The mission of the Connecticut Judicial Branch is to serve the interests of justice and the public by resolving matters brought before it in a fair, timely, efficient and open manner.
Administrative Appeal Law

Administrative Appeal Appellate Court Opinion

   by Roy, Christopher

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=4644

AC43534 - Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities v Cantillon ("The plaintiff, the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities (plaintiff commission), appeals from the judgment of the Superior Court dismissing its administrative appeal from the final decision of the defendant Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities (defendant commission). On appeal, the plaintiff commission argues that the Superior Court erred in dismissing its administrative appeal because the human rights referee (referee) and the Superior Court (1) misinterpreted and misapplied Patino v. Birken Mfg. Co., 304 Conn. 679, 41 A.3d 1013 (2012), in the calculation of emotional distress damages, and (2) misapplied the factors set forth in Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities ex rel. Harrison v. Greco, CHRO No. 7930433 (June 3, 1985) pp. 7–8, in the determination of emotional distress damages. We are unpersuaded and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.")


Administrative Appeal Appellate Court Opinion

   by Booth, George

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=4629

AC43546 - High Watch Recovery Center, Inc. v. Dept. of Public Health (Administrative appeal; certificate of need; motion to dismiss; subject matter jurisdiction; "The plaintiff, High Watch Recovery Center, Inc., appeals from the judgment of the Superior Court dismissing its administrative appeal from the final decision of the defendant Department of Public Health (department) approving the application of the defendant Birch Hill Recovery Center, LLC (Birch Hill), for a certificate of need to establish a substance abuse treatment facility in Kent. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court erred in (1) granting the defendants' motions to dismiss after concluding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to review the department's approval of Birch Hill's certificate of need application and (2) concluding that a letter written by the plaintiff to the Office of Health Care Access (OHCA) requesting to intervene in the matter concerning Birch Hill's application was insufficient to constitute a request for a public hearing for purposes of General Statutes (Rev. to 2017) § 19a-639a (e). We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.")


Administrative Appeal Appellate Court Opinion

   by Booth, George

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=4585

AC43865 - Nussbaum v. Dept. of Energy & Environmental Protection (Administrative appeal; whether trial court properly dismissed appeal from decision of Commissioner of Energy and Environmental Protection affirming decision of Department of Energy and Environmental Protection denying application for permit to maintain fences on certain real property adjacent to Long Island Sound and ordering removal of fences; "The plaintiffs, Bernard W. Nussbaum (Nussbaum) and the Bernard W. Nussbaum Revocable Trust (trust), appeal from the judgment of the trial court dismissing their administrative appeal from the final decision of the Commissioner of Energy and Environmental Protection (commissioner), denying Nussbaum’s application for a permit for two post and wire fences previously erected on certain shoreline property and ordering that the fences be removed. On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the court erred in concluding (1) that the commissioner’s final decision was not arbitrary, illegal, or an abuse of discretion, and (2) that the defendant, the Department of Energy and Environmental Protection (department), (a) properly considered that, under Connecticut law, changes to land, either natural or man-made, which amount to reclamation or erosion, may, under certain circumstances, alter the mean high waterline bordering private shoreline property, (b) correctly determined the location of the mean high waterline bordering the plaintiffs’ property, and (c) properly balanced the plaintiffs’ private rights with the public’s interest in land held in trust under the statutes concerning structures, dredging, and fill; General Statutes §§ 22a-359 through 22a-363; and the Coastal Management Act, General Statutes § 22a-90 et seq. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")


Administrative Appeal Appellate Court Opinion

   by Booth, George

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=4493

AC43781 - Moulthrop v. State Board of Education (Administrative appeal; appeal from decision by defendant revoking plaintiff's initial educator and professional educator certificates pursuant to statute (§ 10-145b (i) (2)); "The plaintiff, Maria Moulthrop, appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing her administrative appeal from the decision of the defendant, the Connecticut State Board of Education (board), revoking her initial educator and professional educator certificates. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court erred by concluding that she failed to establish that the board's decision (1) was predicated on constitutional and statutory violations, and (2) was clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence in the whole record. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")


