SC20733 - Middlebury v. Fraternal Order of Police, Middlebury Lodge No 34. (“In this certified appeal, the plaintiff, the town of Middlebury (town), challenges the trial court’s dismissal of the town’s administrative appeal from the decision of the labor board concluding that the town violated MERA by unilaterally changing the town’s past practice of including extra duty pay in the calculation of pension benefits for members of the named defendant, Fraternal Order of Police, Middlebury Lodge No. 34 (union). The town claims that the Appellate Court incorrectly determined that the labor board did not act unreasonably, illegally, arbitrarily, or in abuse of its discretion when it declined to apply the ‘‘contract coverage’’ standard, as adopted by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) in MV Transportation, Inc., Case No. 28-CA173726, 368 N.L.R.B. No. 66, slip op., pp. 1–2, 9–11 (September 10, 2019), and instead applied the clear and unmistakable waiver standard to the union’s claim that the town’s unilateral change to its pension plan constituted a refusal to bargain collectively in good faith in violation of MERA. We disagree and affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court..”)

• Posted in:
• Administrative Appeal Law,
• Employment Law

AC45365 - Colandrea v. State Dental Commission ("The plaintiff, Anthony Colandrea, a dentist, appeals from the judgment of the Superior Court dismissing his administrative appeal from the decision of the defendant Connecticut State Dental Commission (commission) disciplining him after finding him guilty of incompetence or negligence toward patients in violation of General Statutes § 20-114 (a) (2). On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly dismissed his administrative appeal because (1) the administrative disciplinary proceeding before the commission was barred by the doctrine of res judicata, (2) the defendant Department of Public Health (department) failed to rebut the presumption of prejudice that purportedly arose from an ex parte communication between the department’s attorney and a former member of the panel that submitted a proposed decision to the commission mission pursuant to General Statutes § 4-179, (3) the commission abused its discretion in revoking his dental license as a disciplinary sanction, (4) the panel and the commission failed to act as impartial arbiters, and (5) the court abused its discretion in denying his motion to allow proof outside of the record. We affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.")

AC45056 - Commissioner of Public Health v. Colandrea ("The defendant, Anthony Colandrea, appeals from the judgment of the trial court (1) denying his motion to vacate a contempt enforcement order, which stemmed from a contempt judgment rendered against him following his noncompliance with a subpoena duces tecum issued by the plaintiff, the Commissioner of Public Health, for certain records of his dental practice, and (2) granting in part the plaintiff's motion to increase a per diem fine that the court ordered as a contempt sanction. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court's judgment constitutes error because (1) the present subpoena enforcement action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata, (2) the contempt proceeding against him was criminal in nature, such that (a) he was entitled to several rights afforded by the federal constitution and (b) the Office of the Attorney General, which represents the plaintiff, lost its statutory authority to continue seeking to enforce the subpoena on behalf of the plaintiff, and (3) the investigation with respect to which the plaintiff issued the subpoena has been concluded, thereby depriving the plaintiff of its statutory authority to continue prosecuting the present subpoena enforcement action. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

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• Administrative Appeal Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC45598 - Mata v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles (Motor Vehicle, Appeal of suspension of motor vehicle operator's license for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor)

"On appeal to this court, the plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly concluded that the administrative record contained substantial evidence to support the hearing officer’s findings that he (1) operated the motor vehicle and (2) knowingly refused to submit to a Breathalyzer test. We affirm the judgment of the court."

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• SC20666 - High Watch Recovery Center, Inc. v. Dept. of Public Health (Contested hearing; subject matter jurisdiction "Held that the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that the plaintiff’s petition requesting intervenor status in the public hearing on B Co.’s certificate of need application was not a legally sufficient request for a public hearing for purposes of § 19a-639a (e), and, accordingly, the department’s decision to approve B Co.’s application was a final decision in a contested case: Contrary to the defendants’ contention that, to satisfy § 19a-639a (e), the plaintiff was required to expressly state in its petition to intervene that it was an entity with five or more people, that statute does not impose such a requirement but merely provides that an entity must be an entity with five or more people to be entitled to a hearing, and it was undisputed that the plaintiff satisfied that numerical requirement and that the OHCA was fully aware of that fact.

