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Tort Law

Tort Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Roy, Christopher

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5103

AC44436 - Brass Mill Center, LLC v. Subway Real Estate Corp. ("The defendant AlliedBarton Security Services, LLC, appeals from the judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of the plaintiff, Brass Mill Center, LLC, granting summary judgment as to liability and awarding damages. The defendant argues that the trial court improperly concluded that it had a contractual duty (1) to defend the plaintiff in an underlying wrongful death action brought against the plaintiff and (2) to indemnify the plaintiff in that same wrongful death action, including for attorney’s fees and costs that the plaintiff incurred in pursuing claims against third parties. We agree and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the trial court.")


Property Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Zigadto, Janet

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5078

AC44377 - Kazemi v. Allen ("In this vexatious litigation action, the defendants, Lawrence Allen (Allen) and Green Tree Estate Association, Inc. (Green Tree), appeal from the judgment of the trial court in favor of the plaintiffs, Hossien Kazemi and Mahvash Mirzai. On appeal, the defendants claim that the trial court improperly (1) determined that the plaintiffs established that the defendants lacked probable cause to bring the claims for adverse possession and trespass in their counterclaim, (2) denied the defendants' motion for a directed judgement, (3) determined that the defendants failed to establish their advice of counsel defense, and (4) found that the defendants acted with malice. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")


Tort Law Supreme Court Opinion

   by Agati, Taryn

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5074

SC20537 - Costanzo v. Plainfield ("The apportionment statute, General Statutes § 52-572h, allows a party sued for damages resulting from personal injury, death or property damage caused by that party's negligence to file an apportionment complaint against additional parties, not named as defendants in the plaintiff's lawsuit, whose negligence caused the alleged losses. The statute expressly prohibits apportionment claims between a party liable for negligence and a party liable, among other things, "pursuant to any cause of action created by statute, except that liability may be apportioned among parties liable for negligence in any cause of action created by statute based on negligence . . . ." General Statutes § 52-572h (o). The central issue in this certified appeal is whether the apportionment statute, by this language, permits municipal defendants whose liability is based on General Statutes § 52-557n (b) (8) to file an apportionment complaint sounding in negligence. Section 52-557n (b) (8) renders municipal actors liable for damages and injuries that occur due to the failure to inspect or the negligent or inadequate inspection of property if (1) the municipality had notice of a hazard or violation of law (first exception), or (2) the act or omission "constitutes a reckless disregard for health or safety under all the relevant circumstances" (second exception).

Resolution of this appeal thus requires us to consider whether a claim brought under § 52-557n (b) (8) is a "cause of action created by statute based on negligence," such that apportionment is allowed under § 52-572h (o). As we explain herein, because § 52-557n (b) (8) expressly abrogates the common-law doctrine of municipal immunity, and because the first exception thereunder allows for a cause of action that we determine is based on negligence, we conclude that claims brought pursuant to that exception do qualify for apportionment.

The named plaintiff, Malisa Costanzo, the administratrix of the estate of the decedent, Isabella R. Costanzo, brought claims against the defendants, the town of Plainfield (town), and two of its employees, Robert Kerr and D. Kyle Collins, Jr., under § 52-557n (b) (8), stemming from the drowning of the decedent in a pool located on privately owned property in the town. Thereafter, the defendants filed a notice of intent to seek apportionment against the owners of the property where the pool was located and an apportionment complaint against the former tenants of the property, who had the pool constructed. The plaintiff objected to the defendants' efforts to seek apportionment, claiming that her complaint set forth a cause of action alleging recklessness or an intentional act under § 52-557n (b) (8), rather than negligence, and, therefore, that the apportionment statute did not apply. The trial court agreed and concluded that, "[i]f the defendants are found liable to the [plaintiff] on [the basis of] the [plaintiff's operative] revised complaint, it will be for reckless disregard for health [or] safety under all relevant . . . circumstances, not for negligence." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Therefore, the trial court issued orders sustaining the plaintiff's objections and dismissing the defendants' apportionment complaint and notice of intent to seek apportionment. The defendants appealed to the Appellate Court, and that court reversed the orders of the trial court, concluding that the plaintiff's claims under § 52-557n (b) (8) fell within the first exception, which it held to incorporate a negligence standard. See Costanzo v. Plainfield, 200 Conn. App. 755, 770, 239 A.3d 370 (2020). Consequently, the Appellate Court determined that § 52-572h (o) authorizes apportionment in connection with such claims. See id. We agree with the Appellate Court and, accordingly, affirm its judgment.")


