The mission of the Connecticut Judicial Branch is to serve the interests of justice and the public by resolving matters brought before it in a fair, timely, efficient and open manner.






Workers' Compensation Supreme Court Opinion

   by Townsend, Karen

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=45

SC19377- Gonzalez v. O. & G. Industries, Inc. (Worker's Compensation; paid compensation benefits; "On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the trial court improperly concluded that the defendant had ‘paid compensation benefits’ on the basis of an incorrect interpretation of that term as used in § 31-291. We agree with the plaintiffs’ claim that the trial court improperly interpreted the term ‘paid compensation benefits’ in § 31-291, but further conclude that, even under the proper construction of the statute, no genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the defendant paid compensation benefits to Thompson and McVay. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.")


Land Use Appellate Court Opinion

   by Janet Zigadto

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=43

AC37732 - Kobyluck Bros., LLC v. Planning & Zoning Commission ("The plaintiffs . . . appeal from the judgment of the trial court affirming the decision of the defendant . . . denying the plaintiffs' special permit and site plan application. The plaintiffs claim that the court incorrectly interpreted the term 'manufacturing' as used in the Waterford Zoning Regulations (regulations) to preclude the production of construction aggregate. We agree, and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the trial court.")





Criminal Law Supreme and Appellate Court Opinions

   by Booth, George

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=42

SC19378 - State v. Francis (Motion to correct allegedly illegal sentence imposed for murder conviction; statutory (§ 51-296 [a]) right to counsel in connection with motion to correct; "The state appeals from the judgment of the Appellate Court, which reversed the trial court's denial of the request of the defendant, Ernest Francis, for the appointment of counsel to represent him in connection with the filing of a motion to correct an illegal sentence arising out of his 1992 conviction of murder. In State v. Casiano, 282 Conn. 614, 627–28, 922 A.2d 1065 (2007), this court determined that, pursuant to General Statutes § 51-296 (a), an indigent defendant has a right to the appointment of counsel for the purpose of determining whether a sound basis exists for him to file a motion to correct an illegal sentence, and, if such a basis is determined to exist, he also has the right to counsel for the purpose of pursuing the motion to its conclusion. On appeal, the state claims that the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that the trial court was required to follow the procedure set forth in Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 18 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1967), before it properly could deny the defendant's request for the appointment of counsel on the ground that no sound basis existed for him to file a motion to correct. We conclude that the Anders procedure is not strictly required to safeguard the defendant's statutory right to counsel in the context of a motion to correct an illegal sentence. We further conclude, however, that the trial court improperly failed to appoint counsel to assist the defendant in determining whether there was a sound basis for him to file such a motion. Because we also conclude that this error was harmful to the defendant, the case must be remanded to the trial court so that counsel may be appointed to represent the defendant in accordance with the dictates of Casiano.")

SC19411 - State v. Wright (Murder; "This certified appeal requires us to consider a defendant's rights and obligations when he seeks to advance a theory of defense that the police investigation into the crime with which he was charged was inadequate. The state appeals from the judgment of the Appellate Court, which reversed the judgment of conviction of the defendant, Billy Ray Wright, of murder and remanded the case for a new trial. The Appellate Court held that the trial court violated the defendant's right to a fair trial by limiting his cross-examination of the investigating police officers as to whether the murder investigation conformed to general police practices and/or standard police investigative procedures. State v. Wright, 152 Conn. App. 260, 269, 96 A.3d 638 (2014). We conclude that, in the absence of a sufficient offer of proof regarding this line of questioning, the trial court's rulings limiting cross-examination to the adequacy of the investigation at hand cannot be deemed improper. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.")

AC35949 - State v. Porter (Assault of public safety personal; interfering with officer; "The defendant, Kenneth Porter, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of assault of public safety personnel in violation of General Statutes § 53a-167c (a) (1) and interfering with an officer in violation of General Statutes § 53a-167a. The defendant claims that (1) his conviction of both assault of an officer and interfering with an officer violated the protection of the federal constitution against double jeopardy, and (2) the court erred in denying his request to instruct the jury that interfering with an officer is a lesser included offense of assault of an officer. We disagree.")

AC36656 - State v. Gonzalez (Sexual assault in cohabiting relationship; assault; criminal violation of protective order; "The defendant, Juan Carlos Gonzalez, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of two counts of sexual assault in a cohabiting relationship in violation of General Statutes § 53a-70b, one count of assault in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-60 (a) (2), and two counts of criminal violation of a protective order in violation of General Statutes § 53a-223. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court abused its discretion by (1) denying his motion for a mistrial, (2) ordering him to wear shackles throughout the trial except when testifying, and (3) admitting evidence of his prior uncharged misconduct. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of conviction.")

AC37022 - State v. Harper (Criminal trespass in third degree; possession of less than one-half ounce of marijuana; "The defendant, William Conway Harper, appeals from the judgment of conviction rendered against him after a court trial on charges of criminal trespass in the third degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-109 (a) and possession of less than one-half ounce of marijuana in violation of General Statutes § 21a-279a (a). On appeal, the defendant claims (1) that the evidence was insufficient to support either of his challenged convictions and (2) that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the marijuana seized from a vehicle in which he was a passenger upon which the latter conviction was based. We reverse the defendant's conviction for criminal trespass in the third degree on the ground of insufficient evidence, but affirm his conviction for possession of marijuana upon concluding that the evidence at trial was sufficient to support that conviction and that the court properly denied his motion to suppress.")

AC37676 - State v. West (Assault of public safety official; interfering with officer; breach of peace; "The defendant, Devonte West, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, on one count of assault on a public safety officer in violation of General Statutes § 53a-167c (a) (5), one count of interfering with an officer in violation of General Statutes § 53a-167a, and one count of breach of the peace in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-181 (a) (1). On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court erred when it (1) failed to charge the jury on the quality of the police investigation, and (2) implied at sentencing that it was penalizing the defendant for asserting his constitutional right to stand trial. We disagree and, therefore, affirm the judgment of the court.")


Habeas Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Townsend, Karen

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=41

AC36971- Jamison v. Commissioner of Correction (Habeas; "On appeal, the petitioner claims that the habeas court improperly concluded that he was not deprived of the effective assistance of trial counsel and appellate counsel. Specifically, he claims that the court erroneously determined that (1) 'there was no prejudice in trial counsel’s failure to properly challenge the introduction of a ‘stick’ which was used by the state to prove the element of a deadly weapon at the criminal trial,' and (2) 'appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the sufficiency of the ‘stick.’ ' We affirm the judgment of the habeas court.")


Tort Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Roy, Christopher

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=40

AC37436 - Guzman v. Yeroz ("The defendant Zeynullah Yeroz appeals from the trial court’s denial of his motion to open the judgment, rendered after a hearing in damages, awarding the plaintiff, Juan Guzman, compensatory and statutory damages for personal injuries that Guzman suffered while employed in a pizza restaurant owned and operated by the defendant. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")


Foreclosure Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Roy, Christopher

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=39

AC37896 - Bank of America, N.A. v. Aubut ("In this residential foreclosure action, the defendants, David Aubut and Karen Aubut, appeal following the trial court’s judgment of strict foreclosure rendered in favor of the substitute plaintiff, Nationstar Mortgage, LLC. On appeal, the defendants claim that the court erred in rendering summary judgment as to liability only in favor of the substitute plaintiff because: (1) the court improperly concluded that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether Karen Aubut was provided with preacceleration notice of default in the manner required by the terms of the mortgage; (2) the court improperly accepted an affidavit submitted in support of the substitute plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment; and (3) the court improperly concluded as a matter of law that the defendants could not prevail with respect to their special defenses. We agree, in part, with the defendants’ third claim. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.")


Definitions: Felony, Misdemeanor, Offense, and Infraction

   by Roy, Christopher

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=34

These terms come from the General Statutes of Connecticut:

Felony (General Statutes § 53a-25): An offense for which a person may be sentenced to a term of imprisonment in excess of one year is a felony.

Misdemeanor (General Statutes § 53a-26): An offense for which a person may be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not more than one year is a misdemeanor.

Further…

Offense (General Statutes § 53a-24): The term "offense" means any crime or violation which constitutes a breach of any law of this state or any other state, federal law or local law or ordinance of a political subdivision of this state, for which a sentence to a term of imprisonment or to a fine, or both, may be imposed, except one that defines a motor vehicle violation or is deemed to be an infraction. The term "crime" comprises felonies and misdemeanors. Every offense which is not a "crime" is a "violation". Conviction of a violation shall not give rise to any disability or legal disadvantage based on conviction of a criminal offense.

Infraction (General Statutes Chapter 881b): An infraction is a breach of a state law, regulation or local ordinance so designated by the Legislature, for which an appearance in court is usually not required and payment of the amount due by mail or in person is authorized pursuant to C.G.S. § 51-164n. An infraction is neither a crime nor an offense as defined in the penal code. [Source: https://www.jud.ct.gov/webforms/forms/infractions.pdf]

For a case explaining the four categories of illegal acts, see State v. Menditto, 315 Conn. 861, 110 A. 3d 410 (2015). "Further It is clear, then, that by 1993 the legislature had reclassified illegal acts into four new categories: (1) crimes; (2) major violations, which are deemed to be offenses and for which the maximum penalty is typically a fine of more than $500; (3) minor civil violations, which typically carry a maximum penalty of no more than a $500 fine; and (4) infractions. See General Statutes (Rev. to 1993) § 53a-24."

For more information, see our Law about Criminal Penalties and Law about Criminal Records pages.


Juvenile Law Supreme and Appellate Court Opinions

   by Roy, Christopher

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=33

Connecticut Supreme Court

SC19643, SC19644 - In re Egypt E. ("The respondent father, Morsy E., and the respondent mother, Natasha E., filed separate appeals from the judgments of the trial court terminating their parental rights as to their minor children, Egypt E. and Mariam E. On appeal, the respondents claim that the trial court improperly terminated their parental rights to their minor children pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 2013) § 17a-112 (j). As a threshold matter, the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and Families, asserts that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear the respondents' appeals because the respondents did not appeal from the judgments of the trial court terminating their rights as to their minor children on the ground that reunification efforts were not required under General Statutes (Rev. to 2013) §§ 17a-112 (j) and 17a-111b (b). After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that, due to a clerical error at the trial court, the record is not sufficiently clear to determine whether the respondents were properly notified of the basis of the trial court's judgments such that they could properly appeal from its determination that the petitioner was not required to make reunification efforts pursuant to §§ 17a-112 (j) and 17a-111b (b). Accordingly, because the clerical error at the trial court implicates both the integrity of the trial court's record keeping and the due process rights of the respondents to appeal from the judgments of the trial court terminating their parental rights, we must remand the matter for a new trial.")

Connecticut Appellate Court

AC38541 - In re Carla C. (Termination of parental rights; "In this appeal from the termination of the parental rights of the respondent father, Carlos C., the dispositive issues are (1) whether a parent's involvement in a crime before the birth of his child may be an act of parental commission or omission forming the basis for termination of his parental rights pursuant to General Statutes § 45a-717 (g) (2) (B), and (2) whether a court may find that no ongoing parent-child relationship exists, pursuant to § 45a-717 (g) (2) (C), when a custodial parent's conduct has contributed significantly to the establishment of that ground for termination. We agree with the respondent that his commission of a crime before the birth of the child in this case, Carla C. (Carla), is not a parental act of commission or omission, as that basis for termination properly is understood. We also agree with the respondent that when a custodial parent has interfered with an incarcerated parent's visitation and other efforts to maintain an ongoing parent-child relationship with the parties' child, the custodial parent cannot terminate the noncustodial parent's parental rights on the ground of no ongoing parent-child relationship. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court granting the petition of the petitioner mother, Glenda G., for termination of the respondent's parental rights as to Carla.")