Furthermore, given the undisputed fact that the OHCA had already scheduled a public hearing on B Co.’s application, this court discerned no ambiguity with respect to the plaintiff’s request because, when the OHCA has already scheduled a public hearing, it is only logical that a party wanting to oppose the application would request intervenor status in that hearing, not request another or a different hearing, and that was precisely what the public notice instructed the plaintiff to do if it wanted to be heard on the plaintiff’s application.")

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• Administrative Appeal Law

SC20669, SC20674 - City of Hartford Police Department v. CHRO et al. (Administrative Appeal; Discrimination; Whether Human Rights Referee's Finding of Intentional Discrimination Was Supported by Substantial Evidence).

"On appeal, the defendants claim that the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that there was not substantial evidence in the record to support the referee’s determination of intentional discrimination because Phan had failed to establish either an inference of discrimination in his prima facie case or, alternatively, that the plaintiff’s proffered reasons for terminating Phan’s employment were pretextual."

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• Administrative Appeal Law,
• Employment Law,
• Recent Opinions

SC20643 - Direct Energy Services, LLC v. Public Utilities Regulatory Authority ( Administrative Appeal; Whether Restrictions on Renewable Energy Program Violate Dormant Commerce, Free Speech or Contracts Clauses of Federal Constitution; Whether Plaintiffs Waived Constitutional Claims by Not Raising Them Before Agency; "This case requires us to decide, among other things, whether certain regulations imposed by the defendant, Public Utilities Regulatory Authority (PURA), on energy suppliers within this state violate the dormant commerce clause of the United States constitution. In October, 2020, PURA imposed a series of restrictions on retail electric suppliers who offer customers of this state voluntary products consisting of renewable energy credits (RECs) bundled with electric supply. These products are known as voluntary renewable offers (VROs). The two restrictions relevant to this appeal are the geographic restriction and the marketing restriction. The geographic restriction prohibits VROs from containing RECs sourced outside of particular geographic regions. The marketing restriction requires that suppliers provide clear language informing consumers that a VRO backed by RECs is not "renewable energy" itself but, rather, an energy product backed by RECs.

The plaintiffs, which are all companies that desire to market and sell VROs to Connecticut electric customers, contend that the geographic restriction impermissibly discriminates against RECs created outside of the permitted geographic regions. The plaintiffs further contend that the marketing restriction impedes commerce in the national marketplace because it imposes a regulatory requirement inconsistent with those of other states. The plaintiffs also raise a number of other constitutional and procedural claims. For its part, PURA contends that the trial court correctly concluded that neither the geographic restriction nor the marketing restriction violates the dormant commerce clause because, among other things, the restrictions help advance this state's legitimate environmental policy goals and improve consumer transparency. As to the plaintiffs' remaining claims, PURA contends that the trial court correctly concluded that they are either unreviewable or without merit. We agree with PURA and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

• Posted in:
• Administrative Appeal Law,
• Recent Opinions

SC20655 - Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities v. Cantillon ("Cantillon failed to appear for the administrative hearing on the complainant's claims. Consequently, he was defaulted. Then, after a hearing in damages, the presiding human rights referee found that the complainant had suffered emotional distress and awarded her $15,000 in damages, in addition to costs and postjudgment interest.

The commission itself, viewing the award as too low in light of the pervasive scope and nature of Cantillon's discriminatory conduct, appealed to the Superior Court, challenging the amount of the award. Specifically, the commission argued that (1) under Patino v. Birken Mfg. Co., 304 Conn. 679, 708, 41 A.3d 1013 (2012), an award for garden-variety emotional distress damages presumptively must be at least $30,000, and (2) the referee made various errors of law in assessing the heinousness of Cantillon's conduct pursuant to the test espoused in Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities ex rel. Harrison v. Greco, Docket No. 7930433 (C.H.R.O. June 3, 1985) (Harrison). Neither the complainant nor Cantillon participated in the appeal, however, and, for arcane reasons that are set forth in the decision of the Appellate Court; see Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities v. Cantillon, 207 Conn. App. 668, 670 n.1, 263 A.3d 887 (2021); the commission operated as both the appellant and the appellee in its appeal before the Superior Court. In doing so, the commission, as plaintiff, and the commission, as defendant, both challenged the referee's award as insufficient.

