The mission of the Connecticut Judicial Branch is to serve the interests of justice and the public by resolving matters brought before it in a fair, timely, efficient and open manner.
Administrative Appeal Law

Administrative Appeal Appellate Court Opinion

   by Booth, George

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=4312

AC42997 - Lewis v. Freedom of Information Commission (Administrative appeal; alleged violation of Freedom of Information Act (§ 1-200 et seq.); "The self-represented plaintiff, Kacey Lewis, appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing his administrative appeal from the final decision of the defendant, the Freedom of Information Commission, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the ground that he failed to file his administrative appeal with the Superior Court within the time requirement of General Statutes § 4-183 (c). On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial court erred by (1) dismissing his appeal because the clerk of the court, either negligently or intentionally, gave him incorrect instructions regarding the service of the appeal and did not file his appeal in July, 2018, thereby wrongfully making his filing untimely, and (2) denying his application for the issuance of subpoenas by finding that any additional testimony would be irrelevant. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.")


Administrative Appeal Supreme Court Opinion

   by Booth, George

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=4287

SC20466 - Burton v. Dept. of Environmental Protection (Environmental Protection; Nuclear Power; Whether Administrative Proceeding Concerning Renewal of Millstone's Wastewater Discharge Permit was Conducted in Violation of Connecticut Environmental Protection Act and Clean Water Act; "This case comes to us for the third time following lengthy and highly contested litigation. The plaintiff, Nancy Burton, brought an action under the Connecticut Environmental Protection Act of 1971 (CEPA), General Statutes § 22a-14 et seq., against the defendants, the Commissioner of Environmental Protection and Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc., and an administrative appeal under General Statutes § 4-183 (a) against the defendants, the Department of Environmental Protection and Dominion. The actions, now consolidated, claim, in part, that the operation of the Millstone Nuclear Power Station (plant), which is owned and operated by Dominion, is causing unreasonable pollution of the waters of the state in violation of CEPA. Specifically, the plaintiff challenged the department's decision to issue a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permit to Dominion to authorize the intake and discharge of water by the plant, claiming that the permit renewal proceeding was inadequate to protect the rights recognized by CEPA. The trial court previously dismissed the plaintiff's CEPA action for lack of standing, which this court reversed in Burton v. Commissioner of Environmental Protection, 291 Conn. 789, 970 A.2d 640 (2009) (Burton I). Thereafter, the trial court again dismissed the plaintiff's CEPA action, this time concluding that the action was moot because the permit renewal proceeding had terminated. This court reversed that decision in Burton v. Commissioner of Environmental Protection, 323 Conn. 668, 150 A.3d 666 (2016) (Burton II). On remand from Burton II, the trial court conducted a hearing on the merits of the plaintiff's CEPA claim and administrative appeal and rendered judgments in favor of the defendants. The plaintiff now appeals from those judgments, claiming, among other things, that the trial court incorrectly concluded that she failed to prove that the administrative proceeding was inadequate and the operation of the plant would result in unreasonable pollution.

Although the plaintiff's brief appears to assert six arguments, they are not clearly articulated, and they are more properly distilled into four claims. First, the plaintiff argues that the trial court incorrectly concluded that she failed to establish that the administrative proceeding was inadequate to protect the rights recognized by CEPA. Second, the plaintiff argues that the trial court improperly held that she failed to establish that unreasonable pollution would result from the plant's operation. Third, the plaintiff argues that the trial court incorrectly concluded that the department's BTA determination did not violate the Clean Water Act. Finally, the plaintiff argues that the trial court violated this court's remand order in Burton II by failing to follow the prescribed two step proceeding. The defendants argue that the plaintiff has inadequately briefed all of her claims. They also argue, in the alternative, that the trial court's procedures and substantive holdings were proper. We agree with the defendants that the majority of the plaintiff's claims are inadequately briefed, and we conclude that those claims that are adequately briefed lack merit.

The judgments are affirmed.")


Administrative Appeal Appellate Court Opinions

   by Booth, George

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=4283

AC42555 - Meyers v. Middlefield (Administrative appeal; employment termination pursuant to statute (§ 20-260); "The plaintiff, Robert Meyers, appeals from the judgment of the Superior Court dismissing his administrative appeal from the unanimous decision of the Board of Selectmen of the Town of Middlefield (board) to terminate his employment as the statutory building official for the defendant, the town of Middlefield (town). On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly (1) concluded that the decision to terminate his employment was supported by substantial evidence in the record and (2) upheld the decision of the board to terminate the plaintiff's employment because the decision violated public policy. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the court.")

