AC44356 - State v. Delacruz-Gomez (Assault of public safety personnel and interfering with an officer; “On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court improperly admitted into evidence (1) testimony as to the names of felony charges contained in a prior outstanding warrant for the defendant’s arrest as prior uncharged misconduct evidence, and (2) testimony naming the task force that had executed that warrant, specifically, the Violent Fugitive Task Force. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.”)

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SC20497 - State v. Calhoun (Eyewitnesses to unsolved murder; Murder charge under§ 53a-54a (a); “The outcome of the trial rested largely on the jury’s assessment of the credibility of Canty and Kierce. Their motivations were subject to impeachment because each of them was incarcerated when they first contacted the state about the case, and they each received consideration from the state in return for testifying pursuant to cooperation agreements. The jury returned a verdict finding the defendant guilty of murder. The defendant claims on appeal that the trial court made three erroneous rulings requiring reversal, namely, (1) declining to give the jury a jailhouse informant instruction, (2) admitting into evidence the entirety of Canty’s and Kierce’s cooperation agreements, and (3) not allowing defense counsel to cross-examine Kierce regarding certain details of a prior arrest. We affirm the judgment of conviction.”)

SC20521- State v. Curet (“The state appeals from the judgment of the Appellate Court reversing the conviction of the defendant, Shaila M. Curet, following her conditional plea of nolo contendere to the charge of possession of narcotics with intent to sell in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 2015) § 21a-277 (a). On appeal, the state claims that the Appellate Court incorrectly determined that the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized by the police following a warrantless entry into her apartment should have been granted. We agree and reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.”)

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AC44561 - State v. Armstrong (“Attempt to commit robbery in the first degree; firearm possession; “The defendant claims that (1) the court violated his right to self-representation, (2) the court committed instructional error with respect to the essential elements of attempted robbery, (3) the court improperly enhanced his sentence pursuant to § 53a-40 (g), and (4) the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was guilty of attempted robbery. We agree with the defendant that the state did not satisfy its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that he took a substantial step in the commission of the offense because the evidence did not support a finding that he displayed or threatened the use of what he represented by his words or conduct to be a firearm. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of conviction and remand the case to the trial court with direction to render a judgment of acquittal.”)

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SC20588 - State v. King (“On appeal before this court, the defendant claims that the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that the elements of Florida’s driving under the influence statute, Fla. Stat. Ann. § 316.193, which he previously had been convicted of violating twice, were substantially the same as the elements of § 14-227a (a) for enhancement purposes under § 14-227a (g) because, he contends, the phrase ‘actual physical control’ under § 316.193 (1) criminalizes a broader range of conduct than does the term ‘operating’ under § 14-227a (a). To decide this question, we first must address an issue we have not confronted before: the meaning of the phrase in § 14- 227a (g) that provides an enhancement for ‘any offense the essential elements of which are determined by the court to be substantially the same as subdivision (1) or (2) of subsection (a) of this section . . . .’ We conclude that this phrase means that the basic and necessary parts of the out-of-state statute, including the actus reus, mens rea, and causation, must be the same as the elements of § 14-227a (a) to a considerable degree. Applying this definition to the claim at issue, we conclude that the essential elements of § 14-227a (a) and § 316.193 are substantially the same. Accordingly, we affirm the Appellate Court’s judgment.”)

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SC20164 - State v. Juan A. G.-P. (“On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court violated his right to confrontation under the sixth amendment to the United States constitution by not ordering disclosure of the victims’ psychiatric records to the defense. The defendant asks this court to conduct an independent review of those records to determine whether they contain exculpatory or relevant impeachment material. The defendant further claims that the trial court violated his confrontation rights by preventing him from questioning the victims’ mothers about their U visa applications. Lastly, the defendant raises two unpreserved claims of instructional error. Specifically, he claims that the trial court improperly (1) instructed the jury that, if the evidence was subject to two different interpretations, the jury was ‘‘not required to accept the interpretation consistent with innocence,’’ and (2) failed to instruct the jury, in accordance with instruction 2.6-11 of Connecticut’s model criminal jury instructions, that it must consider each count separately and that a verdict reached on one count does not control the verdict on any other count.”)