Even though no party to the appeal defended the decision of the referee or argued in support of Cantillon's likely position that the award was not impermissibly low, the trial court, recognizing that it was bound by the highly deferential standard of review that governs administrative decisions; see General Statutes § 4-183 (j); concluded that there was no legal basis for it to second-guess the award and rendered judgment dismissing the appeal. For similar reasons, and with the parties similarly situated, the Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court. See Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities v. Cantillon, supra, 207 Conn. App. 670–71, 686. This certified appeal followed.

Like the courts below, we are compelled to affirm. If some minimum award for garden-variety emotional distress damages is to be established for such heinous conduct, then that minimum amount must be established by the legislature, either independently, via legislation, or in conjunction with the commission, through the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act's rule-making process; see General Statutes § 4-168 et seq.; and not on an ad hoc basis by this court.

We presume the reader's familiarity with the well reasoned opinion of the Appellate Court. That court did an admirable job of setting forth the relevant facts and procedural history, describing the controlling standard of review, summarizing the commission's arguments as to the alleged flaws in the decision of the referee, and explaining why those arguments ultimately were not persuasive. Specifically, the Appellate Court did not read Patino to adopt any presumptive floor for emotional distress damages; see Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities v. Cantillon, supra, 207 Conn. App. 673–79; and it concluded that the referee's heavily fact specific assessment of the complainant's emotional distress damages was not an abuse of discretion. See id., 679–86. We agree with that court's resolution of the commission's claims, and no useful purpose would be served by retracing those steps here. We take this opportunity, however, to clarify and elaborate on a few points raised by the commission.")

• SC20655 Dissent - Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities v. Cantillon

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• Recent Opinions

AC44972 - AC44972 - Lowthert v. Freedom of Information Commission (Administrative appeal; alleged violation of open meeting requirements of provision (§ 1-225 (a)) of Freedom of Information Act (§ 1-200 et seq.) by defendant Freedom of Information Commission and/or its staff; "The self-represented plaintiff, Marissa Lowthert, appeals from the judgment of the Superior Court denying her application, pursuant to General Statutes § 1-206 (b) (2), for an order requiring the defendant, the Freedom of Information Commission (commission), to hold a hearing on a complaint she filed with the commission. On appeal, she claims that the court erred in denying her application because the commission and its executive director had a conflict of interest in violation of General Statutes § 1-85 when they decided not to schedule a hearing on her complaint. We affirm the judgment of the court.")

• Posted in:
• Administrative Appeal Law,
• Freedom of Information Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC45011 - O'Reggio v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities (Employment discrimination; claim that trial court erred in affirming administrative decision of defendant Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities; "In the present case, the Superior Court concluded that the department was not liable because the employee who created the hostile work environment, Diane Krevolin, was not the plaintiff's "supervisor" pursuant to the definition adopted by the United States Supreme Court for Title VII purposes in Vance v. Ball State University, supra, 570 U.S. 424; that is, someone "empowered by the employer to take tangible employment actions against the [plaintiff] . . . ." Id. The court determined that because Krevolin was not a supervisor, there was consequently "no merit to the plaintiff's argument that [the commission] should have imputed liability to [the department] on the basis of a supervisor theory of liability," and because the plaintiff did not challenge the decision on any other ground, it affirmed the decision of the commission in favor of the department.

On appeal to this court, the plaintiff asks us to conclude, contrary to the determination of the Superior Court, that the Vance definition of a "supervisor" for Title VII purposes does not apply to hostile work environment claims that are brought under CFEPA. She asks us, instead, to adopt a broader definition of the term for CFEPA purposes that would include employees like Krevolin who cannot "take tangible employment actions" but nonetheless control the day-to-day conditions of their subordinate's work. We conclude that the Superior Court properly determined that the Vance definition applies to claims brought under CFEPA, and, accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court")

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• Employment Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC45024 - Braasch v. Freedom of Information Commission (Administrative appeal; alleged violation of Freedom of Information Act (§ 1-200 et seq.); "The plaintiff, Sarah Braasch, appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing her administrative appeal from the final decision of the Freedom of Information Commission (commission), one of three defendants in this action. The commission concluded that the other two defendants in this action, the Yale University Police Department (department) and the Assistant Chief of the Yale University Police Department (assistant chief), properly denied the plaintiff's request for a copy of certain body camera recordings that were in their custody. On appeal to this court, the plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly (1) concluded that the recordings were exempt from disclosure under General Statutes § 1-210 (b) (3) (H), and (2) granted the motion of the department and the assistant chief to seal the body camera recordings. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

