AC46781 - Pelc v. Southington Dental Associates, P.C. (“In this attorney’s fees dispute, the appellant, the Law Offices of Levine & Levine, appeals from the decision of the Compensation Review Board (board), which affirmed the decision of the administrative law judge denying the appellant’s motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for a stay of proceedings, and continuing a formal hearing to take evidence on the question of how to allocate an escrowed attorney’s fee between the appellant and the appellee, Walker, Feigenbaum & Cantarella Law Group, LLC. On appeal, the appellant argues that (1) the board improperly affirmed the administrative law judge’s conclusion that an alleged violation of General Statutes § 1-84b (b) could not serve as a basis for denying the appellee quantum meruit recovery of a portion of the escrowed attorney’s fee; (2) the board improperly affirmed the administrative law judge’s conclusion that the appellant lacked an enforceable award of attorney’s fees pursuant to General Statutes § 31-327 (a);4 (3) the entire Workers’ Compensation Commission (commission) should have disqualified itself from hearing these proceedings; and (4) the board overlooked the administrative law judge’s alleged violation of the appellant’s right to be heard and concomitant violation of the appellant’s due process rights. We dismiss the appeal as to the appellant’s first claim and affirm the decision of the board in all other respects.”)

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SC20994 - Gardner v. Dept. of Mental Health & Addiction Services (“The sole question in this appeal is whether an administrative law judge with the Workers’ Compensation Commission (commission) has the authority to award ongoing temporary partial incapacity benefits under General Statutes § 31-308 (a) to a claimant who has reached maximum medical improvement and is therefore eligible to receive permanent partial disability benefits under § 31-308 (b). The Appellate Court answered that question in the negative. Gardner v. Dept. of Mental Health & Addiction Services, 223 Conn. App.221, 242–43, 308 A.3d 550 (2024). We disagree with the Appellate Court and conclude that § 31-308 (b) gives an administrative law judge the discretion to award a claimant, after he or she reaches maximum medical improvement, ongoing temporary partial incapacity benefits under § 31-308 (a) in lieu of permanent partial disability benefits under § 31-308 (b), up to the statutory maximum of 520 weeks. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.”)

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SC20922 - Napolitano v. Ace American Ins. Co. (“This certified appeal requires us to consider the relationship between General Statutes § 31-348,1 which governs the cancellation of workers’ compensation insurance policies, and traditional principles of contract law governing the cancellation of insurance policies. The plaintiff, Thomas Napolitano, doing business as Napolitano Roofing, appeals, upon our grant of his petition for certification, from the judgment of the Appellate Court reversing the trial court’s judgment in favor of the plaintiff on his breach of contract claim. Napolitano v. Ace American Ins. Co., 219 Conn. App. 110, 114, 137, 293 A.3d 915 (2023). The plaintiff claims that the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that the named defendant, Ace American Insurance Company, effectively cancelled the plaintiff’s workers’ compensation insurance by providing a cancellation notice that complied with § 31-348, notwithstanding the fact that the defendant, during the same time period, engaged in other conflicting conduct that the plaintiff contends rendered its notice of cancellation indefinite, uncertain, and ambiguous. We agree with the plaintiff and reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.”

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• Contract Law,
• Declaratory Judgment Law,
• Recent Opinions,
• Workers' Compensation Law

SC20932 - Martinoli v. Stamford Police Dept. (“In this certified appeal, the plaintiff, Louis Martinoli, appeals from the judgment of the Appellate Court, which reversed the decision of the Compensation Review Board (board) upholding an award of total incapacity benefits to the plaintiff under General Statutes § 31-307 (a). See Martinoli v. Stamford Police Dept., 220 Conn. App. 874, 875–76, 881, 299 A.3d 1258 (2023). The Appellate Court reasoned that, in accordance with the holding it reached that same day in Cochran v. Dept. of Transportation, 220 Conn. App. 855, 868, 299 A.3d 1247 (2023), rev’d, 350 Conn. 848, A.3d (2024), the plaintiff was ineligible to receive benefits under § 31-307 (a) because, prior to the onset of his incapacity, he had voluntarily retired from the workforce with no intention of returning.”

“We therefore reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court and remand the case to that court for consideration of those issues. The judgment of the Appellate Court is reversed and the case is remanded to that court with direction to consider the defendants’ remaining claims.”

