SC20906 - Ammar I. v. Dept. of Children & Families ("The sole issue in this certified appeal is whether the litigation privilege affords absolute immunity to the defendant, the Department of Children and Families, from a claim by the self-represented plaintiff, Ammar I., that the defendant had discriminated against him based on his religion during his termination of parental rights trial. The plaintiff asserts that the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that the litigation privilege barred his discrimination claim challenging the defendant's improper use of child protection proceedings to alienate him from his children. We conclude that the Appellate Court correctly held that the litigation privilege barred the plaintiff's remaining timely allegations pertaining exclusively to the defendant's actions during his termination of parental rights trial. We nevertheless reverse in part the Appellate Court's judgment to the extent that the court's remand order directed the trial court to grant the defendant's motion to dismiss in its entirety. We therefore affirm in part and reverse in part the Appellate Court's judgment.")

• Posted in:
• Civil Procedure,
• Recent Opinions,
• Tort Law

AC47097- Marks v. GLT Development Corp. ("In this personal injury action, which arose during the COVID-19 pandemic, the plaintiff, Stephen Marks, appeals from the judgment of the trial court granting the defendant GLT Development Corporation's motion to strike on statute of limitations grounds. This appeal involves the question of how to calculate, in connection with the plaintiff's negligence claim arising from an accident that occurred on May 24, 2020, the statute of limitations set forth in General Statutes § 52-584. The operability of that statute was suspended as a result of Governor Ned Lamont's Executive Order No. 7G, effective March 19, 2020, and that suspension subsequently was lifted on March 1, 2021, by Governor Lamont's Executive Order No. 10A.The plaintiff claims that the court incorrectly concluded that the two year limitations period began to run on March 1, 2021, and expired on March 1, 2023.The plaintiff argues instead that he was entitled to a suspension of 347 or 348 days, representing the total number of days that the suspension was in effect, notwithstanding the fact that the plaintiff's cause of action did not exist when the suspension began. That is, the plaintiff contends that the proper calculation of his limitations period is effectively two years plus 347 or 348 days. The defendant argues to the contrary that the court properly concluded that the statute of limitations began to run on March 1, 2021, and expired on March 1, 2023. We agree with the defendant and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

• Posted in:
• Civil Procedure,
• Recent Opinions,
• Tort Law

AC46736 - Marciniszyn v. Board of Education ("The plaintiffs, Joshua Marciniszyn, who is self-represented, and his minor child D, by and through Marciniszyn as next friend, appeal from the trial court's denial of their petition for a bill of discovery (petition). On appeal, the plaintiffs argue that the court erred when it determined that they failed to establish probable cause for their claims that the defendants, the Board of Education of the Town of Southington and the town of Southington, had discriminated against D in violation of several federal civil rights laws. They also argue that the court improperly granted the defendants a continuance to file an objection to their petition and improperly limited the presentation of testimony at the hearing on the petition. We conclude that Marciniszyn lacked standing to bring this action in his individual capacity. We therefore reverse in part the court's judgment and remand the case with direction to dismiss the petition as to Marciniszyn in his individual capacity. We dismiss the appeal as to D because Marciniszyn lacks authority, as a self-represented nonattorney, to proceed in a representative capacity on D's behalf before this court.")

• Posted in:
• Civil Procedure,
• Civil Rights,
• Recent Opinions

SC20797 - Collier v. Adar Hartford Realty, LLC ("This is an interlocutory appeal from the trial court's denial of a motion for class certification. The plaintiffs, former residents of Barbour Gardens, a housing development in the city of Hartford (city), instituted this action in connection with the living conditions at Barbour Gardens during their residency. They sought compensatory and punitive damages and attorney's fees from the owner of Barbour Gardens and its property management company, and alleged various tort, contract, equitable, and statutory claims, including a claim of a violation of a provision of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), General Statutes § 42-110g. The plaintiffs filed a motion to certify a class on behalf 'of all persons who lived at Barbour Gardens for any or all of the time between June 24, 2004, and October 13, 2019,' which the trial court denied on the grounds that individualized issues would predominate over class-wide issues and that a class action is not a superior method to resolve the plaintiffs' claims. See Practice Book § 9-8 (3). In this appeal brought pursuant to General Statutes § 42-110h, the plaintiffs contend that there is sufficient evidence in the record common to the entire class to satisfy the predominance and superiority requirements. We reject this claim due to the lengthy period of time for which class certification was requested—covering all residents at Barbour Gardens at any time over a span of more than fifteen years—and the absence of generalized evidence in the record concerning the living conditions at Barbour Gardens during most of the proposed class period. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiffs' motion for class certification.")

