The mission of the Connecticut Judicial Branch is to serve the interests of justice and the public by resolving matters brought before it in a fair, timely, efficient and open manner.
Administrative Appeal Law

Administrative Appeal Appellate Court Opinions

   by Booth, George

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5169

AC44284 - Clerk of the Common Council v. Freedom of Information Commission (Administrative appeals; alleged violations of Freedom of Information Act (§ 1-200 et seq.); "These consolidated appeals arise out of an investigation by the city of Middletown (city) into alleged improprieties by the former mayor and the city's subsequent refusal to provide unredacted records related to that investigation on the ground that the records were not subject to disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act (act), General Statutes § 1-200 et seq. The defendant Freedom of Information Commission (commission) appeals from the judgments of the Superior Court in Docket No. AC 44284, sustaining the appeal of the plaintiff, the Clerk of the Common Council for the city (clerk of the common council), and in Docket No. AC 44295, sustaining the appeal of the plaintiffs Sebastian Giuliano and Mary Bartolotta from the commission's decisions ordering disclosure of unredacted billing and email records, respectively, after rejecting the city's claims that the information at issue was either protected personnel or similar files or subject to the attorney-client privilege. In AC 44284, the commission claims that the court erred in (1) concluding that the attorney billing records were personnel or similar files pursuant to General Statutes § 1-210 (b) (2); (2) making a factual finding that the disclosure of the redacted information would constitute an invasion of personal privacy and was thus prohibited under § 1-210 (b) (2); and (3) concluding that certain information in attorney billing records was exempt from disclosure as privileged attorney-client communications pursuant to § 1-210 (b) (10). In AC 44295, the commission claims that the court erred in concluding that certain email communications also were privileged attorney-client communications protected under § 1-210 (b) (10). We agree with the commission except with respect to the issue of whether the invoices constitute personnel or similar files. Therefore, in AC 44284, we affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the court. In AC 44295, we reverse the judgment of the court.")

AC44295 - Giuliano v. Freedom of Information Commission (Administrative appeals; alleged violations of Freedom of Information Act (§ 1-200 et seq.); "These consolidated appeals arise out of an investigation by the city of Middletown (city) into alleged improprieties by the former mayor and the city's subsequent refusal to provide unredacted records related to that investigation on the ground that the records were not subject to disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act (act), General Statutes § 1-200 et seq. The defendant Freedom of Information Commission (commission) appeals from the judgments of the Superior Court in Docket No. AC 44284, sustaining the appeal of the plaintiff, the Clerk of the Common Council for the city (clerk of the common council), and in Docket No. AC 44295, sustaining the appeal of the plaintiffs Sebastian Giuliano and Mary Bartolotta from the commission's decisions ordering disclosure of unredacted billing and email records, respectively, after rejecting the city's claims that the information at issue was either protected personnel or similar files or subject to the attorney-client privilege. In AC 44284, the commission claims that the court erred in (1) concluding that the attorney billing records were personnel or similar files pursuant to General Statutes § 1-210 (b) (2); (2) making a factual finding that the disclosure of the redacted information would constitute an invasion of personal privacy and was thus prohibited under § 1-210 (b) (2); and (3) concluding that certain information in attorney billing records was exempt from disclosure as privileged attorney-client communications pursuant to § 1-210 (b) (10). In AC 44295, the commission claims that the court erred in concluding that certain email communications also were privileged attorney-client communications protected under § 1-210 (b) (10). We agree with the commission except with respect to the issue of whether the invoices constitute personnel or similar files. Therefore, in AC 44284, we affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the court. In AC 44295, we reverse the judgment of the court.")


