SC20779 - State v. Carter ("Following a jury trial, the defendant, Jacques Carter, was convicted of home invasion in violation of General Statutes § 53a-100aa (a) (2) and burglary in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-101 (a) (1) stemming from a break-in at a Danbury apartment in 2016. During the break-in, the defendant was armed with a Crosman Vigilante air gun that was loaded with pellets, but the gun had no carbon dioxide (CO2) cartridge installed, and the chamber where the CO2 cartridge would be installed was sealed off with duct tape. To obtain a conviction under either of the foregoing statutes, as charged in the information in this case, the state had to establish, among other things, that the defendant was "armed with . . . a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument." On appeal, the defendant's primary contention is that the trial court erroneously allowed the jury to determine that the air gun he carried during the break-in constituted a deadly weapon. We agree that, as a matter of law, an air gun in which a CO2 cartridge cannot be readily installed is not a deadly weapon. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.")

SC20828 - State v. Delacruz-Gomez ("In this appeal, we address two claims that the trial court improperly admitted unduly prejudicial evidence. The defendant, Raikes Y. Delacruz-Gomez, was convicted, following a jury trial, of assault of public safety personnel in violation of General Statutes (Supp. 2016) § 53a-167c (a) (1), and interfering with an officer in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 2015) § 53a-167a (a), after injuring a police officer assigned to a joint federal and state task force that was executing a warrant for his arrest. We granted certification to appeal from the judgment of the Appellate Court, which affirmed the trial court's judgment of conviction. The defendant contends that the Appellate Court incorrectly held that the trial court had not abused its discretion by admitting testimony naming the felony charges in the defendant's outstanding warrant (warrant charges) and identifying the task force that executed that warrant as the "Violent Fugitive Task Force." We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the evidence pertaining to the warrant charges. We further conclude that, although the evidence pertaining to the name of the task force should not have been admitted, that evidence did not substantially sway the jury's verdict. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.")