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AC44043 - State v. Foster (Psychiatric Security Review Board; § 17a-593; “The acquittee claims that the court improperly (1) found that the state had proven by clear and convincing evidence that he suffered from a mental illness resulting in his being a danger to himself or others and (2) rejected his claim that § 17a-593, as applied to him, violates his right to equal protection guaranteed by the federal constitution. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.”)

• Concurrence -

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AC44701 - State v. Hurdle (Alford doctrine; robbery in the first degree; conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree; “The defendant claims that the trial court improperly (1) determined that it lacked the authority, in accordance with General Statutes § 18-98d, to award him presentence confinement credit, (2) accepted his guilty pleas and denied his subsequent motion for jail credit or to withdraw his pleas, despite his contention that there was never a ‘meeting of the minds’ regarding the terms of his plea agreement with the state, and (3) violated his constitutional rights by failing to advise him during his plea canvass that his guilty pleas would operate as a waiver of his right to a trial by jury. We affirm the judgment of conviction.”)

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AC45019 - State v. Griffin (Assault of an elderly person in the second degree; “On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress a firearm and narcotics that were seized by the police following a warrantless search of a motor vehicle that was connected to the defendant and located near the scene of the defendant’s arrest. We conclude that, under the circumstances of this case, the court properly relied on the automobile exception in determining that the police were not obligated to obtain a warrant before searching the vehicle. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court.”)

AC44690 - State v. Charles L. (Risk of injury to a child; “On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) the evidence was insufficient for the jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that his actions constituted an act likely to impair the health of a child and (2) ‘‘§ 53-21 (a) (1) is unconstitutionally vague as applied to the facts of this case . . . .’’ We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.”)

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AC45097 - State v. Henry (“On appeal, the defendant argues that the court improperly denied his motion to correct because his sentence imposing a period of special parole violated General Statutes (Rev. to 2017) § 54-125e (b) (1), as amended by No. 18-63 of the 2018 Public Acts (P.A. 18-63). In response, the state argues that the court properly denied the defendant’s motion to correct because that statutory provision does not apply retroactively to the defendant’s crimes. We agree with the state and, therefore, affirm the judgment of the trial court.”)

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SC20371 - State v. Brandon (“The defendant appeals from the judgment of conviction, following a jury trial, of manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm in violation of General Statutes § 53a-55a (a). The defendant claims that the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress the statements he made during two separately recorded interrogations of him by police officers. As to the first interrogation, which occurred on February 16, 2016, sometime between 11 a.m. and noon, at the Bridgeport Office of Adult Probation, the defendant contends that, because the police failed to advise him of his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478–79, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966), the interrogation violated his rights under the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution. As to the second interrogation, which occurred later on the same day, at approximately 6 p.m., at the Bridgeport Police Department, the defendant claims that, notwithstanding the fact that the officers had issued Miranda warnings at the outset of that interrogation, it was tainted by the alleged illegality of the first interrogation. We disagree. After review, we have determined that the first interrogation was not custodial, and, therefore, that Miranda warnings were not required. Consequently, the failure to provide them did not violate the defendant’s rights and did not taint the second interrogation. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the statements he made during the two interrogations and, therefore, affirm the judgment of the trial court.”)

• Concurrence
• Dissent

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SC20453 - State v. James A. (“On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion when it (1) joined for trial his sexual assault, risk of injury to a child, and strangulation charges with his threatening and disorderly conduct charges, and (2) denied his request, as a remedy for the disclosure of his prior incarceration by one of the state’s witnesses, that he be allowed to testify about the nonsexual nature of his prior felony convictions without opening the door to being asked on cross-examination about the nature of those convictions. We reject the defendant’s claims and, accordingly, affirm the judgments of the trial court.”)