Administrative Appeal Law Supreme Court Opinion

   by Roy, Christopher

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5148

SC20696 - Board of Education v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities (A was a student with disabilities enrolled in the John C. Daniels Interdistrict Magnet School of International Communication (John Daniels), a public school located in New Haven. His father, M, filed a complaint with the named defendant, the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities (commission), alleging that the plaintiff, the Board of Education of the City of New Haven (board), had discriminated against A on the basis of his disabilities by unilaterally withdrawing him from the school. A human rights referee concluded that the board had discriminated against A on the basis of his disabilities and awarded damages of $25,000. The board appealed to the trial court, which dismissed the appeal. The board then filed this appeal, claiming that the trial court incorrectly determined that (1) the commission had subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate A's claim, pursuant to General Statutes § 46a-58 (a), that the board had violated the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.; (2) the commission had subject matter jurisdiction over A's claims when M failed to exhaust his administrative remedies pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq.; and (3) the issue of whether the referee had incorrectly concluded that a public school is a place of public accommodation for purposes of General Statutes § 46a-64 (a) was not reviewable. We reject the first two claims and conclude that the third claim is not reviewable. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's judgment.")


Administrative Appeal Appellate Court Opinion

   by Booth, George

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5108

SC20570 - Vogue v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act (Unemployment Compensation; Whether defendant correctly determined that plaintiff was liable for unpaid unemployment compensation contributions because on-premises tattoo artist was employee under General Statutes § 31-222 (a) (1); "This certified appeal requires us to consider whether the Board of Review of the Employment Security Appeals Division (board) correctly determined that tattoo services are part of the usual course of business of a body art and piercing business for purposes of part B of the statutory ABC test; see General Statutes § 31-222 (a) (1) (B) (ii) (II); which is used to determine whether an individual is an employee for purposes of the Unemployment Compensation Act (act), § 31-222 et seq. The plaintiff, Vogue, which is a business that provides body piercing and body art services, appeals, upon our grant of its petition for certification, from the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the defendant, the Administrator of the Unemployment Compensation Act, that dismissed its appeal from the decision of the board. Vogue v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 202 Conn. App. 291, 314, 245 A.3d 464 (2021). On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the Appellate Court improperly upheld the trial court's determination that the board had not acted unreasonably or arbitrarily in holding the plaintiff liable for unpaid unemployment compensation contributions on the basis of its conclusion that the offering of tattoo services was within the plaintiff's usual course of business. We disagree with the plaintiff and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.")


Administrative Appeal Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Roy, Christopher

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5069

AC44075 - Costas v. Commissioner of Revenue Services ("The plaintiffs, John P. Costas and Barbara S. Costas, appeal from the summary judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of the defendant, the Commissioner of Revenue Services (commissioner), sustaining the commissioner's assessment of taxes against the plaintiffs with respect to certain stock options and restricted stock units granted to John P. Costas by his employer as compensation for services he performed both in this state and in New York. On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the court incorrectly concluded that the commissioner was entitled to summary judgment because the court (1) misinterpreted and misapplied the regulations at issue, namely, §§ 12-711(b)-17 and 12-711(b)-18 of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies, which govern the credit to which a Connecticut taxpayer is entitled for taxes paid to another state on compensation derived from the vesting of restricted stock and the exercise of nonqualified stock options (stock options), respectively, for services performed in both Connecticut and that other state, and (2) refused to require that the commissioner approve an alternate apportionment methodology with regard to the income attributable to Connecticut and New York for purposes of determining the amount of those tax credits pursuant to § 12-711(b)-15 of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies. We reject the plaintiffs' claims and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the court.")


Administrative Appeal Appellate Court Opinion

   by Booth, George

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5036

AC43877 - Oral Care Dental Group II, LLC v. Pallet (Administrative appeal; employment based sexual harassment and discrimination; "The defendant Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities (commission) appeals from the judgment of the trial court vacating the human rights referee's damages award for garden-variety emotional distress to the defendant Shanteema Pallet, in her sexual harassment complaint against the plaintiff, Oral Care Dental Group II, LLC. On appeal, the commission claims that the court erred when it vacated the damages award after concluding that the plaintiff was prejudiced by Pallet's failure to produce certain medical records. We agree with the commission and, accordingly, reverse in part the judgment of the trial court and remand the case to the trial court with direction to deny the plaintiff's administrative appeal.")


