AC46897 - Brookfield v. Gohn ("The self-represented defendant, Hollene Gohn, appeals from the judgment of the trial court granting injunctive relief in favor of the plaintiffs, the town of Brookfield (town) and Francis W. Lollie, the town's zoning enforcement officer. On appeal, it appears that the defendant is claiming that by enjoining her from violating certain of the Brookfield Zoning Regulations (zoning regulations), the court erred by (1) incorrectly interpreting the applicable regulatory provisions, (2) violating her constitutional rights to due process and equal protection, (3) holding an evidentiary hearing after the close of trial, (4) granting the relief sought by the plaintiffs despite insufficient evidence, and (5) failing to render its decision within 120 days. We are not persuaded by the defendant's claims and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the court.")

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SC20839 - Wihbey v. Zoning Board of Appeals (“In this certified appeal, we must decide whether a zoning regulation that permitted the use of a property as a single-family dwelling allowed the owner to rent the property on a short-term basis. The plaintiff, Frances Wihbey, was ordered to cease and desist from renting his property to guests on a short-term basis by the Pine Orchard Association zoning enforcement officer. The plaintiff appealed to the defendant, the Zoning Board of Appeals of the Pine Orchard Association (board), which upheld the cease and desist order. The plaintiff then appealed to the trial court, which reversed the board’s decision. The board and the intervening defendants, Michael B. Hopkins and Jacqueline C. Wolff, appealed from the trial court’s judgment to the Appellate Court, which affirmed in part and reversed in part the trial court’s judgment. See Wihbey v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 218 Conn. App. 356, 396, 292 A.3d 21 (2023). We then granted the defendants’ petition for certification to appeal, limited to the following issue: ‘Did the Appellate Court correctly conclude that short-term rentals of a single-family dwelling constituted a permissible use of the subject property under the 1994 Pine Orchard Association zoning regulations?’ Wihbey v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 346 Conn. 1019, 1020, 292 A.3d 1254 (2023). We affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.”)

• Dissent

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• Land Use Law,
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SC20808, SC20810, SC20811 - 131 Beach Road, LLC v. Town Plan & Zoning Commission ("These consolidated appeals challenge the judgment of the trial court reversing the decision of the defendant, the Town Plan and Zoning Commission of the Town of Fairfield (commission), on the two part application filed by the plaintiff, 131 Beach Road, LLC, to construct a forty unit, multifamily affordable housing development near Fairfield's Old Post Road Historic District (historic district). The commission denied the first part of the plaintiff's application, which sought a zone text amendment to permit multifamily affordable housing units within the residence A zone district. It approved the second part of the plaintiff's application, which sought a site plan and a certificate of zoning compliance, but imposed two conditions on its approval, one of which limited the height of the proposed building and thereby reduced the number of affordable housing units. The trial court sustained the plaintiff's zoning appeals pursuant to General Statutes § 8-30g (g), concluding in relevant part that the commission had failed (1) to consider the zone text amendment in light of the requirements of § 8-30g, and (2) to satisfy its statutory burden of establishing that the height condition was necessary to protect a substantial public interest that outweighed the need for affordable housing in Fairfield. We agree with the trial court that the commission improperly imposed a height condition on its approval of the plaintiff's site plan and certificate of zoning compliance, and improperly denied the zone text amendment insofar as it applied to the proposed development at issue in this appeal, but we disagree that the commission improperly denied the zone text amendment insofar as it applied to the entire residence A zone district.

. . . .

The judgment is reversed with respect to the trial court's determination concerning the commission's denial of a zone text amendment applicable to the residence A zone district and the case is remanded to the trial court with direction to remand to the commission and to order the commission to grant the plaintiff's application for a zone text amendment limited solely to the subject property; the judgment is affirmed in all other respects.")

