AC47452 - Birch Hill Recovery Center, LLC v. High Watch Recovery Center, Inc. (“On appeal, the plaintiff does not argue that the court erred in its determination that the defendant met its initial burden under the first prong of § 52-196a (e) (3). See footnote 2 of this opinion. Instead, the plaintiff claims that the court erred by dismissing the action because it established that there is probable cause that it will prevail on its claims against the defendant. Specifically, the plaintiff contends that (1) the defendant’s efforts to challenge the facility in court and administrative proceedings constituted ‘‘sham’’ litigation that is not protected by the first amendment to the federal constitution or the state constitution, (2) the absolute litigation privilege does not bar the plaintiff’s claims, and (3) the complaint sufficiently alleged that the defendant’s conduct amounted to tortious interference with business relations. We disagree with the plaintiff’s claim that it established probable cause that it will prevail on its claim that the defendant’s challenges to the facility constituted sham litigation. We, therefore, conclude that the court did not err in its determination that the defendant’s conduct was protected by the first amendment. Because that conclusion is sufficient to uphold the dismissal of the complaint, we need not address the plaintiff’s other challenges to the judgment of dismissal. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.”)

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AC47244 - Beger v. Bristol (Personal injury; municipal highway defect statute § 13a-149; "On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to the first count of her complaint, which asserted a claim against the city under General Statutes § 13a-149, also known as the municipal highway defect statute. We disagree and affirm the judgment of the court.”)

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AC47533 - Gibson v. Denmo's Original Drive-In, LLC (Negligence; premises liability; “On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial court abused its discretion by denying her motion to set aside the verdict because the court provided the jury with an incorrect version of the interrogatories and the jury’s use of those interrogatories precluded the jury from fully evaluating the essential elements of the cause of action. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.”)

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AC47206 - One Eighty-Five Stagg Associates v. Linwood Avenue III, LLC (Negligence; motion for directed verdict; sufficiency of evidence; "On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court erred in (1) granting the defendants’ motion for a directed verdict on the basis that the plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence in support of its claims, and (2) ordering the redaction of certain statements contained in a documentary exhibit presented by the plaintiff. We agree with the plaintiff with respect to both claims and, accordingly, reverse in part the judgment of the trial court.")

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AC47140 - Ready v. New Canaan (“The plaintiffs, Scott Ready and Veronica Ready, appeal from the judgment of the trial court granting the motion for summary judgment filed by the defendant, the town of New Canaan, as to the plaintiffs’ complaint alleging breach of contract. On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the court improperly rendered summary judgment in favor of the defendant on the ground that the plaintiffs’ claim sounded in tort rather than in breach of contract and, therefore, was barred by the doctrine of governmental immunity. We reverse the judgment of the court.”)

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• Contract Law,
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• Tort Law

AC46590 - Bethel Baseball Assn., Inc. v. Dyer ("The self-represented defendant, Kurt R. Dyer, appeals from the judgment, rendered after a court trial, in favor of the plaintiff, Bethel Baseball Association, Inc., on its counts alleging conversion and statutory theft. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court (1) erroneously concluded that he had committed conversion and statutory theft and (2) abused its discretion by not addressing the plaintiff's failures to properly respond to his discovery requests. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

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SC20906 - Ammar I. v. Dept. of Children & Families ("The sole issue in this certified appeal is whether the litigation privilege affords absolute immunity to the defendant, the Department of Children and Families, from a claim by the self-represented plaintiff, Ammar I., that the defendant had discriminated against him based on his religion during his termination of parental rights trial. The plaintiff asserts that the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that the litigation privilege barred his discrimination claim challenging the defendant's improper use of child protection proceedings to alienate him from his children. We conclude that the Appellate Court correctly held that the litigation privilege barred the plaintiff's remaining timely allegations pertaining exclusively to the defendant's actions during his termination of parental rights trial. We nevertheless reverse in part the Appellate Court's judgment to the extent that the court's remand order directed the trial court to grant the defendant's motion to dismiss in its entirety. We therefore affirm in part and reverse in part the Appellate Court's judgment.")

