SC21117 - Airey v. Feliciano ("This is the second appeal arising from a primary election dispute between two competing slates of candidates—the Airey slate, which includes the named plaintiff Phyllis Airey, and the Green slate, which includes defendant Kenneth P. Green—who sought to appear on the ballot for the March 5, 2024 primary election for the Democratic Town Committee for the seventh district of the city of Hartford. After the named defendant, the Democratic registrar of voters, Giselle Feliciano, and defendant city clerk, Noel McGregor, certified that both slates of candidates had qualified for the primary election, the Airey slate filed the underlying action pursuant to General Statutes § 9-329a (a), seeking to disqualify the Green slate. See Airey v. Feliciano, 350 Conn. 162, 164–66, 323 A.3d 1037 (2024). The individual members of the Green slate intervened and filed a counterclaim seeking to disqualify the Airey slate. Id., 165–66. After a hearing, the trial court concluded that only the Airey slate had qualified for the primary and ordered Feliciano and McGregor to remove the Green slate from the ballot. Id., 167. As a result, the March 5 primary was canceled. Id., 168 n.3. The Green slate appealed; id., 165; and we reversed in part the judgment of the trial court. Id., 181–82. We concluded that neither the Green slate nor the Airey slate had qualified for the primary and remanded the case with direction to disqualify the Airey slate "and for other proceedings according to law . . . ." Id., 182.

On remand, the trial court denied the Green slate's motion for a new primary election, reasoning that it lacked the authority to order a new election under § 9-329a (b) (3) because neither slate had qualified for the primary. The Green slate appeals, claiming that (1) the trial court improperly failed to order a new primary election under § 9-329a (b) (3), and (2) the court's failure to order a new primary election violated the fundamental rights of the Democratic voters in Hartford's seventh district. As alternative relief, the Green slate asks this court "to overturn or substantially narrow the overly broad `imputed knowledge doctrine' that enabled this destructive litigation and threatens to undermine Connecticut democracy." We conclude that the court lacked the authority to order a new primary and that its failure to do so did not violate any voter's fundamental right to vote. We also decline the Green slate's request that we overrule or narrow our imputed knowledge doctrine precedent. We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court."

• Posted in:
• Election Law,
• Recent Opinions

SC21049 - Whitnum Baker v. Secretary of the State ("This is an original jurisdiction proceeding before a panel of this court pursuant to General Statutes § 9-323, in which the plaintiff, L. Lee Whitnum Baker, sought an emergency hearing to challenge a ruling of an election official, the secretary of the state, in connection with an election for federal office. The plaintiff challenges the defendant's decision to reject her registration as a write-in candidate for the office of United States Representative for the Third Congressional District of Connecticut on the ground that it was untimely filed in violation of General Statutes (Supp. 2024) § 9-373a, which, in connection with General Statutes § 9-265, governs write-in candidacies. In this action, the plaintiff seeks an injunction directing the defendant to accept her registration as a write-in candidate under § 9-373a. She claims that her untimely filing was the result of following guidance from a form cover letter promulgated by the defendant's office that did not update its block quotation of § 9-373a to reflect the earlier filing deadlines contained in the current statutory revision, which was amended in 2023 to accommodate the new early voting program under General Statutes (Supp. 2024) § 9-163aa. In response, the defendant asks us to dismiss this action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under § 9-323.

We held a hearing on the plaintiff's complaint on Thursday, November 7, 2024. After that hearing, we concluded that we have subject matter jurisdiction over this proceeding, and reserved judgment on the merits. We now conclude that this case does not present the type of "extraordinary circumstance," as contemplated by Butts v. Bysiewicz, 298 Conn. 665, 676 n.7, 5 A.3d 932 (2010), that would warrant equitable relief from the operation of a mandatory statutory provision based on erroneous information given to the plaintiff by an election official. The plaintiff has failed to prove entitlement to relief under the doctrine of equitable estoppel because (1) notwithstanding the defendant's erroneous quotation of an outdated version of § 9-373a on the cover letter provided to the plaintiff, both the cover letter and the registration form itself clearly and unambiguously provided the correct deadline, and (2) the plaintiff failed to exercise any due diligence in resolving the apparent inconsistency. Accordingly, we deny the plaintiff's request for injunctive relief and render judgment for the defendant.")