AC38665 - In re David B. (Termination of parental rights; appeal from Probate Court; trial de novo; "The sole issue raised in the present appeal is whether the trial court, in adjudicating a petition to terminate parental rights originating in Probate Court, had the authority, following the death of the original petitioner and legal guardian of the minor child during the pendency of the proceedings, to grant a motion to substitute the child's newly appointed legal guardian as the petitioner in place of the decedent. We conclude that, under the unique set of circumstances presented here, such a substitution was both legally permissible and appropriate given that the newly appointed legal guardian is authorized to bring the termination action herself.")


Connecticut Business Law Titles in Our Law Libraries

   by Roy, Christopher

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=32

Below are some of our Connecticut treatises, guides, and form books on business law that each of our law libraries own.

  • Connecticut Business Litigation, by Finn & Cedillo (2013)
  • Connecticut Corporation Law & Practice 2d, by Ford (Regularly Updated)
  • Connecticut Limited Liability Company, by Convincer (Regularly Updated)
  • Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act, CT Practice Series, v.12, by Langer (Regularly Updated)
  • Library of Connecticut Civil Complaints for Business Litigation (2010)
  • A Practical Guide to Organizing a Business in CT, edited by Seigel (2013)


Civil Procedure Research Guides

   by Roy, Christopher

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=31

The Connecticut Judicial Branch Law Libraries have a number of civil procedure research guides. These research guides link to relevant case law, court rules, and statutes. Each guide also lists available materials in our law libraries. A list of civil procedure guides is below:


Freedom of Information Supreme and Appellate Court Opinions

   by Mazur, Catherine

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=184

July 2009 - June 2016 (reverse chronological order)

SC19593, SC19594 - People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Freedom of Information Commission ("In these appeals, we must determine the standard of review that applies to a determination that public records are exempt from the disclosure provisions of the Freedom of Information Act (act), General Statutes § 1-200 et seq., pursuant to General Statutes § 1-210 (b) (19), because there are reasonable grounds to believe that their disclosure may result in a safety risk. The plaintiff, People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc., submitted a freedom of information request to the defendant University of Connecticut Health Center (Health Center), requesting copies of all correspondence between the Health Center and the National Institutes of Health regarding potential noncompliance with federal animal welfare guidelines. The Health Center produced the requested documents but redacted the names of the individuals who had violated federal protocols and grant identification numbers that would make it possible to identify those individuals. The plaintiff then filed a complaint against the Health Center with the named defendant, the Freedom of Information Commission (commission). While the complaint was pending, the Health Center requested a safety risk determination from the defendant Commissioner of the Department of Administrative Services (department) pursuant to § 1-210 (b) (19) and (d). The department determined that there were 'reasonable grounds to believe that [the] disclosure of this [redacted] material may result in a safety risk to persons or property' and directed the Health Center to withhold the redacted information. The commission upheld this determination. The plaintiff appealed from the commission's decision to the trial court, which sustained the appeal and ordered the Health Center to disclose the redacted information. The Health Center and the department then brought separate appeals, claiming that the trial court incorrectly determined that the commission had applied the wrong standard of review when it sustained the plaintiff's appeal. We agree with the Health Center and the department that the commission applied the proper standard of review. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court. We further conclude that the case should be remanded to that court so that it may decide whether the commission, upon application of the proper standard of review, properly upheld the determination of the department. ")

AC36821 - Burton v. Freedom of Information Commission ("The sole issue in this appeal is whether the plaintiff...had standing to appeal from a decision of the Freedom of Information Commission (commission) declining to impose a civil penalty against the defendant.... We conclude that the plaintiff lacked standing and affirm the trial court's judgment dismissing the appeal.")

SC19452 - Lieberman v. Aronow ("The primary issue in this appeal is whether two reports (reports) relating to the resolution of a formal grievance alleging misconduct against a state university faculty member fall within the exemption from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act (act), General Statutes § 1-200 et seq., created by General Statutes § 10a-154a. The plaintiff, Jay R. Lieberman, the chairman of the orthopedic surgery department at the defendant University of Connecticut Health Center (health center), appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing his appeal from the final decision of the defendant Freedom of Information Commission (commission). The commission concluded that the reports do not constitute a 'record of the performance and evaluation' within the meaning of § 10a-154a and that, therefore, the health center was required to disclose the reports pursuant to a request by the defendant Michael Aronow, an orthopedic surgeon at the health center.


On appeal, Lieberman claims, inter alia, that the trial court improperly interpreted the language and legislative history of § 10a-154a. Aronow and the commission contend that the trial court properly concluded that the reports do not constitute a 'record of the performance and evaluation' of a faculty member under § 10a-154a. We agree with Aronow and the commission and conclude that the reports at issue in this appeal do not fall within the exemption from disclosure contained in § 10a-154a. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court dismissing Lieberman's appeal from the commission's decision.")

SC19371 - Freedom of Information Officer, Dept. of Mental Health & Addiction Services v. Freedom of Information Commission ("The present case arises from the ruling of the named defendant...that the defendant Ron Robillard was entitled to the disclosure of documents in the possession of the plaintiffs, the Department of Mental Health and Addiction Services (department) and its Freedom of Information Officer (information officer), under the Freedom of Information Act (act), General Statutes § 1-200 et seq. The commission appeals from the judgment of the trial court, claiming, inter alia, that the plaintiffs lacked standing to appeal to the trial court from the commission's decision. The plaintiffs cross appealed from the judgment of the trial court, claiming, inter alia, that the trial court improperly rejected the plaintiffs' claim that the documents were medical records related to the diagnosis and treatment of a patient and were, thus, psychiatric records exempt from disclosure pursuant to General Statutes § 52-146e. We conclude that the plaintiffs had standing to appeal the decision of the commission, and further agree with the plaintiffs that the documents at issue are exempt from disclosure under § 52-146e. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case to that court with direction to sustain the plaintiffs' appeal.")

  • SC19371 Concurrence - Freedom of Information Officer, Dept. of Mental Health & Addiction Services v. Freedom of Information Commission

AC36436 - Peruta v. Freedom of Information Commission (Administrative appeal; appeal from decision of defendant Freedom of Information Commission dismissing complaint; "The plaintiffs, Edward A. Peruta and American News and Information Services, Inc., appeal from the judgment of the trial court affirming the decision of the defendant Freedom of Information Commission (commission) that dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint. The plaintiffs had filed a complaint with the commission claiming that the Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection (department) improperly denied them access to information contained in pending applications for temporary state permits to carry pistols or revolvers. On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the court erroneously construed General Statutes § 29-28 when it concluded that the names and addresses of those applicants were exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act (act), General Statutes § 1-200 et seq. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

AC36114 - Emerick v. Freedom of Information Commission ("The plaintiff...appeals
from the judgment of the trial court dismissing his administrative appeal from the decision of the defendant Freedom of Information Commission (commission). The plaintiff had filed a complaint with the commission claiming that the defendant Department of Public Health (department) improperly had denied him access to certain public records. We conclude that the court properly determined that the plaintiff’s appeal of the commission’s decision was untimely and, accordingly, properly dismissed the appeal. ")

SC19263, SC19264 Planning & Zoning Commission v. Freedom of Information Commission ("Connecticut’s Freedom of Information Act (act) allows public agencies to convene executive sessions, as an exception to the general rule that meetings must be open to the public, to discuss ‘strategy and negotiations with respect to pending claims or pending litigation to which the public agency...is a party....’ General Statutes § 1-200 (6) (B). The dispositive issue in these appeals is whether an executive session held by the named plaintiff...fell within the purview of the act’s ‘pending claims or pending litigation’ exception. The named defendant...initially determined that the zoning commission’s executive session was unlawful under the act. The zoning commission appealed from the FOIC’s decision to the trial court, which reversed the FOIC’s decision, concluding that the zoning commission’s executive session was permissible under the act’s pending claims or pending litigation exception. The FOIC now appeals from the judgment of the trial court, claiming that the executive session violated the act. The defendant...and its principal officers...who were seeking approval of a zoning permit extension by the zoning commission when it convened the executive session in question, also appeal from the judgment of the trial court, claiming that the executive session was unlawful. We conclude that the zoning commission’s executive session was not justified under the pending claims or pending litigation exception of the act and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the trial court.")

SC18966 - Gould v. Freedom of Information Commission ("The plaintiff...a member of the arbitration panel that is the subject of the present case, appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing his appeal from the final decision of the defendant Freedom of Information Commission (commission). In its decision, the commission concluded that: (1) the arbitration panel is a committee of the Department of Education (department); and (2) the evidentiary portion of an arbitration hearing under the Teacher Negotiation Act (TNA); see General Statutes § 10-153a et seq.; is subject to the open meetings provision of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA); see General Statutes § 1-225 (a); and ordered the plaintiff, along with the two other members of the three member arbitration panel, to create a transcript of the stenographic record from an arbitration hearing dated January 30, 2010, and to provide that transcript to the defendant Waterbury Republican-American (newspaper) and the defendant Jim Moore, a journalist with the newspaper, who had been excluded from the arbitration proceedings.


"The plaintiff advances two arguments in support of his contention that the trial court improperly dismissed his appeal. First, the plaintiff claims that, because a TNA arbitration panel is not a 'committee of' the department, it does not constitute a '"[p]ublic agency"' pursuant to General Statutes (Supp. 2014) § 1-200 (1) (A). Second, the plaintiff claims that, because the presentation of evidence and testimony at a TNA arbitration hearing constitutes 'strategy or negotiations with respect to collective bargaining,' the evidentiary portion of the hearings does not constitute a '"[m]eeting"' pursuant to § 1-200 (2). See footnote 4 of this opinion. We agree with the plaintiff's first claim and, therefore, reverse the judgment of the trial court.")

SC19046 - Commissioner of Public Health v. Freedom of Information Commission(Administrative agencies; Freedom of Information Act (§ 1-200 et seq.); "Congress created the National Practitioner Data Bank (Practitioner Data Bank) and the Healthcare Integrity and Protection Data Bank (Healthcare Data Bank) as national clearinghouses for, inter alia, information from health care entities and licensing boards regarding adverse actions taken against physicians and other licensed health care practitioners. The question we must answer in the present case is whether records received from these federal data banks by a state agency authorized to request this confidential information can be subject to disclosure under our Freedom of Information Act (act), General Statutes § 1-200 et seq.


The named defendant, the Freedom of Information Commission (commission), concluded that federal law permits disclosure of Practitioner Data Bank records if they are subject to disclosure under state law such as the act, but does not permit disclosure of Healthcare Data Bank records. The trial court dismissed the appeal of the plaintiff, the Commissioner of Public Health (department), from the commission's decision ordering the department to disclose Practitioner Data Bank records to a local newspaper, the defendant Greenwich Time (newspaper). The trial court also dismissed the newspaper's appeal from the commission's decision insofar as it had denied the newspaper's request for an order to disclose the Healthcare Data Bank records. The department appealed and the newspaper cross appealed from the trial court's judgment. We conclude that a public agency may not disclose to an unauthorized person or entity any records received from either the Practitioner Data Bank or the Healthcare Data Bank, although the agency may disclose to a member of the public information originating from the agency's own files if disclosure is otherwise required under the act. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's judgment in part.")

SC19055 - Chairperson, Connecticut Medical Examining Board v. Freedom of Information Commission ("This is an appeal by the plaintiffs...from the judgment of the trial court dismissing the plaintiffs' appeal from a final decision of the named defendant...in favor of the complainants, Attorney Michael K. Courtney and the Office of the Chief Public Defender. The trial court concluded that the commission properly had found that an executive session convened by the board on February 17, 2009, was not permissible under the Freedom of Information Act (act), General Statutes § 1-200 et seq. The board convened the executive session to obtain legal advice about issues raised in a letter from the complainants dated February 13, 2009 (letter), regarding their request for a declaratory ruling. The plaintiffs claim that the board was permitted to convene in executive session under the act because the letter demanded legal relief and, therefore, constituted notice of a pending claim as defined by § 1-200 (8). In addition, the plaintiffs claim that the executive session was permitted under the act because it involved discussions of strategy and negotiations as defined by § 1-200 (6) (B). The commission responds that the letter did not constitute notice of a pending claim but, rather, that the complainants merely noted a potential conflict of interest and suggested a course of action. We agree with the commission and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

AC32381 - Commissioner of Public Safety v. Freedom of Information Commission ("The plaintiff...appeals from the judgments of the trial court dismissing his appeals and concluding that the defendant...properly determined that the Connecticut Freedom of Information Act (act), General Statutes § 1-200 et seq., required the disclosure of printouts or 'rap sheets' obtained by the Department of Public Safety (department) from the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) computerized database, which is maintained by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The commissioner claims that the NCIC printouts were not subject to public disclosure under the act. We reverse, in part, the judgments of the trial court.")