Administrative Appeal Appellate Court Opinion

   by Booth, George

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=4483

AC43464 - Towing & Recovery Professionals of Connecticut, Inc v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles (Administrative appeal; petition pursuant to statute (§ 14-66) for revision of rates for nonconsensual towing and storage services; "This appeal arises from a petition for an adjustment of towing and storage rates that the plaintiff, Towing & Recovery Professionals of Connecticut, Inc., filed with the named defendant, the Department of Motor Vehicles (department). After the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles (commissioner) granted certain rate increases, the plaintiff filed an administrative appeal in the Superior Court. The court dismissed the plaintiff's administrative appeal, and the plaintiff now appeals. We affirm the judgment of the court.")


Freedom of Information Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Booth, George

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=4466

AC42992 - Allco Renewable Energy Ltd. v. Freedom of Information Commission (Administrative appeal; alleged violation of Freedom of Information Act (§ 1-200 et seq.); "The plaintiffs, Allco Renewable Energy Limited (Allco) and its principal Thomas Melone, appeal from the judgment of the Superior Court dismissing their appeal from the final decision of the defendant Freedom of Information Commission (commission), in which the court concluded that the commission properly dismissed the plaintiffs' request for certain documents of the codefendant Department of Energy and Environmental Protection (department). On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the court improperly concluded that the commission correctly applied General Statutes § 1-210 (b) (5) (A) and (B) of the Freedom of Information Act (act), General Statutes § 1-200 et seq. We affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.")


Administrative Appeal Supreme Court Slip Opinions

   by Booth, George

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=4448

SC20305 - Markley v. State Elections Enforcement Commission ( Campaign financing; Whether trial court properly dismissed administrative appeal for lack of jurisdiction because appeal was not filed within 45 days of agency's constructive denial of petition for reconsideration. "The plaintiffs, Joe Markley and Rob Sampson, appeal from the judgment of the trial court dismissing their administrative appeal, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, from the adverse decision of the defendant, the State Elections Enforcement Commission (commission). In that decision, the commission determined that the plaintiffs, who, as candidates for state elective office, had received funding for their campaigns through the Citizens' Election Program (program), violated certain state election laws and regulations related to the program, and imposed civil fines for those violations. The plaintiffs immediately filed a petition for reconsideration in accordance with General Statutes § 4-181a (a) (1), which provides that an agency's failure to decide whether to reconsider a decision within twenty-five days of the filing of such a petition shall constitute a denial of the petition. Shortly after that twenty-five day period had elapsed without a decision by the commission, however, the matter of the petition appeared on the agenda of an upcoming special meeting of the commission. Following that special meeting, the commission notified the plaintiffs that their petition had been considered at the special meeting and denied. As authorized by General Statutes § 4-183, the plaintiffs appealed from the commission's decision to the Superior Court, which dismissed the appeal on the ground that it was untimely under subdivision (2) of § 4-183 (c) because, contrary to the requirement of that statutory subdivision, the appeal was not filed within forty-five days following the denial of the petition by operation of § 4-181a (a) (1). On appeal to this court, the plaintiffs claim, inter alia, that their administrative appeal was timely filed in the Superior Court because, under § 4-181a (a) (2); see footnote 1 of this opinion; the commission was authorized to reconsider its decision at any time up to forty days from the filing of the petition, the commission did so, and, in accordance with § 4-183 (c) (3); see footnote 2 of this opinion; the plaintiffs filed their appeal with the Superior Court within forty-five days of their receipt of notice from the commission that it had heard and denied the petition. We agree with the plaintiffs that, under the particular facts of this case, the timeliness of their appeal to the Superior Court is governed by the forty-five day limitation period of § 4-183 (c) (3), which commenced on the date they were notified by the commission of its purported action on the petition at the special meeting, rather than the forty-five day period of § 4-183 (c) (2), which, if applicable, would have commenced twenty-five days after the denial of the petition by operation of § 4-181a (a) (1). Because the plaintiffs' appeal was timely under § 4-183 (c) (3), we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case to that court for a resolution of the merits of the plaintiffs' administrative appeal.")