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AC46146, AC46159 - Lepkowski v. Planning Commission ("The defendants, the Planning Commission of the Town of East Lyme (commission) and Real Estate Service of Conn., Inc. (RESC), each appeal from the judgment of the Superior Court sustaining in part the appeal brought by the plaintiff, Brian Lepkowski, from the commission's decision approving a resubdivision application filed by RESC. The dispositive claim asserted by the defendants is that the court incorrectly determined that § 4-14-3 of the East Lyme Subdivision Regulations (subdivision regulations) required the completion of an Environmental Review Team (ERT) evaluation in connection with RESC's application and that, consequently, the court improperly concluded that the commission illegally waived § 4-14-3 in granting RESC's application without an ERT evaluation having been performed. We agree with the defendants and, accordingly, reverse in part the judgment of the Superior Court.")

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AC45972 - High Watch Recovery Center, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Commission ("In this certified zoning appeal, the plaintiff, High Watch Recovery Center, Inc., appeals from the judgment of the Superior Court dismissing its administrative appeal. The plaintiff brought the underlying appeal to the Superior Court from a decision of the defendant, the Planning and Zoning Commission of the Town of Kent (commission), denying its special permit application that proposed the addition of a thirty foot by seventy foot greenhouse to its property located at 47 Carter Road in Kent. The commission denied the plaintiff's application because it determined that the plaintiff's proposed greenhouse was an illegal expansion, rather than a permissible intensification, of its valid nonconforming use of the property. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court erroneously concluded that (1) the plaintiff could not, as a matter of law, intensify its valid nonconforming use of the property because the intensification doctrine recognized by our Supreme Court in Zachs v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 218 Conn. 324, 332, 589 A.2d 351 (1991), does not apply to a nonconforming use that arises out of a previously issued special permit and (2) the substantial evidence in the record supported the commission's determination that the plaintiff's proposed greenhouse was an illegal expansion of its valid nonconforming use. For the reasons that follow, we agree with the plaintiff and reverse the judgment of the Superior Court.")

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AC45082 - Kerlin v. Planning & Zoning Commission ("The plaintiff, Norma Kerlin, appeals from the judgments of the trial court dismissing her appeals from (1) the decision of the defendant Planning and Zoning Board of Appeals of the Town of Greenwich (board), in which the board upheld the decision of the defendant Planning and Zoning Commission of the Town of Greenwich (commission) to approve an application for a subdivision and (2) the decision of the commission to approve two applications for coastal area management (CAM) site plans. The subdivision application and the two CAM applications were submitted to the commission by the defendant Palmer Island, LLC (applicant). The plaintiff, who lives near the subject property, claims that the court erred (1) in upholding the commission's approval of the CAM site plan applications, misinterpreting a regulation and misapplying it to the facts before it, and (2) in upholding the two lot subdivision and the CAM site plan application approvals in the absence of evidence that the board or commission considered the impacts of the right-of-way on coastal resources. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.")

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AC45645 - Miriam v. Summit Saugatuck, LLC ("In this action to enforce a restrictive covenant, the plaintiffs Selma Miriam and Leslie Ogilvy appeal from the judgment rendered by the trial court following its granting of a motion for summary judgment filed by the defendant, Summit Saugatuck, LLC, and denial of their motion for summary judgment. On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the court improperly determined, as a matter of law, that a common plan of development does not exist for certain lots of real property located within the historic Saugatuck neighborhood area of Westport, where both plaintiffs reside. We disagree and affirm the judgment of the court.")