SC18724 - Pictometry International Corp. v. Freedom of Information Commission
SC18725 - Department of Environmental Protection v. Freedom of Information Commission("The primary issue to be resolved in these appeals is whether public records that are protected by federal copyright law fall within the 'otherwise provided by any federal law' exemption to the Freedom of Information Act (act), General Statutes § 1-200 et seq., set forth in General Statutes § 1-210 (a) (federal law exemption)....

"We conclude that, because the commission improperly ordered the DEP to provide copies of the images without first determining whether Whitaker wanted copies of the images stripped of the associated data, whether it was feasible for the DEP to provide such copies and whether doing so would pose a public safety risk, the matter must be remanded to the commission for further proceedings. We further conclude that, if the commission determines that Whitaker wants and is entitled to copies of the photographic images, the copying of the photographic images must be done in compliance with the provisions of the licensing agreement and federal copyright law, including payment by Whitaker of the $25 per image fee.")

SC18622, SC18623 - Commissioner of Correction v. Freedom of Information Commission, SC18624 - United States of America v. Freedom of Information Commission ("These appeals arise from the ruling of the named defendant...that the defendant Rashad El Badrawi was entitled, under the Freedom of Information Act (act), General Statutes § 1-200 et seq., to the disclosure of a document that the plaintiff...obtained from a file in the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) computerized database, which is maintained by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The commissioner and the intervenor...appealed from the commission's ruling to the trial court, claiming that the commission improperly had ordered disclosure of the document because, for among other reasons, disclosure was barred by a federal regulation, and, therefore, the document was exempt from the act in accordance with General Statutes § 1-210 (a). The trial court rendered judgments dismissing the appeals in part and sustaining them in part, and ordered that a redacted version of the document be disclosed to El Badrawi. The commissioner and the United States then filed these appeals.")

AC32246 - Commissioner of Public Safety v. Freedom of Information Commission ("The defendant...appeals from the judgment of the trial court sustaining the appeal of the plaintiff...from the decision of the commission. The court concluded that the commission erroneously had required the department of public safety (department) to release documents to the complainants....On appeal, the commission claims that the court erred by (1) concluding that the text of General Statutes § 1-215 does not plainly and unambiguously require disclosure of certain information at the time of the arrest; and (2) failing to defer to the commission's construction of General Statutes §§ 1-215 and 1-210 (b) (3), and thereby failing to follow the applicable scope of judicial review in an administrative appeal.")

AC32932 - Tompkins v. Freedom of Information Commission ("The issue presented in this appeal is whether the trial court properly dismissed the appeal of the plaintiff, Duane Tompkins, from the amended final decision of the named defendant, the freedom of information commission (commission), ordering the plaintiff's former employer, the town of Enfield police department (department), to disclose the plaintiff's redacted employment termination records to the defendants the Journal Inquirer and Alexander Wood and Jenna Carlesso, staff writers for the Journal Inquirer. The plaintiff claims that the trial court erred in sustaining the commission's order of disclosure over his objection that the subject records are exempt from disclosure under either General Statutes § 1-210 (b) (2) because their release would constitute an invasion of his personal privacy, or § 1-210 (b) (3) (G) because they contain uncorroborated allegations of criminal activity.")

AC33799 - Lucarelli v. Freedom of Information Commission ("The self-represented plaintiff, Lamberto Lucarelli, appeals from the judgment of nonsuit rendered against him in his appeal to the Superior Court from a final decision of the defendant, the freedom of information commission, and from the trial court's subsequent orders denying his motion to open the judgment of nonsuit, denying his motion to reargue the motion to open, finding his motion to disqualify the judge that rendered the judgment of nonsuit moot, and denying his second motion for reargument, clarification and disqualification. We construe the plaintiff's arguments on appeal as claiming that the court abused its discretion by rendering the judgment of nonsuit and by denying his postjudgment motions.")

AC33444 - Albright-Lazzari v. Freedom of Information Commission ("On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the court improperly (1) determined that the commission’s dismissal of their complaint without a hearing was not a violation of their constitutional rights and (2) deferred to the commission’s conclusion that it lacked jurisdiction to determine the rights of access to records of the intervening defendant, the department of children and families (department) pertaining to child protection activities.")

AC33368 - Lantieri v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation ("On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court improperly found facts beyond those certified to it by the board and utilized those facts to improperly determine that the board’s decision that the plaintiff engaged in wilful misconduct was not supported by the evidence.")

AC33336 - Lucarelli v. Freedom of Information Commission ("The self-represented plaintiff, Lamberto Lucarelli, appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing his administrative appeal from the decision of the defendant freedom of information commission (commission) ordering the defendant Old Saybrook police department (department) to produce certain records. The plaintiff claims that the court erred in concluding that (1) the commission properly determined that the department was not required to transcribe or to tape voice mail messages pursuant to General Statutes § 1-213 (b) (3), (2) the commission's failure to rule on his request for subpoenas was not reversible error and (3) the commission properly declined to enforce the penalty provision of General Statutes § 1-240 (a).")

AC33167 - Germain v. Manchester ("The plaintiff... appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing his administrative appeal from the decision of the defendant, freedom of information commission (commission). On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly (1) interpreted General Statutes § 1-212 (g) to limit the permissible type of scanner that can be used to copy public documents to a scanner that is held in the hand and dragged across the page being copied, to the exclusion of any other battery operated scanner, (2) deferred to the commission's interpretation of § 1-212 (g) and (3) concluded that the commission's prior decision in Kreutzer v. Assistant Dean, Administration & Special Projects, Freedom of Information Commission, Docket No. FIC 2004-463 (September 28, 2005), was inapplicable.")

SC18772 - University of Connecticut v. Freedom of Information Commission ("This appeal concerns the issue of whether a public agency can create and maintain trade secrets that are exempt from disclosure under General Statutes § 1-210 (b) (5) (A) of the Freedom of Information Act (act), General Statutes § 1-200 et seq. The named defendant, the freedom of information commission (commission), appeals from the trial court's judgment sustaining the administrative appeal of the plaintiff, the University of Connecticut (university), from the commission's decision ordering the university to disclose databases identifying persons who had paid to attend, donated to, inquired about or participated in certain educational, cultural or athletic activities of institutions within the university. The commission contends that, in light of the public policy favoring disclosure of public records, the trial court improperly rejected the commission's determination that none of the databases at issue could be trade secrets because the university is not principally engaged in a trade")

SC18601 - Ethics Commission v. Freedom of Information Commission ("The plaintiff, the ethics commission of the town of Glastonbury, appeals from the trial court’s judgments dismissing the plaintiff’s consolidated appeals from four decisions of the named defendant, the freedom of information commission (commission). In each decision, the commission had ordered the plaintiff to make and to maintain, for a period of three years, audio recordings of the plaintiff’s executive sessions, or any other session closed to the public, after finding that the plaintiff had violated the open meetings provision of the Freedom of Information Act (act), General Statutes § 1-200 et seq., by convening in nonpublic sessions to discuss certain matters and further finding that the plaintiff had failed to comply with the commission’s orders to amend its minutes to reflect those discussions. The dispositive issue on appeal is whether the commission’s orders exceeded its remedial authority under the act.")

AC31780, AC31781 - Planning & Zoning Commission v. Freedom of Information Commission ("The defendant freedom of information commission (commission) appeals from the judgments of the trial court sustaining the administrative appeals of the plaintiff planning and zoning commission of the town of Pomfret from the final decisions of the commission. On appeal, the commission claims that the court erred in overturning its decisions because the court (1) addressed issues that were not before the commission, and (2) construed General Statutes §§ 1-210 (a) and 1- 212 (a) in a manner that (a) contradicted the statutes’ plain meaning, (b) contradicted the construction of the statutes by the commission, (c) failed to give deference to the commission’s construction of the statutes and (d) was inconsistent with the statutes’ underlying public policy interests.")

AC32409 - Commissioner of Correction v. Freedom of Information Commission ("The defendant David P. Taylor appeals from the judgments of the Superior Court sustaining the appeals of the plaintiffs, the commissioner of correction, Steven Petracca, Harry Soucy and AFSCME, Council 4, Local 387, from the decisions of the defendant freedom of information commission (commission) and prohibiting the disclosure of certain disciplinary records of department of correction (department) employees pursuant to General Statutes § 1-210 (c) and (b) (18) of the Freedom of Information Act (act), General Statutes § 1-200 et seq.")

SC18461 - Lash v. Freedom of Information Commission ("The named defendant, the freedom of information commission (commission), appeals from the judgment of the Appellate Court reversing the judgment of the trial court in favor of the commission. The commission claims that the Appellate Court improperly concluded that: (1) the plaintiffs, James A. Lash, first selectman of the town of Greenwich (town), and the town board of selectmen, sustained their burden of demonstrating that certain documents were exempt from disclosure because they were protected by attorney-client privilege; and (2) the commission abused its discretion in assessing a civil penalty against Lash.")

SC18489 - Dept. of Public Safety v. Freedom of Information Commission ("The principal issue in this appeal is whether the named defendant, the freedom of information commission (commission), properly ordered the plaintiff, the department of public safety (department), to disclose information contained in its sex offender registry because it was not subject to the provisions in General Statutes § 54-255 restricting the dissemination of registration information regarding certain offenders.")

Valvo v. Freedom of Information Commission - SC18283 ("The plaintiffs...filed a complaint with the named defendant,...after the defendant chief court administrator of the judicial branch of the state of Connecticut (chief court administrator), denied their request pursuant to the freedom of information act (act), General Statutes § 1-200 et seq., for copies of certain docket sheets...The plaintiffs then appealed from the judgment of the trial court claiming that, although the trial court properly determined that, under this court's decision in Clerk of the Superior Court v. Freedom of Information Commission, 278 Conn. 28, 37, 895 A.2d 743 (2006), the docket sheets were not administrative records subject to the act, that case was wrongly decided and this court should overrule it. ")

Board of Selectmen v. Freedom of Information Commission - SC18343 ("On appeal, the board contends that the trial court improperly: (1) determined that the emergency meeting provisions of §1-225 (d) were not unconstitutionally vague; (2) agreed with the commission's conclusion that the contested meeting had not been held under emergency circumstances; (3) concluded that the commission had not abused its discretion in declaring the contested board meeting null and void; and (4) relied on evidence outside the factual findings made by the commission and thereby substituted its own judgment for that of the commission.")

Director of Health Affairs Policy Planning v. Freedom of Information Commission - SC18286(Administrative appeal; "The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether certain records held by the plaintiff, the director of health affairs policy planning for the University of Connecticut Health Center, are exempt from disclosure under the freedom of information act (act), General Statutes § 1-200 et seq., pursuant to General Statutes § 19a-17b (d), which protects peer review proceedings from discovery and introduction into evidence in a civil action".)

