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Probate Law

Probate Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Carey, Sean

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=6563

AC47165, AC46635 - Stroll v. Pass (“This appeal concerns the administration of the trusts and estates of John J. Stroll, Sr., and Bettina Gloria Stroll, the parents of several parties to this probate dispute. In Docket No. AC 47165, the plaintiff, John J. Stroll, Jr., appeals from the judgment of the Superior Court rendered in favor of the defendants, Bettina Gloria Stroll Pass (Betty), Joseph G. Stroll (Joseph), and Attorney Robert E. Grant. The plaintiff claims that the court improperly (1) affirmed the order of the Probate Court removing him as the fiduciary of the parents’ trusts and estates, (2) imposed sanctions on him for violating his fiduciary duties, and (3) failed to appoint Joseph as a successor fiduciary. In Docket No. AC 46635, an appeal the plaintiff filed while the proceedings before the Superior Court remained pending, the plaintiff raises identical claims. We affirm the judgment of the Superior Court in Docket No. AC 47165 and dismiss the appeal in Docket No. AC 46635 for lack of a final judgment.”)


Property Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Zigadto, Janet

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=6534

AC46314 - Maefair Health Care Center, Inc. v. Noka ("The plaintiff, Maefair Health Care Center, Inc., appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying its application for a prejudgment remedy filed against Susan Noka, the conservator of the person and estate of Patricia N. Erts. On appeal, the plaintiff claims, inter alia, that the court incorrectly concluded that General Statutes § 52-278a did not permit the plaintiff to attach the decedent's interest in certain real property. We agree and reverse the judgment of the court.")


Probate Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Carey, Sean

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=6436

AC47053 - Moore v. Bryant-Mitchell (“The plaintiff, Larry Allen Moore, appeals from the judgment of the Superior Court removing him as the executor of the estate of the decedent, Clifton Dewayne Bryant. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the Superior Court, in adjudicating his appeal from the decree of the Probate Court granting a petition filed by the defendant, Chelsea Bryant-Mitchell, to remove him as executor, improperly (1) limited the scope of its review to the Probate Court’s removal of the plaintiff as executor and, as a result, failed to allow the plaintiff to present evidence (a) to refute the allegations concerning the plaintiff’s alleged misconduct in administering the estate and (b) to challenge the decedent’s will that had been admitted to probate, (2) failed to overrule the Probate Court’s admission of the will to probate, and (3) prevented him from introducing evidence challenging the authenticity of the will. He also claims that the Superior Court abused its discretion in holding him, as a layperson, responsible for the failures of the attorneys he had retained on behalf of the estate to assist with the administration of the estate. We affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.”)


Probate Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Carey, Sean

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=6417

AC47615 - Chartier v. Valliere (“The defendants Allen Chartier and Carolyn Chartier appeal from the judgment of the Superior Court admitting to probate the purported will of the decedent, Susan Chartier, which names the plaintiffs, Jeremy A. Chartier and Dianne Laferriere, as executors of the decedent’s estate. On appeal, the defendants claim that the court (1) improperly denied their motion to dismiss the present action on timeliness grounds, and, (2) in the alternative, incorrectly found that the plaintiffs had satisfied their burden of showing that the purported will was properly executed. We agree with the defendants’ first claim and, accordingly, vacate the judgment of the Superior Court.”)


Probate Law Supreme Court Opinion

   by Carey, Sean

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=6331

SC21066 - Rutherford v. Slagle (“The plaintiff, Jeffrey A. Rutherford, who also is a cotrustee of the trust, appeals from the judgment of the Superior Court denying his appeal from the decree of the Probate Court, which ordered that the trust estate be distributed. The plaintiff claims that (1) summary judgment is neither an available nor appropriate remedy in a probate appeal because a probate appeal is not an ‘‘action’’ within the meaning of Practice Book § 17-44, and (2) even if summary judgment is available in a probate appeal, the court erred in rendering summary judgment for the defendant because it did not engage in a de novo consideration of the issue resolved by the Probate Court. We disagree with the plaintiff’s first claim but agree with his second claim. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Superior Court.”)


Probate Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Carey, Sean

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=6328

AC47481 - Moore v. Ferguson (“The plaintiff, Larry Allen Moore, appeals from the trial court’s denial of his motion to open the judgment of the Superior Court dismissing his probate appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. He claims that the trial court improperly (1) dismissed his appeal on the ground that he lacked standing to challenge the Probate Court’s decree, (2) denied his motion to open the judgment of dismissal on the grounds that his motion was untimely and failed to demonstrate fraud on the court, and (3) denied his request for an evidentiary hearing with respect to his motion to open the judgment. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.”)