• Posted in:
• Election Law,
• Recent Opinions

• SC20995 - In re Criminal Complaint & Application for Arrest Warrant (“The plaintiffs in error, Diahann Phillips, Alison Scofield, and Albert Bottone, filed this writ of error challenging the decision by the Honorable Thomas J. Welch, declining to issue arrest warrants under General Statutes § 9-368 for two individuals who allegedly violated election laws. The defendant in error, the state of Connecticut, contends that we should dismiss this writ of error because the plaintiffs in error are neither classically nor statutorily aggrieved by the denial of their arrest warrant applications. Although we disagree with the defendant in error that the plaintiffs in error are required to establish statutory aggrievement to bring a writ of error, we dismiss the writ on the ground that the plaintiffs in error are not classically aggrieved.”)
  
  
  • Concurrence

• Posted in:
• Criminal Law & Procedure,
• Election Law,
• Recent Opinions

SC20991 - Airey v. Feliciano ("This case highlights how important it is that individuals seeking elected office familiarize themselves with and adhere to the laws that our legislature has enacted to secure the integrity of the electoral process. The appeal arises from efforts by two competing slates of candidates to collect enough petition signatures to qualify to appear on the ballot for the March 5, 2024 primary election for the Democratic Town Committee for the seventh district of the city of Hartford. The named defendant, Giselle Feliciano, the Democratic registrar of voters for the city of Hartford, and the defendant city clerk, Noel McGregor, initially certified that both slates had obtained more than the 375 valid petition signatures necessary to qualify for the primary. The slate that includes the named plaintiff, Phyllis Airey (Airey slate, or Airey), then initiated the present action, alleging that the slate that includes defendant Kenneth P. Green (Green slate, or Green) should be disqualified because one of the petition sheets used to qualify the Green slate revealed statutory irregularities. Specifically, Airey alleged that one signature on the sheet, that of Clement Nurse, had not in fact been provided by Nurse but, rather, by his son, Andrew Nurse (Andrew), under a purported power of attorney. The individual members of the Green slate then successfully moved to intervene and filed a counterclaim, alleging that (1) one sheet of the Airey petition should be rejected because it contained the forged signature of Lawrence Williams, and (2) five other sheets of the Airey petition should be disqualified because they failed to include a written tally of the number of verified signatures, as required by General Statutes § 9-410 (c).

The trial court agreed that the sheets containing the Nurse and Williams signatures must be rejected but determined that the other five challenged Airey sheets substantially complied with § 9-410 (c). This decision left only the Airey slate with the necessary 375 valid signatures. On appeal, Green contends that the sheet purporting to contain Nurse's signature should not have been rejected and, in the alternative, that all of the challenged Airey sheets must be rejected as well. Affirming in part and reversing in part the judgment of the trial court, we conclude that all of the challenged sheets must be rejected, resulting in the disqualification of both slates.")

• Posted in:
• Election Law,
• Recent Opinions

SC20726 - Markley v. State Elections Enforcement Commission ("This appeal presents an issue of first impression under the first amendment to the United States constitution, namely, the extent to which the statutes and regulations governing the public funding of state elections in connection with the Citizens' Election Program (program), General Statutes § 9-700 et seq., may be applied to preclude publicly funded candidates from using their candidate committee funds to pay for campaign advertisements that, as a rhetorical device, invoke the name of a candidate in a different race to refer more broadly to the policies or political party associated with that candidate. The defendant, the State Elections Enforcement Commission (commission), imposed fines on the plaintiffs, Joe Markley and Rob Sampson, who were publicly funded candidates for state legislative office during the 2014 general election cycle, on the ground that they had violated the statutes and regulations governing the program when they utilized their candidate committee funds to pay for communications that criticized then Governor Dannel Malloy, who was seeking reelection to that office in that same election cycle, in the course of promoting their opposition to his policies. The plaintiffs now appeal from the judgment of the trial court upholding the decision of the commission, claiming that the commission's enforcement of the state election laws in that manner violated their first amendment rights. Although a compelling governmental interest is served by a condition that precludes publicly funded candidates from using program funds to support or oppose candidates in other races, we conclude that the commission violated the plaintiffs' first amendment rights with respect to the five advertisements at issue in this case because they could reasonably be understood to be something other than an appeal to vote against Governor Malloy. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.")