SC20940 - Cochran v. Dept. of Transportation (“The sole issue in this certified appeal is whether an employee who sustained a compensable injury under the Workers’ Compensation Act (act), General Statutes § 31-275 et seq., is eligible to receive total incapacity benefits pursuant to General Statutes § 31-307 (a) when the total incapacity occurred after the employee’s voluntary retirement from the workforce. The Appellate Court held that an employee ‘‘who elected to retire from employment . . . and affirmatively conceded that he had no intention of returning to the workforce . . . was not entitled to [total incapacity] benefits pursuant to the [plain language of] the statute.’’ Cochran v. Dept. of Transportation, 220 Conn. App. 855, 868, 299 A.3d 1247 (2023). We disagree and reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.”

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• Workers' Compensation Law

AC46178 - Waterbury v. Brennan (“In this action for declaratory relief, the defendant Janet Brennan1 appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the plaintiff, the city of Waterbury (city). On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly denied her motion for summary judgment and, relatedly, that it improperly granted the motion for summary judgment filed by the city. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.”)

AC45467 - Brennan v. Waterbury (“The defendant, the city of Waterbury (city), appeals from the judgment of the Compensation Review Board (board), affirming in part the decision of the Workers’ Compensation Commissioner (commissioner) in favor of the plaintiff, Janet Brennan, the executrix of the estate of Thomas Brennan. On appeal, the city claims that the board improperly affirmed the commissioner’s conclusions that (1) the plaintiff’s entitlement to heart and hypertension benefits pursuant to General Statutes § 7-433c matured during the lifetime of the decedent, Thomas Brennan, (2) the plaintiff is entitled to statutory interest on § 7-433c benefits, and (3) the city unduly delayed payment on, and unreasonably contested, the decedent’s claim for § 7-433c benefits. In light of our resolution of the related appeal in Waterbury v. Brennan, 228 Conn. App. 206, A.3d (2024), which also was released today, we conclude that the present appeal is moot, as this court can provide the city no practical relief. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.”)

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• Workers' Compensation Law

AC46589 - Grotto, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. ("The plaintiff employer, The Grotto, Inc. (Grotto), appeals from the summary judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of the defendant insurer, Liberty Mutual Insurance Company (Liberty Mutual). On appeal, Grotto claims that the court improperly concluded that the doctrine of res judicata barred the present action. We agree and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the trial court.")

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• Insurance Law,
• Recent Opinions,
• Workers' Compensation Law

SC20928 - Esposito v. Stamford (“In this appeal, we consider whether a finding of a ‘permanent’ injury entitling a workers’ compensation claimant to total incapacity benefits under General Statutes § 31-307 (c) means that the claimant has reached maximum medical improvement as a matter of law, thus also entitling the claimant to permanent partial disability benefits (permanency benefits) under General Statutes § 31-308 (b). The plaintiff Roseann Esposito, who is the surviving spouse of the decedent and original plaintiff, Robert Esposito, appeals from the decision of the Compensation Review Board (board) affirming the decision of the administrative law judge for the Seventh District of the Workers’ Compensation Commission (commission), who denied an award of permanency benefits. The board based its affirmance on its determination that the decedent had not reached maximum medical improvement during his lifetime. On appeal, the plaintiff claims, among other things, that the decedent, who had been employed as a police officer for the named defendant, the city of Stamford (city), had reached maximum medical improvement prior to his death as a matter of law, insofar as he had been found to have a permanent incapacity qualifying him for benefits under § 31-307 (c). Guided by this court’s recent decision in Brennan v. Waterbury, 331 Conn. 672, 697, 207 A.3d 1 (2019), we disagree with the plaintiff and, accordingly, affirm the decision of the board.”)

• SC20928 Dissent - Esposito v. Stamford

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SC20836 - Ajdini v. Frank Lill & Son, Inc. (“The sole issue in this appeal is whether an employer meets its statutory obligation pursuant to General Statutes § 31-294c (b) to ‘file’ notice of its intention to contest liability to pay compensation for an employee’s workers’ compensation claim by placing that notice in the mail within the twenty-eight day statutory period, regardless of whether that notice is received after the statutory period has elapsed. The defendants, Frank Lill & Son, Inc. (employer), and its workers’ compensation carriers, appeal from the decision of the Compensation Review Board (board) affirming the decision of the administrative law judge for the Fourth District of the Workers’ Compensation Commission (commission), who granted the motion to preclude filed by the plaintiff, Ajredin Ajdini. On appeal, the defendants claim that the board incorrectly concluded that the employer had not timely complied with its statutory obligation under § 31-294c (b) to contest liability because it placed the notice in the mail within the statutory period, and ‘mailing’ is the same as ‘filing’ for purposes of § 31-294c (b). We disagree with the defendants and, accordingly, affirm the decision of the board.”)