AC42845 - Vogue v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act (Unemployment compensation; whether trial court properly dismissed appeal from decision of Employment Security Board of Review; "The plaintiff, Vogue, appeals from the judgment of the trial court, rendered in favor of the defendant, the Administrator of the Unemployment Compensation Act, dismissing the plaintiff's appeal from the decision of the Board of Review of the Employment Security Appeals Division (board). The board had affirmed the decision of an appeals referee of the Employment Security Appeals Division (appeals division), who had affirmed the decision made by the defendant, following an audit of the plaintiff, that the plaintiff was liable for unpaid unemployment compensation contributions under the Unemployment Compensation Act (act), General Statutes § 31-222 et seq., with respect to one of its employees. The primary issue in this appeal is whether the court improperly interpreted and applied part B of the so-called "ABC test" of the act, which governs whether an employment relationship exists for purposes of the act. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")


Administrative Appeal Appellate Court Opinion

   by Booth, George

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=4197

AC42899 - Northwest Hills Chrysler Jeep, LLC v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles (Administrative appeal; "In this administrative appeal, the plaintiffs, Northwest Hills Chrysler Jeep, LLC, Gengras Chrysler Dodge Jeep, LLC, Crowley Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., doing business as Crowley Chrysler Jeep Dodge Ram, and Papa's Dodge, Inc., challenge the judgment of the trial court dismissing their appeal. The plaintiffs had appealed from the decision of a hearing officer for the defendants Commissioner of Motor Vehicles and the Department of Motor Vehicles (collectively, department), which found that good cause existed to allow the defendant FCA US, LLC (FCA), to establish a new Jeep dealership at the defendant Mitchell Dodge, Inc. (Mitchell), in Canton. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

  • AC42899 Appendix - Northwest Hills Chrysler Jeep, LLC v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles


Administrative Appeal Supreme Court Opinion

   by Booth, George

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=4136

SC20339 - 777 Residential, LLC v. Metropolitan District Commission (Administrative Appeal; "In this appeal and cross appeal, we must construe General Statutes § 7-249 to determine whether the defendant, The Metropolitan District Commission, had authority to levy a supplemental sewerage benefit assessment (supplemental assessment) against the property at 777 Main Street, Hartford, owned by the plaintiff, 777 Residential, LLC, and, if so, whether it used a proper methodology in calculating that assessment.

...

We agree with the defendant both that the trial court correctly determined that the defendant had authority to levy the supplemental assessment and that the trial court incorrectly determined that it used an improper method in calculating the supplemental assessment. Accordingly, we uphold the trial court's decision to render summary judgment in favor of the defendant and reverse the trial court's judgment regarding the claim of improper methodology.")


Administrative Appeal Appellate Court Opinion

   by Booth, George

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=4068

AC42442 - Mendes v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act (Unemployment compensation; appeal from decision of Board of Review of Employment Security Appeals Division affirming decision finding plaintiff ineligible for certain unemployment benefits; "The defendant Administrator of the Unemployment Compensation Act (administrator) appeals from the judgment of the Superior Court sustaining the appeal of the plaintiff, John P. Mendes, from the decision of the Board of Review of the Employment Security Appeals Division (board), which had dismissed the plaintiff's appeal from the decision of the referee at the Employment Security Appeals Division (referee). In short, the Superior Court concluded that the board had no evidence that the defendant had mailed notice to the plaintiff of a January 16, 2018 appeal hearing before the referee, and that the plaintiff, therefore, was entitled to a de novo hearing before the referee. On appeal, the defendant claims this was error. We agree and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the Superior Court.")