• Posted in:
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• Property Law

AC44982 - Drewnowski v. Planning & Zoning Commission ("In this certified zoning appeal, the defendant Hamlet Homes, LLC, appeals from the judgment of the Superior Court sustaining the administrative appeal of the plaintiffs, Michael C. Drewnowski and Kelly A. Drewnowski. The plaintiffs brought the underlying appeal from a decision of the Planning and Zoning Commission of the town of Suffield (commission) approving the defendant's special permit and subdivision applications for a proposed, sixteen lot flexible residential development in Suffield (town). The defendant claims on appeal that the court improperly (1) determined that the length of the proposed dead-end access road for the new development exceeded the maximum length prescribed in § 905 (c) of the Suffield Subdivision Regulations (subdivision regulations) regarding dead-end streets or dead-end street systems, thereby rejecting the defendant's contention that the street length limitation was inapplicable because § VI (B) of the Suffield Zoning Regulations (zoning regulations) pertaining to flexible residential developments explicitly provides that generally applicable 'dimensional requirements' are 'superseded' with respect to flexible residential developments; (2) concluded that the commission had failed to make a finding of hardship needed to approve the defendant's applications pursuant to § 902 of the subdivision regulations; and (3) determined that the proposed development was not '"surrounded by subdivided land"' so as to justify approval of the applications pursuant to an exception found in § 905 (a) of the subdivision regulations. We are not persuaded and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.")

• AC44982 Dissent - Drewnowski v. Planning & Zoning Commission

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AC45252 - Taylor v. Planning & Zoning Commission ("In this certified zoning appeal, the plaintiff, William W. Taylor, appeals from the judgment of the Superior Court denying his appeal from the decision of the defendant Planning and Zoning Commission of the Town of Westport (commission), denying his 2019 site plan and special excavation and fill permit applications. The principal issue in this certified appeal is whether the court improperly concluded that the commission did not deprive the plaintiff of fundamental fairness by preventing him from being heard on whether his application was sufficiently complete such that it should be adjudicated on its merits. We reverse the judgment of the court because, under the circumstances of this case, the commission was required to provide the plaintiff with an opportunity to be heard on whether his application was complete at the public hearing on his application, prior to denying it for incompleteness.

.....

We reverse the judgment of the Superior Court and remand with direction to sustain the plaintiff's appeal and to order the commission to hold a hearing on the plaintiff's application.")

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AC45283 - Wihbey v. Zoning Board of Appeals ("In the last few years, an increasing number of courts around the country have been required to address the extent to which local zoning regulations and restrictive covenants that have been in place for decades restrict the relatively recent practice of residential property owners renting their homes on a short-term basis through websites like VRBO and Airbnb. This case represents the first opportunity for an appellate court in Connecticut to address this question. The defendants, the Pine Orchard Association Zoning Board of Appeals (board), Michael B. Hopkins, and Jacqueline C. Wolff, appeal from the judgment of the trial court reversing the decision of the board upholding the issuance of a zoning enforcement officer's order directing the plaintiff, Frances Wihbey, to cease and desist from using his property located at 3 Crescent Bluff Avenue in the Pine Orchard section of Branford (property) for short-term rentals. The defendants claim that the court improperly determined, as a matter of law, that the plaintiff's use of the property was lawful under § IV of the 1994 Pine Orchard Association zoning regulations (1994 regulations) because it was consistent with the definition of a 'single-family dwelling' and, therefore, was a protected nonconforming use. The defendants also claim, in the alternative, that the court should have remanded the case to the board for consideration of whether, even if short-term rentals were permitted under the 1994 regulations, the plaintiff's rental of the property met the other requirements of those regulations. We reject the defendants' claim that the use of any property in the Pine Orchard Association (Pine Orchard) for short-term rentals was impermissible under the 1994 regulations. We agree, however, that the court improperly determined that the plaintiff had established a lawful nonconforming use of the property when there is no indication in the record that the board decided that question in the first instance. Accordingly, we reverse in part the judgment of the court.")

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SC20682 - Markatos v. Zoning Board of Appeals ("The issue presented by this appeal is whether the trial court abused its discretion in concluding that a motion to intervene was untimely. The plaintiffs, David Markatos and Jennifer Holme, appealed to the trial court from a decision of the named defendant, the Zoning Board of Appeals of the Town of New Canaan (board), upholding the issuance of a zoning permit to the intervening defendant, Grace Farms Foundation, Inc. (Grace Farms). The proposed intervenors, Timothy J. Curt and Dona M. Bissonnette, sought intervention nearly nineteen months later. The trial court, noting that it had already issued a decision remanding the case to the board for further proceedings, denied their motion to intervene as untimely. The proposed intervenors now appeal from that decision. For the reasons that follow, we reject the proposed intervenors' claim of error and affirm the trial court's denial of the motion to intervene.")

