AC45318 - AAA Advantage Carting & Demolition Service, LLC v. Capone ("The defendant, Joseph Capone, appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the plaintiff, AAA Advantage Carting & Demolition Service, LLC, on its amended complaint asserting claims of (1) conversion and (2) statutory theft in violation of General Statutes § 52-564. The defendant claims that the court (1) improperly concluded that two savings statutes, General Statutes § 52-591 and/or General Statutes § 52-592, applied to save the present action from being time barred pursuant to the three year limitation period of General Statutes § 52-577, (2) improperly concluded that the plaintiff's claims were not barred pursuant to the doctrine of res judicata, (3) made a clearly erroneous factual finding in concluding that the defendant had committed statutory theft, and (4) erred in awarding damages, including prejudgment interest pursuant to General Statutes § 37-3a, to the plaintiff. We conclude that the trial court committed error only with respect to its award of damages to the plaintiff and, therefore, we reverse the judgment as to damages only.")

AC45354 - Hughes v. Board of Education ("The plaintiffs, Naionna Hughes and her mother, Juanita Jones,1 appeal from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the defendants, the Board of Education of the City of Waterbury (board), the city of Waterbury (city), Irena Varecka, and Jessica Giorgi. On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the court improperly granted the defendants’ motion to strike their complaint on the ground of governmental immunity. More specifically, they contend that the court improperly concluded that the identifiable victim subject to imminent harm exception to governmental immunity did not apply. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

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SC20772 - Escobar-Santana v. State ("General Statutes § 4-160 (f) waives the state's sovereign immunity with respect to qualified medical malpractice actions and allows such actions to proceed against the state without the need for prior authorization from the Claims Commissioner. The statute also expressly provides that "[a]ny such action shall be limited to medical malpractice claims only . . . ." General Statutes § 4-160 (f). The primary question presented by this interlocutory appeal is whether the statutory phrase "medical malpractice claims" is broad enough to encompass a mother's allegation that she suffered emotional distress damages from physical injuries to her child that were proximately caused by the negligence of health care professionals during the birthing process. We hold that claims alleging such damages can qualify as medical malpractice claims for purposes of § 4-160 (f). Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court properly denied the motion of the defendant, the state of Connecticut, to dismiss the second count of the complaint of the plaintiffs, Celine Escobar-Santana (Escobar-Santana) and her son, Emmett Escobar-Santana (Emmett), because the plaintiffs alleged a valid medical malpractice claim in that count.")

• SC20772 Concurrence - Escobar-Santana v. State

• Posted in:
• Medical Malpractice Law,
• Recent Opinions,
• Tort Law

AC45296 - Elwell v. Kellogg (Vexatious litigation; “On appeal, the plaintiff principally claims that the court improperly (1) denied her motion for partial summary judgment and granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment directed to count two of her complaint sounding in vexatious litigation and (2) granted the defendant’s motion to strike count three of her complaint asserting a violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), General Statutes § 42-110a et seq. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.”)

AC45180 - A Better Way Wholesale Autos, Inc. v. Better Business Bureau of Connecticut (“On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly (1) failed to consider each defamatory statement contained in the plaintiff’s complaint, and (2) determined that the rating issued by BBB to the plaintiff, in the form of a letter grade, was a nonactionable expression of an opinion, not a statement of fact. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.”)

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• Tort Law

SC20753 - Adesokan v. Bloomfield ("We now take up the issue, left open by our recent decisions in Daley v. Kashmanian, 344 Conn. 464, 280 A.3d 68 (2022), and Borelli v. Renaldi, 336 Conn. 1, 243 A.3d 1064 (2020), of whether the special defense of governmental immunity for discretionary acts; see General Statutes § 52-557n (a) (2) (B); bars claims of negligence against drivers operating an "emergency vehicle" pursuant to the privileges provided by the emergency vehicle statute, General Statutes § 14-283. The plaintiff, Marline Adesokan, individually and on behalf of her two minor children, appeals from the judgment of the trial court in favor of the defendants, the town of Bloomfield (town), the Bloomfield Police Department, and one of its police officers, Jonathan W. Sykes. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, in part because the court misapplied Borelli in determining that Sykes' "duty to drive with due regard for the safety of all persons and property" in accordance with § 14-283 (d) was discretionary in nature for purposes of governmental immunity under § 52-557n (a) (2) (B).We conclude that the defense of discretionary act immunity provided by § 52-557n (a) (2) (B) does not apply to claims arising from the manner in which an emergency vehicle is operated under the privileges provided by § 14-283. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.")