AC30137 - Lash v. Freedom of Information Commission ("The plaintiffs James A. Lash, first selectman of the town of Greenwich, and the Greenwich board of selectment appeal from the judgment of the Superior Court dismissing their administrative appeal from the decision of the defendant freedom of information commission (commission) in favor of the defendant Stephen Whitaker. On appeal before this court, the plaintiffs claim that the Superior Court improperly dismissed the appeal because the commission erroneously (1) found that they violated General Statutes § 1-210 (a) by failing to provide prompt access to certain public records, (2) found that they failed to establish that two specific documents were exempt from disclosure under § 1-210 (b) (10) and (3) imposed a civil penalty of $100 against Lash pursuant to General Statutes § 1-206 (b) (2).")


Administrative Appeal Supreme Court Opinion

   by Christopher Roy

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=30

SC19562 - Shannon v. Commissioner of Housing ("The defendant, the Commissioner of Housing, administers the state rental assistance program (rental program), which, like the federal program operated pursuant to § 8 of the United States Housing Act of 1937, 42 U.S.C. § 1437f (section 8 program), provides "rental assistance for low-income families living in privately-owned rental housing." General Statutes (Supp. 2016) § 8-345 (a); see also, e.g., Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities v. Sullivan Associates, 250 Conn. 763, 769–70, 739 A.2d 238 (1999) (discussing section 8 program). In this appeal, we consider whether the defendant may terminate rental program assistance to a registered sex offender who had that status when he was admitted to the rental program prior to the promulgation of § 17b-812-13 (9) of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies, which makes sex offender registration a ground for termination or denial of rental program assistance. The plaintiff, Francis Shannon, appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing his administrative appeal from the decision of the defendant to terminate his rental program assistance. On appeal, the plaintiff claims, inter alia, that the trial court improperly concluded that the defendant's application of § 17b-812-13 (9) of the regulations was not retroactive and, thus, did not exceed the authority granted to the defendant by the legislature. We conclude that the relevant statutes, regulations, and agency policies demonstrate that the defendant applied § 17b-812-13 (9) of the regulations retroactively by imposing a new obligation on the plaintiff's sex offender status that terminated his rental program assistance, and that the legislature did not authorize such retroactive agency action. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.")


Foreclosure Supreme and Appellate Court Opinions

   by Mazur, Catherine

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=195

January 2014 - July 2016 (reverse chronological order)

AC37896 - Bank of America, N.A. v. Aubut ("In this residential foreclosure action, the defendants, David Aubut and Karen Aubut, appeal following the trial court’s judgment of strict foreclosure rendered in favor of the substitute plaintiff, Nationstar Mortgage, LLC. On appeal, the defendants claim that the court erred in rendering summary judgment as to liability only in favor of the substitute plaintiff because: (1) the court improperly concluded that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether Karen Aubut was provided with preacceleration notice of default in the manner required by the terms of the mortgage; (2) the court improperly accepted an affidavit submitted in support of the substitute plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment; and (3) the court improperly concluded as a matter of law that the defendants could not prevail with respect to their special defenses. We agree, in part, with the defendants’ third claim. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.")

AC37754 - Astoria Federal Mortgage Corp. v. Genesis Ltd. Partnership ("In this foreclosure action, the defendant Professional Services Group, Inc., appeals from the trial court's judgment granting the motion filed by the plaintiff, Bellmore Partners, Inc., to dismiss the defendant's cross claim. The defendant claims that the court erred by granting the plaintiff's motion to dismiss because it improperly concluded that the defendant lacked standing. We agree and accordingly reverse the judgment of the court.")

AC37940 - Habitat for Humanity of Coastal Fairfield County, Inc. v. Lanham (Foreclosure; "The defendant Kim Lanham appeals from the judgment of strict foreclosure, rendered by the trial court, in favor of the plaintiff, Habitat for Humanity of Coastal Fairfield County, Inc. After reviewing and considering the record in this case, including the briefs and arguments of the parties on appeal, we conclude that the court properly rendered a judgment of strict foreclosure. There is no error.

The judgment is affirmed and the case is remanded to the trial court for the purpose of setting new law days.")

AC37887 - U.S. Bank, N.A., Trustee v. Morawska ("The defendant...appeals from the reentry of the judgment of strict foreclosure in favor of the plaintiff...following the lifting of a bankruptcy stay. On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court (1) should have held oral argument before denying her petition for reinclusion in the foreclosure mediation program, (2) was not permitted to make new findings as to the amount of the debt when setting a new law day, and (3) improperly denied her motion to reargue. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

AC37266 - HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Lahr ("The defendant...appeals from the judgment of strict foreclosure rendered in favor of the plaintiff.... On appeal, she claims that the court improperly denied her motion to open the judgment of strict foreclosure. Specifically, she argues that no further actions should have occurred in the case after she had filed a suggestion of death regarding the defendant Charles Lahr (decedent) until the plaintiff applied for an order to substitute the decedent's executor or administrator as provided in General Statutes § 52-599, the survival of cause of action statute. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

SC19509 - Neighborhood Assn., Inc. v. Limberger (Foreclosure of statutory ([Rev. to 2011]) § 47-258 [m] [3]) common charges lien; motion to dismiss; Common Interest Ownership Act (§ 47-200 et seq.); "Under Connecticut's Common Interest Ownership Act (act), General Statutes § 47-200 et seq., the executive board of a common interest community may commence an action against a unit owner to foreclose a lien for common charges under specified conditions, including that it either has voted to institute the particular foreclosure proceeding or has previously adopted a standard foreclosure policy under which that foreclosure would be authorized. General Statutes (Rev. to 2011) § 47-258 (m) (3). The present case requires us to determine whether a standard foreclosure policy is a "rule" subject to the act's notice and comment requirements and, if so, whether the failure to adhere to those procedural requirements is a jurisdictional defect. The defendant Jill M. Limberger appeals from the judgment of foreclosure by sale rendered by the trial court in favor of the plaintiff, The Neighborhood Association, Inc. The dispositive issue on appeal is whether the trial court properly concluded that the plaintiff's standard foreclosure policy is an “internal business operating procedure”—not a rule—and, thus, not subject to the notice and comment requirements for a rule. See General Statutes § 47-261b. We conclude that the standard foreclosure policy is a rule and that the rule-making requirements are jurisdictional. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court with direction to dismiss the plaintiff's action.")

AC37756 - Profetto v. Lombardi ("The defendant...appeals from the trial court's judgment of foreclosure by sale of a judgment lien that had been placed on the defendant's residential property by the plaintiff.... The purpose of the judgment lien was to secure the order of the court, Burke, J., contained in the parties' dissolution judgment, that required the defendant to pay the plaintiff $72,172.31 plus interest at the rate of 6 percent from the date of that judgment. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court should have concluded that the foreclosure of a judgment lien was 'not the appropriate vehicle to enforce a family support judgment' in a dissolution action. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

AC37530 - Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Ruggiri ("The defendant Martin Ruggiri appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying his 'motion to reopen judgment of strict foreclosure and motion to reargue and set aside motion for summary judgment' (motion to open). In the motion to open, the defendant sought to reargue the motion for summary judgment as to liability filed by the plaintiff, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., which the court previously had granted. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court erred in granting the plaintiff's summary judgment motion, on the basis of which it rendered a judgment of strict foreclosure. The plaintiff counters that the defendant may not use the current appeal, which relates only to the ruling on the motion to open, to raise issues regarding the judgment of strict foreclosure and the granting of the motion for summary judgment. Because the only issue properly before us is whether the court abused its discretion in denying the motion to open, and because we conclude that it did not, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

AC37362- Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Thompson ("In this foreclosure action, the self-represented defendant...appeals from the judgment of strict foreclosure, rendered in favor of the plaintiff.... On appeal, the defendant claims, among other things, that the plaintiff lacked standing to bring this action because it was not in possession of the subject note at the time the action was commenced. Because the resolution of this claim is dependent upon a factual finding that is not part of the appellate record, and because this claim implicates the subject matter jurisdiction of the trial court, we are unable to review the merits of this appeal. We therefore reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for further proceedings.")

AC37729 - Property Asset Management, Inc. v. Lazarte ("The defendant...appeals from the trial court's denial of her postjudgment motion to dismiss the underlying foreclosure action. The defendant claims that the original plaintiff, Property Asset Management, Inc., lacked standing to initiate the action because it was not the owner of the debt or vested with the rights of an owner at the time that the action was initiated, and, therefore, the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to render a judgment of strict foreclosure in favor of the substitute plaintiff, US Bank, National Association, as Trustee for the RMAC Trust, Series 2013-3T. The defendant claims on appeal that the court improperly (1) determined that she failed to produce evidence necessary to rebut the presumption that the original plaintiff had standing by virtue of its possession of the mortgage note, endorsed in blank, at the time that the action was filed and (2) failed to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the motion to dismiss. We affirm the judgment of the court.")

AC38637 - Citigroup Global Markets Realty Corp. v. Christiansen ("The substituted plaintiff, Mid Pac Portfolio, LLC, filed a motion to dismiss the appeal of the defendant...from the judgment of the trial court denying his third motion to open the judgment of strict foreclosure and from the foreclosure judgment. The plaintiff argues that this appeal is moot because the denial of the defendant's third motion to open did not stay the running of the law days and, thus, title to the subject property has vested in the plaintiff. We agree with the plaintiff that this court can provide no practical relief on appeal, and, therefore, we grant the plaintiff's motion to dismiss and dismiss the appeal as moot.")

AC37265 - Connecticut Housing Finance Authority v. Alfaro ("The defendant...appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying his motion for an award of attorney's fees pursuant to General Statutes § 42-150bb. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly denied his motion for attorney's fees because it found that he did not successfully defend the foreclosure action instituted by the plaintiff...who withdrew the action as a matter of right. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

AC36736 - M.U.N. Capital, LLC v. National Hall Properties, LLC ("The former defendant, National Hall Capital, LLC, appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing its motion to open and to vacate a 2010 judgment of strict foreclosure regarding property located at, inter alia, 6 Wilton Road in the town of Westport, to which it was not a party and by which it was not bound. The former defendant claims that the plaintiff in the 2010 foreclosure action...did not have standing to initiate and proceed with the foreclosure, and, therefore, the trial court never had subject matter jurisdiction over the action. The former defendant seeks to have the foreclosure judgment opened and vacated, with the hope that it then will be able to open and vacate a 2010 summary process default judgment that was rendered against it, which resulted in the termination of its leasehold interest in the Wilton Road property.

"Following oral argument in this appeal, we asked the parties to submit simultaneous supplemental briefs addressed to the following: '1. Whether National Hall Capital, LLC, a nonparty to the underlying foreclosure action, had standing to file a motion to open the foreclosure judgment? 2. Whether a nonparty can appeal the dismissal of a motion to open a judgment in a case in which it was not a party? 3. What practical relief can this court provide to National Hall Capital, LLC, in this appeal?' We conclude that we lack subject matter jurisdiction over this appeal. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. ")

AC37269 - Salisbury Bank & Trust Co. v. Christophersen ("The defendant...individually and as trustee, appeals from the judgment of strict foreclosure rendered by the trial court. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court abused its discretion by ordering a judgment of strict foreclosure rather than a foreclosure by sale. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

AC37717 - AS Peleus, LLC v. Success, Inc. ("The defendant Success, Inc., appeals from the judgment of strict foreclosure rendered by the trial court in favor of the plaintiff.... The defendant claims that the court (1) erroneously found that the plaintiff was the owner and holder of the promissory note and mortgage deeds in question and (2) improperly accepted the testimony of a representative of the plaintiff's mortgage servicing company. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. ")

AC37001 - TD Bank, N.A. v. Doran ("The defendants...appeal from the deficiency judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of the plaintiff...in the amount of $167,022.23. On appeal, the defendants claim that the court (1) improperly concluded that their special defense of laches was not relevant to the deficiency judgment proceeding and (2) erroneously found that the plaintiff did not inexcusably delay the strict foreclosure proceedings. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

SC19483 - J.E. Robert Co. v. Signature Properties, LLC ("In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether the trial court properly relied on the appraisal submitted by the substitute plaintiff, Shaw’s New London, LLC (plaintiff), and the testimony of the plaintiff’s appraiser in granting the plaintiff’s motion for a deficiency judgment against the named defendant, Signature Properties, LLC (Signature), and the defendants Andrew J. Julian, Maureen Julian, and Michael Murray. The defendants Andrew J. Julian and Murray (defendants) appeal from the trial court’s judgment and claim that it was improper to rely on the appraisal and the appraiser’s testimony because they expressed an opinion on the value of the leased fee interest in the mortgaged property and the plaintiff was required to establish the value of the fee simple interest. The defendants further argue that the value of the leased fee interest and fee simple interest of the mortgaged property are not equivalent. The plaintiff responds that it was proper to appraise the value of the leased fee interest in the mortgaged property because the day title to the property vested in the plaintiff, it was encumbered by three leases. Alternatively, the plaintiff contends that the value of the leased fee and fee simple interests in the mortgaged property are equal because the leases were at market rates. We conclude that the trial court’s reliance on the appraisal and the appraiser’s testimony was proper and affirm its judgment.")