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AC45200 - 9 Pettipaug, LLC v. Planning & Zoning Commission ("In this certified zoning appeal, we consider whether a zoning body has complied with the statutory notice requirement in General Statutes § 8-3 (d) if it published notice in a newspaper that had no subscribers in the relevant municipality but was available on the Internet. The defendant, the Planning and Zoning Commission of the Borough of Fenwick, appeals from the summary judgment of the Superior Court rendered in favor of the plaintiffs, 9 Pettipaug, LLC, and Eniotna, LLP, holding that the defendant's zoning amendment was invalid because the defendant failed to comply with the applicable statutory notice requirement. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly (1) determined that the defendant failed to satisfy the 'substantial circulation' component of the notice requirement in § 8-3 (d), and (2) shifted the burden of proof to the defendant. We affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.")

• Posted in:
• Civil Procedure,
• Land Use Law,
• Recent Opinions

AC43965 - Tracey v. Miami Beach Assn. ("This case involves an action to enforce a judgment that memorialized the rights of the general public to freely access and use a parcel of waterfront property in Old Lyme. Following a bench trial, the trial court concluded that the prior judgment in question precluded the defendant, Miami Beach Association, from restricting public access and use of that property. On appeal, the defendant challenges the propriety of that determination. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

• AC43965 Concurrence - Tracey v. Miami Beach Assn.

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• Property Law,
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SC20579 - International Investors v. Town Plan & Zoning Commission ("This certified appeal concerns whether a local zoning authority may, by regulation, condition the continuing validity of a special permit on completing development in connection with the permitted use within a specified period of time. The defendant Fairfield Commons, LLC, appeals from the judgment of the Appellate Court, which (1) affirmed the trial court's judgment insofar as the trial court concluded that the named defendant, the Town Plan and Zoning Commission of the Town of Fairfield (commission), improperly granted Fairfield Commons' request for an extension of its special permit deadline to complete development, and (2) reversed the judgment insofar as the trial court concluded that the special permit could not be subject to a temporal limitation as a matter of law. See International Investors v. Town Plan & Zoning Commission, 202 Conn. App. 582, 606–607, 246 A.3d 493 (2021). With regard to the latter determination, the Appellate Court concluded that the commission had authority to adopt a regulation prescribing a temporal condition for special permits; see id., 599; and that a temporal condition does not violate the tenet that special permits run with the land. See id., 606. We agree with those conclusions subject to an important—and, in this case, determinative—limitation that the Appellate Court did not recognize: such a special permit regulation may not prescribe a shorter time limitation for completing development than the statutory period prescribed for completion of development in connection with an accompanying site plan under General Statutes § 8-3 (i) and (m). Because the statutory period governing completion of development in connection with Fairfield Commons' coastal area management site plan (site plan) had not expired, Fairfield Commons' special permit could not have expired for failure to satisfy that condition by force of a municipal regulation. We therefore reverse the Appellate Court's judgment.")

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AC41208 - One Elmcroft Stamford, LLC v. Zoning Board of Appeals ("This administrative appeal returns to us on remand from our Supreme Court. One Elmcroft Stamford, LLC v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 337 Conn. 806, 256 A.3d 151 (2021) (Elmcroft II). In One Elmcroft Stamford, LLC v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 192 Conn. App. 275, 283–89, 217 A.3d 1015 (2019) (Elmcroft I), rev'd, 337 Conn. 806, 256 A.3d 151 (2021), this court concluded, inter alia, that General Statutes (Rev. to 2003) § 14-55 had not been repealed and required the defendant Zoning Board of Appeals of the City of Stamford (board) to consider the suitability of the location in question as a prerequisite to the granting of a certificate of location approval in accordance with General Statutes § 14-54. Following its grant of certification to the defendants, Pisano Brothers Automotive, Inc., and Pasquale Pisano; see One Elmcroft Stamford, LLC v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 333 Conn. 936, 218 A.3d 594 (2019); the Supreme Court concluded, as a matter of law, that § 14-55 had been repealed by Public Acts 2003, No. 03-184, § 10. See One Elmcroft Stamford, LLC v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 337 Conn. 809–10. The court thus reversed the judgment of this court and remanded the matter to us with direction to consider the remaining claims of the plaintiff, One Elmcroft Stamford, LLC. See id., 826.

