The 2024 edition of our research guide on Pseudonyms and Fictitious Names in Connecticut Courts has been added to our research guides web page.

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AC46348 - Rubin v. Brodie (“We agree with the plaintiffs’ first claim and conclude specifically that the court improperly determined that the individual plaintiffs lacked standing to maintain a derivative action to enforce the rights of the plaintiff LLCs in light of the court’s conclusion that their complaint sufficiently alleged demand futility. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s judgment dismissing, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the individual plaintiffs’ derivative action. We disagree with the plaintiffs’ second and third claims and therefore affirm the trial court’s judgment dismissing, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the plaintiff LLCs’ and the individual plaintiffs’ direct actions. We decline to review the plaintiffs’ fourth claim.”)

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AC46709 - White v. FCW Law Offices (“The plaintiff, Frank Charles White, appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered in his favor against the defendants, FCW Law Offices and two John Does, following a hearing in damages on his civil action seeking damages for identity theft pursuant to General Statutes § 52-571h (b) and a violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), General Statutes § 42-110a et seq. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court failed to comply with § 52-571h (b) when it did not award him treble damages under § 52-571h. We reverse in part the judgment of the trial court.”)

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AC46505 - Gateway Development/East Lyme, LLC v. Duong ("In this summary process action, the plaintiff, Gateway Development/East Lyme, LLC, leased property located at 295 Flanders Road in East Lyme (premises) and subleased the premises to the defendants, Anh Duong doing business as Daddy's Noodle Bar and Daddy's Noodle Bar 2, LLC. The defendants appeal from the trial court's judgment of possession rendered in favor of the plaintiff. It is undisputed that the defendants failed to pay rent in a timely manner. On appeal, the defendants claim that the court improperly concluded that the plaintiff was not required to provide them with a pretermination notice and an opportunity to cure their default for nonpayment of rent within ten days of such notice. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

AC46467 - Meineke Bristol, LLC v. Premier Auto, LLC ("Premier Auto, LLC (Premier Auto), and Patrick Flynn appeal from the judgments rendered by the trial court in four related civil actions that were consolidated for trial. The actions encompass various claims by multiple entities concerning the sale by Vazhayil Babu of three businesses as well as associated leases, notes, and guarantee agreements to Premier Auto. On appeal, Premier Auto and Patrick Flynn claim that the trial court abused its discretion when it precluded them from presenting certain evidence. Premier Auto also claims that the court erred in determining that Premier Auto failed to prove its breach of contract cause of action. For the reasons set forth subsequently in this opinion, we conclude that the portion of the appeal concerning the first claim is moot and must be dismissed. With respect to the remaining claim in this appeal, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.")

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SC20821, SC20823 - Dur-A-Flex, Inc. v. Dy (“These appeals arise from a dispute over whether the defendants misappropriated the trade secrets of the plaintiff, Dur-A-Flex, Inc., in violation of the Connecticut Uniform Trade Secrets Act (CUTSA), General Statutes § 35-50 et seq. After a bench trial, the trial court rendered judgment for the plaintiff on certain of its claims and for several defendants on other claims.” The plaintiff appeals from the judgment in favor of the defendants Indue Sales and Services, Inc. (Indue), Christopher Krone, Engineered Coatings, Inc. (ECI), and Merrifield Paint Company, Inc. (Merrifield). The defendants Steven Lipman, Durafloor Industrial Flooring & Coating, Inc. (Durafloor), and ProRez Performance Resins and Coatings, LLC (ProRez), appeal from the judgment against them in favor of the plaintiff. In turn, the plaintiff cross appeals, challenging a number of adverse rulings. We conclude that the trial court incorrectly determined that the plaintiff was not required to prove that Lipman and, through him, Durafloor and ProRez, had knowledge of the plaintiff’s trade secrets and used that knowledge in order to establish the elements of misappropriation under General Statutes § 35-51 (b) (2) (B) (iii). The case must therefore be remanded for a new trial limited to that issue. We further conclude that the trial court applied an incorrect standard when it crafted the monetary and injunctive relief as to Lipman, Durafloor, and ProRez. If the trial court determines on remand that those defendants had knowledge of and used the plaintiff’s trade secrets, it must then apply the correct standard. Finally, we conclude that the trial court incorrectly determined that the noncompete agreement between the plaintiff and the named defendant, Samet Dy (Samet), was unenforceable because continued employment can never constitute consideration for a noncompete agreement. The judgment as to the breach of the noncompete agreement claim must herefore be reversed, and the trial court must determine on remand whether there was sufficient consideration for the noncompete agreement and, if so, whether Samet breached the agreement. We affirm the judgment of the trial court in all other respects.”)