AC37340 - Seminole Realty, LLC v. Sekretaev ("The self-represented defendant...appeals from the judgment of strict foreclosure rendered in favor of the plaintiff.... On appeal, the defendant challenges the trial court's determination that the plaintiff had standing to bring this action, notwithstanding his arguments to the contrary, and its rejection of his special defenses and two counts of his three count counterclaim. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

SC19481 - JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Mendez ("The named defendant...appeals from the order of the trial court, claiming that the court erroneously applied General Statutes § 52-212 in denying her motion to open and vacate the judgment of foreclosure by sale and that the court should have applied the standard articulated in General Statutes § 49-15. The defendant claims that the trial court improperly applied § 52-212, which governs the opening of judgments rendered upon default or nonsuit, rather than § 49-15, which governs the opening of judgments of strict foreclosure. The defendant contends that § 52-212 does not apply to judgments of foreclosure by sale, because such judgments are not final. Accordingly, the defendant contends that this court should construe § 49-15 to apply not only to judgments of strict foreclosure but also to judgments of foreclosure by sale. We do not reach these issues, however, because we determine that the defendant's claim is moot.")

AC36873 - Chevy Chase Bank, F.S.B. v. Avidon ("The defendant Vladimir Avidon appeals from the trial court's judgment of foreclosure by sale entered on May 5, 2014, in favor of the substituted plaintiff, Capital One, N.A. (Capital One). The defendant claims that the trial court improperly (1) denied the defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of standing, (2) denied the defendant's motion to open the default for failure to plead, and (3) struck the defendant's answer with special defenses. We disagree and affirm the judgment of the trial court. ")

AC36718 - Trumbull v. Palmer ("The defendant...appeals from the judgment of the trial court granting the motion of the plaintiff...to open a judgment of dismissal and return the present action to the Superior Court docket. On appeal, the defendant claims, inter alia, that the court lacked the authority to grant the plaintiff's motion to open. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

AC37193 - Ellington v. Robert ("In this matter concerning the foreclosure of tax liens, the self-represented defendant, Paul Robert, appeals from the supplemental judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the plaintiff, the town of Ellington (town). On appeal the defendant claims that the court erred in rendering the supplemental judgment and in denying the defendant's motion to open that judgment. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

AC36681 - JPMorgan Case Bank, National Assn. v. Simoulidis ("The present case is one of a number of foreclosure actions in which the loan originated with the now failed Washington Mutual Bank, FA (bank). As in many foreclosure actions, the borrowers in the present case sought to avoid foreclosure by filing a motion to dismiss, claiming that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The trial court, Hon. Kevin Tierney, judge trial referee, denied the motion to dismiss. Thereafter, the court, Mintz, J., rendered a judgment of strict foreclosure in favor of the plaintiff, JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association. The defendant Christos Simoulidis appealed claiming that Judge Tierney improperly denied the motion to dismiss because (1) the plaintiff lacked standing and (2) the promissory note and mortgage deed are nullities under our contract law. We affirm the judgment of strict foreclosure.")

AC36962 - People’s United Bank v. Sarno ("The defendant...appeals from the judgment of the trial court approving a foreclosure by sale in favor of the plaintiff...of property composed of two separate parcels owned by the defendant. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court abused its discretion in approving the foreclosure sale. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

AC36838 - AJJ Enterprises, LLP v. Jean-Charles ("This case concerns the trial court's application of the doctrine of equitable subrogation to reorder the priorities of interest of existing liens on a residential property. The plaintiff...appeals from the judgment of the trial court, rendered in favor of the substitute defendant...reordering the priorities of interest of the mortgages on a piece of residential property located at 10 Carlin Street, Norwalk, and ordering a strict foreclosure with respect to that property.

On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court erred in: (1) reordering the priority of interest, by applying the doctrine of equitable subrogation, despite the defendant bank having had constructive notice of the plaintiff's properly recorded mortgage on 10 Carlin Street, (2) reducing the amount of the lien held by the plaintiff on the basis of its conclusion that there was a value to a quitclaim deed, previously held by the plaintiff, for commercial property located at 18 Monroe Street, Norwalk, and (3) assigning a value to 18 Monroe Street for 2005 despite the fact that there was no evidence to support such a valuation....We affirm the judgment of the court.")

AC36997 - Carriage House I-Enfield Assn., Inc. v. Johnston ("The defendant...appeals from the trial court's judgment of foreclosure by sale of her condominium unit in favor of the plaintiff...as well as the court's judgment denying her motion for reargument and reconsideration. On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) the court improperly failed to grant her relief under an impossibility defense, and (2) the court erred when it concluded that an allegedly illegal and unenforceable contract between the plaintiff and the defendant subsequently was rendered legal and enforceable. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.")

AC35168, AC35822 - Bomberov. Bombero ("At the nucleus of these consolidated and amended appeals is a monetary dispute between two brothers. In AC 35168, the defendant...appeals from the judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff...as to the plaintiff's complaint, seeking the foreclosure of a note and the reformation of a mortgage release, and granting the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the defendant's counterclaim. In AC 35822, the defendant appeals from the judgment of strict foreclosure rendered in favor of the plaintiff; an amended appeal, designated AC 35822xA01, was filed challenging the court’s subsequent decision to award attorney's fees to the plaintiff. We conclude that the court improperly rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff on his complaint and, therefore, remand that portion of the case for further proceedings. We dismiss the appeal from the judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff with respect to the counterclaim.")

AC36910 - U.S. Bank, National Assn. v. Schaeffer ("The plaintiff... appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing this residential real estate foreclosure action against several defendants, including the named defendant...for lack of standing. U.S. Bank claims that the trial court applied the incorrect legal standard in determining that it lacked standing to enforce the note. U.S. Bank further claims that, pursuant to the correct standard, it has standing to pursue the underlying foreclosure action. We agree, and therefore reverse the judgment of the trial court.")

AC36707 - U.S. Bank National Assn., Trustee v. Works ("The plaintiff...appeals from the judgment of the trial court granting the motion of the defendant...to open the judgment of strict foreclosure and to set aside the default entered against her for failure to plead. The plaintiff claims that the court improperly (1) opened the judgment of strict foreclosure pursuant to General Statutes § 49-15 (b), and (2) set aside the default entered against the defendant. We conclude that the court had the authority to open the judgment of strict foreclosure and we dismiss the remainder of the plaintiff's appeal for lack of a final judgment.")

AC36219 - Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Bliss (Foreclosure; preemption; claim that plaintiff lacked standing because plaintiff failed to demonstrate it was owner of note endorsed in blank when it commenced action; "The plaintiff, Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as trustee for Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-5 (Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust), brought this residential real estate foreclosure action against several defendants, including the named defendant, Heather M. Bliss. The defendant appeals from the judgment of the trial court ordering a foreclosure by sale of the subject property. She claims that: (1) the plaintiff lacked standing to bring the present action; (2) the plaintiff failed to prove its prima facie case; and (3) the court improperly concluded that the mortgage was enforceable. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

AC36590 - Astoria Federal Mortgage Corp. v. Genesis Holdings, LLC ("In October, 2009, this action was commenced by the named plaintiff...to foreclose a mortgage on property in Derby owned by the named defendant....The defendant Professional Services Group, Inc., was named as an additional defendant because it claimed an interest in the property by virtue of a mechanic's lien recorded in the Derby land records. During the pendency of the action, the bank assigned its interest in the property to Bellmore Partners, Inc., which was thereafter substituted as the plaintiff in this matter. On July 19, 2010, the debtor filed a chapter 11 bankruptcy petition, which automatically stayed the foreclosure action. See 11 U.S.C. § 362. On April 12, 2012, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Connecticut entered an order granting relief from the automatic stay for the 'limited purpose of determining the extent, validity and priority' of the defendant's mechanic's lien. On June 10, 2013, the plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment against the defendant, which was granted by the court on February 4, 2014."

On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly rendered summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff because (1) a genuine issue of material fact exists with respect to the validity of the defendant's mechanic's lien, and (2) the court improperly concluded that the defendant's opportunity to foreclose its mechanic's lien had expired. The plaintiff claims, as an alternative ground for affirmance of the court's judgment, that the defendant's claims are barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. We conclude that the court erroneously exceeded the terms of the order granting relief from the stay as ordered by the Bankruptcy Court. We also conclude that the defendant was not collaterally estopped from raising its claims before the trial court. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.")

AC36711 - Berkshire Bank v. Hartford Club ("The defendant...appeals from the judgment of foreclosure by sale rendered by the trial court in favor of the plaintiff.... On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment as to liability because the affidavits and exhibits offered in support of the motion were (1) not admissible evidence with respect to the plaintiff's status to enforce the negotiable instrument at issue, and (2) insufficient to establish the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. We disagree and affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

AC36462 - U.S. Bank National Assn. v. Sorrentino ("In this mortgage foreclosure action, the defendants...appeal from the summary judgment on their counterclaims rendered in favor of the plaintiff.... The defendants claim that the court improperly granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment with respect to four of their five counterclaims because the affidavit and other evidence submitted in support of the motion for summary judgment failed to address the factual allegations underlying those counterclaims and, thus, did not demonstrate a lack of a genuine issue of material fact. The plaintiff argues on appeal, however, that the factual allegations in the counterclaims relate to activities that postdate the origination of the loan, the defendant's default and the plaintiff's commencement of this foreclosure action, and that, because they do not relate to the making, validity or enforcement of the mortgage, they fail as a matter of law. We agree with the plaintiff and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

AC35584 - American Home Mortgage Servicing, Inc. v. Reilly (Foreclosure; "In this residential foreclosure action, the defendant Geoffrey N. Madow, appeals from the judgment of foreclosure by sale rendered by the trial court in favor of the substitute plaintiff, Homeward Residential, Inc. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment as to liability on the foreclosure complaint. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

AC35485 - Spears v. Elder ("The defendant...appeals from (1) the summary judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of the plaintiff...on his complaint and the defendant's counterclaim; (2) the court's order resetting the law days after the filing of the defendant's bankruptcy petition; (3) the court's approval of the committee's sale, deed, report, fees and expenses, and appraiser fees; (4) the court's denial of his claim of the existence of a bankruptcy injunction; (5) the court's overruling of his objections to its approval of the foreclosure sale; and (6) all orders of the court denying his post-February 24, 2014 motions to reargue and to open the judgment of foreclosure by sale. The defendant claims on appeal that the court improperly (1) refused to adjudicate, acknowledge, and protect his statutory homestead exemption both at the time of the rendering of the judgment of foreclosure by sale and at the time the sale was approved, (2) rendered summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff on the complaint and on the counterclaim, and (3) denied his request to compel discovery. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

AC36419 - Customers Bank v. CB Associates, Inc. ("This appeal arises from a stipulated judgment in an action by the plaintiff...to recover sums due and owing to it under a promissory note from the defendant CB Associates, Inc. (CB), secured by a mortgage on several condominium units in Shelton, and a guaranty of CB's obligations under the note by the defendant Wayne R. Blakeman. The stipulated judgment provided: first, that a money judgment in the amount of $1,475,000 would enter in favor of the plaintiff against both defendants; second, that the parties would not contest a separate pending action by a condominium association to foreclose on several of the condominium units; and third, that if the plaintiff later acquired title to all or some of the foreclosed upon condominium units on its assigned law day following the entry of judgment for the condominium association in the foreclosure action, the value of the units so acquired, as determined in the foreclosure action, would be credited to the defendants toward the plaintiff's $1,475,000 judgment against them. The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the trial court properly determined that the defendants fully satisfied the plaintiff's money judgment against them, after it acquired title to the foreclosed upon condominium units, and the foreclosure court had found the units to have an aggregate fair market value of $1.6 million. The plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly construed the terms of the stipulated judgment, and insists that the true and only value of the foreclosed upon units for purposes of the stipulated judgment should be the total amount for which they were later sold, not their 'hypothetical value,' as found by the foreclosure court in rendering a judgment of strict foreclosure. We affirm the trial court's judgment ordering the plaintiff to prepare and file a notice of satisfaction of judgment.")

