AC44925 - Stewart v. Old Republic National Title Ins. Co. (“On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the court improperly concluded that, pursuant to the plaintiffs’ title insurance policies, the defendant had no duty to defend the plaintiffs in two actions involving the plaintiffs’ properties. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.”)

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• Insurance Law,
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AC45151 - Stamford Property Holdings, LLC v. Jashari ("The present appeal arises out of an action brought by the plaintiff lessor, Stamford Property Holdings, LLC, against the defendant lessees, Dorian Jashari (Jashari) and Ismet Jashari, seeking, inter alia, reformation of a commercial lease between the parties based on unilateral or mutual mistake. The defendants appeal from the trial court's judgment in favor of the plaintiff. On appeal, they claim that the court (1) improperly granted reformation of the contract based on the ground of unilateral mistake because, contrary to the court's conclusion, there was no clear, substantial, and convincing proof of inequitable conduct on the part of the defendants, and (2) erred by granting the plaintiff equitable relief because the plaintiff's misconduct before the parties executed the lease barred its claim for reformation. We conclude that the defendants' first claim is moot, and we are not persuaded by their second claim. Accordingly, we dismiss as moot the portion of the appeal related to the first claim and affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

AC45880 - Centrix Management Co., LLC v. Fosberg ("In this summary process action, the plaintiff landlord, Centrix Management Company, LLC, appeals from the trial court's postjudgment award of attorney's fees to the defendant tenant, Donald Fosberg, pursuant to General Statutes § 42-150bb. The defendant moves to dismiss this appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the ground that the plaintiff failed to timely appeal pursuant to General Statutes § 47a-35. The plaintiff opposes the motion, arguing that the applicable appeal period is not five days under § 47a-35 but, rather, twenty days under Practice Book § 63-1, as it is not challenging the judgment of possession. We conclude that the twenty day appeal period set forth in Practice Book § 63-1 applies to a postjudgment award of attorney's fees in the summary process context. We therefore deny the motion to dismiss.")

• Posted in:
• Contract Law,
• Landlord / Tenant Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC45040 - Bradley v. Yovino (“This appeal arises out of an action brought by the plaintiffs, Dhameer Bradley and Malik St. Hilaire, two former students of the defendant Sacred Heart University, Inc. (university), against the university and the defendant Nikki Yovino. Yovino, a fellow student at the university, accused the plaintiffs of sexually assaulting her but later recanted her allegations and pleaded guilty to the charges of falsely reporting an incident in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-180c and interfering with an officer in violation of General Statutes § 53a-167a. In this action, the plaintiffs allege that Yovino committed various torts against them by falsely accusing them of sexual assault and that the university breached its contract with them in the manner in which it conducted an investigation into Yovino’s accusations and by suspending them from the university.

Bradley appeals from the summary judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the university as to the count of the complaint brought by him against the university. On appeal, he claims that the court improperly (1) denied his motion to compel a round of second depositions of certain university employees and his related motion for an extension of time to respond to the university’s motion for summary judgment, (2) rendered summary judgment against him without permitting oral argument on the university’s motion in violation of Practice Book § 11-18, and (3) denied his motion for reargument of his motion to compel and the summary judgment rendered against him. We conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion by denying Bradley’s motion to compel a second round of depositions or his motion for an extension of time. We also conclude that, although the court improperly deprived the plaintiff of oral argument pursuant to Practice Book § 11-18, that error was harmless because, in light of the procedural posture of this case, there is not a reasonable probability that oral argument would have resulted in the trial court denying the motion for summary judgment. Finally, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion by denying Bradley’s motion for reargument. Accordingly, we affirm the summary judgment rendered against Bradley and in favor of the university.”)