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AC45127 - Brownstone Exploration & Discovery Park LLC v. Borodkin (“The plaintiff, Brownstone Exploration & Discovery Park, LLC (Brownstone), appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying its application to compel arbitration of a dispute involving the defendant, Diane Borodkin, who previously had filed an action against Brownstone for personal injuries (personal injury action) that she allegedly sustained when she slipped and fell on an unmarked tree root while walking on a path just past the entrance to a park owned and operated by Brownstone. Brownstone filed its application pursuant to General Statutes § 52-410 seeking to compel arbitration of the dispute in accordance with an agreement that Borodkin signed when she entered the park, which was titled ‘‘Release and Waiver of Claims Arising From Inherent Risks, Indemnity and Arbitration Agreement’’ (agreement). The trial court found the language of the arbitration provision in the agreement to be ambiguous and, as a result, concluded that the issue of arbitrability was a matter for the court to decide. The court further determined that the claim was not arbitrable because it did not fall within the scope of the agreement. Finally, the court concluded, sua sponte, that Brownstone’s application also must be denied on procedural grounds.

On appeal, Brownstone claims that (1) the court erred by concluding that the issue of arbitrability was a matter for the court, not the arbitrators, to decide, and (2) the court erred in denying its application to compel arbitration on procedural grounds. We agree with both of these claims and, thus, reverse the judgment of the court.”)

• Posted in:
• Contract Law,
• Recent Opinions,
• Tort Law

AC45400 - Stevens v. Khalily (“On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly struck counts nine and twelve, which alleged defamation against Shahram and Diana respectively, for failure to plead defamation with the requisite specificity. The plaintiff argues that counts nine and twelve of the operative complaint ‘‘adequately identify the alleged defamatory statements, who made them and to whom they were made, which is what is required of defamation pleadings under Connecticut law and practice.’’ We conclude that the court properly granted the motion to strike counts nine and twelve because the plaintiff has failed to plead reputational harm, an element required to establish a prima facie case of defamation at common law. Because the plaintiff has failed to plead all four elements of defamation, we need not reach the plaintiff’s claim that the court improperly granted the motion to strike on the grounds that he failed to plead the elements of defamation with the requisite specificity. We affirm the judgment of the court.”)

• Posted in:
• Family Law,
• Recent Opinions,
• Tort Law

SC20705 - Khan v. Yale University (“Although the Second Circuit also asked us to answer whether, under Connecticut law, a proceeding before a nongovernmental entity could ever be deemed quasi-judicial for purposes of affording absolute immunity to proceeding participants; id., 833; we conclude that it is unnecessary to answer that question in order to resolve whether Yale’s UWC proceeding was quasi-judicial. Instead, we answer the certified questions focusing on the requirements that any proceeding must satisfy to be considered quasi-judicial.”)

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AC45265 - Ammar I. v. Dept. of Children & Families ("In this discrimination action, the defendant, the Department of Children and Families, appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying its motion to dismiss the complaint filed by the self-represented plaintiff, Ammar I., and from the court's denials of two of its motions to reargue. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court erred in concluding that (1) the litigation privilege did not bar the plaintiff's claims, (2) sovereign immunity did not bar the plaintiff's claim for money damages brought pursuant to General Statutes §§ 46a-58 (a) and 46a-71 (a), and (3) the plaintiff had standing to maintain this action following the termination of his parental rights. For the reasons that follow, we agree with the defendant on its first claim and, therefore, reverse the judgment of the trial court.")