AC36561 - Chase Home Finance, LLC v. Morneau ("The defendant...appeals from a judgment of strict foreclosure rendered following the trial court's granting of summary judgment in favor of the substituted plaintiff... On appeal, Moran claims that the court improperly granted summary judgment because there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether she held a valid one-half interest in the title of the property that is the subject of foreclosure. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.)

AC35601 - Congress Street Condominium Association, Inc. v. Anderson ("In this action to foreclose a statutory lien for unpaid common charges and fines, the defendant...appeals from the judgment of strict foreclosure rendered by the court in favor of the plaintiff.... On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly failed to conclude that the plaintiff’s assessment of fines was invalid because the plaintiff did not afford the defendant a hearing prior to the imposition of those fines. We agree and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the trial court.")

AC36474 - Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Treglia (Foreclosure; "The defendant Patrick A. Treglia and proposed intervenor Richard Treglia appeal from the judgment of strict foreclosure rendered by the trial court in favor of the plaintiff, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., as trustee. On appeal, Patrick Treglia claims that the trial court improperly denied his motion to set aside the default entered against him. Additionally, both Patrick Treglia and Richard Treglia claim that the court improperly denied their motion to cite in Richard Treglia as a party defendant. We reverse the judgment of the trial court denying Patrick Treglia's motion to set aside the default and affirm the judgment denying the motion to cite in Richard Treglia as a party defendant. ")

AC36540 - Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. McKeith (Foreclosure; "The defendant Melissa J. McKeith, also known as Melissa J. Hopkins, appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing her motion to open a judgment of strict foreclosure. She claims that the court improperly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to open that judgment. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

AC36875 - Norwich v. Norwich Harborview Corp. (Foreclosure; action to foreclose municipal tax liens; "In this foreclosure action, the defendant Norwich Harborview Corporation appeals from the judgment of foreclosure by sale rendered in favor of the plaintiff, city of Norwich, on the ground that the trial court committed plain error by approving the sale of the subject property although the court-ordered independent appraisal had not been returned to the court prior to the sale, in accordance with the Uniform Standing Orders for Foreclosure by Sale. We disagree with the defendant, and accordingly affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

SC19289 - Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Perez ("In this certified appeal, the plaintiff...appeals from the judgment of the Appellate Court reversing the judgment of the trial court and remanding the case to that court with direction to render judgment in favor of the defendants...on the reformation count, and in favor of Shaw on the foreclosure count. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Perez, 146 Conn. App. 833, 844, 80 A.3d 910 (2013). We granted the plaintiff's certification to appeal limited to the following issue: 'Did the Appellate Court properly determine that the trial court lacked the authority to reform the mortgage deed in this case?' Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Perez, 311 Conn. 924, 86 A.3d 1058 (2014). On appeal, the plaintiff contends that the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that the trial court improperly reformed the mortgage on the basis of the record before it. The Appellate Court held that the trial court lacked clear, substantial and convincing evidence to support the trial court's reformation of the mortgage by adding another party to the mortgage. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Perez, supra, 146 Conn. App. 843.")

AC36198 - Housing Development Fund, Inc. v. Burke Real Estate Management, LLC ("The defendant JRS Investments, LLC (JRS), a junior lienholder, appeals from the judgment of the trial court approving the foreclosure by sale of a six unit apartment building. On appeal, JRS claims that (1) the court abused its discretion by approving the sale where there had not been an inspection of the interior of the individual units, and (2) the court improperly failed to cite in the tenants of the individual apartments as necessary parties. We are not persuaded by these claims and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

AC36324 - National City Real Estate Services, LLC v. Tuttle ("At issue in this appeal is whether, following a judgment of foreclosure by sale rendered in favor of the substitute plaintiff...with respect to property owned by the defendants...the trial court abused its discretion by approving a sale of the property in an amount substantially lower than its fair market value. Having carefully considered the facts and circumstances surrounding the court's approval of the sale, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

AC32247, AC32830 - Gagne v. Vaccaro ("This consolidated appeal comes to us on remand from our Supreme Court. In Gagne v. Vaccaro, 133 Conn. App. 431, 439, 35 A.3d 380 (2012), this court held that the trial court improperly failed to recuse itself from hearing the motion for appellate attorney’s fees, discovery objections, and motion for contempt filed by the plaintiff, J. William Gagne, Jr. Our Supreme Court reversed that decision, concluding that the recusal issue was moot and, therefore, not properly before this court. Gagne v. Vaccaro, 311 Conn. 649, 660, 90 A.3d 196 (2014). The court remanded the case to us with direction to dismiss the appeal as to that issue and to consider the remaining claims advanced by the defendant, Enrico Vaccaro. Id., 662. Consistent with that mandate, we now consider whether the trial court (1) abused its discretion in entering certain discovery orders, (2) lacked authority to impose interest or taxable costs on its award of attorney’s fees, and (3) improperly held the defendant in contempt. We affirm in part and reverse in part the judgments of the trial court.")

AC35827 - Noroton Properties, LLC v. Lawendy ("The plaintiff... appeals from the judgment of the trial court, rendered after a trial to the court, in favor of the defendant...in this action to foreclose a commercial mortgage. The court concluded that the plaintiff failed to prove that the defendant was in default of the mortgage note and, accordingly, declined to award the plaintiff an appraisal fee, a title search fee, late fees, default interest, or attorney's fees. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly (1) found that the parties mutually agreed to extend the maturity date of the mortgage note, (2) determined that the mortgage note provided a ten day grace period for the payment of the final balloon payment, (3) concluded that the defendant satisfied his obligations by being 'ready, willing and able' to make the final payment in April, 2011, rather than by making a 'bona fide offer and tender' of payment as required by General Statutes § 49-13, (4) found that the plaintiff would not have accepted payment from the defendant in April, 2011, and (5) determined that the plaintiff was not entitled to attorney's fees because the remaining amount due under the mortgage note was not collected in 'court proceedings.' We agree with the plaintiff's first claim and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the trial court.")

AC36105 - BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP v. Farina (Foreclosure; "The original plaintiff...commenced this residential mortgage foreclosure action in June, 2009, against the defendant.... The defendant appeals from the judgment of strict foreclosure rendered by the trial court on September 10, 2013. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment because the plaintiff lacked standing to institute this foreclosure action. We disagree, and we affirm the judgment of the trial court. ")

AC36024 - Eastern Savings Bank, FSB v. Cortese ("The defendant...claims that the trial court (1) improperly concluded that the plaintiff...had standing to bring this foreclosure action, and, thus, that the court had subject matter jurisdiction, on the basis of its erroneous determination that the plaintiff was the holder of the notes at issue, and (2) abused its discretion in permitting the plaintiff to amend its complaint to include an allegation that it was the holder of those notes. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

SC19118 - E & M Custom Homes, LLC v. Negron ("The plaintiff, E & M Custom Homes, LLC, brought an action seeking the foreclosure of a mechanic’s lien on certain real property belonging to the defendants Alberto Negron and Luz Maria Negron in connection with services that the plaintiff had provided related to the construction of a single-family residence on the property....We granted the plaintiff’s petition for certification to appeal to this court on the following issue: 'Did the Appellate Court properly affirm the trial court's award of damages on the defendants' counterclaim when the plaintiff claims that the amount due under the contract exceeds the amount of damages claimed by the defendants?' E & M Custom Homes, LLC v. Negron, 308 Conn. 912, 61 A.3d 1099 (2013)."

After examining the record on appeal and after considering the briefs and the arguments of the parties, we have concluded that the appeal in this case should be dismissed on the ground that certification was improvidently granted.")

SC19099 - Hartford v. McKeever ("The primary issue that we must resolve in this certified appeal is whether the Appellate Court properly determined as a matter of law that the plaintiff, the city of Hartford, as assignee of the note and mortgage executed by the defendant...did not take the note and mortgage subject to the defendant's affirmative claims against the assignor, or, instead, the Appellate Court should have recognized and applied an equitable exception to this rule because the assignor or its predecessors had received overpayments on the note on the plaintiff's behalf. The plaintiff, as the assignee of a promissory note and mortgage executed by the defendant, brought an action to foreclose the mortgage. The defendant filed a five count counterclaim seeking, inter alia, an accounting of amounts paid pursuant to the note and recoupment of any excess amounts paid, including amounts that he had paid to the entity that had assigned the note and mortgage to the plaintiff and that entity's predecessors in interest. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the defendant on his counterclaim and awarded him damages of $195,909. The plaintiff appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court, which reversed the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. Hartford v. McKeever, 139 Conn. App. 277, 288, 55 A.3d 787 (2012). We then granted the defendant's petition for certification to appeal to this court. Hartford v. McKeever, 307 Conn. 956, 59 A.3d 1191 (2013). The issue that we must address on appeal is whether the Appellate Court properly determined that the plaintiff, as the most recent assignee and current holder of the defendant's note, could not be held liable to repay the defendant for sums that were overpaid on the note before it was assigned to the plaintiff. We answer this question in the affirmative and, therefore, affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.")

AC36108 - Mengwall v. Rutkowski ("The defendant...appeals from the trial court's judgment of strict foreclosure rendered in favor of the plaintiff.... On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court erred by: (1) failing to complete an evidentiary hearing prior to denying her motion to dismiss, and (2) denying her motion to reargue. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

AC35690 - Bombero v. Trumbull on the Green, LLC ("The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether equity and common sense will permit a mortgage, which had been omitted from a prior foreclosure action but which had no value at the time of that action, to now be foreclosed. We hold that it may not and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the trial court.")

SC19048 - JP Morgan Chase Bank, NA v. Winthrop Properties, LLC ("The sole issue in this certified appeal is whether General Statutes § 49-1, under which the foreclosure of a mortgage is a bar to further action against persons liable for the payment of the mortgage debt, note or obligation who are, or may be, made parties to the foreclosure, applies to guarantors of the mortgage note. The mortgagee plaintiff...appeals from the judgment of the Appellate Court, which reversed the judgment of the trial court in favor of the plaintiff on its claim against the defendant guarantors of the mortgage debt.... The plaintiff claims that the Appellate Court improperly concluded that, following the entry of the judgment of strict foreclosure and lapse of the period provided for filing a motion for a deficiency judgment under General Statutes § 49-14, § 49-1 barred the plaintiff from obtaining any additional remedy from the guarantors. We conclude that § 49-1 had no effect on the plaintiff's ability to recover the remaining unpaid debt from the guarantors because, irrespective of the fact that the plaintiff advanced claims to foreclose the mortgage and to enforce the guarantee in a single cause of action, the guarantors were not parties to the foreclosure claim because their liability arises separately under their guarantee. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.")