Land Use Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Zigadto, Janet

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5026

AC41208 - One Elmcroft Stamford, LLC v. Zoning Board of Appeals ("This administrative appeal returns to us on remand from our Supreme Court. One Elmcroft Stamford, LLC v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 337 Conn. 806, 256 A.3d 151 (2021) (Elmcroft II). In One Elmcroft Stamford, LLC v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 192 Conn. App. 275, 283–89, 217 A.3d 1015 (2019) (Elmcroft I), rev'd, 337 Conn. 806, 256 A.3d 151 (2021), this court concluded, inter alia, that General Statutes (Rev. to 2003) § 14-55 had not been repealed and required the defendant Zoning Board of Appeals of the City of Stamford (board) to consider the suitability of the location in question as a prerequisite to the granting of a certificate of location approval in accordance with General Statutes § 14-54. Following its grant of certification to the defendants, Pisano Brothers Automotive, Inc., and Pasquale Pisano; see One Elmcroft Stamford, LLC v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 333 Conn. 936, 218 A.3d 594 (2019); the Supreme Court concluded, as a matter of law, that § 14-55 had been repealed by Public Acts 2003, No. 03-184, § 10. See One Elmcroft Stamford, LLC v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 337 Conn. 809–10. The court thus reversed the judgment of this court and remanded the matter to us with direction to consider the remaining claims of the plaintiff, One Elmcroft Stamford, LLC. See id., 826.

In accordance with that order, we now consider whether the Superior Court properly rejected the plaintiff's claims that the board (1) lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the application due to defective legal notice, (2) violated the plaintiff's right to fundamental fairness in administrative proceedings, (3) applied an improper legal standard in granting the certificate of location approval, and (4) failed to 'consider or distinguish' a prior denial of a certificate of approval application for the location in question. We affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the Superior Court.")

  • AC41208 Concurrence & Dissent - One Elmcroft Stamford, LLC v. Zoning Board of Appeals


Administrative Appeal Appellate Court Opinion

   by Booth, George

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5013

AC43937 - Sokolovsky v. Mulholland (Administrative appeal; discrimination; motion to dismiss; subject matter jurisdiction; claim that trial court erred in concluding that statutory (§ 46a-101) ninety day limitation period for commencing action in Superior Court pursuant to statute (§ 46a-100) was subject matter jurisdictional; "The self-represented plaintiff, Matvey Sokolovsky, appeals from the judgment of the trial court granting a motion to dismiss filed by the defendants, the town of East Lyme; William Mulholland, zoning official; and Mark C. Nickerson, first selectman. Although the plaintiff's claims on appeal are not a model of clarity, he appears to argue that the court erred by concluding that (1) the ninety day time limitation set forth in General Statutes § 46a-101 (e) for commencing an action in Superior Court pursuant to General Statutes § 46a-100 is subject matter jurisdictional, (2) his application for a waiver of fees did not commence the action, and (3) he was required to specially plead the continuing course of conduct doctrine in his complaint in order for the court to consider its effect on the limitation period. We conclude that the time limitation in § 46a-101 (e) is not subject matter jurisdictional but, rather, is mandatory and subject to consent, waiver, and equitable tolling. As a result, we reverse the judgment of the court and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.")


Employment Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Booth, George

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=4993

AC44570 - Board of Education v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities (Employment discrimination; whether trial court properly dismissed plaintiff's appeal and affirmed decision of defendant Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities; "The plaintiff, the Board of Education of the City of Waterbury, appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing its administrative appeal and affirming the decision of the named defendant, the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities (commission), which concluded that the plaintiff had discriminated against the defendant Cynthia Leonard on the basis of her physical disability by failing to interview and promote her. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that (1) the trial court improperly affirmed the commission's award of back pay because the award was not supported by substantial evidence and (2) the commission exceeded its statutory authority in awarding compensatory damages. We disagree with the plaintiff's first claim and decline to review the second claim because it is unpreserved. We, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.")