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• Recent Opinions

SC20660 - Strazza Building & Construction, Inc. v. Harris ("In Girolametti v. Michael Horton Associates, Inc., 332 Conn. 67, 87, 208 A.3d 1223 (2019), this court held that, when a property owner and a general contractor have resolved disputes arising from a construction project by way of binding arbitration, there arises a rebuttable presumption that the general contractor and its subcontractors are in privity for purposes of res judicata in any subsequent litigation. In this certified appeal, we must determine whether the Appellate Court correctly applied Girolametti to the facts of the present case, in which a general contractor had sued the property owner to foreclose two mechanic's liens it served on the owner, claiming unpaid balances for labor and materials stemming from renovations it began on the owner's home. In particular, we consider whether the Appellate Court properly upheld the trial court's denial of the property owner's motion for summary judgment, declining to give preclusive effect to the findings of the trial court in a prior action between the owner and one of the general contractor's subcontractors. We agree with the Appellate Court that the presumption of privity that we held to apply in Girolametti does not apply in the present case, in which a property owner seeks to bind a general contractor to a prior judgment against a subcontractor. We also agree that the trial court correctly denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment because there remains an issue of material fact as to whether the doctrine of res judicata applies to the facts of this case.

. . . The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.")

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• Contract Law,
• Foreclosure Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC45277 - Circulent, Inc. v. Hatch & Bailey Co.(“In this action for breach of contract, the plaintiff, Circulent, Inc., appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the defendant, The Hatch and Bailey Company. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court erred in finding that (1) the defendant paid in full the amounts owed to the plaintiff on the parties’ managed technologies services agreement (MTS agreement), (2) the term of the parties’ ‘‘Disaster Recovery-as-a-Service’’ agreement (DRaaS agreement) was one year rather than three years, and (3) the defendant paid in full the amounts owed on the DRaaS agreement. The plaintiff argues that, as a result of its erroneous findings, the court improperly rendered judgment in favor of the defendant as to counts one and two of the plaintiff’s complaint, which alleged a breach of the DRaaS agreement and a breach of the MTS agreement, respectively. Because we conclude that the court’s conclusions as to those counts rested on clearly erroneous factual findings, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for a new trial as to those counts.”)

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• Contract Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC44843 - Ah Min Holding, LLC v. Hartford ("The plaintiff, Ah Min Holding, LLC, appeals from the judgment of the trial court, rendered in favor of the defendant, the city of Hartford, on the plaintiff's claims that the defendant breached a tax abatement agreement (agreement) regarding properties owned by the plaintiff and known as the Clay Arsenal Renaissance Apartments (CARA properties) and that the defendant was unjustly enriched by that alleged breach. On appeal, the plaintiff argues that the court improperly (1) read into the agreement a term that the plaintiff must comply with the General Statutes and certain provisions of the defendant's Municipal Code (code) relating to the maintenance of dwelling units, (2) concluded that the defendant had a contractual right to terminate the agreement, and (3) concluded that the plaintiff failed to prove that the defendant breached the agreement. The defendant argues in response that the court properly read the related statutes and code provisions into the agreement. Further, the defendant argues that, because those provisions properly were read into the agreement, the court correctly determined that the defendant had the contractual right to terminate the agreement because the plaintiff failed to maintain the properties in accordance therewith and that the plaintiff failed to prove that the defendant breached the agreement. We agree with the defendant and, therefore, affirm the judgment.")

• Posted in:
• Contract Law,
• Property Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC45192 - Myshkina v. Gusinski (Breach of contract; motion for default for failure to appear; motion for judgment on default; "The defendant, Vladimir Gusinski, appeals from the default judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff, Galina Myshkina. The defendant claims that the court, in rendering the judgment, improperly relied on the affidavit of debt of the plaintiff's counsel in contravention of Practice Book § 17-25 (b) (1). We agree and reverse the judgment of the trial court.")

• Posted in:
• Contract Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC44274 - Schimenti Construction Co., LLC v. Schimenti (“The plaintiff, Schimenti Construction Company, LLC, appeals from the summary judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of the defendant, Joseph Schimenti, on counts one and two of its complaint alleging breach of an employment contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court erred in determining that continued employment of an at-will employee does not constitute consideration for a restrictive covenant. We agree with plaintiff’s claim and, therefore, reverse the summary judgment rendered in favor of the defendant and remand the case for further proceedings.”)