• Posted in:
• Civil Procedure,
• Contract Law,
• Landlord / Tenant Law,
• Recent Opinions,
• Tort Law

AC46333 - Palmieri v. Cirino ("The plaintiff in the underlying quiet title action, Patrick Palmieri, appeals from the judgment of the trial court awarding attorney’s fees to the defendant, Frank Cirino, following a default judgment rendered against the plaintiff on the defendant’s counterclaim. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court (1) abused its discretion in issuing the award because the affidavit in support of attorney’s fees was filed beyond the thirty day deadline set forth in Practice Book § 11-21 and (2) improperly awarded attorney’s fees that were incurred prior to the present action. We agree with the plaintiff’s second claim and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for a new hearing on the defendant’s motion for attorney’s fees.")

• Posted in:
• Civil Procedure,
• Property Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC46294 - Torrington Tax Collector, LLC v. Riley ("The plaintiff, Torrington Tax Collector, LLC, appeals from the judgment of the trial court granting the defendant, Holly Riley, an exemption from a bank execution on an account held by the defendant. See General Statutes (Supp. 2022) § 52-367b. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly (1) determined that the plaintiff's opposition to the claim of exemption was barred by the doctrine of res judicata and/or collateral estoppel, and (2) failed to hold an evidentiary hearing before granting the defendant's claim for exemption from execution. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the court.")

• Posted in:
• Civil Procedure,
• Recent Opinions

SC20754 - Mercedes-Benz Financial v. 1188 Stratford Avenue, LLC ("In this certified appeal, the defendants, Aniello Dizenzo and his company, 1188 Stratford Avenue, LLC (company), appeal from the Appellate Court's judgment affirming the trial court's denial of their motion to open the judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff, Mercedes-Benz Financial. On appeal, the defendants claim that the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that the trial court had not abused its discretion by denying their motion to open as untimely and with no basis, even though the defendants timely filed their motion. We agree and, therefore, reverse the Appellate Court's judgment.")

• SC20754 Dissent - Mercedes-Benz Financial v. 1188 Stratford Avenue, LLC

AC45867 - Burr v. Grossman Chevrolet-Nissan, Inc. (“The plaintiffs, Mathew Burr, Elmer Blackwell, and MPK Property Maintenance, LLC (MPK), appeal from the judgment of the trial court, rendered in favor of the defendant, Grossman Chevrolet-Nissan, Inc. On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the court erred in (1) misinterpreting their legal claims, (2) relying on the testimony of the defendant’s representative to reach its conclusion, and (3) finding certain facts in support of its judgment for the defendant. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.”)

AC45620 - Jefferson Solar, LLC v. FuelCell Energy, Inc. (“The plaintiff, Jefferson Solar, LLC, appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing the action as to the defendants FuelCell Energy, Inc., and SCEF1 Fuel Cell, LLC (collectively, FuelCell), and the United Illuminating Company (United Illuminating). On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly concluded that the plaintiff lacked standing to assert its claims. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.”