Administrative Appeal Appellate Court Opinion

   by Booth, George

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=4981

AC44331 - Idlibi v. State Dental Commission (Administrative appeal; appeal from decision of defendant State Dental Commission, which found that plaintiff failed to meet applicable standard of care; "The self-represented plaintiff, Ammar A. Idlibi, appeals from the judgment of the Superior Court dismissing his administrative appeal from the decision of the defendant, the Connecticut State Dental Commission (commission), finding that the plaintiff had failed to meet the applicable standard of care while treating a three year old patient and ordering disciplinary sanctions with respect to the plaintiff's dental license. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly dismissed his administrative appeal. Specifically, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly (1) determined that it was proper for the commission to rely on its own expertise in reaching its conclusion that he had breached the applicable standard of care by failing to obtain adequate informed consent; (2) concluded that the commission properly permitted certain expert testimony from a witness who was not board-certified and, as such, lacked knowledge as to the prevailing standard of care; (3) rejected his challenge to the commission's finding that he breached the standard of care by failing to obtain informed consent to place more than one stainless steel crown in the patient's mouth because (a) he did obtain informed consent and (b) the commission, in finding a deviation from the standard of care, acted in excess of its statutory authority; (4) determined that the evidence in the record supports the commission's finding that he failed to chart caries and decalcifications adequately in violation of the standard of care; (5) left unresolved inconsistences in the commission's decision; and (6) violated his right to fundamental fairness. The commission contends that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiff served his administrative appeal on the Department of Public Health (department) rather than on the commission. We affirm the judgment of the Superior Court dismissing the plaintiff's appeal.")


Administrative Appeal Appellate Court Opinion

   by Zigadto, Janet

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=4971

AC44061 - Middlebury v. Fraternal Order of Police, Middlebury Lodge No. 34 ("The plaintiff, the town of Middlebury (town), appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing the town's administrative appeal from the decision of the defendant State Board of Labor Relations (labor board). The labor board found that the town violated the Municipal Employee Relations Act (act), General Statutes § 7-467 et seq., by unilaterally changing an established past practice of including extra duty pay in the calculation of pensions for members of the defendant Fraternal Order of Police, Middlebury Lodge No. 34 (union), the union representing the town's police officers. On appeal, the town claims that the labor board improperly (1) concluded that it had jurisdiction over the union's prohibited practice complaint and (2) applied the incorrect standard for evaluating the town's contract defense to the unilateral change complaint. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.")


Administrative Appeal Supreme Court Opinion

   by Booth, George

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=4946

SC20580 - Stratford Police Dept. v. Board of Firearms Permit Examiners (Administrative Appeal; Statutory interpretation; Whether trial court improperly interpreted and applied General Statutes § 29-28 (b) (2) (b) to require statutory equivalency test for out-of-state misdemeanor convictions; Whether trial court improperly substituted its judgment for judgment of Board of Firearms Permit Examiners; "General Statutes § 29-28 (b) prohibits the issuance of a permit to carry a pistol or revolver if the applicant has been convicted of a felony or certain enumerated offenses under the Connecticut General Statutes but contains no language prohibiting the issuance of a permit on the basis of out-of-state, nonfelony convictions. See General Statutes § 29-28 (b) (2). The applicant in the present case had been convicted in New York of a misdemeanor crime that, had it been committed in Connecticut, would have been among the enumerated offenses precluding him from obtaining a permit. In this appeal, we must decide whether § 29-28 (b) prohibits the issuance of a permit for a pistol or a revolver to an applicant under these circumstances. In light of the fact that the legislature has previously used explicit language in other Connecticut statutes to incorporate equivalent out-of-state convictions, we conclude that the absence of such language in § 29-28 (b) (2) (B) indicates that the legislature intended only for the enumerated Connecticut offenses to operate as a per se bar to obtaining a state pistol permit.

The defendant Anthony Leo, appeals from the judgment of the trial court, which reversed the decision of the named defendant, the Board of Firearms Permit Examiners, ordering the issuance of a pistol permit to the defendant. On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court erroneously read § 29-28 (b) (2) (B) to include extraterritorial misdemeanor convictions, in contravention of the statute's clear language and enumeration of specific offenses that constitute a per se bar to obtaining a pistol permit in Connecticut. The defendant also claims that the trial court improperly substituted its own judgment for the board's judgment when it overturned the board's determination that the defendant was of suitable character to obtain a pistol permit. We agree with the defendant and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the trial court.")