Tort Law Supreme and Appellate Court Opinions

   by Roy, Christopher

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5070

SC20585 - Garcia v. Cohen (Premises Liability; "After examining the entire record on appeal and considering the parties' briefs, we have determined that the appeal in this case should be dismissed on the ground that certification was improvidently granted."

AC44798 - Ferri v. Powell-Ferri ("In this action alleging vexatious litigation, the plaintiff, Paul John Ferri, appeals from the judgment of the trial court, rendered following a court trial, in favor of the defendant Nancy Powell-Ferri. On appeal, Ferri claims that the trial court incorrectly concluded that Powell-Ferri had probable cause to initiate and pursue her cross complaint filed against Ferri in a prior lawsuit. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")


Tort Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Booth, George

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5049

AC44465 - Lavette v. Stanley Black & Decker Inc. (Intentional tort; motion to strike; whether plaintiff employee's pleading was legally sufficient to bring claim within intentional tort exception to exclusivity provision (§ 31-284) of Workers' Compensation Act (§ 31-275 et seq.); whether plaintiff's allegations were legally sufficient to establish that supervisory employee acted as defendant employer's alter ego; "The plaintiff, Henry Lavette III, a former employee of the defendant, Stanley Black & Decker, Inc., appeals from the judgment of the trial court, rendered in favor of the defendant following the court's decision to strike count one of his fourth amended complaint with prejudice. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly concluded that he had failed to allege sufficient facts to establish that his claim came within the intentional tort exception to the exclusivity provision of the Workers' Compensation Act (act), General Statutes § 31-275 et seq. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.")


Tort Law Supreme Court Opinion

   by Agati, Taryn

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5020

SC20607 - Glover v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc. ("This case presents two questions of law certified to us by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199b (d), regarding the interpretation the Connecticut Product Liability Act (CPLA), General Statutes § 52-572m et seq., and the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), General Statutes § 42-110a et seq. The plaintiff, Marjorie Glover, brought this action in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, alleging that she had been injured by defective artificial lenses manufactured and marketed by the defendants, Bausch & Lomb, Inc., Bausch & Lomb Holdings, Inc., Valeant Pharmaceuticals International, Valeant Pharmaceuticals International, Inc., Valeant Pharmaceuticals North America, LLC, and the "Doe defendants." The plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that the defendants had violated the CPLA by failing to warn her of the inherent dangers of the artificial lenses, thereby causing injuries to her eyes. After the operative complaint was filed, the plaintiff filed a motion for leave to amend the complaint to add a claim that the defendants had violated CUTPA by engaging in deceptive advertising. The District Court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the plaintiff's claims pursuant to the CPLA on the ground that they were preempted by federal law. The court also denied the plaintiff's motion for leave to amend the complaint to add a CUTPA claim on the ground that the amendment would be futile because federal law would also preempt that claim.

The plaintiff appealed from the judgment of dismissal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. That court determined that the resolution of the plaintiff's claims depended on the interpretation of Connecticut law for which there was no controlling precedent in this court's decisions, and it requested certification of the following questions of law for our consideration: (1) "[w]hether a cause of action exists under the negligence or failure-to-warn provisions of the [CPLA, General Statutes §] 52-572q, or elsewhere in Connecticut law, based on a manufacturer's alleged failure to report adverse events to a regulator like the [United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA)] following approval of the device, or to comply with a regulator's [postapproval] requirements." And (2) "[w]hether the [CPLA's] exclusivity provision, [General Statutes] § 52-572n, bars a claim under [CUTPA] based on allegations that a manufacturer deceptively and aggressively marketed and promoted a product despite knowing that it presented a substantial risk of injury." Glover v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 6 F.4th 229, 244 (2d Cir. 2021). We accepted the certified questions of law and answer "yes" to both."