AC45222 - Travinski v. General Ins. Co. of America (“The plaintiffs, Christoper S. Travinski and Lena L. Travinski, appeal from the summary judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of the defendants, General Insurance Company of America, Safeco Corporation, Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, and Liberty Mutual Holding Company, Inc., on the plaintiffs’ complaint. The plaintiffs claim that the court improperly (1) granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to the counts of their complaint alleging breach of contract and a violation of the Connecticut Unauthorized Insurers Act (CUIA), General Statutes § 38a-271 et seq., and (2) permitted the defendants Safeco Corporation, Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, and Liberty Mutual Holding Company, Inc., to file a motion for summary judgment without posting a bond pursuant to General Statutes § 38a-27. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.)

• Posted in:
• Civil Procedure,
• Contract Law,
• Insurance Law,
• Recent Opinions,
• Tort Law

AC45956 - Clark v. Quantitative Strategies Group, LLC (“In this appeal from postjudgment proceedings to obtain satisfaction of a domesticated judgment arising from an arbitration award, the defendant judgment debtor John A. Brunjes appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying his claim of exemption filed pursuant to General Statutes (Supp. 2022) § 52-367b claiming that the plaintiff judgment creditors, William Thomas Clark and TDA Construction, Inc., executed on bank accounts that did not belong to him but, rather, belonged to his mother, Josephine M. Brunjes. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly found that he was a co-owner of the bank accounts at issue and that they were not exempt from execution under § 52-367b. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.”)

• Posted in:
• Civil Procedure,
• Recent Opinions

SC20699 - Benvenuto v. Brookman ("This is an appeal from an order granting a bill of discovery and requiring the defendant, Kevin Brookman, who publishes an Internet blog known as ‘‘We The People–Hartford,’’ to submit his laptop and cell phone for a forensic analysis that will enable the plaintiff, Vincent G. Benvenuto, to ascertain the identities of persons who posted blog comments containing allegedly defamatory statements about him. ‘‘[T]o safeguard the defendant’s privacy interest,’’ the trial court’s discovery order mandates that the parties attempt to reach an agreement on the terms of a protective order and search protocols that together will govern the scope and procedures to be used in the forensic analysis, or, in the absence of an agreement, submit proposed orders so that the trial court can resolve any disputes regarding the terms of the protective order and search protocols. The court expressly retained jurisdiction until such time as the parties have filed an agreement or the court has resolved any impasse. Following oral argument, we ordered the parties to file supplemental briefs addressing whether the trial court’s order is a final judgment for purposes of appellate review. We conclude that the order is not final and dismiss the appeal.")

• Posted in:
• Civil Procedure,
• Recent Opinions,
• Tort Law

AC45810 - Cazenovia Creek Funding I, LLC v. Roman ("Louis Roman appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying his motion to dismiss this foreclosure action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Roman filed this appeal as a self-represented litigant seeking to represent the interests of the named defendant, Louis Roman, in Trust for Alexandria K. Roman and Dakota T. Roman (trust). Because Roman, who is neither a party to this action nor an attorney, has appeared without counsel on behalf of a trust, we conclude that Roman does not have the authority to represent the trust. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.")

• Posted in:
• Civil Procedure,
• Foreclosure Law,
• Recent Opinions

Law Library Services has posted a new video that discusses the basic procedures for a landlord to follow when beginning a Connecticut Residential Summary Process action. The video addresses residential evictions, not commercial evictions. The video can be found on our Representing Yourself web page under Connecticut Civil Lawsuit Videos.

• Connecticut Civil Lawsuit – Residential Summary Process (Eviction) – Landlord (Video) PDF Text

• Posted in:
• Civil Procedure,
• FYI,
• Landlord / Tenant Law,
• Self-Help

AC45836 - Finance of America Reverse, LLC v. Henry ("The present appeal concerns the proper application of Practice Book § 61-11 (h), which limits the effect of the automatic appellate stay that arises following the denial of a motion to open a foreclosure judgment if that denial occurs fewer than twenty days before a scheduled foreclosure auction. In particular, we address the interplay between Practice Book §§ 61-11 (h) and 63-1 (c) (1), the latter of which governs when and how a new appeal period is created that, by implication, also extends any existing appellate stay of execution. See Practice Book § 61-11 (a) (automatic appellate stay of action to enforce or carry out judgment exists until time to appeal judgment expires).