In accordance with that order, we now consider whether the Superior Court properly rejected the plaintiff's claims that the board (1) lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the application due to defective legal notice, (2) violated the plaintiff's right to fundamental fairness in administrative proceedings, (3) applied an improper legal standard in granting the certificate of location approval, and (4) failed to 'consider or distinguish' a prior denial of a certificate of approval application for the location in question. We affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the Superior Court.")

• AC41208 Concurrence & Dissent - One Elmcroft Stamford, LLC v. Zoning Board of Appeals

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SC20541 - McLoughlin v. Planning & Zoning Commission ("The principal issue in this certified appeal is whether the Appellate Court's decision in St. Joseph's High School, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 176 Conn. App. 570, 170 A.3d 73 (2017) (St. Joseph's), allows a zoning commission to deny an application for a special use permit based on the applicant's noncompliance with the general standards enumerated in the zoning regulations, despite its full compliance with the technical requirements contained therein. The plaintiffs, B. Shawn McLoughlin and Mono-Crete Step Co. of CT, LLC (Mono-Crete), appeal, upon our grant of their petition for certification, from the judgment of the Appellate Court, which affirmed the trial court's dismissal of their appeal from the decision of the defendant, the Planning and Zoning Commission of the Town of Bethel (commission), to deny their application for a special permit to construct a crematory on their property. See McLoughlin v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 200 Conn. App. 307, 309, 334, 240 A.3d 709 (2020). On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the Appellate Court (1) improperly interpreted its decision in St. Joseph's to allow nonspecific objections to the crematory based on the general standards contained in the zoning regulations to serve as a basis for the denial of their application, and (2) incorrectly concluded that the commission's denial of their application was supported by substantial evidence. Although we conclude that the Appellate Court correctly determined that the precedent set by its holding in St. Joseph's permits objections based on the general standards in the zoning regulations to serve as the basis for the denial of a special permit application, we nevertheless agree with the plaintiffs' argument that the commission's denial of their application was not supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.")

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SC20595 - High Ridge Real Estate Owner, LLC v. Board of Representatives ("The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the defendant, the Board of Representatives of the City of Stamford (board of representatives), properly considered a protest petition that opposed zoning amendments approved by the Zoning Board of the City of Stamford (zoning board). The plaintiff, High Ridge Real Estate Owner, LLC, filed an application with the zoning board to amend the zoning regulations of the city of Stamford (city). The zoning board approved the zoning amendment. Thereafter, local property owners filed a protest petition pursuant to § C6-40-9 of the Stamford Charter (charter), which opposed the amendment. The board of representatives determined that the protest petition was valid and, thereafter, considered and rejected the amendment. The plaintiff appealed from the decision of the board of representatives to the trial court, claiming that the board of representatives did not have the authority to consider whether the protest petition was valid, and asserting that the petition was not valid because it did not contain the signatures of 'at least [300] landowners' anywhere in the city, as required by § C6-40-9. The trial court sustained the plaintiff's appeal. Although we conclude that the board of representatives did not have the authority to determine the validity of the protest petition, we conclude that it was a valid petition because it contained the requisite number of signatures. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court sustaining the plaintiff's appeal and remand the case to that court to determine whether the board of representatives properly rejected the amendment.")