• Posted in:
• Contract Law,
• Employment Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC45123 - Johnson v. Vita Built, LLC (“We agree that the court improperly concluded that the contract unambiguously provided that the parties would share only in net profits and did not reflect an intent to share in all losses resulting from the sale of the property. We also agree with the plaintiffs that the court made clearly erroneous factual findings in support of its alternative conclusion that, even if the contract is ambiguous regarding the parties’ intent, the parol evidence established probable cause that the defendants would prevail on their counterclaim. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court granting the defendants’ application for a prejudgment remedy and remand for a new prejudgment remedy hearing.”)

• Posted in:
• Contract Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC44740 - 307 White Street Realty, LLC v. Beaver Brook Group, LLC (“The present appeal arises out of an action brought by the plaintiff lessee, 307 White Street Realty, LLC, against the defendant lessor, Beaver Brook Group, LLC, to enforce an option to purchase clause in the parties' commercial lease (lease option), which included certain concomitant contractual and statutory obligations related to the Hazardous Waste Establishment Transfer Act, General Statutes § 22a-134 et seq. (Transfer Act). The plaintiff appeals from the judgment of the trial court granting the defendant's motion to dismiss the present action as moot because, after the plaintiff commenced it, the parties executed a purchase and sale agreement regarding the leased property that purportedly supersedes the lease option with respect to the sale of the property such that the court no longer can afford any practical relief to the plaintiff by adjudicating the underlying action. The plaintiff claims on appeal that the court improperly (1) determined that the defendant's motion to dismiss implicated the court's subject matter jurisdiction, (2) failed to hold an evidentiary hearing necessary to resolve disputed material facts, and (3) concluded that the execution of the purchase and sale agreement rendered the plaintiff's action moot in its entirety. For the reasons that follow, we agree with the plaintiff that the court improperly granted the motion to dismiss, and, accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court and remand for further proceedings.”)

AC45078 - Tremont Public Advisors, LLC v. Materials Innovation & Recycling Authority (“The plaintiff, Tremont Public Advisors, LLC, appeals from the judgment of the trial court, rendered following the court's decision striking the plaintiff's complaint. The plaintiff claims that the court erred in concluding that the defendant, Materials Innovation and Recycling Authority (MIRA), formerly known as Connecticut Resources Recovery Authority, is exempt from liability under the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), General Statutes § 42-110a et seq., for engaging in allegedly illegitimate bidding practices. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.”)

• Posted in:
• Contract Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC44872 -Fischer v. People's United Bank, N.A. (“We conclude that (1) the judgment dismissing some, but not all, counts of the complaint brought by Fischer and Fischer Real Estate, Inc., is not an appealable final judgment, and (2) the court properly dismissed all counts brought by 1730 LP for a lack of subject matter jurisdiction because 1730 LP’s general partner did not authorize the commencement of the action against the defendants. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal as it pertains to Fischer and Fischer Real Estate, Inc., and affirm the court’s judgment of dismissal as it relates to the claims brought by 1730 LP.”)

• Posted in:
• Contract Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC44416 - Downing v. Dragone (“In this breach of contract action, the defendant Dragone Classic Motorcars, Inc., appeals from the judgment of the trial court, rendered after a court trial, in favor of the plaintiff, Christine Downing. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly (1) found that a written contract existed between the parties and (2) admitted ‘‘hearsay evidence’’ on the issue of damages. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.”)

• Posted in:
• Contract Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC44790 - Metropolitan District Commission v. Marriott International, Inc. (“The plaintiff claims on appeal that the trial court, in ruling on the defendant's postjudgment motion, improperly ordered the discharge of its sewer benefit assessment lien, which the plaintiff argues exceeded the court's jurisdiction and constituted an "unlawful end run around § [7-250] . . . ." The defendant disagrees, contending that the court either had continuing jurisdiction to invalidate the lien as a means of effectuating its summary judgment ruling in favor of the defendant or that it properly acted pursuant to the statutory authority granted it by § 49-51. Alternatively, the defendant argues that the plaintiff's claim is barred by res judicata and/or judicial estoppel. For the reasons that follow, we agree with the plaintiff that the court improperly ordered the sewer benefit assessment lien discharged and reject the defendant's arguments to the contrary. Accordingly, we reverse in part the judgment of the court and remand with direction to deny, in total, the defendant's postjudgment motion.”)