Administrative Appeal Appellate Court Opinion

   by Booth, George

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=4057

AC39631 - Petrucelli v. Meriden (Appeal of violation of city ordinance; whether trial court should have dismissed petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction; "The petitioner, Arthur Petrucelli, appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the respondent, the city of Meriden (city), following a de novo hearing held on his petition to reopen a decision issued by a city hearing officer upholding the issuance of a written notice to the petitioner for violation of the city's ordinance concerning abandoned, inoperable, or unregistered motor vehicles. On appeal, the petitioner claims that the court (1) erroneously concluded that his due process rights had not been violated, (2) improperly denied his posthearing motion to reopen the evidence or, in the alternative, to take judicial notice, and (3) committed several evidentiary errors during the de novo hearing. We do not reach the merits of the petitioner's claims, however, because we conclude that the petitioner did not have a statutory right to appeal to the Superior Court from the hearing officer's decision and, therefore, the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to entertain the petition. Accordingly, the form of the trial court's judgment is improper, and we reverse the judgment and remand the case with direction to dismiss the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.")


Probate Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Roy, Christopher

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=3969

AC42587 - Lamberton v. Lamberton ("The plaintiffs, Lance Lamberton and Roark Lamberton-Davies, appeal from the Superior Court's judgment in a de novo appeal from an order of the Probate Court for the district of Stamford awarding the defendant Rearden Lamberton, the nominated executor, legal fees incurred in the defense of a will in Probate Court, pursuant to General Statutes § 45a-294.The plaintiffs claim that the Superior Court (1) erroneously found that a nominated executor in a will not yet admitted to probate has standing to seek reimbursement of fees prior to being appointed as an executor by the Probate Court while a will contest is pending and (2) abused its discretion in awarding the fees prior to the conclusion of a hearing on the merits of an objection to the writing submitted to probate.

…We conclude that the court properly decided that § 45a-294 permits the award of legal fees as a reasonable expense incurred by a nominated executor to defend a will prior to admission of the will to probate. We further conclude that, in light of the reasons for appeal to the Superior Court and the paucity of the stipulation of facts, the court properly decided that the plaintiffs waived or conceded the issue of their reasonableness.")


Administrative Appeal Appellate Court Opinion

   by Booth, George

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=3886

AC41918 - Windham Solar, LLC v. Public Utilities Regulatory Authority (Administrative appeal; appeal from decisions by defendant Public Utilities Regulatory Authority concerning plaintiff's petition, pursuant to statute (§ 16-243a), to compel defendant utility to enter into contract with plaintiff for purchase of energy and capacity from solar electric generating facilities; "In this administrative appeal seeking regulatory remedies with respect to a proposed contract for the sale of energy, the plaintiff, Windham Solar, LLC, appeals from the judgment of dismissal rendered by the trial court on the ground that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction.The plaintiff claims that the court erred in concluding that it did not have standing to bring this administrative appeal and that, even if it did, its claims were moot. We agree with the plaintiff and reverse the judgment of the trial court.")


Administrative Appeal Supreme Court Opinion

   by Booth, George

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=3753

SC20215 - Sobel v. Commissioner of Revenue Services (Income tax; administrative appeal; "This appeal arises from a dispute as to whether the income of a general partner who lives in Connecticut and manages intangible property owned by limited partnerships operating in New York constitutes income derived from trading intangible property for the general partner's own account, in which case it would be taxable in this state or, instead, constitutes income from a trade or business, in which case it would be taxable in New York. The plaintiff, Jonathan A. Sobel, who resided in Connecticut and worked in New York, was a member of a limited liability company that was the managing partner of two limited partnerships that operated as hedge funds. The plaintiff reported his income derived from the two partnerships on his Connecticut tax returns in 1997 and 1998, and sought a credit pursuant to General Statutes § 12-704 (a) (1) for income taxes that he had paid on the income as a nonresident in New York. The defendant, the Commissioner of Revenue Services (commissioner), disallowed the credit after conducting an audit. Specifically, the commissioner concluded that the plaintiff was not entitled to a credit because (1) the plaintiff's income must be treated as if it derived from trading intangible property for his own account because the limited partnerships were trading their own intangible property and the character of the partnerships' income passed through to the income of their general partner; see General Statutes §§ 12-712 (c) (1) and 12-715 (b); (2) Connecticut does not tax the income of nonresidents from trading intangible property for their own accounts; see General Statutes § 12-711 (f); and (3) residents of this state are not entitled to a credit for income taxes paid in other states unless Connecticut would tax nonresident income of the same character. See General Statutes § 12-704 (a) (1). The plaintiff then filed a protest against the proposed income tax assessment. The commissioner denied the protest in relevant part. The plaintiff appealed from that denial to the trial court, which, after conducting a trial de novo, concluded on two independent grounds that the plaintiff was not trading intangible property for his own account but was engaged in the trade or business of trading intangible property owned by the limited partnerships. Accordingly, the court concluded that the plaintiff was entitled to a credit for the income tax that he paid in New York. The commissioner then filed this appeal, in which he challenged only one of the two independent bases for the trial court's decision. After oral argument, this court, sua sponte, ordered the parties to submit supplemental briefs on the issue of whether the appeal was moot as a consequence of the commissioner's failure to challenge both grounds for the trial court's decision. See, e.g., State v. Lester, 324 Conn. 519, 526–27, 153 A.3d 647 (2017) ("[w]here an appellant fails to challenge all bases for a trial court's adverse ruling on his claim, even if this court were to agree with the appellant on the issues that he does raise, we still would not be able to provide [him] any relief in light of the binding adverse finding[s] [not raised] with respect to those claims," and, therefore, appeal is moot [internal quotation marks omitted]). The commissioner contended in his supplemental brief that the appeal is not moot because there was only one basis for the trial court's ruling that the plaintiff was engaged in a trade or business, which he had challenged on appeal. The plaintiff contended in his supplemental brief that the appeal is moot. We agree with the plaintiff that the appeal is moot because the commissioner failed to challenge an independent basis for the trial court's ruling and that the appeal must therefore be dismissed.")