The defendant Stephanie Henry appeals, following the court's approval of a foreclosure sale, from the denial of her motion for an order "nullifying" that sale. The defendant claims that the foreclosure sale was conducted in violation of the automatic appellate stay that arose as a result of the denial of her motion to open and extend the sale date, and that the court improperly relied on Practice Book § 61-11 (h) as a basis for refusing to set aside the sale. In response, the substitute plaintiff, Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB, as Trustee of Finance of America Structured Securities Acquisition Trust 2019-HB1, asserts that the sale was properly conducted as ordered by the court and that the court correctly denied the defendant's motion for order and, subsequently, approved the sale. For the reasons that follow, we agree with the defendant that the property was auctioned in violation of the automatic stay. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court and remand with direction to vacate the foreclosure sale and set a new sale date.")

• Posted in:
• Civil Procedure,
• Foreclosure Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC45662 - Speer v. Brown Jacobson P.C. ("The self-represented plaintiff, Sheri Speer, appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing, on the grounds of res judicata and collateral estoppel, her quo warranto action challenging the qualifications of the defendants Brown Jacobson P.C. (Brown Jacobson) and one of its attorneys, Aimee Wickless, to serve as corporation counsel for the defendant city of Norwich (city). On appeal, the plaintiff claims, inter alia, that the court improperly concluded that her claims are barred by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. We agree and, therefore, reverse the judgment of the trial court.")

• Posted in:
• Civil Procedure,
• Property Law,
• Recent Opinions,
• Tort Law

AC45774 - Speer v. Danjon Capital, Inc. ("The self-represented plaintiff, Sheri Speer, appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing her present action against the defendant, Danjon Capital, Inc., as a sanction for abuse of discovery. On appeal, she claims that the court (1) abused its discretion by dismissing this action as a sanction for her alleged discovery abuse, which it found that she had engaged in by insisting repeatedly that she had served the defendant with requests for admissions to which the defendant had failed to respond although the court file and her own records contradicted her claim that requests for admissions had been served; (2) improperly denied her timely motion for reassignment of all matters concerning the amount of attorney's fees she should be ordered to pay the defendant as a sanction for her discovery abuse after the court failed to decide that matter within 120 days of the parties' final court-ordered submission thereon; and (3) erred in denying her motion for summary judgment. We agree with the plaintiff that the court improperly dismissed this action as a sanction for her alleged abuse of discovery and that it improperly denied her motion for reassignment of the pending matter concerning the amount of attorney's fees that should be awarded to the defendant as a sanction for her discovery abuse, which the court failed to decide within 120 days of the last court-ordered submission on that matter. We dismiss that portion of the plaintiff's appeal challenging the purported denial of her motion for summary judgment."

________________________

"As for the plaintiff's third claim, alleging error in the denial of her motion for summary judgment, we lack jurisdiction to decide that claim because the plaintiff's motion was not, in fact, denied, or otherwise finally adjudicated. In addition, we note that the denial of a motion for summary judgment, except in limited circumstances that do not exist here, is not an appealable final judgment over which we would have jurisdiction. See, e.g., Kellogg v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co., 211 Conn. App. 335, 346–47, 272 A.3d 677 (2022).

The judgment of dismissal, the order requiring the plaintiff to pay attorney's fees to the defendant, and the denial of the plaintiff's motion for reassignment are reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion; the portion of the appeal pertaining to the purported denial of the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is dismissed.")