SC20340 - Great Plains Lending, LLC v. Department of Banking (Tribal sovereign immunity; Whether trial court properly remanded matter for evidentiary hearing; Whether trial court applied proper test to determine if plaintiffs were "Arms of the tribe"; whether plaintiff tribal chairman was entitled to immunity from administrative orders and civil penalties. "This appeal presents three significant issues of first impression with respect to whether a business entity shares an Indian tribe's sovereign immunity as an "arm of the tribe," as we consider (1) which party bears the burden of proving the entity's status as an arm of the tribe, (2) the legal standard governing that inquiry, and (3) the extent to which a tribal officer shares in that immunity for his or her actions in connection with the business entity. The plaintiffs, Great Plains Lending, LLC (Great Plains), American Web Loan, Inc., doing business as Clear Creek Lending (Clear Creek) (collectively, entities), and John R. Shotton, chairman of the Otoe-Missouria Tribe of Indians (tribe), a federally recognized tribe, appeal from the judgment of the trial court sustaining their administrative appeal and remanding this case to the defendant Commissioner of Banking (commissioner) for further proceedings with respect to the plaintiffs' entitlement to tribal sovereign immunity in administrative proceedings. On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the trial court should have rendered judgment in their favor as a matter of law, insofar as it improperly (1) allocated the burden of proving entitlement to tribal sovereign immunity to the plaintiffs, (2) required proof of a functioning relationship between the entities and the tribe, and (3) failed to find Shotton immune in further administrative proceedings. The defendants, the commissioner and the Department of Banking (department), cross appeal and similarly challenge the legal standard adopted by the trial court and its decision to remand the case for further administrative proceedings. We conclude that the entity claiming arm of the tribe status bears the burden of proving its entitlement to that status under the test articulated by the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Breakthrough Management Group, Inc. v. Chukchansi Gold Casino & Resort, 629 F.3d 1173, 1187 (10th Cir. 2010) (Breakthrough), cert. dismissed, 564 U.S. 1061, 132 S. Ct. 64, 180 L. Ed. 2d 932 (2011). We further conclude, as a matter of law, that Great Plains is an arm of the tribe and that Shotton, with respect to his capacity as an officer of Great Plains and the tribe, is entitled to tribal sovereign immunity from civil penalties but not injunctive relief. We also conclude, however, that there is insufficient evidence to support a conclusion that Clear Creek is an arm of the tribe as a matter of law, which requires a remand to the commissioner for further administrative proceedings. Accordingly, we reverse in part the judgment of the trial court.")


Administrative Appeal Appellate Court Opinion

   by Townsend, Karen

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=4419

AC43691 - Nandabalan v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles (Forty-five day suspension of license to operate a motor vehicle; ignition interlock device; General Statutes § 14-227b; refusal to submit to a chemical alcohol test; breathalyzer test; probable cause; “The plaintiff claims that the court erred in concluding that the administrative record contained substantial evidence to support the hearing officer’s finding that he knowingly refused to submit to the chemical alcohol test. We disagree and affirm the judgment of the trial court.”)


Freedom of Information Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Booth, George

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=4378

AC42496 - Lindquist v. Freedom of Information Commission (Administrative appeal; Freedom of Information Act (§ 1-200 et seq.); whether trial court properly concluded that Freedom of Information Commission did not abuse its discretion in finding that redacted records were exempt from disclosure under statute (§ 1-210 (b) (1)); "The self-represented plaintiff, Richard Lindquist, at all relevant times, a tenured professor at the defendant University of Connecticut Health Center (health center), appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing his appeal from the final decision of the defendant Freedom of Information Commission (commission), in which the trial court concluded that the commission correctly dismissed the plaintiff's request for certain documents of the health center relating to his annual performance review. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that (1) the trial court failed to consider whether the commission failed to apply various provisions of the Freedom of Information Act (act), General Statutes § 1-200 et seq., including General Statutes §§ 1-200 (6), 1-210 (b) (2), 1-213 and 1-225, and General Statutes (Rev. to 2015) § 1-214, and chapters 563 and 563a of the General Statutes, (2) the trial court improperly concluded that the commission properly applied § 1-210 (b) (1) and (e) (1) of the act to the records at issue, (3) the trial court improperly rejected the due process claim raised by the plaintiff, and (4) the commission failed to comply with General Statutes §§ 1-210 (b) (2) and 10a-154a. We agree, in part, with the plaintiff's second claim, as it relates to § 1-210 (e) (1), that he is entitled to judgment in his favor requiring the disclosure of the final individual comments and ratings by the committee members that were delivered to the dean of the University of Connecticut School of Medicine (dean), and, accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case to that court with direction to render judgment for the plaintiff. In light of our resolution on the basis of the plaintiff's second claim, we need not reach the plaintiff's other claims.")