Probate Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Berardino, Emily

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=6132

AC46570- Heibeck v. Heibeck ("In this probate appeal, the defendants Martin John Heibeck, Thomas Edward Heibeck, Michael William Heibeck, and George Stephen Heibeck appeal from the judgment of the Superior Court rendered in favor of the plaintiffs, Barbara Heibeck and Skylar Smith. On appeal, the defendants claim that the court improperly deemed valid a commercial lease executed in 2016 whose lease term commenced upon the death of the owner-lessor in 2019.We affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.")


Juvenile Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Greenlee, Rebecca

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=6022

AC 47902 - In re Christian G. ("The petitioner, Christian G., appealed to the Superior Court challenging the orders of the Probate Court denying his petitions for the voluntary appointment of a guardian and for the designation of a minor child as having special immigrant juvenile status. See General Statutes §§ 45a-608n and 45a-610. Following a trial de novo, the Superior Court denied the petitions, and this appeal followed. We affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.")


Legal Malpractice Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Oumano, Emily

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5938

AC46208 - Martinelli v. Martinelli (“In the latest chapter in this family dispute arising out of the administration of the estate of Kevin P. Martinelli (Kevin), the plaintiffs, Aubri E. Martinelli, Zachary Martinelli, and Linzy Martinelli, who are Kevin’s children, appeal from the judgment of the trial court granting the motions to dismiss filed by the defendants, Martin P. Martinelli (Martin), who is Kevin’s brother and was the first executor of Kevin’s estate, and Reid & Riege, P.C. (Reid & Riege), the law firm that represented Martin in the administration of Kevin’s estate. The court concluded that the plaintiffs lacked standing to assert their claims of breach of fiduciary duty, common-law conversion, and statutory theft against Martin and their legal malpractice claim against Reid & Riege. On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the trial court improperly (1) concluded that they lacked standing to assert their claims against the defendants, and (2) denied their request to amend their complaint. We are unpersuaded by either claim and, therefore, affirm the judgment of the trial court.”


Connecticut Probate Court Regulations

   by Zigadto, Janet

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5888

The Connecticut Probate Courts have amended their regulations, effective May 16th of this year. Their website describes their regulation process:

"Probate regulations are adopted in accordance with C.G.S. section 45a-77.

Either the Probate Court Administrator or the Executive Committee of the Probate Assembly may propose regulations, but both must approve the proposed regulation.

The proposed regulation is then submitted to the Judiciary Committee of the General Assembly for review. The Judiciary Committee has 90 days from the date of submission to accept or reject the regulations in whole. Inaction of the committee is considered approval."

The 2024 version of the Connecticut Probate Court Regulations is available here.


Probate Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Agati, Taryn

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5858

AC46257 - Buzzard v. Fass ("The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the defendants, Laura Fass and Pamela Baker Weiss, the adopted great grandnieces of Joseph Merrow, the testator, are included within the terms "issue" and "descendants" used in a testamentary trust executed by the testator in 1946.The plaintiff, Joan Buzzard, claims that the only persons permitted to receive distributions under the subject trust are the originally named beneficiaries and their lineal blood descendants, not the adopted defendants. The plaintiff claims that the Superior Court improperly granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment and denied her motion for summary judgment because it erroneously concluded that General Statutes § 45a-731 (4), which provides that the terms "issue" and "descendants" when used in a will or trust shall include legally adopted persons, applied to the trust at issue in this case. She claims that the definitions set forth in § 45a-731 (4) do not apply to the subject trust because the exceptions to their application that are set forth in § 45a-731 (11) (A) and (B) apply in this case. For the reasons that follow, we disagree with the plaintiff and affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.")


Business Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Oumano, Emily

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5829

AC45631, AC45632 - Lyons v. Birmingham Law Office, LLC (“The plaintiff, Justine Lyons, appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing the underlying action against the defendants Birmingham Law Office, LLC, and Attorney Matthew Birmingham (Birmingham defendants); and Marylou Scofield, PC, and Attorney Marylou Scofield (Scofield defendants), for lack of personal jurisdiction. The plaintiff claims that the court improperly concluded that (1) personal jurisdiction over the defendants was not conferred under our state’s long arm statute, General Statutes § 52-59b, and (2) exercising jurisdiction over the defendants would violate the due process requirements of the United States constitution because they have insufficient ‘‘minimum contacts’’ with the state. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.”)