AC45319 - Cornelius v. Markle Investigators, Inc. ("The plaintiff, Charles Cornelius, appeals from the judgment of the trial court granting the motions for summary judgment filed by the defendants Markle Investigations, Inc. (Markle), and Hopkins School, Inc. (Hopkins School).On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly rendered summary judgment in favor of the defendants as to the plaintiff's claim of invasion of privacy by intrusion upon seclusion because genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether (1) the defendants' alleged intrusion was intentional, (2) the defendants' surveillance of the plaintiff solely in public was an actionable intrusion, and (3) the defendants' surveillance of the plaintiff was highly offensive to a reasonable person. We disagree with the plaintiff as to his claims regarding whether there was an actionable intrusion and whether such intrusion was highly offensive and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

• AC45319 Concurrence - Cornelius v. Markle Investigators, Inc.

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AC45088 - Jakobowski v. State (Negligence; claim that sovereign immunity barred plaintiff's claims because claims commissioner exceeded statutory authority in granting permission to sue state; "The defendant, the state of Connecticut, appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying its motion to dismiss the claims asserted against it by the plaintiff, Edward Jakobowski, administrator of the estate of Melinda Jakobowski, on the basis of sovereign immunity. The defendant claims that the court improperly denied its motion to dismiss because the claims commissioner authorized only a medical malpractice claim pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 2017) § 4-160 (b), and the plaintiff did not comply with the mandatory requirements of that statute. Alternatively, the defendant contends that if the claims commissioner authorized the plaintiff to sue the defendant for negligence based on lack of informed consent pursuant to § 4-160 (a), any waiver of immunity was invalid because the claims commissioner did not develop a factual record, hold a hearing, or make a finding that the plaintiff's claim was just and equitable. Finally, the defendant claims than the trial court erred in concluding that the claims commissioner's failure to act on the plaintiff's claim within the two year period set forth in General Statutes § 4-159a did not deprive the claims commissioner of authority to act. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

• Posted in:
• Medical Malpractice Law,
• Tort Law

AC45249 - Ahern v. Board of Education (Negligence; summary judgment; final judgments; governmental immunity pursuant to statute (§ 52-557n); indemnification pursuant to statute (§ 10-235); "The plaintiff, Nicole Ahern, a former student of Coginchaug Regional High School (high school) and a former member of the high school's cheerleading squad, brought this action against the defendants, the Board of Education of Regional School District Number 13 (board); Kathryn Y. Veronesi, the superintendent of Regional School District Number 13; Paula Murphy, the high school's head cheerleading coach; and Marissa Barletta, the high school's assistant cheerleading coach. The plaintiff alleged that, due to the negligence of the defendants and the board, she was injured while attempting a stunt during the high school's cheerleading practice. The plaintiff appeals from the partial summary judgment the trial court rendered in favor of the defendants and the board on the ground that governmental immunity barred certain counts of the action.

The plaintiff claims on appeal that the court improperly rendered summary judgment because there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether she was subject to imminent and apparent harm and was an identifiable individual pursuant to the identifiable person-imminent harm exception to governmental immunity. After oral argument, this court ordered the parties to file supplemental briefs addressing whether this appeal should be dismissed, in part, for the lack of a final judgment as to the board because the trial court did not dispose of all of the counts brought against it.

We conclude that (1) the summary judgment rendered with respect to some, but not all, counts of the complaint brought against the board is not an appealable final judgment as to the board, and (2) the court properly rendered summary judgment in favor of Veronesi, Murphy, and Barletta on the ground that they are entitled to governmental immunity because there is no genuine issue of material fact that the plaintiff was not subject to imminent and apparent harm. Accordingly, we dismiss the plaintiff's appeal as it pertains to the board and affirm the court's judgment in favor of Veronesi, Murphy, and Barletta.")