• Posted in:
• Administrative Appeal Law,
• Election Law,
• Recent Opinions

SC20907, SC20908 - Alves v. Giegler ("This election appeal, which arises from a dispute over two slates of candidates each purporting to be the endorsed slate of the Independent Party of Danbury (Independent Party) for various municipal offices in the city of Danbury (city), raises two issues under the statutes governing nominations to municipal office by minor political parties in our state, namely, (1) the nature of the "certification" required by General Statutes § 9-452, which governs the submission of a party's list of nominees for municipal office to a town clerk, and (2) the form that notice to a town clerk of a party's meeting or caucus to nominate candidates for municipal office must take under General Statutes § 9-452a. The plaintiff, Roberto Alves, a candidate for election as mayor of the city, brought this action pursuant to General Statutes § 9-328 against the defendants, Janice Giegler, the city's town clerk, Dean Esposito, the city's incumbent mayor who is seeking reelection to that office, and Veasna Rouen, the chairperson of the Independent Party, challenging Giegler's decision on September 18, 2023, to file with the secretary of the state (secretary), pursuant to General Statutes § 9-461, a slate of candidates purporting to be the Independent Party's nominations of candidates for municipal office. The challenged Independent Party slate consisted of candidates supported by the Danbury Republican Town Committee, including Esposito and Giegler (Esposito slate); Giegler did not file with the secretary a previously submitted Independent Party slate consisting of candidates supported by the Danbury Democratic Town Committee, including the plaintiff (Alves slate). After a three day court trial, the trial court, Medina, J., issued an order on October 12, 2023, which, pursuant to General Statutes § 9-329b, directed Giegler to remove the Esposito slate that she had submitted to the secretary from the ballot (October 12 order).

- - -

The judgment is affirmed.")

• Posted in:
• Election Law,
• Recent Opinions

SC20737 - Cohen v. Rossi (Elections; Absentee ballots; "This appeal concerns a contested mayoral election in the city of West Haven and requires us to interpret and apply various statutory provisions that govern the absentee ballot process. Following an automatic recanvass, which was triggered by the closeness of the election, the plaintiff, the Republican mayoral candidate, Barry Lee Cohen, brought this action pursuant to General Statutes § 9-328 against the defendants, the Democratic mayoral candidate, Nancy Rossi, and certain West Haven election officials, challenging the results of the election. The plaintiff asserted that the West Haven election officials failed to adequately comply with various statutory requirements regarding absentee ballots. The trial court agreed that the election officials failed to strictly comply with certain statutory requirements but nevertheless concluded that the plaintiff failed to establish that the reliability of the results of the election was seriously in doubt. Accordingly, the trial court denied the plaintiff's requested relief. This appeal followed. Following oral argument, we issued a per curiam ruling on October 4, 2022, affirming the judgment of the trial court. We indicated at that time that a full opinion would follow. This is that opinion.")

• SC20737 - Cohen v. Rossi—First Concurrence
• SC20737 - Cohen v. Rossi—Second Concurrence

• Posted in:
• Election Law,
• Recent Opinions

SC20542 - O'Shea v. Scherban ("In this appeal, we must construe a Stamford Charter (charter) provision that controls the filling of vacancies on the Board of Education of the City of Stamford (board) and consider claims that, as applied to the circumstances of this case, both the provision generally and the actions of election officials specifically violate the federal and state constitutions. The plaintiff, Stephanie O’Shea, wanted to run in the November, 2020 election to fill a vacancy on the board and claims that she in fact ran in that election, won it and should be serving on the board presently. She brought suit when the city’s election officials refused to credit the election results on the ground that the charter provides that the election to fill the vacancy could not be held until the ‘next biennial election’ in 2021. Stamford Charter § C1-80-2 (b). She appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the defendants, who are various city election officials and the secretary of the state.")