• Posted in:
• Civil Procedure,
• Property Law,
• Recent Opinions

SC20746 - In re Cole (“In 1993, the legislature, for the first time, enacted a so-called ‘homestead act,’ whereby a debtor could protect up to $75,000 of the value of a primary residence from attachment in postjudgment proceedings or bankruptcy. See Public Acts 1993, No. 93-301, § 2 (P.A. 93-301). Although P.A. 93-301 had an effective date of October 1, 1993, and thus applied to any proceedings initiated on or after that date, the act included a special carve-out: the homestead exemption could not be claimed for debts accrued prior to the effective date. See P.A. 93-301, § 3. In 2021, the legislature amended the homestead act and replaced it with a new version that included several changes from the prior version of the act. For purposes of this appeal, the relevant change made by the legislature was to increase the exemption from $75,000 to $250,000, but this time the legislature did not include any carve-out for preexisting debts. See Public Acts 2021, No. 21-161, § 1 (P.A. 21-161). The primary question presented by this appeal, which reaches us in the form of a certified question in a bankruptcy appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, is whether we should nevertheless read a carve-out into the 2021 public act. We decline to do so.”

“The District Court therefore certified to this court the question of ‘[w]hether [P.A.] 21-161 applies retroactively to debts incurred by the debtor before [P.A.] 21- 161 took effect or prospectively.’ We accepted certification but, pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199b (k), and for the reasons discussed in part II B 3 of this opinion, we will answer a slightly modified version of the certified question: does the expanded homestead exemption contained in P.A. 21-161, § 1, apply in bankruptcy proceedings filed on or after the effective date of the act to debts that accrued prior to that date? We answer that question in the affirmative.”

• Posted in:
• Civil Procedure,
• Contract Law,
• Property Law

AC45043 - U.S. Bank National Assn. v. Weinbaum ("In this foreclosure action, the defendant, Sholeh Weinbaum, appeals from the judgment of foreclosure by sale rendered by the trial court in favor of the plaintiff, U.S. Bank National Association, As Trustee for Structured Adjustable Rate Mortgage Loan Trust, Mortgage Pass Through Certificates, Series 2006-4. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly denied her motion to set aside the default that was entered against her for failing to plead because the plaintiff's motion for judgment was filed prematurely. Alternatively, she makes the related claim that the default was set aside by operation of law when she filed her answer and special defenses. Lastly, she claims that the court abused its discretion when it denied her motion to set aside the default. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

• Posted in:
• Civil Procedure,
• Foreclosure Law,
• Recent Opinions

SC20731 - Robinson v. V. D. ("The defendant, V. D., appealed from the order of the trial court denying his special motion to dismiss, pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute, General Statutes § 52-196a, the action brought by the plaintiffs, Michael Robinson and Mary Robinson. The plaintiffs now move to dismiss this appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and, specifically, for lack of an appealable final judgment. In response to the plaintiffs' motion, the defendant contends that the legislature's inclusion of "interlocutory appeal" language in subsection (d) of § 52-196a, the statute's legislative history, and public policy all favor an implicit right to an immediate appeal, and the defendant further asserts that the denial of a special motion to dismiss is an appealable final judgment under the standard set forth in State v. Curcio, 191 Conn. 27, 31, 463 A.2d 566 (1983). For the reasons set forth in the companion case that we also decide today, Smith v. Supple, 346 Conn. ___, ___ A.3d ___ (2023), we conclude that a trial court's denial of a colorable special motion to dismiss under § 52-196a is an immediately appealable final judgment under the second prong of Curcio. We further conclude that the record demonstrates that the defendant has presented a colorable claim that he is entitled to a right to avoid litigation under our anti-SLAPP statute. Accordingly, we deny the plaintiffs' pending motion to dismiss this appeal for lack of a final judgment and transfer the case to the Appellate Court for further proceedings according to law.")

• SC20731 Dissent - Robinson v. V. D.