Administrative Appeal Appellate Court Opinion

   by Booth, George

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=4374

AC42609 - Jacques v. Commissioner of Energy & Environmental Protection (Administrative appeal; injunction; motion to dismiss; whether trial court erred in determining that plaintiff failed to allege facts sufficient to establish standing under applicable statute (§ 22a-16); "The plaintiff, Kathleen Jacques, brought the action underlying this appeal against the defendants, Robert Klee, the Commissioner of Energy and Environmental Protection (commissioner), and Benjamin Barnes, Secretary of the Office of Policy and Management (secretary). The plaintiff sought, inter alia, a permanent injunction prohibiting the defendants from taking further action with respect to a plan to redevelop Seaside State Park in Waterford and an order precluding the defendants from "further denying . . . her statutory rights" to intervene in public hearings related to the redevelopment project. The plaintiff appeals from the judgment of the trial court granting the defendants' motion to dismiss on the ground of sovereign immunity and concluding that she failed to demonstrate that an exception to sovereign immunity applied. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court (1) erred in determining that she failed to allege facts sufficient to establish her statutory standing under General Statutes § 22a-16, (2) utilized an improper standard in construing the complaint's allegations under the sovereign immunity exceptions for state actions in violation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights and for state actions in excess of its authority, (3) erred when it concluded that the allegations of the complaint did not come within the exception to sovereign immunity for state actions alleged in violation of constitutional rights, (4) erred when it held that the allegations of the complaint did not come within the exception to sovereign immunity for a substantial allegation of wrongful conduct to promote an illegal purpose in excess of a state officer's statutory authority, and (5) erred when it ruled that the scoping process/review of the environmental impact evaluation was not a "proceeding" for purposes of intervention under General Statutes § 22a-19. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")


Freedom of Information Law Supreme Court Slip Opinion

   by Booth, George

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=4360

SC20378 - Meriden v. Freedom of Information Commission (Freedom of Information; Whether Appellate Court Properly Held that a Gathering of Less than a Quorum of Meriden City Council Members did not Constitute a "Meeting" Subject to FOIA's Open Meeting Requirements; "Although all meetings of individuals may be gatherings, the general question before us is whether all gatherings of individuals are necessarily meetings. More specifically, this certified appeal requires us to construe the meaning of the term "meeting" as it is defined in the Freedom of Information Act (act), General Statutes § 1-200 et seq. Even more precisely, the narrow issue we must decide is whether a gathering of individuals comprising less than a quorum of the members of a city council, together with the mayor and the city manager, constitutes a "hearing or other proceeding of a public agency"; General Statutes § 1-200 (2); and, therefore, a "meeting" within the meaning of the act. If that gathering was a meeting, it was subject to the open meeting requirements of the act. See General Statutes § 1-225 (a).

The defendant Freedom of Information Commission appeals from the judgment of the Appellate Court, which reversed the judgment of the trial court and concluded that the plaintiffs, the city of Meriden and the Meriden City Council, did not violate the open meeting requirements of the act. Meriden v. Freedom of Information Commission, 191 Conn. App. 648, 650, 663, 665, 216 A.3d 847 (2019). On appeal, the commission claims that the Appellate Court incorrectly determined that a "hearing or other proceeding" refers to a process of adjudication, which fell outside the scope of the activities conducted during the gathering at issue in this case. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 659.