• SC20595 Concurrence - High Ridge Real Estate Owner, LLC v. Board of Representatives

SC20578 - Strand/BRC Group, LLC v. Board of Representatives ("The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the defendant, the Board of Representatives of the City of Stamford (board of representatives), had the authority to approve a protest petition that objected to master plan amendments approved by the Planning Board of the City of Stamford (planning board). The plaintiffs, The Strand/BRC Group, LLC, 5-9 Woodland, LLC, Woodland Pacific, LLC, and Walter Wheeler Drive SPE, LLC, filed an application with the planning board to amend the master plan of the city of Stamford (city). Shortly afterward, the planning board filed its own application to amend the city's master plan. After the planning board approved both applications with some modifications, local property owners filed a protest petition under § C6-30-7 of the Stamford Charter (charter). The board of representatives determined that the protest petition was valid and rejected the planning board's approval of the amendments. The plaintiffs appealed from the decision of the board of representatives to the trial court, which sustained the plaintiffs' appeal. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

• SC20578 Dissent - Strand/BRC Group, LLC v. Board of Representatives

AC43209 - Newtown v. Gaydosh ("The defendants, Gary Gaydosh, Barbara Gaydosh, and Justin Gaydosh, appeal from the judgment of the trial court granting the motion for contempt filed by the plaintiffs, the town of Newtown (town) and its zoning enforcement officer, Gary Frenette, for the defendants' alleged violation of a stipulated judgment entered into by the plaintiffs and the defendants and rendered by the court to remedy zoning violations on the defendants' property. On appeal, the defendants claim that (1) the court's finding that they had violated the terms of the judgment was not supported by the evidence and (2) the court abused its discretion with respect to the sanctions imposed as a result of its finding of contempt. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

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AC44130 - Parker v.Zoning Commission ("The plaintiffs, Robert L. Parker, Peter E. Rogness, and Randi M. Solomon, trustee for the Randi M. Solomon Revocable Trust, appeal from the judgment of the Superior Court denying their appeal from the decision of the defendant Zoning Commission of the Town of Washington (commission) to grant the application of the defendant 101 Wykeham Road, LLC (applicant), to modify a special permit previously approved by the commission in 2013 pursuant to a settlement agreement. On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the court improperly concluded that the application did not constitute an impermissible expansion of both a nonconforming structure and a nonconforming use. The plaintiffs further claim that the court 'failed to require compliance with [the] special permit standards' contained in the Washington Zoning Regulations (regulations). We affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.")

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• Land Use Law,
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SC20478 - Pfister v. Madison Beach Hotel, LLC (Zoning, permanent injunction; "The plaintiffs Cecilia Pfister, Margaret P. Carbajal, Katherine Spence, Emile J. Geisenheimer, Susan F. Geisenheimer, Henry L. Platt, Douglas J. Crowley, and 33 MBW, LLC, appeal from the judgment of the Appellate Court reversing the judgment of the trial court, which granted the plaintiffs' request for a permanent injunction prohibiting the defendants Madison Beach Hotel, LLC, and Madison Beach Hotel of Florida, LLC, from hosting a summer concert series at a public park adjacent to the Madison Beach Hotel (hotel). The plaintiffs claim that the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that the trial court had abused its discretion in granting the injunction because the concerts do not violate the Madison zoning regulations. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.")

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AC44090 - Savin Gasoline Properties, LLC v. Commission on the City Plan (Zoning; administrative appeal; motion for vacatur; "Having considered the briefs and oral arguments of the parties, we conclude that the appeal is moot and, accordingly, dismiss the appeal. Furthermore, because we conclude that this appeal became moot through no fault of Savin; see State v. Boyle, 287 Conn. 478, 489, 949 A.2d 460 (2008); In re Jessica M., 250 Conn. 747, 749, 738 A.2d 1087 (1999); we grant Savin's motion for vacatur and vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand with direction to the trial court to order the commission to vacate the special permit, corresponding site plan and § 14-321 approvals.")

• Posted in:
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• Land Use Law,
• Recent Opinions