Tort Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Booth, George

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5015

AC44153, AC44122 - Doe v. Board of Education (Negligence; recklessness; respondeat superior liability; motion for summary judgment; "These appeals involve consolidated actions concerning complaints of the bullying of two minor children by some of their classmates, which occurred while they attended Coleytown Middle School (middle school) in the town of Westport, and the alleged failures of school staff and administration in addressing those bullying complaints. In Docket No. AC 44153, the plaintiffs, John Doe 1, Jane Doe 1, and Jack Doe 1, appeal from the judgment of the trial court granting, in part, the motion for summary judgment filed by the defendants, the Board of Education of the Town of Westport (board); Micah Lawrence, the vice principal of the middle school; Elliott Landon, the superintendent of schools for the Westport school system; Richard Quiricone, a physical education teacher at the middle school; and the town of Westport (town). On appeal, the Doe 1 plaintiffs claim that the court erred in granting the Doe 1 defendants' motion for summary judgment. Specifically, the Doe 1 plaintiffs claim that the court improperly (1) failed to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the Doe 1 plaintiffs, (2) determined that the Doe 1 defendants are immune from liability under General Statutes § 10-222l because (a) the allegations of negligence in counts three, four, five, eight, and nine involve issues relating to whether the Doe 1 defendants acted in good faith and adequately reported and investigated the bullying allegations, which are factual issues and should not have been decided on a motion for summary judgment, and (b) the Doe 1 defendants failed to respond to six bullying complaints, (3) rendered summary judgment in favor of Lawrence, Landon, and Quiricone with respect to the claim of recklessness in count six because the claim requires a determination of their intent, which is a question of fact, (4) granted the motion for summary judgment as to count ten, which alleges a claim of respondeat superior liability against the board and the town, and (5) granted the motion for summary judgment when a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Landon or the board retaliated against the Doe 1 plaintiffs, as alleged in counts five, six, and nine. We disagree and affirm the judgment of the trial court in AC 44153.

In Docket No. AC 44122, the plaintiffs, John Doe 2, Jane Doe 2, and Jack Doe 2, appeal from the judgment of the trial court granting the motion for summary judgment filed by the defendants, the board, Kris Szabo, Lawrence, Landon, Quiricone, and the town. On appeal, the Doe 2 plaintiffs claim that the court improperly granted the Doe 2 defendants' motion for summary judgment. Specifically, the Doe 2 plaintiffs claim that (1) the court improperly failed to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the Doe 2 plaintiffs, (2) the allegations of negligence involve factual issues that are not susceptible to summary adjudication, (3) the claim of recklessness against Lawrence, Landon, Szabo, and Quiricone in count five requires a determination of their intent, which is a question of fact, (4) the court improperly granted the motion for summary judgment as to the claim of respondeat superior liability against the board and the town in count nine, and (5) a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Landon or the board retaliated against the Doe 2 plaintiffs, as alleged in counts four, five, and eight. We disagree and affirm the judgment of the trial court in AC 44122.")


Tort Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Booth, George

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=4992

AC44871 - Bennetta v. Derby (Public nuisance; motion to strike; claim that trial court erred in granting defendant city's motion to strike; "In this public nuisance action, the plaintiff, Arlene Bennetta, appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered after it granted the motion filed by the defendant, the city of Derby, to strike the plaintiff's substitute complaint. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court erred in striking her complaint because she properly alleged that the defendant created the nuisance by a positive act as required by General Statutes § 52-557n. We disagree and, therefore, affirm the judgment of the court.")


Tort Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Agati, Taryn

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=4982

AC44539 - Nardozzi v. Perez ("The defendant city of Bridgeport appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying in part its motion to dismiss the action of the plaintiff, James Nardozzi. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly denied its motion to dismiss the ninth count of the plaintiff's complaint on the ground of absolute immunity arising from the litigation privilege. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")


Landlord/Tenant Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Zigadto, Janet

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=4975

AC44657 - Robbins Eye Center, P.C. v. Commerce Park Associates, LLC ("The defendants, Commerce Park Associates, LLC (Commerce Park), and RDR Management, LLC (RDR), appeal from the judgment of the trial court granting a postjudgment motion of the plaintiff, Robbins Eye Center, P.C., seeking an order compelling Commerce Park to deliver to the plaintiff's counsel certain escrowed funds and future payments received by Commerce Park vis-a-vis an account receivable. The dispositive issue raised by the defendants on appeal is whether a provision in a commercial lease executed by Commerce Park and Kim Robbins, who owns the plaintiff and is a nonparty to this matter, precludes the plaintiff from collecting the escrowed funds and payments at issue. We conclude that the lease provision does not bar the plaintiff's collection efforts, and, therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.")


Tort Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Townsend, Karen

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=4970

AC43413 - Byrne v. Avery Center for Obstetrics & Gynecology, P.C. (“On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly (1) limited the testimony of its expert witness; (2) admitted into evidence a medical report, charged the jury concerning future noneconomic damages, and denied its request for a jury interrogatory differentiating between past and future damages; and (3) granted the plaintiff’s motion for offer of judgment interest pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 2005) § 52-192a.2 We affirm the judgment of the trial court.”)