Land Use Law Supreme and Appellate Court Opinions

   by Zigadto, Janet

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=4888

SC20595 - High Ridge Real Estate Owner, LLC v. Board of Representatives ("The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the defendant, the Board of Representatives of the City of Stamford (board of representatives), properly considered a protest petition that opposed zoning amendments approved by the Zoning Board of the City of Stamford (zoning board). The plaintiff, High Ridge Real Estate Owner, LLC, filed an application with the zoning board to amend the zoning regulations of the city of Stamford (city). The zoning board approved the zoning amendment. Thereafter, local property owners filed a protest petition pursuant to § C6-40-9 of the Stamford Charter (charter), which opposed the amendment. The board of representatives determined that the protest petition was valid and, thereafter, considered and rejected the amendment. The plaintiff appealed from the decision of the board of representatives to the trial court, claiming that the board of representatives did not have the authority to consider whether the protest petition was valid, and asserting that the petition was not valid because it did not contain the signatures of 'at least [300] landowners' anywhere in the city, as required by § C6-40-9. The trial court sustained the plaintiff's appeal. Although we conclude that the board of representatives did not have the authority to determine the validity of the protest petition, we conclude that it was a valid petition because it contained the requisite number of signatures. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court sustaining the plaintiff's appeal and remand the case to that court to determine whether the board of representatives properly rejected the amendment.")

  • SC20595 Concurrence - High Ridge Real Estate Owner, LLC v. Board of Representatives

SC20578 - Strand/BRC Group, LLC v. Board of Representatives ("The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the defendant, the Board of Representatives of the City of Stamford (board of representatives), had the authority to approve a protest petition that objected to master plan amendments approved by the Planning Board of the City of Stamford (planning board). The plaintiffs, The Strand/BRC Group, LLC, 5-9 Woodland, LLC, Woodland Pacific, LLC, and Walter Wheeler Drive SPE, LLC, filed an application with the planning board to amend the master plan of the city of Stamford (city). Shortly afterward, the planning board filed its own application to amend the city's master plan. After the planning board approved both applications with some modifications, local property owners filed a protest petition under § C6-30-7 of the Stamford Charter (charter). The board of representatives determined that the protest petition was valid and rejected the planning board's approval of the amendments. The plaintiffs appealed from the decision of the board of representatives to the trial court, which sustained the plaintiffs' appeal. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

  • SC20578 Dissent - Strand/BRC Group, LLC v. Board of Representatives

AC43209 - Newtown v. Gaydosh ("The defendants, Gary Gaydosh, Barbara Gaydosh, and Justin Gaydosh, appeal from the judgment of the trial court granting the motion for contempt filed by the plaintiffs, the town of Newtown (town) and its zoning enforcement officer, Gary Frenette, for the defendants' alleged violation of a stipulated judgment entered into by the plaintiffs and the defendants and rendered by the court to remedy zoning violations on the defendants' property. On appeal, the defendants claim that (1) the court's finding that they had violated the terms of the judgment was not supported by the evidence and (2) the court abused its discretion with respect to the sanctions imposed as a result of its finding of contempt. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")


Employment Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Roy, Christopher

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=4890

AC43891 - Dept. of Public Health v. Estrada ("This appeal arises out of an alleged whistleblower retaliation action filed by the defendant Juanita Estrada in which a human rights referee (referee) from the Office of Public Hearings (office of public hearings) of the defendant Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities (commission) concluded that Estrada made a protected whistleblower disclosure pursuant to General Statutes § 4-61dd. Thereafter, the Superior Court sustained the appeal of the plaintiff, the Department of Public Health (department), concluding that Estrada’s disclosure to her supervisor was not a whistleblower disclosure under § 4-61dd, that Estrada failed to establish a causal connection between any alleged whistleblower disclosure and the complained of personnel actions, and that the commission lacked subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate Estrada’s complaint because she had brought the same adverse personnel actions at issue through the grievance procedures in her collective bargaining agreement. On appeal, the commission claims that the court erred (1) in concluding that the commission lacked subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate Estrada’s complaint, (2) in concluding that Estrada did not make a protected whistleblower disclosure pursuant to § 4-61dd, (3) in concluding that Estrada failed to establish a causal connection between the alleged disclosure and the adverse personnel actions, and (4) by failing to apply the proper standard of review in its analysis of the administrative decision. We agree with the commission that the court improperly determined that the commission lacked subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate Estrada’s whistleblower retaliation complaint. We determine, however, that the court properly concluded that Estrada did not make a protected whistleblower disclosure pursuant to § 4-61dd and that the court applied the proper standard of review in making this determination. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court.")