...

Applying these principles to the facts of this case, we conclude that the gathering of the leadership group with the mayor and the retiring city manager was not a "hearing or other proceeding" of a public agency under § 1-200 (2). The mayor and the retiring city manager had no authority to create the city manager search committee. There is no evidence in the record that the leadership group was formed pursuant to any official resolution of the city council, and it had no independent, express authority to take any action regarding the formation of the search committee that could legally bind the city council. There is no statute, ordinance, bylaw, or other legal source of power granting the leadership group any authority to act, either as a group or on behalf of the city council. Indeed, that is why the leadership group submitted the resolution to the full city council for its consideration and a vote. See Meriden City Charter § C5-1 ("[t]he [c]ity [m]anager . . . shall be appointed . . . by the [c]ity [c]ouncil"). The commission acknowledges in its brief that it was the city council "as a whole" that had responsibility for hiring a new city manager. Accordingly, because the gathering of the leadership group with the mayor and the retiring city manager did not constitute a "hearing or other proceeding of a public agency," and, therefore, a "meeting," the gathering was not subject to the act's open meeting requirements.

The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.")


Administrative Appeal Appellate Court Opinion

   by Booth, George

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=4312

AC42997 - Lewis v. Freedom of Information Commission (Administrative appeal; alleged violation of Freedom of Information Act (§ 1-200 et seq.); "The self-represented plaintiff, Kacey Lewis, appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing his administrative appeal from the final decision of the defendant, the Freedom of Information Commission, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the ground that he failed to file his administrative appeal with the Superior Court within the time requirement of General Statutes § 4-183 (c). On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial court erred by (1) dismissing his appeal because the clerk of the court, either negligently or intentionally, gave him incorrect instructions regarding the service of the appeal and did not file his appeal in July, 2018, thereby wrongfully making his filing untimely, and (2) denying his application for the issuance of subpoenas by finding that any additional testimony would be irrelevant. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.")


Administrative Appeal Supreme Court Opinion

   by Booth, George

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=4287

SC20466 - Burton v. Dept. of Environmental Protection (Environmental Protection; Nuclear Power; Whether Administrative Proceeding Concerning Renewal of Millstone's Wastewater Discharge Permit was Conducted in Violation of Connecticut Environmental Protection Act and Clean Water Act; "This case comes to us for the third time following lengthy and highly contested litigation. The plaintiff, Nancy Burton, brought an action under the Connecticut Environmental Protection Act of 1971 (CEPA), General Statutes § 22a-14 et seq., against the defendants, the Commissioner of Environmental Protection and Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc., and an administrative appeal under General Statutes § 4-183 (a) against the defendants, the Department of Environmental Protection and Dominion. The actions, now consolidated, claim, in part, that the operation of the Millstone Nuclear Power Station (plant), which is owned and operated by Dominion, is causing unreasonable pollution of the waters of the state in violation of CEPA. Specifically, the plaintiff challenged the department's decision to issue a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permit to Dominion to authorize the intake and discharge of water by the plant, claiming that the permit renewal proceeding was inadequate to protect the rights recognized by CEPA. The trial court previously dismissed the plaintiff's CEPA action for lack of standing, which this court reversed in Burton v. Commissioner of Environmental Protection, 291 Conn. 789, 970 A.2d 640 (2009) (Burton I). Thereafter, the trial court again dismissed the plaintiff's CEPA action, this time concluding that the action was moot because the permit renewal proceeding had terminated. This court reversed that decision in Burton v. Commissioner of Environmental Protection, 323 Conn. 668, 150 A.3d 666 (2016) (Burton II). On remand from Burton II, the trial court conducted a hearing on the merits of the plaintiff's CEPA claim and administrative appeal and rendered judgments in favor of the defendants. The plaintiff now appeals from those judgments, claiming, among other things, that the trial court incorrectly concluded that she failed to prove that the administrative proceeding was inadequate and the operation of the plant would result in unreasonable pollution.