Probate Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Carey, Sean

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5770

AC45758 - Vecchiarino v. Potter (“In this appeal from the judgments of the Superior Court approving the settlement agreement, the defendant Elizabeth Isenburg, a former romantic partner of the decedent, who is neither a named beneficiary under the contested will nor an heir-at-law of the decedent, claims that she is a ‘‘[person] interested in the estate’’ pursuant to General Statutes § 45a-434 (c) and that the court should not have approved the settlement agreement without her participation in it. We are not persuaded by her claim and, accordingly, affirm the judgments of the Superior Court.”)


Tort Law Supreme Court Opinion

   by Agati, Taryn

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5656

SC20676 - Barash v. Lembo ("The primary issue in this appeal is whether the trustee of an inter vivos trust that is the residuary beneficiary of the estate of the settlor-decedent has a duty to protect and collect assets that have not yet been transferred to the trust. After providing for the payment of debts and taxes and setting forth a number of specific bequests, the will of the decedent, Richard Ripps, who died in 2006, bequeathed the residue of his estate to an amended and restated revocable trust benefiting his three children, the plaintiffs Jennie R. Ripps, Michael J. Ripps, and Elizabeth J. Ripps (trust beneficiaries).The present action and five other consolidated cases concern the proper administration of that portion of the decedent's residuary estate that has not yet been distributed to the trust. In particular, the undistributed assets consist of a 49 percent interest in certain commercial real estate development projects (residuary assets), including properties owned by Evergreen Walk, LLC (Evergreen Walk), Northern Hills, LLC (Northern Hills), and M/S Town Line Associates, LLC (M/S Town Line Associates) (collectively, commercial assets).

Approximately seventeen years later, the estate has not yet settled. In 2018, the trust beneficiaries and their mother, the plaintiff Susan Shapiro Barash, one of three cotrustees of the Richard Ripps Amended and Restated Revocable Trust Dated February 8, 2008, filed this action in the Superior Court, alleging that the defendant and cotrustee, Barbara Lembo, breached her fiduciary duty as trustee by failing to protect and collect trust property, to investigate or ask questions regarding the alleged misconduct of the executor of the estate, Laurence P. Rubinow, and to seek recovery from and hold Rubinow accountable for any damages sustained by the trust as a result of the alleged misconduct. The plaintiffs sought damages and the removal of the defendant as cotrustee. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the defendant, who was the decedent's widow, on the basis of its conclusion that the defendant, as a trustee, had no duty, prior to the distribution of the residuary assets, to take any action against Rubinow with respect to those assets—including investigating, questioning or monitoring Rubinow's administration of the estate, or, as the trial court stated, to "[s]hap[e]" or "gather" the property that has not yet poured over into the trust.

We agree with the plaintiffs that the trial court incorrectly concluded that, as a matter of law, no material issue of fact remained as to whether the defendant owed the trust beneficiaries a duty to collect and protect the prospective trust property in the residuary estate. We also conclude that the complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action against the defendant for breach of her fiduciary duty as trustee. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.")


Probate Law Supreme Court Opinion

   by Carey, Sean

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5610

SC20701 - Salce v. Cardello (“In this certified appeal, we consider the extent to which in terrorem, or no-contest, clauses in will and trust documents are enforceable against a beneficiary who has challenged certain aspects of the performance of a fiduciary, namely, the executor of the will or the trustee of the trust. The plaintiff, John Salce, appeals, upon our grant of his petition for certification, from the judgment of the Appellate Court, which affirmed the trial court’s judgment for the defendant, Joan Cardello, dismissing his probate appeal. See Salce v. Cardello, 210 Conn. App. 66, 68, 82, 269 A.3d 889 (2022). On appeal, the plaintiff principally contends that the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that enforcement of the in terrorem clauses in the decedent’s will and trust agreement against the defendant would violate public policy when she challenged the executor’s refusal (1) to remove her personal bank account from the estate’s Connecticut estate and gift tax return, and (2) to deduct the outstanding mortgages from the value of the estate on the return. Consistent with this court’s venerable decisions in South Norwalk Trust Co. v. St. John, 92 Conn. 168, 101 A. 961 (1917), and Griffin v. Sturges, 131 Conn. 471, 40 A.2d 758 (1944), because the defendant’s actions were based in good faith, we conclude that enforcement of the in terrorem clauses in the present case would violate the public policy embodied by our statutes requiring probate courts to supervise fiduciaries. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.”)



Probate Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Booth, George

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5510

AC44507 - Haydusky's Appeal from Probate (Probate appeal; subject matter jurisdiction; motion to dismiss; application for reconsideration; "The self-represented plaintiff, Marianne Haydusky, appeals from the judgment of the Superior Court granting the defendants' motion to dismiss, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, her appeal from an order of the Probate Court. We affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.")