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SC20731 - Robinson v. V. D. ("The defendant, V. D., appealed from the order of the trial court denying his special motion to dismiss, pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute, General Statutes § 52-196a, the action brought by the plaintiffs, Michael Robinson and Mary Robinson. The plaintiffs now move to dismiss this appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and, specifically, for lack of an appealable final judgment. In response to the plaintiffs' motion, the defendant contends that the legislature's inclusion of "interlocutory appeal" language in subsection (d) of § 52-196a, the statute's legislative history, and public policy all favor an implicit right to an immediate appeal, and the defendant further asserts that the denial of a special motion to dismiss is an appealable final judgment under the standard set forth in State v. Curcio, 191 Conn. 27, 31, 463 A.2d 566 (1983). For the reasons set forth in the companion case that we also decide today, Smith v. Supple, 346 Conn. ___, ___ A.3d ___ (2023), we conclude that a trial court's denial of a colorable special motion to dismiss under § 52-196a is an immediately appealable final judgment under the second prong of Curcio. We further conclude that the record demonstrates that the defendant has presented a colorable claim that he is entitled to a right to avoid litigation under our anti-SLAPP statute. Accordingly, we deny the plaintiffs' pending motion to dismiss this appeal for lack of a final judgment and transfer the case to the Appellate Court for further proceedings according to law.")

• SC20731 Dissent - Robinson v. V. D.

SC20730 - Smith v. Supple ("In this appeal, we must consider whether Connecticut's appellate courts have jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal from a trial court's denial of a special motion to dismiss filed pursuant to our anti-SLAPP statute, General Statutes § 52-196a. The defendants, Aaron Supple, Karen Montejo, Hendrick Xiong-Calmes, and Gianna Moreno, who were students at Trinity College in Hartford (Trinity), appealed to the Appellate Court from the trial court's denial of their special motion to dismiss the action brought against them by the plaintiffs, Gregory B. Smith, Nicholas Engstrom, and The Churchill Institute, Inc. (Churchill Institute). Thereafter, this court transferred the appeal to itself and ordered the parties, sua sponte, to brief the issue of whether the trial court's denial of the special motion to dismiss constitutes a final judgment for the purpose of an appeal.On that limited issue, the defendants argue that the trial court's denial is immediately appealable under the second prong of State v. Curcio, 191 Conn. 27, 31, 463 A.2d 566 (1983). For the reasons that follow, we agree with the defendants and conclude that the denial of a special motion to dismiss based on a colorable claim of a right to avoid litigation under § 52-196a is an appealable final judgment under the second prong of Curcio. Because the defendants' appeal presents such a colorable claim, we transfer the appeal back to the Appellate Court for further proceedings according to law.")

• SC20730 Dissent - Smith v. Supple

• Posted in:
• Civil Procedure,
• Recent Opinions,
• Tort Law

AC44542 - Stanziale v. Hunt (Negligence; contributory negligence; general verdict rule; "In this negligence action arising out of a motorcycle accident on Great Hill Road in Oxford on July 24, 2015, the plaintiff, Leonard Stanziale, appeals from the judgment of the trial court in favor of the defendants, Betty A. Hunt and Harold W. Hunt, which was rendered upon the general verdict of a jury following the denial of the plaintiff's motion to set aside the verdict. On appeal, as in his motion to set aside, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly (1) denied his pretrial motion in limine to redact from his medical records all statements as to the speed at which he was operating his motorcycle at the time of the accident, and (2) overruled his foundation and relevancy objection to the testimony of Harold Hunt, the owner of the motor vehicle that was allegedly being driven by his wife, Betty Hunt, at the time and place of the accident, as to the length of a skid mark he allegedly found, measured, and photographed in that location when he went there approximately three hours after the accident.

In response to the plaintiff's claims, the defendants argue first that the general verdict rule precludes our review of those claims, and, second, if we conclude that the general verdict rule does not bar our review of those claims, neither such claim requires the reversal of the judgment. For the reasons that follow, although we disagree with the defendants' contention that the general verdict rule bars our review of the plaintiff's claims, we agree with the defendants that neither such claim requires us to reverse the judgment of the trial court in this action.")