Although the plaintiff's brief appears to assert six arguments, they are not clearly articulated, and they are more properly distilled into four claims. First, the plaintiff argues that the trial court incorrectly concluded that she failed to establish that the administrative proceeding was inadequate to protect the rights recognized by CEPA. Second, the plaintiff argues that the trial court improperly held that she failed to establish that unreasonable pollution would result from the plant's operation. Third, the plaintiff argues that the trial court incorrectly concluded that the department's BTA determination did not violate the Clean Water Act. Finally, the plaintiff argues that the trial court violated this court's remand order in Burton II by failing to follow the prescribed two step proceeding. The defendants argue that the plaintiff has inadequately briefed all of her claims. They also argue, in the alternative, that the trial court's procedures and substantive holdings were proper. We agree with the defendants that the majority of the plaintiff's claims are inadequately briefed, and we conclude that those claims that are adequately briefed lack merit.

The judgments are affirmed.")


Administrative Appeal Appellate Court Opinions

   by Booth, George

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=4283

AC42555 - Meyers v. Middlefield (Administrative appeal; employment termination pursuant to statute (§ 20-260); "The plaintiff, Robert Meyers, appeals from the judgment of the Superior Court dismissing his administrative appeal from the unanimous decision of the Board of Selectmen of the Town of Middlefield (board) to terminate his employment as the statutory building official for the defendant, the town of Middlefield (town). On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly (1) concluded that the decision to terminate his employment was supported by substantial evidence in the record and (2) upheld the decision of the board to terminate the plaintiff's employment because the decision violated public policy. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the court.")

AC42845 - Vogue v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act (Unemployment compensation; whether trial court properly dismissed appeal from decision of Employment Security Board of Review; "The plaintiff, Vogue, appeals from the judgment of the trial court, rendered in favor of the defendant, the Administrator of the Unemployment Compensation Act, dismissing the plaintiff's appeal from the decision of the Board of Review of the Employment Security Appeals Division (board). The board had affirmed the decision of an appeals referee of the Employment Security Appeals Division (appeals division), who had affirmed the decision made by the defendant, following an audit of the plaintiff, that the plaintiff was liable for unpaid unemployment compensation contributions under the Unemployment Compensation Act (act), General Statutes § 31-222 et seq., with respect to one of its employees. The primary issue in this appeal is whether the court improperly interpreted and applied part B of the so-called "ABC test" of the act, which governs whether an employment relationship exists for purposes of the act. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")


Administrative Appeal Appellate Court Opinion

   by Booth, George

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=4197

AC42899 - Northwest Hills Chrysler Jeep, LLC v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles (Administrative appeal; "In this administrative appeal, the plaintiffs, Northwest Hills Chrysler Jeep, LLC, Gengras Chrysler Dodge Jeep, LLC, Crowley Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., doing business as Crowley Chrysler Jeep Dodge Ram, and Papa's Dodge, Inc., challenge the judgment of the trial court dismissing their appeal. The plaintiffs had appealed from the decision of a hearing officer for the defendants Commissioner of Motor Vehicles and the Department of Motor Vehicles (collectively, department), which found that good cause existed to allow the defendant FCA US, LLC (FCA), to establish a new Jeep dealership at the defendant Mitchell Dodge, Inc. (Mitchell), in Canton. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

  • AC42899 Appendix - Northwest Hills Chrysler Jeep, LLC v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles


Administrative Appeal Supreme Court Opinion

   by Booth, George

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=4136

SC20339 - 777 Residential, LLC v. Metropolitan District Commission (Administrative Appeal; "In this appeal and cross appeal, we must construe General Statutes § 7-249 to determine whether the defendant, The Metropolitan District Commission, had authority to levy a supplemental sewerage benefit assessment (supplemental assessment) against the property at 777 Main Street, Hartford, owned by the plaintiff, 777 Residential, LLC, and, if so, whether it used a proper methodology in calculating that assessment.

...

We agree with the defendant both that the trial court correctly determined that the defendant had authority to levy the supplemental assessment and that the trial court incorrectly determined that it used an improper method in calculating the supplemental assessment. Accordingly, we uphold the trial court's decision to render summary judgment in favor of the defendant and reverse the trial court's judgment regarding the claim of improper methodology.")