Probate Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Carey, Sean

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5417

AC44316 - Wolfel v. Wolfel (“The plaintiffs, Kenneth and Rodney, appeal from the judgment of the Superior Court affirming in part and reversing in part the decree of the Probate Court holding that they, as cotrustees of the trust, violated their fiduciary duties and ordering them to reimburse Lawrence, the defendant, for his equal share of the trust assets. On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the Superior Court (1) exceeded its authority by addressing issues that they did not raise in their appeal from the decree of the Probate Court, and (2) erroneously found that Kenneth failed to prove that he had paid $552,271 into the trust to reimburse it for distributions made to him for his personal benefit. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.”)


Probate Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Roy, Christopher

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5388

AC45034 - Sacramone v. Harlow, Adams & Friedman, P. C. ("In this probate matter, the defendants, Harlow, Adams & Friedman, P.C. (law firm), and Ronald Milone, appeal from the judgment of the Superior Court vacating a decree of the Probate Court awarding attorney's fees in the amount of $97,979.60 in connection with the administration of the estate of Joseph F. Latella, Sr. (estate), and ordering the law firm to return these fees to the estate. The defendants claim that the Superior Court, in an appeal filed by the plaintiff, Frank Sacramone, Jr., the successor administrator of the estate, erred in concluding that the Probate Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to award those fees after disallowing them in an earlier decree. We affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.")


Probate Law Supreme Court Opinion

   by Roy, Christopher

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5377

SC20584 - Derblom v. Archdiocese of Hartford ("The sole issue in this certified appeal is whether the plaintiffs, who are the putative beneficiaries of a testamentary bequest, have standing under the special interest exception to the common law rule, codified at General Statutes § 3-125, that the attorney general has exclusive authority to enforce the terms of a charitable gift, to enforce the terms of a bequest from Fred H. Rettich to Our Lady of Mercy School (OLM) in Madison. The plaintiffs appeal, upon our granting of their petition for certification, from the judgment of the Appellate Court, which affirmed the trial court’s granting of the motion to dismiss filed by the defendant, the Archdiocese of Hartford. Derblom v. Archdiocese of Hartford, 203 Conn. App. 197, 217, 247 A.3d 600 (2021). On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the Appellate Court incorrectly determined that they lacked standing to bring this action. We conclude that the plaintiffs do not come within the 'special interest' exception to the attorney general’s exclusive standing to bring an action to enforce the terms of a charitable gift. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.")


Tort Law Supreme Court Slip Opinion

   by Agati, Taryn

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5293

SC20597 - Solon v. Slater ("This appeal requires us to decide the scope of the preclusive effect, in a subsequent tort action in the Superior Court, of an unappealed Probate Court decree admitting a will to probate. The plaintiff, Linda Yoffe Solon, filed the present lawsuit against the defendants, Joseph M. Slater and Joshua Solon, alleging that they tortiously interfered with her contractual relations and right of inheritance by exercising undue influence over her husband, Michael Solon (decedent), with respect to two different legal instruments, a proposed amendment to an antenuptial agreement and a testamentary will. The trial court rendered summary judgment in favor of the defendants, concluding in pertinent part that both of the plaintiff’s tortious interference claims were barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel because the Probate Court previously had admitted the decedent’s will to probate after rejecting the plaintiff’s claim that the decedent executed the will as a result of the defendants’ undue influence. The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court. See Solon v. Slater, 204 Conn. App. 647, 665, 253 A.3d 503 (2021).

The issue before us is whether both of the plaintiff’s tortious interference claims in her civil tort action are barred by either the doctrine of collateral estoppel, as the courts below concluded, or the doctrine of res judicata, which the defendants have raised as an alternative ground for affirmance. We conclude that neither preclusion doctrine bars the plaintiff from litigating her tortious interference with contractual relations claim, which relates to the proposed amended antenuptial agreement, because the Probate Court did not actually or necessarily determine whether the defendants tortiously interfered with that contract and the plaintiff lacked an opportunity to litigate her claim in the Probate Court. We arrive at a different conclusion with respect to the plaintiff’s tortious interference with her right of inheritance claim because the Probate Court actually and necessarily determined that the defendants had not tortiously interfered with the execution, alteration, or revocation of the will admitted to probate, and the plaintiff therefore is collaterally estopped from relitigating that claim. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court in part and remand the case for further proceedings on the plaintiff’s tortious interference with contractual relations claim.")