SC20822 - Dur-A-Flex, Inc. v. Dy (“This appeal arises from a dispute between the plaintiff, Dur-A-Flex, Inc., a manufacturer of resinous flooring systems, and the named defendant, Samet Dy, a former employee of the plaintiff, over whether the defendant misappropriated the plaintiff’s trade secrets in violation of the Connecticut Uniform Trade Secrets Act (CUTSA), General Statutes § 35-50 et seq. The plaintiff brought this action, claiming that the defendant had breached his noncompete agreement with the plaintiff, misappropriated the plaintiff’s trade secrets in violation of CUTSA, and breached his duty of confidentiality. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the breach of the noncompete agreement and breach of the duty of confidentiality claims. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that (1) the trial court improperly rendered judgment for the defendant on the breach of the noncompete agreement claim on the ground that it was unenforceable for lack of consideration, (2) even if the noncompete agreement was invalid, it became enforceable when the defendant orally reaffirmed his promise not to compete, and (3) the trial court improperly rendered judgment for the defendant on the breach of the duty of confidentiality claim on the ground that it was preempted by CUTSA. With respect to the plaintiff’s first claim, we conclude that the trial court incorrectly determined that the noncompete agreement was unenforceable as a matter of law and that the case must be remanded for further proceedings on that issue. We reject the plaintiff’s second and third claims. We therefore reverse in part and affirm in part the judgment of the trial court.”

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SC20777 - Deutsche Bank AG v. Vik ("The plaintiff, Deutsche Bank AG, has spent the last decade attempting to collect from a nonparty, Sebastian Holdings, Inc. (SHI), an approximately $243 million foreign judgment (English judgment) resulting from an unpaid margin call in 2008. In Deutsche Bank AG v. Sebastian Holdings, Inc., 346 Conn. 564, 294 A.3d 1 (2023), the plaintiff unsuccessfully sought to pierce SHI's corporate veil and to hold the defendant Alexander Vik (Alexander) jointly and severally liable with SHI for the English judgment. Id., 568–69. While that case was pending in the trial court, the plaintiff commenced the present action against Alexander and his daughter, the defendant Caroline Vik (Caroline), alleging tortious interference with business expectancy and violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), General Statutes § 42-110a et seq., on the basis of the defendants' alleged efforts to interfere with the order of a Norwegian courtrequiring the sale of SHI's shares in a Norwegian software company in partial satisfaction of SHI's debt to the plaintiff. The defendants moved to dismiss the action, arguing that it was barred by the litigation privilege. The trial court denied the motion, and the defendants appealed to the Appellate Court, which reversed the trial court's decision and directed the trial court to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint in its entirety. See Deutsche Bank AG v. Vik, 214 Conn. App. 487, 511, 281 A.3d 12 (2022). We granted the plaintiff's petition for certification to appeal, limited to the issue of whether the Appellate Court correctly determined that the plaintiff's complaint was barred by the litigation privilege. See Deutsche Bank AG v. Vik, 345 Conn. 964, 964–65, 285 A.3d 388 (2022). During oral argument before this court, the defendants argued that this case was rendered moot by our decision in Deutsche Bank AG v. Sebastian Holdings, Inc., supra, 346 Conn. 564, which we issued after the parties had filed their briefs in this case. We conclude that the case is not moot and that the plaintiff's complaint is not barred by the litigation privilege. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.")