Administrative Appeal Appellate Court Opinion

   by Booth, George

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=3727

AC41949 - Summit Saugatuck, LLC v. Water Pollution Control Authority (Administrative appeal; appeal from denial of application for sewer extension by defendant water pollution control authority; "The defendant, the Water Pollution Control Authority for the Town of Westport, appeals from the judgment of the trial court sustaining the appeal of the plaintiff, Summit Saugatuck, LLC, from the defendant's decision to deny the plaintiff's application for a sewer extension to service a proposed affordable housing development. The court remanded the matter back to the defendant with direction to approve conditionally the sewer extension application subject to the completion of ongoing improvements and upgrades of capacity to the sanitary sewer system in the town of Westport (town). On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court, by sustaining the appeal and ordering a conditional approval of the application, improperly substituted its own judgment for the reasoned and lawful discretion exercised by the defendant. We agree and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the trial court.")


Tort Law Supreme Court Opinion

   by Penn, Michele

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=3686

AC20097 - King v. Volvo Excavators AB ("The plaintiff, Donita J. King, individually and as executrix of the estate of Daniel H. King (decedent), appeals from the judgment of the trial court in favor of the defendants Volvo Group North America, LLC (VGNA), Volvo Construction Equipment North America, LLC (VCENA), and Tyler Equipment Corporation (Tyler Equipment), on claims arising from a workplace accident in which the bucket of an excavator became dislodged and fell on the decedent, causing fatal injuries. On appeal, the plaintiff asserts that the trial court improperly granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment. The plaintiff's primary claim on appeal is that the statute of repose applied to her product liability claims, General Statutes (Rev. to 2015) § 52-577a, is unconstitutional because it creates two classes of claimants—employees who are subject to a ten year statute of repose and nonemployees who are not subject to the ten year statute of repose if the claimant can show that the product was within its useful safe life when the injury occurred. While the defendants' motions for summary judgment were pending before the trial court, the legislature enacted Number 17-97 of the 2017 Public Acts (P.A. 17-97), which combined those two classes of claimants by removing the limitations provision applicable to employees. In its decision on the motions for summary judgment, the trial court concluded that P.A. 17-97 was not retroactive and applied the statute of repose applicable to employees to bar the plaintiff's claims.

We conclude that the trial court improperly rendered judgment in favor of the defendants because the amendment to the statute of repose in P.A. 17-97 retroactively applied to the plaintiff's claims. As a result, we need not address the plaintiff's claim on appeal that General Statutes (Rev. to 2015) § 52-577a is unconstitutional. Instead, we conclude that the trial court must consider whether there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the injury occurred during the useful safe life of the product.")