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• Workers' Compensation Law

AC45594 - Gardner v. Dept. of Mental Health & Addiction Services (“In this workers’ compensation dispute, the plaintiff, Beulah Gardner, appeals from the decision of the Compensation Review Board (board) affirming the decision of the Workers’ Compensation Commissioner for the Fifth District (commissioner) of the Workers’ Compensation Commission approving a form 36 that was filed by the defendants, the Department of Mental Health and Addiction Services (department) and Gallagher-Bassett Services, Inc., and denying the plaintiff’s claim for ongoing temporary partial disability benefits pursuant to General Statutes § 31-308 (a). The plaintiff claims that the board improperly determined as a matter of law that, in light of the undisputed fact that she had reached maximum medical improvement, she could no longer receive benefits pursuant to § 31-308 (a). We affirm the decision of the board.”)

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• Workers' Compensation Law

AC45341 - Dusto v. Rogers Corp. (“The plaintiff, Lana Kelly, acting in her capacity as executor of the estates of Harold Dusto and his wife, Anita Dusto,1 appeals from the summary judgment rendered in favor of Harold Dusto’s employer, Rogers Corporation (Rogers), and the judgment of dismissal rendered in favor of Special Electric Company, Inc. (Special Electric), which sold asbestos materials to Rogers. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly (1) rendered summary judgment in favor of Rogers on the ground that her claims against Rogers were barred by the exclusivity provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act (act), General Statutes § 31-275 et seq., and (2) dismissed her claims against Special Electric for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We agree with the plaintiff that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether her claims against Rogers satisfied the substantial certainty exception to the exclusivity provision of the act, and we therefore reverse the summary judgment rendered in favor of Rogers. We affirm the dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims against Special Electric.”)

• AC45341 - Dusto v. Rogers Corp. — Concurrence & Dissent

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• Recent Opinions,
• Tort Law,
• Workers' Compensation Law

AC45531 - Cochran v. Dept. of Transportation (“The defendant, the Department of Transportation, appeals from the decision of the Compensation Review Board (board) affirming the award of benefits under General Statutes § 31-307 (a), by the Workers’ Compensation Commissioner for the Third District (commissioner) to the plaintiff, Stephen T. Cochran, to commence retroactively on December 30, 2017, and for a three month period following a surgery in April, 2013. On appeal, the defendant claims that the board erred in upholding the commissioner’s decision to award temporary total disability benefits because the plaintiff, pursuant to the language of § 31-307 (a), was not entitled to those benefits. We agree with the defendant and, accordingly, reverse the decision of the board.”)

AC45229 - Martinoli v. Stamford Police Dept. (“The named defendant, the Stamford Police Department (department), appeals from the decision of the Compensation Review Board (board) affirming the award of benefits under General Statutes § 31-307 (a), by the Workers’ Compensation Commissioner for the Seventh District (commissioner) to the plaintiff, Louis Martinoli, to commence retroactively on July 15, 2015. On appeal, the defendant claims, inter alia, that the board erred in affirming the commissioner’s decision to award temporary total disability benefits because the plaintiff, pursuant to the language of § 31- 307 (a), was not entitled to those benefits. We agree with the defendant and, accordingly, reverse the decision of the board.”

“We addressed the plain and unambiguous language of § 31-307 (a) in Cochran v. Dept. of Transportation, 220 Conn. App. 855, A.3d (2023), also released today, in which the parties raised similar claims and arguments. Applying the principles of statutory interpretation in that case, we concluded that ‘‘the plain and unambiguous language of § 31-307 (a) requires that, in order to be eligible for temporary total disability benefits, a claimant’s ‘injury . . . result[s] in total incapacity to work.’ ’’ Id., 867. We held that where a claimant retires without any intention of returning to the workforce and does not return to the workforce, he or she is not entitled to temporary total disability benefits pursuant to § 31-307 (a) because it cannot be said that the claimant’s ‘‘ ‘injury . . . results in total incapacity to work.’ ’’ Id., 867–68. Accordingly, we reversed the decision of the board affirming the commissioner’s award of temporary total disability benefits. Id., 873. Like the plaintiff in Cochran, the plaintiff here elected to retire from his employment with the defendant. Moreover, the plaintiff testified in September, 2020, that he never intended to return to the workforce after retirement, his intention was to ‘‘stay retired’’ and ‘‘enjoy retirement,’’ and he has not worked for any employer since he retired in October, 1999. We see no reason to repeat the analysis set forth in Cochran v. Dept. of Transportation, supra, 855. For the reasons stated therein, we conclude that the board improperly affirmed the commissioner’s award of § 31-307 (a) benefits to the plaintiff beginning retroactively on July 15, 2015.