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SC20663 - Menard v. State ("This certified appeal raises questions regarding the recovery of underinsured motorist benefits by Connecticut state troopers injured in a motor vehicle accident involving an intoxicated driver. Two of the three plaintiffs in the underlying consolidated cases, Scott Menard and Darren Connolly (plaintiffs), appeal from the Appellate Court's judgment reversing the trial court's judgments in their favor and remanding the cases to the trial court with direction to render judgments for the defendant, the state of Connecticut (state). The third plaintiff, Robert Zdrojeski, withdrew his portion of the joint appeal to the Appellate Court and is not a party to this certified appeal. The plaintiffs contend that the Appellate Court improperly (1) affirmed the trial court's judgments insofar as the trial court concluded that the plaintiffs were not entitled to recover underinsured motorist benefits for alleged post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and (2) reversed the judgments insofar as the trial court determined that the state was not entitled to a reduction in the trial court's awards for sums received by the plaintiffs in settlement of a claim under Connecticut's Dram Shop Act, General Statutes § 30-102. We agree with the Appellate Court's conclusion as to the first issue, although on the basis of a different ground from the one relied on by that court. We disagree with its conclusion as to the second issue. We therefore reverse in part the judgment of the Appellate Court.")

• Posted in:
• Insurance Law,
• Recent Opinions,
• Tort Law

SC20623 - Dobie v. New Haven ("In this certified appeal, we are asked to decide whether an open manhole on a public roadway, uncovered after a snowplow driver negligently knocked off its cover only seconds before a motorist drove into the manhole, constitutes a "highway defect," making General Statutes § 13a-149, our highway defect statute, the motorist's exclusive remedy for injuries he sustained as a result. The plaintiff, William Dobie, appeals from the judgment of the Appellate Court, which reversed the trial court's judgment, rendered after a jury verdict in his favor, on one count of negligence as against the named defendant, the city of New Haven. The Appellate Court held that the highway defect statute was in fact the plaintiff's exclusive remedy. Dobie v. New Haven, 204 Conn. App. 583, 595, 254 A.3d 321 (2021). We affirm the Appellate Court's judgment.")

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• Tort Law

AC45090 - Worth v. Picard ("The plaintiff, Keyin Worth, brought the underlying civil action against the defendant Christopher Picard. The plaintiff appeals from the judgment rendered in the defendant's favor after the court granted his motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff claims that the court improperly concluded as a matter of law that, pursuant to the litigation privilege, the plaintiff's claims were barred by absolute immunity. We dismiss the appeal as moot.")

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• Tort Law

AC44938 - Doe v. Quinnipiac University ("The plaintiff, Jane Doe, brought the underlying action against the defendants, Alpha Sigma Phi Fraternity, Inc. (fraternity), and Quinnipiac University (Quinnipiac), pursuant to two savings statutes, General Statutes §§ 52-592 (accidental failure of suit statute) and 52-593 (wrong defendant statute).In her complaint, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants were negligent in that they failed to prevent members of the fraternity from sexually assaulting her.The plaintiff appeals from the judgment of the trial court granting the motions to dismiss filed by the defendants.On review of the arguments presented on appeal, we interpret the plaintiff's claims to be that the trial court erred in concluding that (1) the process filed with the court never was served on the defendants, (2) the plaintiff's service of process and filing of process violated General Statutes §§ 52-46 and 52-46a, and (3) § 52-592 does not save the plaintiff's action. We dismiss the plaintiff's appeal as moot.")