Administrative Appeal Appellate Court Opinion

   by Booth, George

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=4068

AC42442 - Mendes v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act (Unemployment compensation; appeal from decision of Board of Review of Employment Security Appeals Division affirming decision finding plaintiff ineligible for certain unemployment benefits; "The defendant Administrator of the Unemployment Compensation Act (administrator) appeals from the judgment of the Superior Court sustaining the appeal of the plaintiff, John P. Mendes, from the decision of the Board of Review of the Employment Security Appeals Division (board), which had dismissed the plaintiff's appeal from the decision of the referee at the Employment Security Appeals Division (referee). In short, the Superior Court concluded that the board had no evidence that the defendant had mailed notice to the plaintiff of a January 16, 2018 appeal hearing before the referee, and that the plaintiff, therefore, was entitled to a de novo hearing before the referee. On appeal, the defendant claims this was error. We agree and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the Superior Court.")


Administrative Appeal Appellate Court Opinion

   by Booth, George

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=4057

AC39631 - Petrucelli v. Meriden (Appeal of violation of city ordinance; whether trial court should have dismissed petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction; "The petitioner, Arthur Petrucelli, appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the respondent, the city of Meriden (city), following a de novo hearing held on his petition to reopen a decision issued by a city hearing officer upholding the issuance of a written notice to the petitioner for violation of the city's ordinance concerning abandoned, inoperable, or unregistered motor vehicles. On appeal, the petitioner claims that the court (1) erroneously concluded that his due process rights had not been violated, (2) improperly denied his posthearing motion to reopen the evidence or, in the alternative, to take judicial notice, and (3) committed several evidentiary errors during the de novo hearing. We do not reach the merits of the petitioner's claims, however, because we conclude that the petitioner did not have a statutory right to appeal to the Superior Court from the hearing officer's decision and, therefore, the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to entertain the petition. Accordingly, the form of the trial court's judgment is improper, and we reverse the judgment and remand the case with direction to dismiss the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.")


Probate Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Roy, Christopher

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=3969

AC42587 - Lamberton v. Lamberton ("The plaintiffs, Lance Lamberton and Roark Lamberton-Davies, appeal from the Superior Court's judgment in a de novo appeal from an order of the Probate Court for the district of Stamford awarding the defendant Rearden Lamberton, the nominated executor, legal fees incurred in the defense of a will in Probate Court, pursuant to General Statutes § 45a-294.The plaintiffs claim that the Superior Court (1) erroneously found that a nominated executor in a will not yet admitted to probate has standing to seek reimbursement of fees prior to being appointed as an executor by the Probate Court while a will contest is pending and (2) abused its discretion in awarding the fees prior to the conclusion of a hearing on the merits of an objection to the writing submitted to probate.

…We conclude that the court properly decided that § 45a-294 permits the award of legal fees as a reasonable expense incurred by a nominated executor to defend a will prior to admission of the will to probate. We further conclude that, in light of the reasons for appeal to the Superior Court and the paucity of the stipulation of facts, the court properly decided that the plaintiffs waived or conceded the issue of their reasonableness.")


Administrative Appeal Appellate Court Opinion

   by Booth, George

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=3886

AC41918 - Windham Solar, LLC v. Public Utilities Regulatory Authority (Administrative appeal; appeal from decisions by defendant Public Utilities Regulatory Authority concerning plaintiff's petition, pursuant to statute (§ 16-243a), to compel defendant utility to enter into contract with plaintiff for purchase of energy and capacity from solar electric generating facilities; "In this administrative appeal seeking regulatory remedies with respect to a proposed contract for the sale of energy, the plaintiff, Windham Solar, LLC, appeals from the judgment of dismissal rendered by the trial court on the ground that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction.The plaintiff claims that the court erred in concluding that it did not have standing to bring this administrative appeal and that, even if it did, its claims were moot. We agree with the plaintiff and reverse the judgment of the trial court.")


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