• Posted in:
• Contract Law,
• Property Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC44322 - Paniccia v. Success Village Apartments, Inc. ("In this breach of contract action, the named defendant, Success Village Apartments, Inc., appeals from the judgment of the trial court, rendered after a second court trial, in favor of the plaintiff, David Paniccia, the defendant’s former employee. In 2018, following the first court trial of this matter, the court, Arnold, J., rendered judgment for the defendant on the plaintiff’s claims for breach of an employment contract, violations of General Statutes §§ 31-71b and 31-72,2 and breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing. Thereafter, however, Judge Arnold granted the plaintiff’s motion to open and vacate the judgment because his judgment was rendered untimely pursuant to General Statutes § 51-183b, which requires that a trial court render a decision within 120 days after the completion of a civil trial.3 After conducting a second court trial in 2019, the court, Jacobs, J., rendered judgment for the plaintiff and awarded him $172,969.90 in damages, which included $11,672.46 in prejudgment interest on back wages.

On appeal, the defendant claims that Judge Arnold improperly granted the plaintiff's motion to open and vacate the 2018 judgment for the defendant. In the alternative, the defendant claims that Judge Jacobs improperly (1) relied on parol evidence rather than the employment contract in finding that the contract was valid and enforceable and (2) awarded the plaintiff prejudgment interest pursuant to General Statutes § 37-3a. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.”)

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• Contract Law,
• Employment Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC43880 - Bruno v. Whipple ("The plaintiff, Lisa Bruno, appeals, and the defendant Heritage Homes Construction Company, LLC, cross appeals, from the judgment of the trial court denying their respective motions for attorney's fees. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court erred by failing to award her (1) attorney's fees pursuant to General Statutes § 42-150bb and/or (2) attorney's fees and other litigation-related costs pursuant to a fee-shifting provision of a construction contract executed by the parties. On cross appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly denied its motion for attorney's fees because the defendant, not the plaintiff, is the prevailing party in this matter. We conclude that the court did not err in denying both motions for attorney's fees. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

AC44804 - Hassett v. Secor's Auto Center, Inc. ("In this action arising from the purchase of a used motor vehicle by the plaintiff, Erin C. Hassett, from the defendant, Secor's Auto Center, Inc., a used car dealer, the trial court rendered judgment in accordance with a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff with respect to four of the five claims set forth in the complaint and awarded the plaintiff $11,000 in damages. On appeal from that judgment, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly denied her motion for additur. We disagree and affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

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• Contract Law,
• Recent Opinions

SC20543, SC20544 - Clinton v. Aspinwall (Action to recover damages for breach of contract and fiduciary duty; "When a court renders judgment in a multicount civil action with fewer than all counts of a plaintiff’s complaint accounted for in that judgment, jurisdictional alarm bells should ring if any party files an appeal, alerting the parties and the trial court to a potential final judgment problem. Before the parties and the appellate courts expend resources resolving the appeal, it is important to examine the rules of practice, statutes and our case law to determine whether an appeal can be taken from that judgment. See General Statutes §§ 51-197a and 52-263; Practice Book §§ 61-2 through 61-5. In Meribear Productions, Inc. v. Frank, 328 Conn. 709, 183 A.3d 1164 (2018), we held in the context of a court trial that, when legally consistent theories of recovery have been litigated but not all theories have been ruled on, there is no final judgment. The present appeals require us to determine whether the same threshold jurisdictional rule applies in the context of civil jury trials. We hold that it does and are therefore compelled to vacate the judgment of the Appellate Court and to remand this case to that court with direction to dismiss the appeals for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.")