Contract Law Supreme Court Opinion

   by Booth, George

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=3622

SC20131 - Dept. of Transportation v. White Oak Corp. (Arbitration; "After an arbitration proceeding, the defendant, White Oak Corporation (White Oak), was awarded a money judgment against the plaintiff, the Department of Transportation (department) in the amount of $8,362,308.41 plus interest. In paying that judgment on behalf of the department, the Office of the State Comptroller (comptroller) withheld $1,642,312.14 for taxes White Oak had owed to the state. As a result of this withholding, White Oak filed a motion with the trial court seeking a determination as to whether the judgment had been satisfied. In its motion, White Oak asserted that the department did not fully satisfy its judgment because, during a prior arbitration proceeding between the parties, the department had alleged but failed to prove its claim for taxes owed to the state and that, thus, the doctrine of collateral estoppel precluded the comptroller from reducing the payment by any amount for taxes owed.

The trial court rejected White Oak's claim and determined that the judgment had been satisfied. The defendant now appeals from the trial court's determination, again alleging that collateral estoppel precluded the comptroller from withholding the taxes owed to the state. We agree with the trial court that the department satisfied its judgment to White Oak because General Statutes § 12-39g imposed a mandatory obligation on the comptroller to reduce the amount paid to White Oak by the amount of taxes owed to the state as those taxes were not the subject of a timely filed administrative appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.")


Administrative Appeal Appellate Court Opinion

   by Booth, George

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=3605

AC41441 - Meriden v. Freedom of Information Commission (Administrative appeal; alleged violation of Freedom of Information Act (§ 1-200 et seq.); whether gathering of less than quorum of city council was "proceeding" within meaning of § 1-200 (2), and constituted "meeting" within meaning of statute; "The plaintiffs, the city of Meriden and the Meriden City Council (city council), appeal from the judgment of the trial court dismissing their appeal from the final decision of the defendant Freedom of Information Commission (commission), in which the commission found that the city council violated the open meeting requirements of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), General Statutes § 1-200 et seq., specifically General Statutes § 1-225 (a). On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court erred in concluding that (1) a gathering of less than a quorum of city council members to set an agenda and decide to submit a resolution for action by the full city council constituted a "meeting" under § 1-200 (2), and (2) such a gathering constituted "a step in the process of agency-member activity" that made it a "proceeding" and, therefore, a "meeting" within the meaning of § 1-200 (2). We reverse the judgment of the trial court.")


Administrative Appeal Appellate Court Opinion

   by Penn, Michele

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=3594

AC41423 - Seward v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act ("The defendant, the Administrator of the Unemployment Compensation Act, appeals from the judgment of the Superior Court reversing the decision of the Employment Security Board of Review (board) denying benefits to the plaintiff, Karim Seward, and remanding the matter to the board for further proceedings. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly (1) found and relied on facts beyond those certified by the board and (2) used those facts to determine that the board had abused its discretion in concluding that the plaintiff had not established good cause to open the decision of the appeals referee. We agree and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the Superior Court.")


Declaratory Judgment Appellate Court Opinion

   by Roy, Christopher

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=3585

AC40525 - Board of Education v. Bridgeport ("The plaintiffs, the Board of Education of the Town of Stratford, James Feehan, the Board of Education of the Town of Trumbull, and the Board of Education of the Town of Monroe, appeal from the judgment of the trial court granting the motions to dismiss filed by the defendants, the State Board of Education (state board); the Commissioner of Education (commissioner); the Board of Education of the City of Bridgeport (Bridgeport board); the city of Bridgeport (city); Joseph Ganim, the mayor of the city; and Aresta Johnson, the interim superintendent of the city's schools. On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the trial court erred by (1) dismissing counts one, two, three, and four of their complaint against the state defendants for lack of subject matter jurisdiction for failing to exhaust their administrative remedies, and (2) dismissing count six, a civil theft claim against the Bridgeport defendants, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction for failing to exhaust their administrative remedies. For the reasons discussed herein, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.")