• Posted in:
• Administrative Appeal Law,
• Freedom of Information Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC45323 - L. D. v. Commissioner of Children and Families ("The plaintiff father, L. D., who is self-represented in this court, appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing his appeal from the decision of a hearing officer of the Department of Children and Families (department), who upheld the department’s decision to substantiate allegations of emotional neglect by the plaintiff against three of his children. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly concluded that there was substantial evidence in the record to support the findings of emotional neglect. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

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• Administrative Appeal Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC44635 - Waterbury v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act (“The plaintiff, the city of Waterbury, appeals from the judgment of the trial court, rendered in favor of the named defendant, the Administrator of the Unemployment Compensation Act (defendant), dismissing the plaintiff's appeal from the decision of the defendant Board of Review of the Employment Security Appeals Division (board). The board held that the defendant Thomas F. Eccleston II (claimant) was eligible for unemployment benefits because he was not discharged for wilful misconduct, even though he tested positive for marijuana use. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the board (1) erred in finding the Palliative Use of Marijuana Act (PUMA); see General Statutes § 21a-408 et seq.; and specifically General Statutes § 21a-408p, applicable to the present case, and (2) erroneously concluded that the claimant was not discharged for wilful misconduct. We disagree and, therefore, affirm the judgment of the court.”)

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• Administrative Appeal Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC44491 - Parnoff v. Stratford ("The plaintiff, Laurence V. Parnoff, appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered following the granting of motions to strike filed by the defendants, the town of Stratford (town), Melinda Fonda, Berchem Moses PC (Berchem Moses), and Laura Hoydick. On appeal, the plaintiff argues that (1) his claims under the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), General Statutes § 42-110a et seq., and his negligent infliction of emotional distress claims, all stemming from a public records request he made pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (act), General Statutes § 1-200 et seq., were improperly stricken because he pleaded allegations sufficient to support those claims, and (2) the court improperly granted the motions to strike with prejudice. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

• Posted in:
• Administrative Appeal Law,
• Freedom of Information Law,
• Recent Opinions,
• Tort Law

AC44547, AC44551 - Cohen v. Dept. of Energy & Environmental Protection ("In these related appeals, the plaintiff, Susan Cohen, in Docket No. AC 44547, and the intervening plaintiffs, the Harbor Management Commission of the Town of Greenwich (commission) and the town of Greenwich (town), in Docket No. AC 44551, appeal from the judgment of the Superior Court dismissing the plaintiff's administrative appeal from the final decision of the Deputy Commissioner of Energy and Environmental Protection (deputy commissioner) granting the application of the defendants Mark Marache and Marti Marache to construct a residential dock and pier. On appeal, both the plaintiff and the intervening plaintiffs claim that the court improperly concluded that General Statutes § 22a-113n did not authorize the commission to make recommendations that are binding on the named defendant, the Department of Energy and Environmental Protection (department), regarding applications for dock permits within the commission's jurisdiction. The plaintiff also claims that the court incorrectly determined (1) that the department applied the correct burdens of proof during the parties' administrative hearing, and (2) that there was substantial evidence in the record to support the department's determination that there were no feasible and prudent alternatives that would reduce the proposed dock's environmental impact. We affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.")

• Posted in:
• Administrative Appeal Law,
• Environmental Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC44284 - Clerk of the Common Council v. Freedom of Information Commission (Administrative appeals; alleged violations of Freedom of Information Act (§ 1-200 et seq.); "These consolidated appeals arise out of an investigation by the city of Middletown (city) into alleged improprieties by the former mayor and the city's subsequent refusal to provide unredacted records related to that investigation on the ground that the records were not subject to disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act (act), General Statutes § 1-200 et seq. The defendant Freedom of Information Commission (commission) appeals from the judgments of the Superior Court in Docket No. AC 44284, sustaining the appeal of the plaintiff, the Clerk of the Common Council for the city (clerk of the common council), and in Docket No. AC 44295, sustaining the appeal of the plaintiffs Sebastian Giuliano and Mary Bartolotta from the commission's decisions ordering disclosure of unredacted billing and email records, respectively, after rejecting the city's claims that the information at issue was either protected personnel or similar files or subject to the attorney-client privilege. In AC 44284, the commission claims that the court erred in (1) concluding that the attorney billing records were personnel or similar files pursuant to General Statutes § 1-210 (b) (2); (2) making a factual finding that the disclosure of the redacted information would constitute an invasion of personal privacy and was thus prohibited under § 1-210 (b) (2); and (3) concluding that certain information in attorney billing records was exempt from disclosure as privileged attorney-client communications pursuant to § 1-210 (b) (10). In AC 44295, the commission claims that the court erred in concluding that certain email communications also were privileged attorney-client communications protected under § 1-210 (b) (10). We agree with the commission except with respect to the issue of whether the invoices constitute personnel or similar files. Therefore, in AC 44284, we affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the court. In AC 44295, we reverse the judgment of the court.")