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• Civil Procedure,
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• Tort Law

AC47007 - DiSpazio v. Pacapelli ("The plaintiffs, Paul DiSpazio and Maltby Street, LLC (Maltby Street), appeal from the trial court's rendering of summary judgment in favor of the defendants, Eugene Pacapelli and other officers and members of the board of directors of West Cove Marina Coop, Inc. (West Cove), and from its granting of the defendants' motion for sanctions. The plaintiffs claim that the court improperly granted (1) the defendants' motion for summary judgment because a release of liability entered into by the plaintiffs for the benefit of West Cove in connection with prior litigation (2015 release) did not preclude the present action; and (2) the defendants' motion for sanctions because the plaintiffs' claims were not without basis in law or fact and the court did not make a requisite finding of bad faith. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the court.")

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AC47097- Marks v. GLT Development Corp. ("In this personal injury action, which arose during the COVID-19 pandemic, the plaintiff, Stephen Marks, appeals from the judgment of the trial court granting the defendant GLT Development Corporation's motion to strike on statute of limitations grounds. This appeal involves the question of how to calculate, in connection with the plaintiff's negligence claim arising from an accident that occurred on May 24, 2020, the statute of limitations set forth in General Statutes § 52-584. The operability of that statute was suspended as a result of Governor Ned Lamont's Executive Order No. 7G, effective March 19, 2020, and that suspension subsequently was lifted on March 1, 2021, by Governor Lamont's Executive Order No. 10A.The plaintiff claims that the court incorrectly concluded that the two year limitations period began to run on March 1, 2021, and expired on March 1, 2023.The plaintiff argues instead that he was entitled to a suspension of 347 or 348 days, representing the total number of days that the suspension was in effect, notwithstanding the fact that the plaintiff's cause of action did not exist when the suspension began. That is, the plaintiff contends that the proper calculation of his limitations period is effectively two years plus 347 or 348 days. The defendant argues to the contrary that the court properly concluded that the statute of limitations began to run on March 1, 2021, and expired on March 1, 2023. We agree with the defendant and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

• Posted in:
• Civil Procedure,
• Recent Opinions,
• Tort Law

SC21005 - L. L. v. Newell Brands, Inc. ("Over the past one-half century, this court has twice recognized a cause of action for loss of consortium. In Hopson v. St. Mary's Hospital, 176 Conn. 485, 408 A.2d 260 (1979), this court recognized a claim for the loss of the consortium of an injured spouse; id., 496; defined to encompass both the tangible elements of consortium, such as a spouse's household services and financial support, and the intangible elements, including a spouse's "affection, society, [and] companionship . . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 487. Thirty-six years later, in Campos v. Coleman, 319 Conn. 36, 123 A.3d 854 (2015), this court further extended a tortfeasor's liability to a minor child's loss of the consortium of an injured parent. Id., 57. The sole issue in this case, which comes to us on certification from the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, is whether we should further expand the scope of liability by recognizing a parent's claim for the loss of the consortium of an injured minor child. We decline to do so.")

• SC21005 Concurrence - L. L. v. Newell Brands, Inc.
• SC21005 Dissent - L. L. v. Newell Brands, Inc.

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AC46773 - Petrocelli v. Shelton ("In this action brought, in part, pursuant to the state highway defect statute, General Statutes § 13a-144, the defendant, the state of Connecticut, appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying its motion to dismiss the claims asserted against it by the plaintiff, Jennifer Petrocelli, on the ground that they are barred by sovereign immunity. On appeal, the state claims that the court improperly denied the motion to dismiss because it did not have a duty to maintain and repair the area where the alleged injury occurred and, thus, is entitled to sovereign immunity. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

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SC21013 - McCarter & English, LLP v. Jarrow Formulas, Inc. ("This case, which comes to us upon our acceptance of a certified question from the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, requires us to consider whether a law firm can recover punitive damages from a former client for the client's breach of contract. We have long recognized that the principal purpose of remedies in a breach of contract action is to provide compensation for loss. See, e.g., Vines v. Orchard Hills, Inc., 181 Conn. 501, 506, 435 A.2d 1022 (1980). As a result, damages for breach of contract are traditionally limited to compensatory damages. See, e.g., id., 506–507. Connecticut is unique among the states because common-law punitive damages are limited to litigation expenses that may also serve to compensate the plaintiff. See, e.g., Berry v. Loiseau, 223 Conn. 786, 827, 614 A.2d 414 (1992). But we have also recognized that, "in . . . light of the increasing costs of litigation," punitive damages can also "punish and deter wrongful conduct." Id. Consequently, punitive damages are often in tension with the purpose of damages in contract law because, "[e]ven if the breach [of contract] is deliberate, it is not necessarily blameworthy." Patton v. Mid-Continent Systems, Inc., 841 F.2d 742, 750 (7th Cir. 1988). In light of this tension, we tread carefully when determining whether to broaden the scope of a client's potential liability to its attorney when that attorney brings a breach of contract action against the client. After consideration of the common law of this state and other jurisdictions, and the relevant policy implications, we agree with, and adopt, the rule followed by the majority of jurisdictions and the Restatements: a law firm may not recover common-law punitive damages for its client's breach of contract unless it pleads and proves the existence of an independent tort for which punitive damages are available.")