• Posted in:
• Contract Law,
• Tort Law

AC44424 - Harrigan v. Fidelity National Title Ins. Co. (The plaintiff, Paul Harrigan, appeals from the judgment of the trial court, following a bench trial, rendered in part in favor of the defendant, Fidelity National Title Insurance Company, in connection with a title insurance policy (title policy) issued by the defendant to the plaintiff. On appeal, the plaintiff challenges the judgment in favor of the defendant only with respect to count two of the operative complaint, the third revised complaint, which alleges that the defendant's conduct in handling an insurance claim filed by the plaintiff pursuant to the title policy violated the Connecticut Unfair Insurance Practices Act (CUIPA); General Statutes § 38a-815 et seq.; and that such unfair and deceptive acts or practices of the defendant thereby violated the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), General Statutes § 42-110a et seq. Specifically, the plaintiff claims on appeal that (1) the court applied an incorrect standard in its analysis of whether the defendant violated CUIPA by requiring a finding of common-law bad faith by the defendant for the plaintiff to establish a violation of CUIPA, (2) when the proper standard is applied, the record sufficiently demonstrates that the defendant violated the relevant provisions of CUIPA, and (3) the evidence submitted by the plaintiff establishes that the defendant's unfair practices were part of a general business practice, as required under General Statutes § 38a-816 (6). We affirm the judgment of the court, albeit on different grounds.")

AC44560 - Pollard v. Geico General Ins. Co. (The plaintiff, Michelle J. Pollard, appeals from the summary judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of the defendant, Geico General Insurance Company, on the plaintiff's complaint seeking to recover underinsured motorist benefits. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly determined that the accidental failure of suit statute, General Statutes § 52-592 (a), did not apply so as to revive her otherwise time barred action. The defendant counters that summary judgment was appropriately rendered and asserts, as an alternative ground for affirmance of the court's judgment, that the plaintiff's action was barred because she failed under the terms of the parties' insurance policy to commence suit timely or to invoke the policy's tolling provision. We agree with the defendant's alternative argument and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court on that basis.)

• Posted in:
• Contract Law,
• Insurance Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC44537 - Konover Development Corp. v. Waterbury Omega, LLC (“The defendant Waterbury Omega, LLC appeals from the judgment of the trial court granting the application for a prejudgment remedy in favor of the plaintiff, Konover Development Corporation, upon a finding of probable cause that the defendant had breached an oral agreement for the plaintiff's procurement, management and accounting of building/rooftop wireless telecommunications agreements on behalf of the defendant. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly concluded that the plaintiff had established probable cause in light of its defenses that enforcement of the oral agreement was barred by (1) General Statutes § 20-325a, (2) the rule against perpetuities, and (3) the statute of frauds. We affirm the judgment of the court.”)

• Posted in:
• Business Law,
• Contract Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC44436 - Brass Mill Center, LLC v. Subway Real Estate Corp. ("The defendant AlliedBarton Security Services, LLC, appeals from the judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of the plaintiff, Brass Mill Center, LLC, granting summary judgment as to liability and awarding damages. The defendant argues that the trial court improperly concluded that it had a contractual duty (1) to defend the plaintiff in an underlying wrongful death action brought against the plaintiff and (2) to indemnify the plaintiff in that same wrongful death action, including for attorney’s fees and costs that the plaintiff incurred in pursuing claims against third parties. We agree and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the trial court.")

• Posted in:
• Contract Law,
• Recent Opinions,
• Tort Law

AC44397 - Sargent, Sargent & Jacobs, LLC v. Thoele ("This interpleader action arises from a dispute between the defendant purchaser, Merwin, LLC (purchaser), and the defendant seller, Alan Thoele (seller), concerning a failed commercial real estate transaction. The seller appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the purchaser on its claims for breach of contract and return of deposit. On appeal, the seller claims that the court erred in concluding that (1) the parol evidence rule precluded consideration of a letter of intent from 2016, (2) the purchaser did not have actual knowledge of a potential sewer easement on the property, (3) the potential sewer easement was an encumbrance on the property, and (4) the seller's failure to disclose the potential sewer easement was a material breach of the purchase and sale agreement. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

• Posted in:
• Contract Law,
• Recent Opinions