AC35850, AC35851 - Bank of America, N.A. v. Thomas ("In this residential mortgage foreclosure action, the defendant...has filed consolidated appeals from the trial court's denial of two motions to open the judgment of strict foreclosure rendered in favor of the plaintiff.... The defendant claims that the court improperly denied the first motion to open because it reached its decision before hearing the parties' oral argument in violation of her right to due process, and because it refused to hear her claim, raised for the first time at oral argument, that the plaintiff had filed a fraudulent affidavit of debt as evidenced by a consent order between the plaintiff and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency of the United States (comptroller). With respect to the second motion to open, the defendant claims that the court improperly failed to open the foreclosure judgment to allow her to present 'new evidence regarding the fraudulent actions of the plaintiff in obtaining the initial [foreclosure] judgment.' We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgments of the trial court.")

AC35632 - U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Foote ("The defendant...appeals from the judgment of strict foreclosure rendered by the trial court following the granting of a motion for summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff.... On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court erred in granting the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment because (1) the action is barred by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel; (2) the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case for foreclosure; and (3) a prior judgment of dismissal against the plaintiff created a genuine issue of material fact as to the plaintiff's status as holder of the note at the time the present action was commenced. The defendant further claims that, because the plaintiff was not entitled to summary judgment, the court improperly rendered judgment of strict foreclosure in favor of the plaintiff. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

AC30600 - Equity One, Inc. v. Shivers ("This case comes to us on remand from our Supreme Court. We previously remanded the case to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the plaintiff, Equity One, Inc., had standing. Equity One, Inc. v. Shivers, 125 Conn. App. 201, 9 A.3d 379 (2010). Our Supreme Court reversed our decision and determined that the trial court properly found that the plaintiff had standing to bring the action. Equity One, Inc. v. Shivers, 310 Conn. 119, 74 A.3d 1225 (2013). Our Supreme Court remanded the case to us with direction to address the defendant's remaining claim, that action had been taken in the trial court in violation of the automatic bankruptcy stay. Id., 125 n.2. The defendant...claims on appeal that the trial court improperly rendered judgment in violation of the stay. We reverse in part the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for further proceedings.")

AC35539 - Citimortgage, Inc. v. Rey ("This appeal calls upon the court to decide whether, in a residential foreclosure action in which the parties have participated in court-sponsored forbearance mediation and in which a final forbearance agreement has been reported to the court, a defendant may counterclaim for damages allegedly caused by the plaintiff's subsequent pursuit of the foreclosure complaint in an alleged breach of the forbearance agreement. Because, in the particular factual and procedural circumstances of this case, we answer that question in the affirmative, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.")

AC35466 - Federal National Mortgage Assn. v. Bridgeport Portfolio, LLC ("The defendants...appeal from the judgment of strict foreclosure rendered by the trial court in favor of the plaintiff.... On appeal, the defendants claim that the trial court erred by including both default interest and a prepayment premium in its calculation of the mortgage debt. We disagree and affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

AC35791 - Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Tarzia ("The defendant...appeals from the entry of a judgment of strict foreclosure for the plaintiff.... In this appeal, the defendant claims that (1) the plaintiff has not stated a claim for strict foreclosure of the mortgage because it did not plead that it is the owner of the debt, and (2) the judgment of strict foreclosure was procedurally improper because the court's earlier entry of summary judgment as to liability on the note could only apply to his personal liability, and could not be the basis for a judgment of strict foreclosure. We disagree, and accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

AC35266 - U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Ugrin ("The defendant...appeals from the judgment of foreclosure by sale rendered in favor of the plaintiff.... The defendant claims that the court erred by failing to conduct an additional evidentiary hearing, and thereby improperly denied his motion to dismiss. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

AC35287 - East Windsor v. East Windsor Housing, Ltd. ("The plaintiff...appeals from the order of the trial court denying in large part its request for attorney's fees in conjunction with seven foreclosure actions. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the attorney's fees awarded by the court were unreasonable as a matter of law and fact. We conclude that the amount of attorney's fees awarded by the court to the plaintiff did not constitute an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

SC18937 - Gagne v. Vaccaro ("The present action is the culmination of a disagreement between two attorneys that has lasted decades. The plaintiff... appeals from the judgment of the Appellate Court, which concluded that General Statutes § 51-183c required Hon. Anthony V. DeMayo, judge trial referee, to recuse himself from presiding over a hearing regarding the reasonableness of attorney's fees. The Appellate Court determined that this conclusion was dispositive of the appeal and remanded the case to the trial court for consideration of the defendant's other claims. We granted the plaintiff's petition for certification to appeal, limited to the following issue: 'Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that . . . § 51-183c required [Judge DeMayo] to recuse [him]self from presiding over the hearing on the plaintiff's motion for attorney's fees?' Gagne v. Vaccaro, 304 Conn. 907, 39 A.3d 1118 (2012). We do not reach this claim, or any of the defendant's alternative grounds for affirmance with respect to Judge DeMayo's recusal, however, because we conclude that these claims are moot. We therefore remand the case to the Appellate Court with direction to dismiss the appeal as to the recusal issue and to consider the defendant's remaining claims.")

AC34602 - Connecticut Housing Finance Authority v. Muhammad ("The defendant...appeals from the judgment of foreclosure by sale, rendered by the trial court, in favor of the plaintiff.... Shortly after this appeal was argued in the Appellate Court, the trial court, on February 3, 2014, issued an order approving the committee sale, deed and report. The defendant did not appeal from that order, and the time has expired for him to do so. On March 18, 2014, we issued an order, sua sponte, requiring the parties to file simultaneous supplemental briefs addressing the following question: 'In light of the trial court's February 3, 2014 order approving the committee sale/deed/report, and no appeal having been taken therefrom, why is the appeal in AC 34602 not moot?' The plaintiff filed its brief arguing that the appeal is moot because no relief could be afforded to the defendant. The defendant has not filed a supplemental brief or any other response to our order. We conclude that the appeal is moot and, thus, should be dismissed.")

AC35149 - Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Americas DeGennaro ("The defendant...appeals from the judgment of strict foreclosure following the summary judgment rendered in favor of the named plaintiff.... The defendant claims that the trial court erred in (1) granting the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment as to liability, and (2) rendering a judgment of strict foreclosure. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

AC35559 - JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Georgitseas ("The defendant...appeals from the judgment of strict foreclosure rendered by the trial court in favor of the plaintiff.... On appeal, the defendant makes three claims pertaining to the court’s reliance on a ‘drive-by’ or ‘exterior-only’ appraisal dated more than 120 days before the date of the judgment in its calculation of the subject property’s fair market value. We conclude that the defendant has failed to preserve any of his claims for appellate review, and we accordingly affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

AC35253 - Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Strong ("The defendant...appeals from the summary judgment as to liability and the subsequent judgment of strict foreclosure rendered by the trial court in favor of the plaintiff...as trustee. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court erred because (1) it granted summary judgment even though there were genuine issues of material fact about the plaintiff's status as owner of the note and mortgage, which implicated the plaintiff's standing, and (2) it denied her request for an evidentiary hearing regarding the plaintiff's affidavit of debt, upon which it relied in granting the plaintiff's motion for judgment of strict foreclosure. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

AC35157 - Pachaug Marina & Campground Assn., Inc. v. Pease ("The defendants...appeal from the judgment of the trial court denying their motion to open and correct the judgment of strict foreclosure and to extend the sale date. On appeal, the defendants claim that the court improperly denied their motion because part of the lien for unpaid assessments was extinguished by General Statutes § 47-258 (e). We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendants' motion. We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

AC35482 - Manning v. Feltman ("The plaintiff in this foreclosure action...appeals from the judgment of dismissal rendered by the trial court in favor of the defendants.... The court concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the foreclosure action after determining that the plaintiff lacked standing because he failed to list the note and mortgage deed at issue in his foreclosure complaint as an asset in his 1995 bankruptcy petition. The court ruled that the note and mortgage remain the property of the bankruptcy estate, not the plaintiff. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court erred in granting the defendants' motion to dismiss because (1) the court should have abstained from deciding bankruptcy law issues, stayed the case, and referred such issues to the Bankruptcy Court; (2) the defendants lacked standing to raise bankruptcy issues; and (3) the court should have substituted the bankruptcy trustee as a party plaintiff. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

AC35759 - Ginsberg & Ginsberg, LLC v. Alexandria Estates, LLC ("The defendant...appeals from the judgment of strict foreclosure rendered by the trial court in favor of the plaintiff...after remand by this court for a determination of priorities. See Ginsberg & Ginsberg, LLC v. Alexandria Estates, LLC, 136 Conn. App. 511, 48 A.3d 101 (2012). On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court improperly (1) relied solely on two warranty deeds to support its determination that the plaintiff's mortgage had priority over the defendant's claimed interest in the subject property, (2) 'failed to allow' the plaintiff's counsel to testify with respect to the title search he had prepared in connection with the foreclosure action, and (3) 'followed an inappropriate directive from the Appellate Court' in the remand order. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

AC35838 - Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Torres ("The plaintiff...appeals from the judgment of the trial court granting the motion to dismiss of the self-represented defendant.... On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly found that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that it had standing, and subsequently erred in granting the defendant's motion to dismiss. We agree, and therefore, reverse the judgment of the trial court.")

AC35354 - Wells Fargo Bank Minnesota, N.A. v. Russo ("In this foreclosure action, the self-represented defendant...appeals from the judgment of the trial court granting the motion of the plaintiff...to open a judgment of foreclosure by sale and denying his motion to open that judgment. He claims that the court abused its discretion in so doing. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

AC34726 - Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Melahn ("The defendant...appeals from the trial court's judgment denying his motion to open the strict foreclosure action that was instituted against him by the plaintiff.... We conclude that the court had the jurisdiction and authority to open, and that it should have opened, the judgment of strict foreclosure after the running of the law day in order to effectuate the clear terms of its judgment, with which the plaintiff encumbrancer had failed to comply and then falsely certified that it had complied. Accordingly, given the unusual specific facts and circumstances of this case, including the omissions and falsification by the plaintiff constituting its noncompliance with the strict foreclosure judgment of the court, we reverse the judgment of the trial court denying the defendant's motion to dismiss the strict foreclosure action.")

AC35076 - Nikola v. 2938 Fairfield, LLC ("The defendants...appeal from the judgment of foreclosure by sale rendered by the trial court in favor of the plaintiff.... The defendants claim that the court erred in (1) concluding that the plaintiff was the holder of the note and mortgage from Fairfield, (2) finding that the mortgage exception to the usury statute applied, and (3) finding the debt to be in excess of $140,000. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

AC35340 - American Tax Funding, LLC v. Basher (This appeal from the trial court's judgment of strict foreclosure concerns the apportionment of moneys paid for past due real property taxes. On appeal, the defendant...claims that the court improperly (1) construed an agreement between the parties and (2) granted summary judgment as to his liability because there was a genuine issue of material fact with regard to the parties' agreement. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.)


Employment Law Supreme and Appellate Court Opinions

   by Roy, Christopher

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=180

July 2015 - July 2016 (reverse chronological order)

SC19496 - Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities v. Echo Hose Ambulance ("We are called upon to decide what test should be applied to determine whether an unpaid volunteer is an 'employee' for purposes of the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act (CFEPA), General Statutes § 46a-51 et seq. More specifically, we must decide whether a volunteer must satisfy the predominant 'remuneration test' used to resolve similar federal causes of action or Connecticut's common-law 'right to control' test.

"This certified appeal arises out of a complaint filed with the plaintiff, the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities, by Brenda Puryear (Brenda), on behalf of her then minor daughter Sarah Puryear (Sarah). The complaint alleged that the defendants, Echo Hose Ambulance and the city of Shelton, had discriminated and retaliated against Sarah on the basis of her race and color in violation of CFEPA and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (Title VII). The trial court rendered judgment dismissing the commission's administrative appeal from the decision of the commission's human rights referee, who had struck the complaint on the ground that Sarah was not an employee under the remuneration test. The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's judgment; Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities v. Echo Hose Ambulance, 156 Conn. App. 239, 253, 113 A.3d 463 (2015); and Sarah appealed to this court. We affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.")