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AC45631, AC45632 - Lyons v. Birmingham Law Office, LLC (“The plaintiff, Justine Lyons, appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing the underlying action against the defendants Birmingham Law Office, LLC, and Attorney Matthew Birmingham (Birmingham defendants); and Marylou Scofield, PC, and Attorney Marylou Scofield (Scofield defendants), for lack of personal jurisdiction. The plaintiff claims that the court improperly concluded that (1) personal jurisdiction over the defendants was not conferred under our state’s long arm statute, General Statutes § 52-59b, and (2) exercising jurisdiction over the defendants would violate the due process requirements of the United States constitution because they have insufficient ‘‘minimum contacts’’ with the state. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.”)

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AC46023 - National Bank Trust v. Yurov (“The defendant Sergey Belyaev appeals from the trial court’s denial of his second motion to open and dismiss or stay the enforcement of a certified foreign judgment filed by the plaintiff, National Bank Trust. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly denied the motion to open the judgment pursuant to General Statutes § 50a-34 (b) (3). We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the court.”)

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AC45707 - E. I. du Pont de Numours & Co. v. Chemtura Corp. (“This breach of contract case, which was commenced by the plaintiff, E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Company (DuPont), in 2014, was first tried to the trial court in 2018, after which the court rendered judgment in favor of the defendant, Chemtura Corporation, on the ground that DuPont failed to strictly comply with the notice provisions of an asset purchase agreement (APA) between the parties. Our Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded the case for further proceedings on the breach of contract claims. See E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Chemtura Corp., 336 Conn. 194, 218, 244 A.3d 130 (2020). Following its review of the record from the first trial and further briefing from the parties, the court rendered judgment in favor of the defendant. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that (1) the court erred in rejecting its breach of contract claims as to certain fire protection systems in that it failed to determine the applicable law and apply that law to the evidence to determine whether those fire protection systems violated the Arkansas State Fire Code, and (2) the court misinterpreted the applicable federal regulations and improperly concluded that those regulations did not require the replacement of certain refrigeration units that leaked ozone depleting substances at rates exceeding the statutory threshold for several consecutive years. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.”)

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SC20642 - Companions & Homemakers, Inc. v. A&B Homecare Solutions, LLC ("This is an appeal from a judgment, rendered after a bench trial, awarding damages to the plaintiff, Companions and Homemakers, Inc. (Companions), for tortious interference with contractual and business relations and a violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), General Statutes § 42-110a et seq. The defendant, A&B Homecare Solutions, LLC (A&B), doing business as Northwest Homecare, raises four claims of error: (1) the trial court improperly found that A&B's misrepresentations were tortious because it did not owe a legal duty of disclosure to Companions, (2) the evidence was insufficient to establish that A&B's allegedly tortious interference caused Companions to suffer any losses or damages, (3) there was no violation of CUTPA because there was no tortious interference, and (4) the trial court improperly found that A&B had tortiously interfered with noncompete agreements between Companions and its employees because those agreements are void as against public policy. We affirm the judgment of the trial court."

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SC20647 - Deutsche Bank AG v. Sebastian Holdings, Inc. (“The plaintiff, Deutsche Bank AG (Deutsche Bank), brought this action against the defendants, Sebastian Holdings, Inc. (SHI), and Alexander Vik, SHI’s sole shareholder and director, seeking, inter alia, to enforce an approximately $243 million foreign judgment (English judgment) against Vik. Following a five day trial to the court, the trial court denied Deutsche Bank’s requested relief and rendered judgment in favor of the defendants. On appeal, Deutsche Bank claims that the trial court improperly declined to pierce SHI’s corporate veil and to hold Vik jointly and severally liable with SHI for the English judgment. We disagree and affirm the judgment of the trial court.”)