AC44295 - Giuliano v. Freedom of Information Commission (Administrative appeals; alleged violations of Freedom of Information Act (§ 1-200 et seq.); "These consolidated appeals arise out of an investigation by the city of Middletown (city) into alleged improprieties by the former mayor and the city's subsequent refusal to provide unredacted records related to that investigation on the ground that the records were not subject to disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act (act), General Statutes § 1-200 et seq. The defendant Freedom of Information Commission (commission) appeals from the judgments of the Superior Court in Docket No. AC 44284, sustaining the appeal of the plaintiff, the Clerk of the Common Council for the city (clerk of the common council), and in Docket No. AC 44295, sustaining the appeal of the plaintiffs Sebastian Giuliano and Mary Bartolotta from the commission's decisions ordering disclosure of unredacted billing and email records, respectively, after rejecting the city's claims that the information at issue was either protected personnel or similar files or subject to the attorney-client privilege. In AC 44284, the commission claims that the court erred in (1) concluding that the attorney billing records were personnel or similar files pursuant to General Statutes § 1-210 (b) (2); (2) making a factual finding that the disclosure of the redacted information would constitute an invasion of personal privacy and was thus prohibited under § 1-210 (b) (2); and (3) concluding that certain information in attorney billing records was exempt from disclosure as privileged attorney-client communications pursuant to § 1-210 (b) (10). In AC 44295, the commission claims that the court erred in concluding that certain email communications also were privileged attorney-client communications protected under § 1-210 (b) (10). We agree with the commission except with respect to the issue of whether the invoices constitute personnel or similar files. Therefore, in AC 44284, we affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the court. In AC 44295, we reverse the judgment of the court.")

• Posted in:
• Administrative Appeal Law,
• Freedom of Information Law

SC20696 - Board of Education v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities (A was a student with disabilities enrolled in the John C. Daniels Interdistrict Magnet School of International Communication (John Daniels), a public school located in New Haven. His father, M, filed a complaint with the named defendant, the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities (commission), alleging that the plaintiff, the Board of Education of the City of New Haven (board), had discriminated against A on the basis of his disabilities by unilaterally withdrawing him from the school. A human rights referee concluded that the board had discriminated against A on the basis of his disabilities and awarded damages of $25,000. The board appealed to the trial court, which dismissed the appeal. The board then filed this appeal, claiming that the trial court incorrectly determined that (1) the commission had subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate A's claim, pursuant to General Statutes § 46a-58 (a), that the board had violated the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.; (2) the commission had subject matter jurisdiction over A's claims when M failed to exhaust his administrative remedies pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq.; and (3) the issue of whether the referee had incorrectly concluded that a public school is a place of public accommodation for purposes of General Statutes § 46a-64 (a) was not reviewable. We reject the first two claims and conclude that the third claim is not reviewable. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's judgment.")

• Posted in:
• Administrative Appeal Law,
• Civil Rights,
• Recent Opinions

SC20570 - Vogue v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act (Unemployment Compensation; Whether defendant correctly determined that plaintiff was liable for unpaid unemployment compensation contributions because on-premises tattoo artist was employee under General Statutes § 31-222 (a) (1); "This certified appeal requires us to consider whether the Board of Review of the Employment Security Appeals Division (board) correctly determined that tattoo services are part of the usual course of business of a body art and piercing business for purposes of part B of the statutory ABC test; see General Statutes § 31-222 (a) (1) (B) (ii) (II); which is used to determine whether an individual is an employee for purposes of the Unemployment Compensation Act (act), § 31-222 et seq. The plaintiff, Vogue, which is a business that provides body piercing and body art services, appeals, upon our grant of its petition for certification, from the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the defendant, the Administrator of the Unemployment Compensation Act, that dismissed its appeal from the decision of the board. Vogue v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 202 Conn. App. 291, 314, 245 A.3d 464 (2021). On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the Appellate Court improperly upheld the trial court's determination that the board had not acted unreasonably or arbitrarily in holding the plaintiff liable for unpaid unemployment compensation contributions on the basis of its conclusion that the offering of tattoo services was within the plaintiff's usual course of business. We disagree with the plaintiff and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.")