Administrative Appeal Appellate Court Opinion

   by Booth, George

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=4863

AC43519 - O'Rourke v. Dept. of Labor (Administrative appeal; labor law; "In this administrative appeal, the plaintiff, Joan O'Rourke, appeals from the decision of the Superior Court, affirming the dismissal of her hybrid action against the defendant AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Council 4, Local 2663 (union) and the defendant Department of Children and Families (department) by the Department of Labor, State Board of Labor Relations (board), a codefendant in this case. Following the termination of the plaintiff's employment with the department, the union filed a grievance on her behalf and represented her in an arbitration proceeding. After the arbitrator determined that the department had just cause to terminate the plaintiff's employment, the plaintiff filed a complaint with the board and, ultimately, appealed the decision of the board to the Superior Court. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the Superior Court improperly determined that substantial evidence supported the findings of the board and that the board reasonably concluded that the plaintiff had failed to establish that the union breached its duty of fair representation. The plaintiff specifically contends that the union breached its duty of fair representation because it failed to make two particular legal arguments to the arbitrator. We affirm the decision of the Superior Court.")


Administrative Appeal Supreme Court Slip Opinion

   by Booth, George

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=4853

SC20560 - 1st Alliance Lending, LLC v. Dept. of Banking (Administrative appeal; Mortgage lender license revocation; whether defendant had statutory discretion to suspend plaintiff's license and, if so, whether defendant actually and lawfully exercised that discretion; whether defendant was estopped from suspending plaintiff's license; "This appeal requires us to consider, for the first time, the statutory scheme governing the suspension and revocation of a mortgage lender's license. The plaintiff, 1st Alliance Lending, LLC, appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing its appeal from the decision of the defendant Jorge Perez, the commissioner of banking, revoking the plaintiff's license to serve as a mortgage lender in the state. The principal issue on appeal is whether General Statutes § 36a-492 and the relevant statutory scheme granted the commissioner the legal authority to suspend and revoke the plaintiff's mortgage lender license. We conclude that they did and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.")


Employment Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Roy, Christopher

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=4838

AC44266 - Shelton v. State Board of Labor Relations ("The defendant State Board of Labor Relations (board) appeals from the judgment of the Superior Court sustaining the appeal of the plaintiff, the city of Shelton, from the decision of the board in favor of the defendant Shelton Police Union, Inc. (union). On appeal, the board claims that the court improperly concluded that the board's decision was erroneous as a matter of law and predicated on factual findings that were not supported by the record. We affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.")


Administrative Appeal Appellate Court Opinions

   by Agati, Taryn

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=4833

AC44189 - Glanz v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles ("The plaintiff, Adam Glanz, appeals from the judgment of the Superior Court rendered in favor of the defendant, the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles (commissioner), dismissing his appeal from the decision of the commissioner suspending his motor vehicle operator's license for forty-five days, pursuant to General Statutes § 14-227b, and requiring ignition interlock devices in his motor vehicles for six months. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that (1) the presumption in § 14-227b (g) that the results of blood alcohol tests commenced within two hours of operation shall be sufficient to indicate blood alcohol content at the time of operation violates his right to due process under the federal constitution because it does not include an exception requiring the submission of additional evidence to prove the accuracy of the blood alcohol test results in the event that such test results reveal that the operator's blood alcohol level was rising, and (2) the court erred in concluding that the rising blood alcohol exception in the criminal statute for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs, General Statutes § 14-227a (b), did not apply to his administrative license suspension hearing. We affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.")

