northland Investment Corp. v. Public Utilities Regulatory Authority

• Posted in:
• Administrative Appeal Law,
• Landlord / Tenant Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC46146, AC46159 - Lepkowski v. Planning Commission ("The defendants, the Planning Commission of the Town of East Lyme (commission) and Real Estate Service of Conn., Inc. (RESC), each appeal from the judgment of the Superior Court sustaining in part the appeal brought by the plaintiff, Brian Lepkowski, from the commission's decision approving a resubdivision application filed by RESC. The dispositive claim asserted by the defendants is that the court incorrectly determined that § 4-14-3 of the East Lyme Subdivision Regulations (subdivision regulations) required the completion of an Environmental Review Team (ERT) evaluation in connection with RESC's application and that, consequently, the court improperly concluded that the commission illegally waived § 4-14-3 in granting RESC's application without an ERT evaluation having been performed. We agree with the defendants and, accordingly, reverse in part the judgment of the Superior Court.")

• Posted in:
• Administrative Appeal Law,
• Land Use Law,
• Recent Opinions

SC20703 - Marshall v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles (Administrative appeal, Driving Under the Influence; "Turning now to the present case, we note that the arresting officer did not complete the report until he signed and dated it five business days after the plaintiff’s arrest. It is undisputed that the arresting officer failed to comply with the three business day preparation and mailing requirement of § 14-227b (c). The plaintiff’s attorney objected to the admission of the report on that ground. The hearing officer simply overruled the objection and admitted the report without hearing testimony from the arresting officer. Because the report failed to satisfy the preparation and mailing requirement, we conclude that the hearing officer abused her discretion by admitting the noncompliant report without the testimony of the arresting officer.")

• Posted in:
• Administrative Appeal Law

AC45885 - Avon v. Sastre (Administrative appeal; "The plaintiffs, the town of Avon (town) and the town manager, Brandon Robertson, appeal from the judgment of the Superior Court dismissing their administrative appeal from the final decision of the defendant Freedom of Information Commission (commission) regarding a complaint filed by the defendant Joseph Sastre. In its final decision, the commission found that the plaintiffs had violated the Freedom of Information Act (act), General Statutes § 1-200 et seq., when they denied Sastre's request for a document (log) related to the resignation in 2019 of the town's police chief, Mark Rinaldo (Chief Rinaldo), and ordered that the town disclose the log pursuant to the act. On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the court improperly dismissed their appeal from the commission's decision ordering disclosure of the log because (1) the log is not a public record under § 1-200 (5) and, thus, is not subject to disclosure under the act, and (2) even if the log is a public record, it is exempt from disclosure under General Statutes § 1-210 (b) (10) pursuant to the attorney-client privilege. We disagree with the plaintiffs and affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.")

• Posted in:
• Administrative Appeal Law,
• Freedom of Information Law,
• Recent Opinions