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• Contract Law,
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SC20950 - Murphy v. Rosen ("The use of derogatory remarks on social media and elsewhere has become commonplace in political discourse, with words and phrases taking on different meanings depending on the context in which the expression is made, the intentions of the speaker, and the viewpoint of the audience. This case arises out of heated political dialogue that took place on a town's social media page. The plaintiff, Sean Murphy, appeals from the judgment of the trial court, which granted the special motion to dismiss filed by the defendant, Beth Rosen, pursuant to Connecticut's anti-SLAPP statute. See General Statutes § 52-196a. The trial court determined, as a matter of law, that the statements made by the defendant labeling the plaintiff as a "white supremacist" were nonactionable opinions. Therefore, the court concluded that the plaintiff had failed to satisfy his burden of showing that there was probable cause that he would succeed on the merits of his defamation per se claim, as required by § 52-196a (e) (3). The primary issue on appeal is whether the characterization of the plaintiff as a "white supremacist" is, standing alone, an actionable fact constituting defamation per se. We conclude that, although calling someone a "white supremacist" or a "racist" is a serious accusation, the meanings of these terms are inherently subjective. As a result, we join numerous other jurisdictions that have concluded that these terms are not objectively verifiable and do not, without more, imply the existence of undisclosed defamatory facts. Because the trial court correctly determined that the defendant's allegedly defamatory statements constituted nonactionable opinions, we affirm the judgment of dismissal.")

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SC20992 - Suprynowicz v. Tohan ("The plaintiffs, Kayla Suprynowicz and Reilly Flaherty, who were strangers for most of their lives, discovered through the genetic testing company 23andMe that they are half siblings. They allege in this action that their biological father is the defendant, Narendra B. Tohan, the reproductive endocrinologist who assisted the plaintiffs' parents in the parents' efforts to conceive children. The plaintiffs claim that, in treating their parents' infertility, the defendant utilized his own sperm rather than the sperm of the men they believed to be their fathers to impregnate their mothers, causing the plaintiffs physical and emotional harm. Although the plaintiffs' causes of action were labeled in the complaint as ordinary negligence claims, the defendant moved to strike them on the ground that they were noncognizable wrongful life claims. The trial court agreed and granted the motion to strike the plaintiffs' complaint.

The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the trial court correctly determined that the plaintiffs' negligence claims sounded in wrongful life rather than ordinary negligence. We conclude that the answer to that question is no and that our recent decision in Lynch v. State, 348 Conn. 478, 308 A.3d 1 (2024), controls the outcome. In Lynch, this court clarified that a claim arising from hospital staff's alleged negligence in using sperm infected with a virus in the course of a therapeutic donor insemination (TDI) procedure sounded in medical negligence, not wrongful life. See id., 484–87, 489–91, 505, 507. Similarly, the plaintiffs' claims in the present case are ordinary negligence claims rather than wrongful life claims because they arise from the defendant doctor's alleged negligence in using his own sperm to impregnate the plaintiffs' mothers during in vitro fertilization (IVF) procedures. Accordingly, we reverse in part the judgment of the trial court.")

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AC46498 - Roux v. Coffey ("The plaintiffs, Carri Roux and Stephen J. Roux, coadministrators of the estate of their son, Luke M. Roux (Roux), appeal from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the defendant Live Nation Worldwide, Inc., following the court's granting of the defendant's motion to strike all counts of the complaint brought against it. On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the court improperly struck counts four and five of their complaint, which alleged negligence and public nuisance claims, respectively. We affirm the judgment of the court.")