The decision of the Compensation Review Board is reversed and the case is remanded to the board with direction to reverse the decision of the commissioner.”)

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• Workers' Compensation Law

SC20630- Clark v. Waterford, Cohanzie Fire Dept. (“The sole issue in this certified appeal is whether a uniformed firefighter must ‘customarily’ work twenty hours or more per week to be eligible for heart and hypertension benefits under General Statutes § 7-433c. The named defendant, the town of Waterford, Cohanzie Fire Department (town), appeals, upon our grant of its petition for certification, from the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming the decision of the Compensation Review Board (board), which upheld the finding and award of the Workers’ Compensation Commissioner for the Second District (commissioner), ordering the town to accept as compensable a claim filed by the plaintiff, Christopher A. Clark, for heart disease benefits pursuant to § 7-433c. Clark v. Waterford, Cohanzie Fire Dept., 206 Conn. App. 223, 224–25, 243, 261 A.3d 97 (2021). On appeal, the town claims that the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that the definition of ‘member’ in General Statutes § 7-425 (5), which excludes ‘any person who customarily works less than twenty hours a week if such person entered employment after September 30, 1969,’ does not govern whether the plaintiff was ‘a uniformed member of a paid municipal fire department’ for purposes of § 7-433c. (Emphasis added.) General Statutes § 7-433c (a). We agree with the town and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.”)

• SC20630 Dissent- Clark v. Waterford, Cohanzie Fire Dept.

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AC45106 - Bassett v. East Haven (Scope of job duties; “On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the board erred in upholding the commissioner’s decision that the plaintiff’s claimed injuries did not arise out of his employment with the defendant town of East Haven (town). We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the decision of the board.”)

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AC44694 - Napolitano v. Ace American Ins. Co. (“The defendant Ace American Insurance Company appeals from the judgment of the trial court granting the motion for summary judgment filed by the plaintiff, Thomas Napolitano, doing business as Napolitano Roofing, as to counts one and two of the plaintiff’s fifth amended complaint, in which he sought a declaratory judgment and asserted a breach of contract claim, respectively. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court erred in (1) granting the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment because the court improperly determined that (a) the defendant’s notice of cancellation to the plaintiff, cancelling his workers’ compensation insurance policy, was ineffective and (b) the defendant breached its duty under the policy to defend or indemnify the plaintiff with respect to a workers’ compensation claim submitted by his employee, (2) awarding attorney’s fees to the plaintiff, as damages, in connection with his defense of the workers’ compensation claim and a lawsuit brought by the employee, and (3) awarding prejudgment statutory interest to the plaintiff relating to workers’ compensation payments that he made to his employee. In addition, the plaintiff cross appeals from the court’s granting of the defendant’s motion to strike count three of his fifth amended complaint, in which he asserted a claim of bad faith. The plaintiff argues on appeal that he pleaded legally sufficient allegations that the defendant breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing when it refused to defend or indemnify him under his insurance policy. With respect to the defendant’s appeal, we reverse the summary judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the plaintiff, and, as a result, we also vacate the attorney’s fees and prejudgment statutory interest awarded to the plaintiff—relief that was predicated on the court’s conclusion that the plaintiff was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on count two. As to the plaintiff’s cross appeal, we reverse the decision of the trial court striking the third count of the plaintiff’s fifth amended complaint.”)

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AC45589 - White v. Waterbury Fire Dept. (“The plaintiff, a firefighter for the named defendant, the Waterbury Fire Department, argues that the commissioner and the board erred in concluding that the plaintiff was not entitled to workers’ compensation benefits because he was not engaged in an activity for the mutual benefit of both himself and the defendant when he was injured as he left his home to go to work. We affirm the decision of the board.”)

AC44987 - Gaudett v. Bridgeport Police Dept. (“The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the plaintiff, Joseph L. Gaudett, Jr., began employment with the named defendant, the Bridgeport Police Department, on or after July 1, 1996, for purposes of being eligible to receive benefits under General Statutes § 7-433c, the Heart and Hypertension Act, which affords benefits for any eligible regular member of a paid municipal police department who was hired before July 1, 1996. The plaintiff, the former chief of police employed by the city of Bridgeport (city), appeals from the decision of the Compensation Review Board (board), which affirmed the decision of the Workers’ Compensation Commissioner for the Fourth District (commissioner) dismissing his claim for benefits under § 7-433c on the ground that, although the plaintiff initially was hired as a police officer in 1983, the effective date of his employment as chief of police in 2010 constituted a new date of hire such that his claim for benefits was beyond the ambit of § 7-433c. The plaintiff claims that the board improperly affirmed the commissioner’s decision because he was a regular member of the Bridgeport Police Department from 1983 until he retired from his position as the chief of police in 2016. We agree and, accordingly, reverse the decision of the board.”)