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AC45070 - Russo v. Thornton ("The defendants, Brett W. Thornton (Brett), ProxySoft Worldwide, Inc. (ProxySoft Worldwide), and ProxySoft Direct, Inc. (ProxySoft Direct), appeal from the judgment of the trial court (1) granting an application for a turnover and charging order filed by the plaintiffs, Home Dental Care, Inc., Thornton International, Inc., and Robert D. Russo, acting in his capacity as executor of the estate of Thomas F. Thornton, and (2) denying Brett's motion to vacate a judgment lien and a financial institution execution. On appeal, the defendants claim that the court (1) incorrectly concluded that it had rendered a final judgment that gave rise to the postjudgment enforcement remedies pursued by the plaintiffs, and (2) improperly ordered injunctive relief and continued a receivership as part of the turnover and charging order. We conclude that ProxySoft Direct is not aggrieved by the judgment from which the defendants have appealed, and, therefore, we dismiss the portion of the appeal filed by ProxySoft Direct. As to the remainder of the appeal, filed by Brett and ProxySoft Worldwide, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.)

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AC44537 - Konover Development Corp. v. Waterbury Omega, LLC (“The defendant Waterbury Omega, LLC appeals from the judgment of the trial court granting the application for a prejudgment remedy in favor of the plaintiff, Konover Development Corporation, upon a finding of probable cause that the defendant had breached an oral agreement for the plaintiff's procurement, management and accounting of building/rooftop wireless telecommunications agreements on behalf of the defendant. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly concluded that the plaintiff had established probable cause in light of its defenses that enforcement of the oral agreement was barred by (1) General Statutes § 20-325a, (2) the rule against perpetuities, and (3) the statute of frauds. We affirm the judgment of the court.”)

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AC44586 - Deutsche Bank AG v. Vik (“The defendants, Alexander Vik (Alexander) and Caroline Vik (Caroline), appeal from the judgment of the trial court denying their motion to dismiss, in which they asserted that the claims brought by the plaintiff, Deutsche Bank AG, were barred by the litigation privilege. On appeal, the defendants claim that the court improperly concluded that the litigation privilege does not bar the plaintiff's claims of tortious interference with business expectancy and violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), General Statutes § 42-110a et seq. We agree and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the trial court.”)

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AC4417, AC44597 - Levco Tech, Inc. v. Kelly ("In this dispute among family members over control of the family business, the defendants, Sally Levene (Sally), both individually and as executrix of the estate of Martin Levene (Martin), and Edward Levene (Edward), bring these consolidated appeals from the judgment of the trial court determining that the defendants Robert Levene (Robert), Jeffrey Levene (Jeffrey), and Dorothy Kelly (Dot) owned the majority of the outstanding shares of common stock of the plaintiff, Levco Tech, Inc. (Levco). On appeal, Sally and Edward claim that the court improperly determined that (1) Dot had not placed her ten shares of Levco stock in an irrevocable trust and (2) the issuance of twelve shares of Levco stock to Edward was invalid. We disagree and, therefore, affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

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AC44063 - Pointe Residential Builders BH, LLC v. TMP Construction Group, LLC (“This appeal arises out of a contract for the construction of a condominium complex in Greenwich. The defendants, TMP Construction Group, LLC (TMP), and Olin Paige III, appeal from the judgment of the trial court, rendered in favor of the plaintiff, Pointe Residential Builders BH, LLC, following a trial to the court. On appeal, the defendants claim that the court erred by rendering judgment for the plaintiff with respect to the plaintiff's count alleging a violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), General Statutes § 42-110a et seq., and the plaintiff's count alleging unjust enrichment. We conclude that the court did not improperly render judgment on the plaintiff's CUTPA claim. In light of this conclusion, we need not address the defendants' claims pertaining to the unjust enrichment claim. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.”)

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AC44777 - Jefferson Solar, LLC v. FuelCell Energy, Inc. (“The plaintiff, Jefferson Solar, LLC, appeals from the judgment of the trial court granting the motion to dismiss filed by the defendants, FuelCell Energy, Inc. FuelCell), and SCEF1 Fuel Cell, LLC (company). On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly concluded that it lacked standing to maintain an action under the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), General Statutes § 42-110a et seq. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.”)