Tort Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Agati, Taryn

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=4961

AC43128 - Chapnick v. DiLauro ("The plaintiff Dominica Chapnick, individually and as administratrix of the estate of Randall Chapnick, appeals from the portion of the judgment of the trial court dismissing, pursuant to Connecticut's anti-SLAPP statute, General Statutes § 52-196a, the counts of the complaint against the defendants Cynthia Flaherty and John Popolizio, Jr., alleging nuisance and seeking injunctive relief. We reverse in part the judgment of the trial court.")


Tort Law Supreme Court Opinion

   by Agati, Taryn

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=4957

SC20522 - Maldonado v. Flannery ("This case presents the scenario, not altogether uncommon, in which a jury awards personal injury plaintiffs economic damages for medical expenses but zero noneconomic damages. The trial court granted the joint motion for additurs filed by the plaintiffs, William Maldonado and Geovanni Hernandez, and awarded each plaintiff additional money damages for pain and suffering. The Appellate Court reversed the judgment of the trial court on the grounds that it had failed to articulate the specific facts to justify the additur awards or to construe the conflicting evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the jury's verdict. See Maldonado v. Flannery, 200 Conn. App. 1, 9, 13, 238 A.3d 127 (2020). We reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.")


Tort Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Agati, Taryn

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=4924

AC43705 - Wethersfield v. Eser ("In this animal welfare action, the defendant, Suzanne Eser, appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the plaintiff, the town of Wethersfield, following the court's denial of her motion to dismiss the plaintiff's verified petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On appeal, the plaintiff argues that the appeal is moot, and the defendant claims that (1) the trial court incorrectly determined that the plaintiff's failure to file a verified petition within ninety-six hours of taking custody of the animals, as required by General Statutes (Supp. 2022) § 22-329a (a), did not deprive it of subject matter jurisdiction and, alternatively, (2) she was deprived of procedural due process. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")



Tort Law Supreme and Appellate Court Opinions

   by Agati, Taryn

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=4911

SC20556 - Dorfman v. Smith ("This appeal requires that we examine the scope of the litigation privilege, which provides absolute immunity from suit, in relation to alleged misconduct by an insurance company. The plaintiff, Tamara Dorfman, appeals from that part of the trial court's judgment dismissing her claims against the defendant Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA); General Statutes § 42-110a et seq.; based on a violation of the Connecticut Unfair Insurance Practices Act (CUIPA), General Statutes § 38a-815 et seq. The trial court dismissed these claims on the ground that the litigation privilege deprived the court of subject matter jurisdiction over these claims. The plaintiff argues that, because these claims were the functional equivalent of claims for vexatious litigation, the litigation privilege did not apply. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

SC20556 Concurrence & Dissent - Dorfman v. Smith

AC43956 - Pizzoferrato v. Community Renewal Team, Inc. ("The plaintiff, Gail Pizzoferrato, appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying her motion to open and vacate the judgment of the court rendered in favor of the defendant, Community Renewal Team, Inc., in accordance with a decision of an arbitrator that resulted from court-annexed arbitration.On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly denied her motion because the language of both General Statutes § 52-549z and Practice Book § 23-66 require that a decision of an arbitrator be sent to the parties both electronically and by mail before it can become a judgment of the court. Because notice of the arbitrator's decision was never sent to the parties or their counsel by mail in the present case, the plaintiff argues that the judgment of the court, rendered on the basis of the arbitrator's decision, should be vacated. We disagree and affirm the judgment of the court.")


Tort Law Appellate Court Opinions

   by Agati, Taryn

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=4846

AC42981, AC42982 - Canner v. Governor's Ridge Assn., Inc., Puteri v. Governor's Ridge Assn., Inc. ("These appeals arise from a dispute concerning the foundations of two condominium units located in the Governor's Ridge common interest community in Trumbull. In Docket No. AC 42981 (first appeal), the plaintiff, Glen A. Canner (Canner), in his capacity as executor of the estate of Charles A. Canner, appeals from the judgment of the trial court in favor of the defendants, Governor's Ridge Association, Inc. (Governor's Ridge); South Meadow Development, LLC (South Meadow), Glenn Tatangelo, and Anthony O. Lucera (South Meadow defendants); the town of Trumbull and Donald G. Murray (town defendants); and Adeeb Consulting, LLC (Adeeb Consulting) and Kareem Adeeb (Adeeb defendants), after the court concluded that each count alleged against the defendants was time barred by the applicable statute of limitations. On appeal, Canner claims that the court improperly concluded that (1) his claim against Governor's Ridge brought pursuant to General Statutes § 47-278 is time barred by the statute of limitations period set forth in General Statutes § 52-577, and (2) his nuisance claims are time barred by the statute of limitations codified in either § 52-577 or General Statutes § 52-584.