• Posted in:
• Election Law,
• Recent Opinions

SC20305 - Markley v. State Elections Enforcement Commission ( Campaign financing; Whether trial court properly dismissed administrative appeal for lack of jurisdiction because appeal was not filed within 45 days of agency's constructive denial of petition for reconsideration. "The plaintiffs, Joe Markley and Rob Sampson, appeal from the judgment of the trial court dismissing their administrative appeal, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, from the adverse decision of the defendant, the State Elections Enforcement Commission (commission). In that decision, the commission determined that the plaintiffs, who, as candidates for state elective office, had received funding for their campaigns through the Citizens' Election Program (program), violated certain state election laws and regulations related to the program, and imposed civil fines for those violations. The plaintiffs immediately filed a petition for reconsideration in accordance with General Statutes § 4-181a (a) (1), which provides that an agency's failure to decide whether to reconsider a decision within twenty-five days of the filing of such a petition shall constitute a denial of the petition. Shortly after that twenty-five day period had elapsed without a decision by the commission, however, the matter of the petition appeared on the agenda of an upcoming special meeting of the commission. Following that special meeting, the commission notified the plaintiffs that their petition had been considered at the special meeting and denied. As authorized by General Statutes § 4-183, the plaintiffs appealed from the commission's decision to the Superior Court, which dismissed the appeal on the ground that it was untimely under subdivision (2) of § 4-183 (c) because, contrary to the requirement of that statutory subdivision, the appeal was not filed within forty-five days following the denial of the petition by operation of § 4-181a (a) (1). On appeal to this court, the plaintiffs claim, inter alia, that their administrative appeal was timely filed in the Superior Court because, under § 4-181a (a) (2); see footnote 1 of this opinion; the commission was authorized to reconsider its decision at any time up to forty days from the filing of the petition, the commission did so, and, in accordance with § 4-183 (c) (3); see footnote 2 of this opinion; the plaintiffs filed their appeal with the Superior Court within forty-five days of their receipt of notice from the commission that it had heard and denied the petition. We agree with the plaintiffs that, under the particular facts of this case, the timeliness of their appeal to the Superior Court is governed by the forty-five day limitation period of § 4-183 (c) (3), which commenced on the date they were notified by the commission of its purported action on the petition at the special meeting, rather than the forty-five day period of § 4-183 (c) (2), which, if applicable, would have commenced twenty-five days after the denial of the petition by operation of § 4-181a (a) (1). Because the plaintiffs' appeal was timely under § 4-183 (c) (3), we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case to that court for a resolution of the merits of the plaintiffs' administrative appeal.")

SC20340 - Great Plains Lending, LLC v. Department of Banking (Tribal sovereign immunity; Whether trial court properly remanded matter for evidentiary hearing; Whether trial court applied proper test to determine if plaintiffs were "Arms of the tribe"; whether plaintiff tribal chairman was entitled to immunity from administrative orders and civil penalties. "This appeal presents three significant issues of first impression with respect to whether a business entity shares an Indian tribe's sovereign immunity as an "arm of the tribe," as we consider (1) which party bears the burden of proving the entity's status as an arm of the tribe, (2) the legal standard governing that inquiry, and (3) the extent to which a tribal officer shares in that immunity for his or her actions in connection with the business entity. The plaintiffs, Great Plains Lending, LLC (Great Plains), American Web Loan, Inc., doing business as Clear Creek Lending (Clear Creek) (collectively, entities), and John R. Shotton, chairman of the Otoe-Missouria Tribe of Indians (tribe), a federally recognized tribe, appeal from the judgment of the trial court sustaining their administrative appeal and remanding this case to the defendant Commissioner of Banking (commissioner) for further proceedings with respect to the plaintiffs' entitlement to tribal sovereign immunity in administrative proceedings. On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the trial court should have rendered judgment in their favor as a matter of law, insofar as it improperly (1) allocated the burden of proving entitlement to tribal sovereign immunity to the plaintiffs, (2) required proof of a functioning relationship between the entities and the tribe, and (3) failed to find Shotton immune in further administrative proceedings. The defendants, the commissioner and the Department of Banking (department), cross appeal and similarly challenge the legal standard adopted by the trial court and its decision to remand the case for further administrative proceedings. We conclude that the entity claiming arm of the tribe status bears the burden of proving its entitlement to that status under the test articulated by the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Breakthrough Management Group, Inc. v. Chukchansi Gold Casino & Resort, 629 F.3d 1173, 1187 (10th Cir. 2010) (Breakthrough), cert. dismissed, 564 U.S. 1061, 132 S. Ct. 64, 180 L. Ed. 2d 932 (2011). We further conclude, as a matter of law, that Great Plains is an arm of the tribe and that Shotton, with respect to his capacity as an officer of Great Plains and the tribe, is entitled to tribal sovereign immunity from civil penalties but not injunctive relief. We also conclude, however, that there is insufficient evidence to support a conclusion that Clear Creek is an arm of the tribe as a matter of law, which requires a remand to the commissioner for further administrative proceedings. Accordingly, we reverse in part the judgment of the trial court.")

• Posted in:
• Administrative Appeal Law,
• Election Law,
• Recent Opinions

The Office of Legislative Research has recently published the following report:

Voter Identification Requirements in Connecticut - 2021-R-0071 - Summarize identification (ID) requirements in Connecticut for registering to vote and for voting in person. Indicate whether the state has ever had a strict photo ID requirement for voting in person.

This report updates OLR Report 2008-R-0301.

Additional information on election and voting law in Connecticut is available on our webpage entitled Connecticut Law About Election Law.