• Posted in:
• Administrative Appeal Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC44075 - Costas v. Commissioner of Revenue Services ("The plaintiffs, John P. Costas and Barbara S. Costas, appeal from the summary judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of the defendant, the Commissioner of Revenue Services (commissioner), sustaining the commissioner's assessment of taxes against the plaintiffs with respect to certain stock options and restricted stock units granted to John P. Costas by his employer as compensation for services he performed both in this state and in New York. On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the court incorrectly concluded that the commissioner was entitled to summary judgment because the court (1) misinterpreted and misapplied the regulations at issue, namely, §§ 12-711(b)-17 and 12-711(b)-18 of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies, which govern the credit to which a Connecticut taxpayer is entitled for taxes paid to another state on compensation derived from the vesting of restricted stock and the exercise of nonqualified stock options (stock options), respectively, for services performed in both Connecticut and that other state, and (2) refused to require that the commissioner approve an alternate apportionment methodology with regard to the income attributable to Connecticut and New York for purposes of determining the amount of those tax credits pursuant to § 12-711(b)-15 of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies. We reject the plaintiffs' claims and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the court.")

• Posted in:
• Administrative Appeal Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC43877 - Oral Care Dental Group II, LLC v. Pallet (Administrative appeal; employment based sexual harassment and discrimination; "The defendant Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities (commission) appeals from the judgment of the trial court vacating the human rights referee's damages award for garden-variety emotional distress to the defendant Shanteema Pallet, in her sexual harassment complaint against the plaintiff, Oral Care Dental Group II, LLC. On appeal, the commission claims that the court erred when it vacated the damages award after concluding that the plaintiff was prejudiced by Pallet's failure to produce certain medical records. We agree with the commission and, accordingly, reverse in part the judgment of the trial court and remand the case to the trial court with direction to deny the plaintiff's administrative appeal.")

• Posted in:
• Administrative Appeal Law,
• Employment Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC41208 - One Elmcroft Stamford, LLC v. Zoning Board of Appeals ("This administrative appeal returns to us on remand from our Supreme Court. One Elmcroft Stamford, LLC v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 337 Conn. 806, 256 A.3d 151 (2021) (Elmcroft II). In One Elmcroft Stamford, LLC v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 192 Conn. App. 275, 283–89, 217 A.3d 1015 (2019) (Elmcroft I), rev'd, 337 Conn. 806, 256 A.3d 151 (2021), this court concluded, inter alia, that General Statutes (Rev. to 2003) § 14-55 had not been repealed and required the defendant Zoning Board of Appeals of the City of Stamford (board) to consider the suitability of the location in question as a prerequisite to the granting of a certificate of location approval in accordance with General Statutes § 14-54. Following its grant of certification to the defendants, Pisano Brothers Automotive, Inc., and Pasquale Pisano; see One Elmcroft Stamford, LLC v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 333 Conn. 936, 218 A.3d 594 (2019); the Supreme Court concluded, as a matter of law, that § 14-55 had been repealed by Public Acts 2003, No. 03-184, § 10. See One Elmcroft Stamford, LLC v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 337 Conn. 809–10. The court thus reversed the judgment of this court and remanded the matter to us with direction to consider the remaining claims of the plaintiff, One Elmcroft Stamford, LLC. See id., 826.

In accordance with that order, we now consider whether the Superior Court properly rejected the plaintiff's claims that the board (1) lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the application due to defective legal notice, (2) violated the plaintiff's right to fundamental fairness in administrative proceedings, (3) applied an improper legal standard in granting the certificate of location approval, and (4) failed to 'consider or distinguish' a prior denial of a certificate of approval application for the location in question. We affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the Superior Court.")

• AC41208 Concurrence & Dissent - One Elmcroft Stamford, LLC v. Zoning Board of Appeals

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• Administrative Appeal Law,
• Land Use Law,
• Recent Opinions