In Docket No. AC 42982 (second appeal), the plaintiff, Louis D. Puteri, similarly appeals from the judgment of the trial court in favor of the defendants after the court concluded that each count alleged against the defendants was time barred by the applicable statute of limitations. On appeal, Puteri claims that the court erred for the same reasons Canner asserts in his appeal. We disagree with the plaintiffs and, accordingly, affirm the judgments of the court.")

AC43749 - Karanda v. Bradford ("The plaintiff, Kimberly Karanda, appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying her motion to open a judgment of nonsuit due to her noncompliance with a discovery order. The plaintiff claims that the court did not properly evaluate her motion pursuant to General Statutes § 52-212a and Practice Book § 17-43.We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")


Medical Malpractice Law Supreme Court Slip Opinion

   by Agati, Taryn

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=4843

SC20577 - Caverly v. State ("The decedent, James B. Caverly, died while under the medical care of the employees of the John Dempsey Hospital at the University of Connecticut Health Center. The plaintiff, Ronald G. Caverly, administrator of the decedent's estate, subsequently received authorization from the Office of the Claims Commissioner to file a medical malpractice action against the defendant, the state of Connecticut, doing business as UCONN Health Center/John Dempsey Hospital, pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 2017) § 4-160 (b). The plaintiff filed the present medical malpractice action, which the state moved to dismiss on the basis of sovereign immunity. The state argued that, because the plaintiff had received a settlement payment from a joint tortfeasor in connection with the decedent's death, the plaintiff's action was barred by General Statutes § 4-160b (a), which provides that "[t]he Office of the Claims Commissioner shall not accept or pay any subrogated claim or any claim directly or indirectly paid by or assigned to a third party." The trial court denied the state's motion to dismiss on the ground that § 4-160b (a) applies only to subrogated or assigned claims and not to payments made by joint tortfeasors. We affirm the trial court's denial of the state's motion to dismiss."


Tort Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Agati, Taryn

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=4836

AC43696 - Margarum v. Donut Delight, Inc. ("The original plaintiff, Wayne Margarum, Sr., who claimed that he fell and injured himself on an icy sidewalk while exiting a donut shop operated by Donut Delight, Inc. (Donut Delight), at premises owned by the defendant Square Acre Realty, LLC (Square Acre), appeals from the judgment of the trial court, rendered following a jury trial, in favor of the defendant. The plaintiff claims that the court improperly (1) denied a motion to set aside the verdict returned by the jury because the verdict "shocks the conscience" and is "manifestly unjust and palpably against the evidence," and (2) denied a motion to submit supplemental or amended interrogatories to the jury after the jury initially reported that it was "deadlocked" in its attempt to answer jury interrogatories and was unable to reach a verdict. In addition to responding to the plaintiff's claims on their merits, the defendant argues that the plaintiff's failure to provide this court with the transcripts from the evidentiary portion of the trial precludes this court from reviewing the court's ruling on the motion to set aside the verdict and that the second claim is inadequately briefed. We agree with the defendant that the record is inadequate to review the plaintiff's first claim and that the plaintiff has inadequately briefed her claim regarding supplemental jury interrogatories. Accordingly, we decline to review the plaintiff's claims and affirm the judgment of the court.")


Tort Law Supreme Court Slip Opinion

   by Agati, Taryn

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=4830

SC20414 - Peek v. Manchester Memorial Hospital ("The defendants, Manchester Memorial Hospital and Prospect Medical Holdings, Inc., appeal from the judgment of the Appellate Court, which reversed the judgment of the trial court and concluded that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the action of the plaintiff, Delores Peek, was barred by the two year statute of limitations set forth in General Statutes (Rev. to 2015) § 52-584. We conclude that a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding whether the plaintiff initiated her action within two years from the date of her injury, as that term is understood in the context of § 52-584. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.")