AC43317 - Lucky 13 Industries, LLC v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles ("This administrative appeal arises from a complaint filed with the Department of Motor Vehicles (department), alleging that the plaintiff, Lucky 13 Industries, LLC, doing business as Midnight Auto, charged an illegal "gate fee" for the release of a vehicle following a nonconsensual tow to its place of business. The plaintiff appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing its appeal from the decision of the defendant, the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles (commissioner), concluding that the plaintiff had charged an unlawful gate fee and ordering the plaintiff to make restitution to the complainant, Amica Insurance Company (Amica), and to pay a civil penalty to the department. On appeal to this court, the plaintiff claims that federal law preempts state regulation of gate fees charged pursuant to a voluntary agreement.The plaintiff additionally claims that the trial court improperly concluded that (1) the tow at issue was nonconsensual notwithstanding that the plaintiff and Amica's subcontractor executed a contract providing that the plaintiff would perform an "expedited service" when retrieving the vehicle for release and (2) the contract was void as against public policy. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")


Administrative Appeal Supreme Court Slip Opinion

   by Booth, George

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=4829

SC20532 - Crandle v. Connecticut State Employees Retirement Commission (Administrative appeal; whether determination by State Employees Retirement Commission concerning date on which disability retirement benefits become payable was proper; "The principal issue in this appeal is whether the State Employees Retirement Act (act), General Statutes § 5-152 et seq., requires the state to commence payment of state employee disability retirement benefits on the day after the employee's last day of paid employment or, instead, the act permits the payment of such benefits to start on the first day of the month after receipt of the employee disability retirement application. The plaintiffs, Catherine Crandle and Ronald Robinson, who are former state employees, appeal from the judgment of the trial court dismissing their administrative appeal from the declaratory ruling of the defendant, the Connecticut State Employees Retirement Commission (commission). On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the trial court improperly upheld the commission's declaratory ruling that, under various provisions of the act, disability retirement benefit payments commence on the first day of the month following receipt by the Retirement Services Division (division) of the employee's application for such benefits. The plaintiffs contend that the trial court improperly (1) deferred to the commission's interpretation of the act because that interpretation is neither reasonable nor time-tested, and (2) failed to consider that the commission, as a fiduciary of members of the State Employees Retirement System (SERS), had the burden of proving fair dealing by clear and convincing evidence. We disagree with these claims. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.")


Administrative Appeal Appellate Court Opinion

   by Booth, George

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=4823

AC43834 - Nutmeg State Crematorium, LLC v. Dept. of Energy & Environmental Protection (Administrative appeal; "The plaintiffs, Luke DiMaria and Nutmeg State Crematorium, LLC, appeal from the judgment of the Superior Court dismissing their administrative appeal from the decision of the Commissioner of Energy and Environmental Protection (commissioner), denying the plaintiffs' applications for two new source review air permits (air permits), which had been submitted by the plaintiffs to the defendant Department of Energy and Environmental Protection (department). On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the trial court erred by (1) concluding that the plaintiffs' cremation system exceeded the maximum allowable stack concentration (MASC) for mercury, (2) interpreting improperly the term "ambient air" to mean all atmosphere external to buildings, (3) adjudicating issues not raised in the administrative appeal, and (4) violating binding legal precedent and General Statutes § 4-183 (j). We affirm the judgment of the court dismissing the plaintiffs' appeal.")


Administrative Appeal Supreme Court Slip Opinion

   by Booth, George

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=4818

SC20538 - Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities v. Edge Fitness, LLC (Sex Discrimination; Whether Women Only Workout Area in Gym Amounted to Sex Discrimination Prohibited by General Statutes § 46a-64; Whether Trial Court Properly Found Activity Exempt. "This appeal presents a significant question of first impression with respect to whether the Public Accommodation Act, General Statutes § 46a-64, contains an implied customer gender privacy exception to its general prohibition against sex based discrimination. The plaintiff, the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities (commission), appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing its administrative appeal from the decision of the commission's human rights referee (referee), who found that the defendants Edge Fitness, LLC (Edge Fitness) and Club Camel, Inc., Bloomfield, doing business as Club Fitness (Club Fitness), did not engage in discriminatory public accommodations practices. On appeal, the commission claims that the trial court incorrectly concluded that women's only workout areas in otherwise public gyms did not violate § 46a-64 because that statute contains an implied customer gender privacy exception. We conclude that the exceptions to the general prohibition against discrimination on the basis of sex in public accommodations are limited to those expressly provided by the plain language of § 46a-64 and, therefore, that there is no implied customer gender privacy exception to the statute. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.")