• Concurrence

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AC44149 - State v. Billings (“On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) the court abused its discretion by admitting into evidence social media posts and messages that the state failed to properly authenticate, (2) the state committed prosecutorial impropriety by failing to comply with certain discovery requirements and by making improper statements during its closing arguments, (3) the court abused its discretion when it declined to sanction the state for violating a court order regarding discovery, and (4) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions for stalking and harassment because they were predicated on speech protected by the first amendment. Because we agree with the defendant with respect to his first amendment claim, we reverse the judgment of conviction of harassment in the second degree and stalking in the second degree. The judgment is affirmed in all other respects.”)

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SC20456 - State v. Douglas C. (Five counts of risk of injury to a child in violation of § 53-21 (a) (2); “The defendant claims that counts one, five, and six were duplicitous because each count charged him with a single violation of § 53-21 (a) (2), despite evidence at trial of multiple, separate incidents of conduct. As a result, he argues that the trial court improperly declined to give the jury a specific unanimity instruction as to these counts. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.”)

• Concurrence

SC20504 - State v. Joseph V. (Sexual assault in the first degree; risk of injury to a child; conspiracy to commit risk of injury to a child; “We now must apply our holding in Douglas C. to the present case …The defendant claims that each count was duplicitous because each count charged him with a single violation of the underlying statute despite evidence at trial of multiple, separate incidents of conduct, each of which could establish a violation of the statute, thus creating the possibility that the jury found him guilty without having unanimously agreed on which incident occurred. As a result, he argues that the trial court’s failure to either grant his request for a bill of particulars or a specific unanimity instruction violated his federal constitutional right to jury unanimity. We agree with the defendant as to the sexual assault count but disagree with him as to the risk of injury and conspiracy counts. Accordingly, we reverse in part the Appellate Court’s judgment and remand the case to that court with direction to remand the case to the trial court for a new trial on the sexual assault count.”)

• Concurrence and Dissent

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SC20438 - State v. Gary S. (“On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction on certain counts, and (2) the prosecutor made improper remarks during closing and rebuttal arguments that deprived the defendant of his constitutional right to a fair trial. Because the state concedes that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support the defendant’s conviction on the charge of risk of injury to a child pertaining to one of the complainants, A, we reverse the trial court’s judgment with respect to that count. We reject each of the defendant’s remaining claims and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of conviction in all other respects.”)

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SC20408 - State v. Brown (“On appeal, the defendant claims that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of felony murder. Specifically, he contends that there was no evidence that he intended to commit a larceny, that he committed a larceny, or that he used or threatened the immediate use of physical force to effectuate a taking, as required to establish that he committed robbery in the third degree. The defendant also contends that, if this court agrees with his claim of insufficient evidence of felony murder, it cannot reinstate his vacated conviction of the intentional manslaughter in the first degree charge because the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he did not shoot the victim in self-defense. Finally, the defendant claims that his conviction must be reversed because the prosecutor engaged in prosecutorial improprieties during closing argument. We reject the defendant’s insufficiency claim and, therefore, need not address his claim related to the manslaughter conviction. We also reject the defendant’s claims of prosecutorial impropriety and, therefore, affirm the judgment of the trial court.”)

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SC210039 Order on Motion - State v. Pan (“The defendant, Qinxuan Pan, seeks review of the trial court’s denial of his motion for modification of the $20 million bond that was set in connection with murder charges against him. The defendant claims that the trial court, Harmon, J., abused its discretion in denying his motion to modify the $20 million bond set at his arraignment by the trial court, B. Fischer, J., because (1) the bail amount is unreasonably high, and (2) the trial court incorrectly concluded that it lacked the authority under Practice Book § 38-8 to grant the defendant’s request for a 10 percent cash option. Although we conclude that the $20 million bond amount was not an abuse of the trial court’s discretion given the extraordinary flight risk and public safety considerations presented in this case, we agree with the defendant’s second claim and conclude that remand to the trial court is necessary for that court to consider its authority to grant a 10 percent cash option. Because this case highlights the existence of several substantive and procedural issues concerning the information on which the judges of the Superior Court rely in setting reasonable bond amounts, we also address the procedures applicable to any future bond modification proceedings. Accordingly, we grant the defendant’s petition for review, and we grant the relief requested in part.”)