• Posted in:
• Election Law,
• FYI,
• Legal Research,
• Self-Help

SC20486 - Fay v. Merrill ("The principal issue in this public interest appeal is whether Governor Ned Lamont's Executive Order No. 7QQ, which was later ratified by the legislature; see Public Acts, Spec. Sess., July, 2020, No. 20-3, § 16 (Spec. Sess. P.A. 20-3); and which modified General Statutes (Rev. to 2019) § 9-135 by adding 'COVID-19' as a permissible reason for absentee voting, violates article sixth, § 7, of the Connecticut constitution. The four plaintiffs, who were candidates for the Republican Party's nomination for United States Congress for Connecticut's First and Second Congressional Districts, appealed directly pursuant to General Statutes § 52-265a from the judgment of the trial court in favor of the defendant, Denise W. Merrill, Secretary of the State, in this action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to the defendant's change of the absentee ballot application for the August 11, 2020 primary election (August primary) to add coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) as a new reason for requesting an absentee ballot pursuant to Executive Order No. 7QQ. Following deliberations after an expedited oral argument held on August 6, 2020, we ruled from the bench that (1) the plaintiffs were aggrieved and had standing to bring the declaratory judgment action, (2) we could not consider, for the first time on appeal, the defendant's special defense of laches as an alternative ground for affirming the judgment of the trial court, and (3) Executive Order No. 7QQ does not violate article sixth, § 7, because the phrase 'unable to appear at the polling place on the day of election because of . . . sickness,' as used in that constitutional provision, is not limited to an illness suffered by the individual voter that renders that person physically unable to travel to the polling place. Accordingly, we affirmed the judgment of the trial court and indicated that a written opinion would follow. This is that opinion.")

• Posted in:
• Declaratory Judgment Law,
• Election Law,
• Recent Opinions

SC20315 - Praisner v. State (Indemnification; Sovereign Immunity; "The sole issue in this certified appeal is whether the Appellate Court correctly concluded that a university police officer is not a member of a "local police department" entitled to indemnification under General Statutes (Rev. to 2013) § 53-39a. The plaintiff, Martin J. Praisner, Jr., argues that the Appellate Court erred in concluding that a university's special police force is not a "local police department" for purposes of § 53-39a, and that the legislature, by limiting coverage to local police departments, did not intend for university special police forces to be covered under this statute. We conclude that the Appellate Court correctly interpreted § 53-39a and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.")

SC20477 - Fay v. Merrill ("The four plaintiffs, who are candidates in the August 11, 2020 primary election (August primary) for the Republican Party's nomination for the office of United States Representative for Connecticut's First and Second Congressional Districts, brought this original jurisdiction proceeding pursuant to General Statutes § 9-323 against the defendant, Denise W. Merrill, in her official capacity as the Secretary of the State. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief challenging the defendant's "ruling of an election official," which added a seventh category for absentee voting, "COVID-19," to the application for absentee ballots (application) for the August primary in contemplation of the ongoing coronavirus disease-19 (COVID-19) global pandemic. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendant's change to the application violates article sixth, § 7, of the Connecticut constitution because (1) she acted pursuant to Governor Ned Lamont's Executive Order No. 7QQ, which itself violates article sixth, § 7, of the Connecticut constitution, and (2) it expanded the application beyond the existing limitations set forth by General Statutes § 9-135. The plaintiffs also claimed that the application is inconsistent with the terms of Executive Order No. 7QQ. The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint, contending, inter alia, that the court lacked jurisdiction under § 9-323 because that election contest statute does not apply to primaries, and, in any event, the plaintiffs' constitutional challenge is not one that is cognizable under the election contest statutes. After a hearing held on July 20, 2020, this court granted the motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under § 9-323. This written opinion followed.")