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• Tort Law

AC45568- Houghtaling v. Benevides ("The plaintiff, Aurora Houghtaling, appeals from the judgment of the trial court granting the motion for summary judgment filed by the defendant Jakub Micengendler in this tort action, commenced pursuant to General Statutes § 22-357, commonly known as the dog bite statute. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court erred in rendering summary judgment because the underlying facts do not support the court's conclusion that there was no genuine issue of material fact that the plaintiff was a "keeper" of the dog that allegedly caused her to sustain an injury, thus precluding her from recovery pursuant to § 22-357. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

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• Tort Law

AC44949 - Herrera v. Meadow Hill, Inc. ("The plaintiff, Byron Herrera, appeals from the summary judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of the defendants, Meadow Hill, Inc. (Meadow Hill), and Imagineers, LLC, in this premises liability action arising out of the plaintiff's alleged slip and fall on ice on property possessed and controlled by the defendants.On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly rendered summary judgment in favor of the defendants because the documents submitted in support of the defendants' motion for summary judgment did not eliminate all questions of material fact about (1) whether they had a reasonable time to remediate the snowy or icy condition prior to the plaintiff's fall, or (2) whether, if they did have a reasonable time to remediate that condition before the plaintiff's fall, they failed to do so or did so negligently. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

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• Tort Law

AC45070 - Russo v. Thornton ("The defendants, Brett W. Thornton (Brett), ProxySoft Worldwide, Inc. (ProxySoft Worldwide), and ProxySoft Direct, Inc. (ProxySoft Direct), appeal from the judgment of the trial court (1) granting an application for a turnover and charging order filed by the plaintiffs, Home Dental Care, Inc., Thornton International, Inc., and Robert D. Russo, acting in his capacity as executor of the estate of Thomas F. Thornton, and (2) denying Brett's motion to vacate a judgment lien and a financial institution execution. On appeal, the defendants claim that the court (1) incorrectly concluded that it had rendered a final judgment that gave rise to the postjudgment enforcement remedies pursued by the plaintiffs, and (2) improperly ordered injunctive relief and continued a receivership as part of the turnover and charging order. We conclude that ProxySoft Direct is not aggrieved by the judgment from which the defendants have appealed, and, therefore, we dismiss the portion of the appeal filed by ProxySoft Direct. As to the remainder of the appeal, filed by Brett and ProxySoft Worldwide, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.)

• Posted in:
• Business Law,
• Recent Opinions,
• Tort Law

AC45094 - Booth v. Park Terrace II Mutual Housing Ltd. Partnership (Premises liability; negligence; summary judgment; request for admission pursuant to rule of practice (§ 13-22); "The plaintiff, Joseph M. Booth, appeals from the judgment of the trial court granting motions for summary judgment filed by the defendants, Park Terrace II Mutual Housing Limited Partnership and Mutual Housing Association of Greater Hartford, Inc. (collectively, owner defendants), and Crosskey Architects, LLC, and TO Design, LLC (collectively, design defendants), and denying the plaintiff's request to amend his complaint and his motion to preclude expert testimony. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court (1) improperly rendered summary judgment because genuine issues of material fact exist, (2) abused its discretion in denying his request to amend his complaint, and (3) abused its discretion in denying his motion to preclude the expert affidavit offered in support of the owner defendants' motion for summary judgment. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

AC44587 - Aviles v. Barnhill (Premises liability; negligence; motion for summary judgment; "The plaintiffs, Dominique Aviles, individually and on behalf of her minor child, Xavier Bauza, appeal from the summary judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of the defendant landlord, H-Squared Construction, LLC, on two counts of the plaintiffs' complaint asserting negligence against the defendant arising from an off premises attack by a dog owned by one of its tenants. On appeal, the plaintiffs argue that the court incorrectly determined that the defendant could not be held liable as a matter of law because, contrary to the court's conclusion, Connecticut case law provides that a landlord has a duty of care under a premises liability theory to use reasonable care to prevent injuries to third parties from known vicious dogs housed on the property by a tenant, including, in certain circumstances, from a dog attack occurring off of the landlord's property. The plaintiffs also argue that this court should adopt § 379A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (§ 379A), which, if its elements are met, would extend liability to the defendant regardless of where the attack took place. We disagree with the plaintiffs' first claim and conclude that, within the specific context of off premises dog attacks, landlords do not owe a duty of care to injured third parties under a theory of premises liability. We also decline to adopt § 379A for this particular context because we determine that doing so would be contrary to our appellate precedent. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

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