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SC20367 - State v. Ares ( Criminal; Whether evidence insufficient for conviction under act prong of risk of injury to a child in violation of General Statutes § 53-21 (a) (1); Whether risk of injury statute unconstitutionally vague as applied; Whether defendant improperly convicted under situation prong of risk of injury statute for which he was not charged; "After a bench trial, the defendant, Angel Ares, was convicted of one count of arson in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-111, eight counts of reckless endangerment in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-63, and four counts of risk of injury to a child in violation of General Statutes § 53-21 (a) (1). In the present appeal, the defendant challenges only his convictions of risk of injury to a child by raising the following three claims of error: (1) there was insufficient evidence to support a conviction under the act prong of § 53-21 (a) (1) because the state had failed to adduce any proof that he had "perpetrated an act directly on the person of a minor" as required by the judicial gloss first imposed by this court in State v. Schriver, 207 Conn. 456, 542 A.2d 686 (1988); (2) the act prong of § 53-21 (a) (1) is unconstitutionally vague as applied to him because the conduct proven by the state falls outside of that very same gloss; and (3) the trial court improperly convicted him under the situation prong of § 53-21 (a) (1) when the state's allegations against him were limited to only the act prong of that statute. Although our reading of Schriver and its progeny leads us to reject the defendant's first two claims on this record, we agree with the defendant that the trial court committed reversible error by applying the incorrect elements and convicting the defendant under the situation prong, a provision he was not formally charged with violating. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's judgment of conviction with respect to the counts of risk of injury to a child and remand the case for a new trial only as to those four counts.")

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SC20495 - State v. Washington (“On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) the trial court erred when it in admitted into evidence recordings of phone calls that the defendant made while incarcerated, thereby permitting the state to use the defendant’s postarrest silence against him, (2) the trial court erred when it instructed the jury regarding adoptive admissions and combat by agreement, respectively, (3) the prosecutor committed improprieties during certain portions of his closing argument, and (4) the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion for a new trial, in light of fact that the COVID-19 pandemic impacted the jury’s deliberations. Although we conclude that the majority of the defendant’s claims are without merit, we agree with his contention that the trial court improperly instructed the jury on combat by agreement, as there was insufficient evidence presented at trial to warrant the instruction. We nevertheless conclude that the error was harmless and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of conviction.”)

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SC20235 - State v. Ortega (Tender years exception to the hearsay rule, § 54-86l (a) (1); Conn. Code Evid. § 8-10; “On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion by, inter alia, (1) admitting into evidence certain out-of-court statements of the victim, N,2 under the tender years exception to the hearsay rule, (2) admitting a transcript, which had been modified by N’s mother, Joselin, of a recorded conversation between N and Joselin, and (3) denying the defendant’s request for a continuance during trial. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the out-of-court statements of N under the tender years exception. We further conclude that the defendant failed to preserve his claim that the court abused its discretion in admitting the modified transcript and that the record does not support the defendant’s claim that the court denied his request for a continuance. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.”)

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SC20437 - State v. Johnson (“On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) the admission of the testimony of a forensic biologist and a DNA analyst violated his rights under the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment to the United States constitution, (2) the state violated his due process rights by failing to correct the false or substantially misleading testimony of its witnesses, and (3) the use of the term ‘victim’ by the prosecutor and some of the state’s witnesses during the trial prejudiced him. We conclude that the defendant’s claims fail and, accordingly, affirm the judgment.”)

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