• Posted in:
• Declaratory Judgment Law,
• Election Law,
• Recent Opinions

SC20165 - Independent Party of CT—State Central v. Merrill ("This appeal is the latest battle in the war for control over the state's Independent Party between its Danbury faction, which is led by the plaintiffs, the Independent Party of CT—State Central and its officers, Michael Duff, Donna L. LaFrance, and Roger Palanzo, and its Waterbury faction, which is led by two of the defendants, Michael Telesca and Rocco Frank, Jr. The plaintiffs appeal from the judgment of the trial court, rendered after a bench trial, for Telesca and Frank on the complaint and the counterclaim in the present action, which both sought declaratory and injunctive relief. Specifically, the trial court ordered the named defendant, Secretary of the State Denise W. Merrill, to accept candidate endorsements made pursuant to the Independent Party's 2010 bylaws (2010 bylaws), which, in effect, gave the Waterbury faction control over the Independent Party's statewide nominations. There are two principal issues among the plaintiffs' plethora of claims in the present appeal. First, we consider whether the trial court's order of supplemental briefing and oral argument concerning its subject matter jurisdiction, issued just prior to the 120 day decision deadline pursuant to General Statutes § 51-183b, and after the plaintiffs' objection to the trial court's request for an extension, preserved its personal jurisdiction over the parties by stopping and later restarting the decision period. The second principal issue is whether the trial court properly determined that General Statutes § 9-374, which requires the filing of party rules before the name of a candidate endorsed by a minor political party may be printed on an election ballot, rendered the 2010 bylaws controlling, as opposed to bylaws that the Danbury faction had filed with the Secretary in 2006 (2006 bylaws) prior to the Independent Party's receiving the 1 percent of statewide votes necessary to confer minor party status. Because we conclude that the order of supplemental briefing and argument opened the 120 day decision period and later restarted it, thus rendering the trial court's decision timely under § 51-183b, and also conclude that the trial court properly construed § 9-374, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

SC20160 - Independent Party of CT—State Central v. Merrill ("This writ of error is the companion case to Independent Party of CT—State Central v. Merrill, 330 Conn. ___, ___ A.3d ___ (2019), in which this court affirmed the judgment of the trial court resolving a long running dispute between the Danbury and Waterbury factions of the state's Independent Party by, inter alia, granting declaratory and injunctive relief directing the named defendant in the underlying action, Secretary of the State Denise W. Merrill (Secretary), to accept only those endorsements made pursuant to the party's 2010 bylaws. The plaintiffs in error, thirteen candidates for the state House of Representatives endorsed by the Danbury faction prior to the issuance of the trial court's decision in the underlying action, brought this writ of error to protect their rights with respect to the judgment of the trial court. The endorsed candidates now argue that their writ of error is moot given the unchallenged decision of the Secretary to accept the Danbury faction's endorsements with respect to twelve of them, thus allowing them to be on the Independent Party's ballot line for the 2018 election. Rebekah Harriman-Stites, a candidate endorsed by the Waterbury faction for the 106th assembly district, however, has appeared in the present proceeding as a defendant in error and contends that the writ of error is not moot in light of her request that we order the Secretary to print her name on the ballot in accordance with the trial court's decision. Because the writ of error is moot, and Harriman-Stites' separate request for relief is not properly before us, we dismiss this writ of error.")

• Posted in:
• Declaratory Judgment Law,
• Election Law,
• Recent Opinions

SC20216, SC20217, SC20218 - Feehan v. Marcone ("These expedited public interest appeals arise from an apparent mix-up at the Bunnell High School polling place in the town of Stratford (town), where it is alleged that approximately seventy-six voters who should have received ballots for the 120th assembly district election were instead given ballots for the 122nd assembly district, rendering those voters unable to vote for their assembly district's state representative. The plaintiff, Jim Feehan, who is the Republican Party's candidate for state representative in the 120th assembly district, brought this action seeking declaratory relief, a new election, and an injunction prohibiting the defendants, Secretary of the State Denise W. Merrill, Treasurer Denise L. Nappier, and Comptroller Kevin Lembo (state defendants), from declaring the intervening defendant, Phillip L. Young III, the Democratic Party's candidate, as the winner of that election. After the Chief Justice granted the parties' separate applications for permission to appeal pursuant to General Statutes § 52-265a, the plaintiff appealed from the judgment of the trial court dismissing the complaint in part as barred by the elections clause set forth in article third, § 7, of the Connecticut constitution, and the defendants appealed from the grant of the plaintiff's application for a temporary injunction. We conclude that the elections clause gives our state House of Representatives exclusive jurisdiction over this election contest, and we disagree with the plaintiff's claims that (1) General Statutes § 9-328, which governs contested elections for 'municipal office,' confers jurisdiction on the courts over this case, and (2) under the supremacy clause of the United States constitution; see U.S. Const., art. VI, cl. 2; state courts have jurisdiction over his federal constitutional claims, notwithstanding the elections clause in the Connecticut constitution. Accordingly, we also agree with the defendants' claim that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enjoin the state defendants from canvassing the votes and declaring a winner. We, therefore, affirm the judgment of the trial court insofar as it dismissed the complaint and reverse the judgment of the trial court with respect to its issuance of a temporary injunction.")

• Posted in:
• Declaratory Judgment Law,
• Election Law,
• Recent Opinions