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AC46166 - Unifoods, S.A. de C.V. v. Magallanes ("The plaintiff, Unifoods, S.A. de C.V., appeals from the summary judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of the defendants Julia Magallanes and Calvin Cordulack on counts two through five of the plaintiff's operative complaint asserting violations of the Connecticut Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (CUFTA), General Statutes § 52-552a et seq. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly concluded that (1) the defendants satisfied their initial burden of demonstrating that no genuine issues of material fact existed and that, as a matter of law, the plaintiff's fraudulent transfer claims were time barred pursuant to General Statutes § 52-552j, and (2) after shifting the burden of proof to the plaintiff, the plaintiff had not established the existence of genuine issues of material fact regarding the timeliness of its claims. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

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• Tort Law

AC46508 - Civic Mind, LLC v. Hartford (“In this action concerning the redevelopment of Dillon Stadium (stadium) in Hartford, the plaintiff, Civic Mind, LLC, appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing its complaint against the nineteen defendants, including the city of Hartford (city) and the Capital Region Development Authority (CRDA). On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly granted motions to dismiss filed by the defendants on the ground that the plaintiff lacked standing to pursue its claims against the defendants. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.”)

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AC 46133 - Lafferty v. Jones ("In these consolidated appeals, the defendants Alex Emric Jones and Free Speech Systems, LLC, appeal from the judgments of the trial court rendered following jury verdicts returned in favor of the plaintiffs in the underlying consolidated tort actions arising out of the 2012 mass shooting at Sandy Hook Elementary School in Newtown. On appeal, the defendants claim that the court improperly (1) defaulted them as a sanction for violating certain discovery orders and a protective order, (2) construed the effect of the default to relieve the plaintiffs of the burden to prove the extent of their damages, (3) restricted the scope of Jones’ testimony at the hearing in damages, (4) denied their motion for a remittitur, and (5) concluded that the plaintiffs’ claim asserting a violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), General Statutes § 42-110a et seq., was legally sufficient. For the reasons that follow, we disagree with the defendants’ first, second, and fourth claims, and deem the defendants’ third claim to be abandoned as inadequately briefed. We agree, however, with the defendants’ fifth claim. Accordingly, we reverse in part the judgments of the trial court.")

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AC46477 - Robinson v. V. D. ("The defendant, V. D., appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying his special motion to dismiss the underlying civil action pursuant to General Statutes § 52-196a, our state's anti-SLAPP statute. The civil action filed by the plaintiffs, Michael Robinson and Mary Robinson, seeks compensatory damages and injunctive relief for defamation, invasion of privacy by false light, statutory and common-law vexatious litigation, and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The defendant claims that (1) the court improperly denied his special motion to dismiss the action on the ground that his alleged conduct did not relate to an exercise of a protected right in connection with a matter of public concern and, thus, fell outside the scope of § 52-196a, and, (2) even if he is not entitled to a dismissal of the action pursuant to § 52-196a, the trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this action because the defendant is entitled to absolute immunity under the litigation privilege for his alleged conduct, all of which occurred in the course of judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings. In addition to disputing the defendant's claims, the plaintiffs raise as an alternative ground for affirming the denial of the special motion to dismiss that § 52-196a violates both the state and federal constitutions. We conclude that the question of whether the plaintiffs' action is barred by absolute immunity under the litigation privilege implicates the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction and, thus, must be considered prior to addressing the merits of the special motion to dismiss. We agree with the defendant that, with the exception of those counts sounding in vexatious litigation, the complaint is barred by absolute immunity. With respect to the remaining vexatious litigation counts, we affirm in part and reverse in part the court's decision to deny the special motion to dismiss, we reject the plaintiffs' alternative ground for affirmance, and we remand the matter for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.")

AC46645 - Vu v. N. L. ("The plaintiff, Nhan Vu, appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying his motion to open the judgment of dismissal rendered in favor of the self-represented defendant, N. L. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court abused its discretion in denying his motion to open. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

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AC45829 - Mulvihill v. Spinnato ("The defendant, Kara Spinnato, known also as Kara Callahan, appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying her special motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Connecticut's anti-SLAPP statute, General Statutes § 52-196a, in this defamation action brought by the self-represented plaintiff, Daniel Mulvihill. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly concluded that the plaintiff met his burden under § 52-196a of establishing probable cause that he will prevail on the merits of his complaint. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

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