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• Workers' Compensation Law

AC44491 - Kelly v. Dept. of Mental Health & Addiction Services (“The plaintiff, George Kelly, who was employed as a per diem psychiatrist by the defendant Department of Mental Health and Addiction Services (department), appeals from the decision of the Compensation Review Board (board), upholding the determination by the Workers’ Compensation Commissioner for the Eighth District (commissioner) that he was not entitled to enhanced, full salary disability benefits pursuant to General Statutes § 5-142 (a). On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the board erred in upholding the commissioner’s decision because the commissioner (1) improperly relied on a supersedence appendix and cost sheet, which the plaintiff had offered into evidence, for substantive purposes; (2) failed to allocate to the department the burden of proving that the plaintiff was not entitled to the enhanced benefits of § 5-142 (a); (3) improperly concluded that a 1989 memorandum of agreement between the plaintiff’s union and the state operated to supersede § 5-142 (a) for per diem employees such as the plaintiff; (4) set forth inconsistent conclusions in his original decision and his subsequent decision on the plaintiff’s motion to correct; and (5) improperly concluded that a 1993 collective bargaining agreement, which added psychiatrists to the class of per diem employees, was not required to go through ‘a new supersedence process.’ We affirm the decision of the board.”)

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• Workers' Compensation Law

AC44844 - Britto v. Bimbo Foods, Inc. (“The plaintiff, John J. Britto, appeals from the decision of the Compensation Review Board (board) affirming the decision of the Workers’ Compensation Commissioner for the Fourth District (commissioner) denying the plaintiff’s motion to preclude the named defendant, Bimbo Foods, Inc., from contesting liability as to his claimed bilateral knee injury stemming from repetitive trauma. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the board improperly affirmed the commissioner’s denial of his motion to preclude, which was predicated on the commissioner’s determination that the defendant did not receive the notice of claim that the plaintiff sent to it by certified mail. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the decision of the board.”)

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• Workers' Compensation Law

AC44225 - Fieldhouse v. Regency Coachworks, Inc. ("The defendant Regency Coachworks, Inc., appeals from the decision of the Compensation Review Board (board) reversing the decision of the Workers' Compensation Commissioner for the Second District (commissioner) determining that the plaintiff, Linda Fieldhouse, failed to satisfy the notice requirement set forth in General Statutes § 31-294c and that her claim for workers' compensation benefits failed to satisfy an exception to the notice requirement as set forth in § 31-294c (c).On appeal, the defendant claims that the board erred, as a matter of law, in concluding that the commissioner misapplied the totality of the circumstances standard and that the plaintiff had substantially complied with the notice requirements such that the defendant was provided with constructive notice of the claim. We affirm the decision of the board.")

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• Workers' Compensation Law

AC44465 - Lavette v. Stanley Black & Decker Inc. (Intentional tort; motion to strike; whether plaintiff employee's pleading was legally sufficient to bring claim within intentional tort exception to exclusivity provision (§ 31-284) of Workers' Compensation Act (§ 31-275 et seq.); whether plaintiff's allegations were legally sufficient to establish that supervisory employee acted as defendant employer's alter ego; "The plaintiff, Henry Lavette III, a former employee of the defendant, Stanley Black & Decker, Inc., appeals from the judgment of the trial court, rendered in favor of the defendant following the court's decision to strike count one of his fourth amended complaint with prejudice. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly concluded that he had failed to allege sufficient facts to establish that his claim came within the intentional tort exception to the exclusivity provision of the Workers' Compensation Act (act), General Statutes § 31-275 et seq. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

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• Recent Opinions,
• Tort Law,
• Workers' Compensation Law

AC44180, AC44181, AC44182 - Desmond v. Yale-New Haven Hospital, Inc. (“In these consolidated actions, the plaintiff, Sandhya Desmond, a former employee of the defendant Yale-New Haven Hospital, Inc., appeals from the judgments of the trial court rendered following the granting of the defendant's motions to strike her complaints. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court incorrectly construed her claims as alleging bad faith processing of a workers' compensation claim rather than as claims made pursuant to General Statutes § 31-290a and, therefore, erred in determining that her claims were barred by the exclusivity provision of the Workers' Compensation Act (act), General Statutes § 31-275 et seq. We disagree and, therefore, affirm the judgments of the trial court.”)

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• Workers' Compensation Law