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SC20607 - Glover v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc. ("This case presents two questions of law certified to us by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199b (d), regarding the interpretation the Connecticut Product Liability Act (CPLA), General Statutes § 52-572m et seq., and the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), General Statutes § 42-110a et seq. The plaintiff, Marjorie Glover, brought this action in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, alleging that she had been injured by defective artificial lenses manufactured and marketed by the defendants, Bausch & Lomb, Inc., Bausch & Lomb Holdings, Inc., Valeant Pharmaceuticals International, Valeant Pharmaceuticals International, Inc., Valeant Pharmaceuticals North America, LLC, and the "Doe defendants." The plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that the defendants had violated the CPLA by failing to warn her of the inherent dangers of the artificial lenses, thereby causing injuries to her eyes. After the operative complaint was filed, the plaintiff filed a motion for leave to amend the complaint to add a claim that the defendants had violated CUTPA by engaging in deceptive advertising. The District Court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the plaintiff's claims pursuant to the CPLA on the ground that they were preempted by federal law. The court also denied the plaintiff's motion for leave to amend the complaint to add a CUTPA claim on the ground that the amendment would be futile because federal law would also preempt that claim.

The plaintiff appealed from the judgment of dismissal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. That court determined that the resolution of the plaintiff's claims depended on the interpretation of Connecticut law for which there was no controlling precedent in this court's decisions, and it requested certification of the following questions of law for our consideration: (1) "[w]hether a cause of action exists under the negligence or failure-to-warn provisions of the [CPLA, General Statutes §] 52-572q, or elsewhere in Connecticut law, based on a manufacturer's alleged failure to report adverse events to a regulator like the [United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA)] following approval of the device, or to comply with a regulator's [postapproval] requirements." And (2) "[w]hether the [CPLA's] exclusivity provision, [General Statutes] § 52-572n, bars a claim under [CUTPA] based on allegations that a manufacturer deceptively and aggressively marketed and promoted a product despite knowing that it presented a substantial risk of injury." Glover v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 6 F.4th 229, 244 (2d Cir. 2021). We accepted the certified questions of law and answer "yes" to both."

• SC20607 Concurrence - Glover v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc.

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AC44056 - Barclays Bank Delaware v. Bamford (“In this debt collection action, the defendant, Diana L. Bamford, appeals from the judgment of the trial court, Suarez, J., following a hearing in damages, awarding the plaintiff, Barclays Bank Delaware, monetary relief in the amount of $5661.81 plus costs of $436.20. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court: (1) abused its discretion in denying her motion to disqualify the Honorable Matthew E. Frechette, a judge of the Superior Court, and in ruling on her motions to reargue and reconsider that denial; (2) improperly granted the plaintiff's motion for default for failure to disclose a defense; and (3) improperly admitted certain documents containing hearsay statements into evidence at the hearing in damages. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.”)

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SC20562 - Chugh v. Kalra (“This case is the latest in a series of cases arising out of a failed business venture between the named plaintiff, Rakshitt Chugh, and the named defendant, Aashish Kalra. Chugh commenced the present action seeking compensatory and punitive damages for, inter alia, breach of partnership agreement, breach of fiduciary duty, and libel per se. A jury found in favor of Chugh on those three counts, awarding him damages in the amount of $9,400,000 and authorizing the imposition of punitive damages, which the trial court awarded in the amount of $2,965,488.29. On appeal, Kalra claims that the trial court improperly denied his motions to set aside the verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict because (1) Chugh's claims are barred by the compulsory counterclaim rule set forth in rule 13 (a) (1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, (2) as a matter of law, no partnership existed between the parties during the relevant time frame, and (3) with respect to the libel claim, the trial court improperly admitted the testimony of Chugh's expert witness on damages because there was no evidence to support the testimony. We agree with Kalra's third claim and, accordingly, reverse in part the judgment of the trial court.”)

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