AC36895 - Matos v. Ortiz ("It is well established that a court may summarily enforce—within the framework of existing litigation—a clear and unambiguous settlement agreement reached during that litigation. Audubon Parking Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Barclay & Stubbs, Inc., 225 Conn. 804, 812, 626 A.2d 729 (1993) (Audubon). We are now called upon to decide whether that power extends to the summary enforcement of agreements reached both outside the framework of and before the start of the litigation in which enforcement is sought.")

AC37628 - Morrissey-Manter v. Saint Francis Hospital & Medical Center ("In this wrongful termination of employment action, the plaintiff...appeals from the summary judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of the defendants.... On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to four counts of her amended complaint because one or more genuine issues of material fact existed with respect to her claims that (1) an implied contractual agreement between the parties prohibited her discharge without cause, (2) the defendants terminated her employment in violation of an important public policy, (3) the defendants breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing by terminating her employment in ‘‘bad faith,’’ and (4) the defendants withheld certain medical records and destroyed evidence that would have supported her cause of action. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

AC37251 - Dickman v. University of Connecticut Health Center ("The plaintiff...appeals from the decision of the Workers’ Compensation Commissioner for the first district (commissioner) dismissing her General Statutes § 31-290a discriminatory
discharge claim against the defendant, the University of Connecticut Health Center. On appeal, the self represented plaintiff challenges the commissioner’s findings and conclusions. The defendant responds that the plaintiff has failed to provide any grounds for reversing the commissioner’s dismissal, and that the record supports the commissioner’s dismissal. We agree with the defendant, and, accordingly, affirm the decision of the commissioner.")

SC19323 - Trusz v. UBS Realty Investors, LLC ("Specifically, we conclude that, under the state constitution, employee speech pursuant to official job duties on certain matters of significant public interest is protected from employer discipline in a public workplace, and § 31-51q extends the same protection to employee speech pursuant to official job duties in the private workplace.")

AC36092 - Bridgeport Board of Education v. NAGE, Local RI-200 ("The plaintiff...appeals from the decision of the trial court denying its application to vacate an arbitration award in favor of the defendant.... On appeal, the board claims that the court should have vacated the award because (1) it failed to conform to the submission, (2) the arbitrators exceeded their authority and issued an award that is not mutual, final and definite, and (3) the award violates public policy. Because we conclude that the award violates public policy, we reverse the judgment of the trial court. In light of this conclusion, we need not address the board’s additional claims.")

AC36868 - Cragg v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act ("In this case, the plaintiff...appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the defendants.... On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly (1) granted the administrator’s motion for judgment and (2) denied the plaintiff the opportunity for oral argument before ruling on the administrator’s motion. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

AC36986 - Santos v. Massad-Zion Motor Sales Co. ("The defendants...appeal from the judgment of the trial court enforcing a settlement agreement purportedly entered into by the defendants and the plaintiff.... The defendants claim that the court erred because the parties had not reached a clear and unambiguous agreement as to the terms of a confidentiality provision, an essential component of the parties’ settlement agreement. We agree and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the trial court.")

AC36582 - Heyward v. Judicial Dept. ("In this action arising out of alleged workplace discrimination, the plaintiffs...appeal from the judgment of the trial court granting a motion to dismiss certain counts of the complaint against the defendants...and transferring venue for the remainder of the action from the judicial district of Waterbury to the judicial district of Hartford. The dispositive issues on appeal are (1) whether the court’s dismissal of only some of the counts brought against the state was an appealable final judgment, (2) whether the trial court properly dismissed all claims against Axelrod, and (3) whether the trial court’s order transferring venue was an immediately appealable final judgment. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that (1)the judgment dismissing some, but not all, of the plaintiffs’ counts against the state was not an appealable final judgment, (2) the plaintiffs have failed to adequately brief and therefore have abandoned their claim that the court improperly dismissed all claims against Axelrod, and (3) the interlocutory order transferring venue with respect to the remainder of the action was not an appealable final judgment. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal except as to that portion challenging the judgment of dismissal as it relates to the counts brought against Axelrod, and, as to that portion of the appeal, we affirm the judgment of the court.")

AC36778 - Benedetto v. Dietze & Associates, LLC ("In this case arising out of alleged employment discrimination, the plaintiffs...appeal from the summary judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of the defendants.... The plaintiffs claim on appeal that the court (1) abused its discretion by granting the defendants’ motion to reargue its ruling sustaining the plaintiffs’ objection to the defendants’ request to revise, and (2) improperly granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

AC36506 - Sidorova v. East Lyme Board of Education ("The plaintiff...appeals from the summary judgment rendered in favor of the defendants...in this action arising out of the termination of the plaintiff’s employment. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial court erred in determining that (1) she lacked standing to pursue a breach of contract claim alleging violation of the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement (agreement) between the board and the East Lyme Teachers’ Association, (2) governmental immunity applied to the superintendent’s conduct in terminating the plaintiff, which conduct the court found to be discretionary, and (3) the plaintiff had failed to allege sufficient facts in support of her claims that the defendants breached their duties of good faith and fair dealing. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

AC36199 - Kachnowski v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act ("The self-represented plaintiff...appeals from the judgment of the Superior Court dismissing her appeal from the decision of the Employment Security Board of Review (board). On appeal, the plaintiff claims: (1) 'the [board] improperly handled [her] appeal when it certified the appeal to the Superior Court and failed to comply with Practice Book § 22-1 . . . and . . . [§] 31-237g-51 [of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies]'; (2) 'the [board] erred in [not] certifying all pertinent file records concerning the appeal to the Superior Court as pursuant to . . . § 31-237g-1 (b) [of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies] and the Superior Court erred in ignoring the plaintiff's argument that the board failed to do so'; (3) 'the board failed to respond to, file and certify [her] motion to correct to the Superior Court, as required by Practice Book §§ 22-4, 22-7 and 22-8, and . . . the Superior Court erred in dismissing [her] argument regarding it [because the] exclusion of this motion precluded further review of the facts by the court'; (4) '[the board] failed to follow the guidelines of . . . § 31-236-26d [of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies] and the plaintiff did not commit wilful misconduct in the course of employment and, therefore, was eligible for unemployment benefits'; and (5) 'the Superior Court erred in making a judgment of dismissal in [her] case . . . .' Based on our review of claims four and five, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.")

AC36826 - Varley v. First Student, Inc. ("The plaintiff...appeals from the summary judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of the defendant.... The plaintiff claims that the court improperly determined that no genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether (1) the defendant was her employer for purposes of analyzing her wrongful discipline and discharge claim under General Statutes § 31-51q, and (2) the defendant tortiously interfered with her contractual employment relationship. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")


Landlord/Tenant Law Supreme and Appellate Court Opinions

   by Zigadto, Janet

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=183

July 2015 - July 2016 (reverse chronological order)

AC37174 - Elliott Enterprises, LLC v. Goodale (Summary process; equitable nonforfeiture; "In this summary process action, the defendant tenants . . . appeal from the judgment of the trial court in which the court found that the defendants had violated their lease agreement (lease) and granted possession of the leased premises to the plaintiff landlord . . . The trial court rendered judgment of possession in favor of the plaintiff on the ground that the defendants had failed to pay sewer charges and late fees due under the lease. On appeal, the defendants claim that the trial court erred by failing to consider that they had overpaid the plaintiff real estate taxes, which were a component of the rent pursuant to the lease, in an amount greater than what the plaintiff claimed they owed for the sewer charges and late fees. The defendants also claim that the trial court erred in determining that they had failed to prove the defense of equitable nonforfeiture. We reverse the judgment of the trial court.")

AC36966 - Housing Authority v. Weitz ("In this summary process action, the defendant . . . appeals from the judgment of immediate possession rendered by the trial court in favor of the plaintiff . . . after she was defaulted for failure to appear at trial. The defendant claims on appeal that the trial court erred in ‘ordering a default judgment for failure of the defendant to appear at trial where the defendant appeared by counsel, counsel requested a continuance, and when the continuance was denied, [counsel] stated he was ready to proceed on trial, no motion was made for default, counsel indicated that the defendant was not personally present due to illness, and the court had already indicated that the case would have to be sent to Stamford for scheduling a trial.’ We reverse the judgment of the trial court.")

AC36954 - Pollansky v. Pollansky ("This appeal is the latest skirmish in the ongoing dispute between the plaintiff, Steven Pollansky, and his mother, the defendant Anna Pollansky, concerning the plaintiff's claim of entitlement to real property allegedly promised to him by his father, Andrew Pollansky, many years ago. Anna Pollansky previously had initiated a summary process action against the plaintiff and his family seeking immediate possession of three parcels of property located in Coventry, which they occupied. The plaintiff's primary claim in the summary process action, raised by way of special defense, was that he occupied the Coventry property pursuant to an ownership interest that was orally promised to him by Andrew Pollansky. After a trial, the court in the summary process action rendered judgment in favor of Anna Pollansky, and this court affirmed that judgment. See Pollansky v. Pollansky, 144 Conn. App. 188, 71 A.3d 1267 (2013). . . . We reverse the judgment of the trial court in favor of the defendants on the plaintiff's counts of unjust enrichment and quantum meruit. We affirm the judgment in all other respects.")

AC37213 - 136 Field Point Circle Holding Co., LLC v. Razinski ("The issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred when it rendered a judgment of possession for the plaintiff . . . in a summary process action without first conducting the hearing prescribed by General Statutes § 47a-26b (d). We conclude that the court erred and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the court.


The defendants . . . appeal from the judgment of possession. On appeal, they claim that the judgment was ultra vires because rendering it violated § 47a-26b (d). The plaintiff responds that the self-executing provision of § 47a-26b(d) did not apply at the phase of the proceedings in which the court rendered a judgment of possession. The plaintiff also claims that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the appeal because it is moot. We agree with the defendants.")

AC37396 - Kenosia Commons, Inc. v. DaCosta ("The plaintiff, Kenosia Commons, Inc., appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the defendants, Cynthia DaCosta and Candra DaCosta, in this summary process action. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly concluded that by virtue of Cynthia DaCosta’s ownership of shares of stock in the plaintiff corporation she is not subject to summary process proceedings pursuant to General Statutes § 21-80. We reverse the judgment of the trial court.")

AC36519 - Lee v. Stanziale (In this landlord-tenant case, the defendant . . . appeals from the judgment of the trial court awarding the plaintiff . . . a total of $18,122.50 in attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to General Statutes § 52-251a. The defendant contends that the court abused its discretion in so doing. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

AC36458 - Success, Inc. v. Curcio ("In this summary process action, the defendants Gus Curcio, Jr., and Theresa Smyers appeal following the trial court’s denial of their motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and the rendering of judgment of immediate possession of premises located in Stratford in favor of the plaintiff, Success, Inc. The defendants claim that the court erred in: (1) denying their motion to dismiss and finding that the plaintiff had standing as the legal owner of the property to pursue its summary process action, (2) improperly rendering judgment of immediate possession in favor of the plaintiff because Curcio, Jr., is the beneficial owner of the property, and (3) improperly failing to impose a constructive trust in favor of the defendants. We agree with the defendants that the plaintiff failed to sufficiently prove legal ownership of the premises and, as a result, lacked standing to initiate the summary process action. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court and remand this case with direction to dismiss the plaintiff’s action.")

AC35834 - Southhaven Associates, LLC v. McMerlin, LLC (Breach of commercial lease agreement; "The defendant Francis G. Linn, guarantor of a commercial lease agreement, appeals from the judgment of the trial court in favor of the plaintiff landlord . . . in this action brought against the defendant tenant and the defendant guarantors of the lease. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court erred in its factual findings with regard to his special defense of failure to mitigate damages and in its calculation of damages. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")