Freedom of Information Appellate Court Opinion

   by Booth, George

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=3481

AC41297 - Aronow v. Freedom of Information Commission (Administrative appeal; request for documents pursuant to Freedom of Information Act (§ 1-200 et seq.); "The self-represented plaintiff, Michael Aronow, appeals from the dismissal by the trial court of his appeal from the final decision of the defendant Freedom of Information Commission (commission). Although, after a hearing, the commission concluded that the University of Connecticut Health Center (health center) had violated the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), General Statutes § 1-200 et seq., in regard to document requests made by the plaintiff, the plaintiff appealed to the trial court from the orders and subordinate findings made by the commission. On appeal from the judgment of the court dismissing his appeal from the commission, the plaintiff claims that the court erred in (1) concluding that he was not aggrieved by the commission's decision to decline to impose a civil penalty against the health center for the FOIA violation, (2) dismissing his claim that the commission improperly dismissed a previous FOIA complaint filed by the plaintiff regarding an earlier document request made to the health center, (3) concluding that there was substantial evidence in the record to support the commission's finding that the plaintiff had narrowed the scope of his FOIA request, and (4) concluding that the commission did not abuse its discretion by affording the health center nine months to comply with its document production order.

We agree with the court's conclusions regarding the plaintiff's first and second claims, and, accordingly, affirm the judgment as to those claims. We conclude, however, that the trial court erred in concluding that there was substantial evidence to support the commission's finding that the plaintiff had narrowed the scope of his original FOIA request in regard to paragraph eleven of the commission's final decision. Accordingly, the judgment is reversed in part, and the case is remanded to the trial court with direction to remand to the commission with direction to order that the health center comply expeditiously with the plaintiff's original request, as narrowed only by paragraph ten of the commission's final decision.")


Administrative Appeal Appellate Court Opinion

   by Booth, George

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=3453

AC41187 - Natasha B. v. Dept. of Children & Families (Administrative appeal; appeal from decision of hearing officer of defendant Department of Children and Families, who upheld department's decision to substantiate allegations of physical abuse, physical neglect, and emotional neglect by plaintiff against minor child and to place plaintiff's name on its child abuse and neglect central registry; "The plaintiff, Natasha B., appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing her appeal from the decision of a hearing officer of the defendant, the Department of Children and Families (department), who upheld the department's decision to substantiate allegations of physical abuse, physical neglect, and emotional neglect by the plaintiff against a minor child and to place the plaintiff's name on its child abuse and neglect central registry (central registry). On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly concluded that (1) a finding of chronicity was not required to place the plaintiff's name on the central registry, and (2) the hearing officer did not improperly shift the burden of proof to the plaintiff to demonstrate changed conditions that would justify removal of her name from the central registry. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")


Administrative Appeal Appellate Court Opinion

   by Booth, George

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=3444

AC39609 - PMC Property Group, Inc. v. Public Utilities Regulatory Authority (Administrative appeal; appeal from trial court's judgment affirming in part decision of defendant Public Utilities Regulatory Authority, which found that plaintiffs had engaged in unauthorized submetering of electricity and imposed sanctions "The plaintiffs, PMC Property Group, Inc. (PMC), and Energy Management Systems, Inc. (EMS), appeal from the trial court's judgment affirming in part the decision of the defendant Public Utilities Regulatory Authority (authority), which found that the plaintiffs had engaged in the unauthorized submetering of electricity and, pursuant to that finding, imposed sanctions. On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the court erred in (1) deferring to the authority's definition of electric submetering where that definition was not time-tested with respect to the heating and air conditioning system at issue in this appeal and (2) affirming the authority's determination that the plaintiffs' use of the heating and air conditioning system constituted submetering of electricity. We affirm the judgment of the court.")


Administrative Appeal Appellate Court Opinion

   by Booth, George

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=3412

AC40957 - Matthew C. v. Commissioner of Children & Families (Administrative appeal; child neglect; "The plaintiff, Matthew C., appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing his administrative appeal following a decision by the defendant, the Commissioner of Children and Families, denying him a hearing to challenge the defendant's decision to substantiate allegations that he neglected his two minor children. The plaintiff avers that the trial court erred by (1) deciding the plaintiff's appeal on a basis not decided by the defendant's administrative hearing officer, (2) declining to equate § 22-12-4 of the policy manual (policy manual) of the Department of Children and Families (department), as derived from § 17a-101k-7 of the department's regulations, with the doctrine of collateral estoppel, (3) dismissing his appeal from the denial of his request for a substantiation hearing irrespective of whether § 22-12-4 of the policy manual and collateral estoppel are equivalent, and (4) violating his right to fundamental fairness by dismissing his appeal after denying him a substantiation hearing. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. ")


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