SC20730 - Smith v. Supple ("In this appeal, we must consider whether Connecticut's appellate courts have jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal from a trial court's denial of a special motion to dismiss filed pursuant to our anti-SLAPP statute, General Statutes § 52-196a. The defendants, Aaron Supple, Karen Montejo, Hendrick Xiong-Calmes, and Gianna Moreno, who were students at Trinity College in Hartford (Trinity), appealed to the Appellate Court from the trial court's denial of their special motion to dismiss the action brought against them by the plaintiffs, Gregory B. Smith, Nicholas Engstrom, and The Churchill Institute, Inc. (Churchill Institute). Thereafter, this court transferred the appeal to itself and ordered the parties, sua sponte, to brief the issue of whether the trial court's denial of the special motion to dismiss constitutes a final judgment for the purpose of an appeal.On that limited issue, the defendants argue that the trial court's denial is immediately appealable under the second prong of State v. Curcio, 191 Conn. 27, 31, 463 A.2d 566 (1983). For the reasons that follow, we agree with the defendants and conclude that the denial of a special motion to dismiss based on a colorable claim of a right to avoid litigation under § 52-196a is an appealable final judgment under the second prong of Curcio. Because the defendants' appeal presents such a colorable claim, we transfer the appeal back to the Appellate Court for further proceedings according to law.")

• SC20730 Dissent - Smith v. Supple

• Posted in:
• Civil Procedure,
• Recent Opinions,
• Tort Law

SC20581, SC20583 - Pryor v. Brignole (Appellate Jurisdiction; Whether the Denial of a Special Motion to Dismiss Filed Pursuant to General Statutes § 52-196a is an Appealable Final Judgment; "The sole issue in these certified appeals is whether the denial of a special motion to dismiss filed pursuant to our state's anti-SLAPP statute, General Statutes § 52-196a, is an appealable final judgment. The defendants, Timothy Brignole and Brignole, Bush & Lewis, LLC (law firm), appeal, upon our granting of their petitions for certification, from the judgments of the Appellate Court, which dismissed their appeals from the order of the trial court denying their special motions to dismiss the underlying civil action brought against them by the plaintiff, J. Xavier Pryor. Specifically, the defendants claim that the Appellate Court improperly dismissed their respective appeals for lack of a final judgment because (1) the legislature expressly provided for an interlocutory appeal of the denial of a special motion to dismiss in subsection (d) of § 52-196a, and (2) the denial of a special motion to dismiss filed pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute constitutes an appealable final judgment under the second prong of State v. Curcio, 191 Conn. 27, 31, 463 A.2d 566 (1983). For the reasons set forth in the companion case that we also decide today, Smith v. Supple, 346 Conn. ___, ___ A.3d ___ (2023), we conclude that a trial court's denial of a colorable special motion to dismiss filed pursuant to § 52-196a is an appealable final judgment under Curcio. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court and remand the case to that court for further proceedings according to law.")

• SC20581, SC20583 Dissent - Pryor v. Brignole

• Posted in:
• Civil Procedure,
• Contract Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC44760 - Nowak v. Environmental Engery Services, Inc. ("The defendants, Environmental Energy Services, Inc. (EES), and Richard Nowak, appeal from the judgment of the trial court granting, in part, the equitable petition for a bill of discovery (petition) filed by the plaintiff, Anna Nowak, in her capacity as the executor of the estate of her late husband, Kenneth Nowak. On appeal, the defendants claim that the court improperly determined that the plaintiff met her burden of establishing probable cause to bring claims against the defendants for corporate misconduct and that the plaintiff had no means, other than the bill of discovery, to discover the majority of the requested records. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

• Posted in:
• Civil Procedure,
• Recent Opinions

AC45200 - 9 Pettipaug, LLC v. Planning & Zoning Commission ("In this certified zoning appeal, we consider whether a zoning body has complied with the statutory notice requirement in General Statutes § 8-3 (d) if it published notice in a newspaper that had no subscribers in the relevant municipality but was available on the Internet. The defendant, the Planning and Zoning Commission of the Borough of Fenwick, appeals from the summary judgment of the Superior Court rendered in favor of the plaintiffs, 9 Pettipaug, LLC, and Eniotna, LLP, holding that the defendant's zoning amendment was invalid because the defendant failed to comply with the applicable statutory notice requirement. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly (1) determined that the defendant failed to satisfy the 'substantial circulation' component of the notice requirement in § 8-3 (d), and (2) shifted the burden of proof to the defendant. We affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.")

• Posted in:
• Civil Procedure,
• Land Use Law,
• Recent Opinions