The mission of the Connecticut Judicial Branch is to serve the interests of justice and the public by resolving matters brought before it in a fair, timely, efficient and open manner.
AC46484 - Netter v. Netter (Dissolution of marriage; equitable distribution pursuant to
§ 46b-81; spendthrift trusts; Connecticut Qualified Dispositions in Trust Act §
45a-487j et seq. “On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly (1)
treated trust assets from four separate trusts as marital property under
General Statutes § 46b-812 and ordered the defendant to make a lump sum
property distribution to the plaintiff using funds from those trusts, (2)
calculated his earning capacity and relied on that ‘astronomical’ calculation
to set ‘unachievable child support and alimony orders,’ (3) ordered the
defendant to secure and maintain a $5,000,000 life insurance policy, (4)
ordered the defendant to pay $3,300,000 in attorney’s fees to the plaintiff,
(5) valued the assets within the marital estate, including, but not limited to,
the trust assets, (6) faulted him for the breakdown of the marriage and awarded
the plaintiff sole legal custody of the parties’ two, then minor, children, and
(7) issued a vague and imprecise order that allows the plaintiff unrestricted
access to the parties’ former marital residence in order to retrieve her
personal property in violation of his constitutional rights. Because we
conclude that the court improperly determined that trust assets from one of the
four trusts—i.e., the spend-thrift trust the defendant’s father created for the
defendant’s benefit, prior to the marriage—constituted divisible marital
property, and ordered the defendant to make distributions to the plaintiff from
that trust, we reverse the judgment of the trial court with respect to all the
financial orders and remand this case for a new trial on all financial issues
consistent with this opinion, with the exception of the personal property
distribution order that gives rise to the property access order. We affirm the
judgment of the court as to the custody order insofar as it pertains to the
parties’ remaining minor child and as to the property access order.”)
AC47263 -
Shear v. Shear (“In this postjudgment dissolution matter, the
self-represented plaintiff, Daniel Shear, appeals from the judgment of the
trial court resolving several motions filed by the plaintiff and the
self-represented defendant, Yupaporn Shear. The plaintiff sets forth a myriad
of claims in support of his efforts to reverse the judgment of the court as to
custody of the parties’ minor child. We dismiss the plaintiff’s appeal.”)
AC48574 - Villao v. Paz (Marital dissolution; postjudgment motion for contempt; "On May 30, 2025, the defendant filed a motion
for review of the order of the trial court determining
that its attorney’s fees award was in the nature of support and thus exempted from the automatic appellate
stay pursuant to Practice Book § 61-11 (c). On July
23, 2025, this court granted the motion for review and
granted the relief requested, vacating the trial court’s
order. This court also indicated that an opinion would
follow. This opinion sets forth the reasoning for our
decision.")
AC47507 - D. A. v. A. C. (“The defendant, A. C., appeals from the judgment of the
trial court granting the application of the plaintiff, D. A., for relief from
abuse and the issuing of a civil order of protection pursuant to General
Statutes § 46b-15. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly
(1) denied his motion to dismiss and (2) issued a civil order of protection. We
affirm the judgment of the trial court.”)
AC47860 - D. K. v. D. F. (Modification of custody and visitation; “Although the
self-represented defendant’s appellate brief is not a model of clarity, we construe
his claims to be that the court improperly (1) concluded that joint legal
custody and visitation is not in the children’s best interests pursuant to
General Statutes § 46b-56, (2) delegated its judicial authority to the
plaintiff, D. K., by giving her discretion to decide the nature and scope of
the defendant’s visitation rights, and (3) failed to apply § 46b-56 (g). We
disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the court.”)
AC46331 - Buggelli v. Buggelli (“The plaintiff claims that the court improperly denied her
motion concerning extracurricular and healthcare expenses because it
misinterpreted the parties’ settlement agreement, as incorporated into the
dissolution judgment and as modified by a postjudgment consent order. We agree
with this claim. The plaintiff further claims that the court improperly (1)
modified, by way of an articulation, its original decision denying the motion
regarding college expenses and (2) denied the motion regarding college
expenses. We conclude that (1) the court’s articulation did not modify its
original decision denying the motion regarding college expenses, but (2) the
parties’ modified settlement agreement contains an ambiguity that materially
affects the merits of the motion regarding college expenses, such that the
court’s denial of the motion cannot stand. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment
of the trial court.”)
AC46632 - Surgent v. Surgent ("In this postdissolution matter, the plaintiff, Robert Surgent, appeals from the judgment of the trial court granting his motion for modification of unallocated child support and alimony payable to the defendant, Geraldine Surgent. The plaintiff contends that the court, in modifying his alimony obligation, improperly (1) considered the defendant's claim that he had failed to share with her the proceeds of a postdissolution sale of stock when it is undisputed that no motion raising that issue had been filed with the court, and (2) modified a nonmodifiable term of the alimony award. We agree with the plaintiff as to the first claim and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the trial court only with respect to the order pertaining to the postdissolution sale of the stock.")
AC47318 - L. F. v. S. F. (“On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court, without holding a hearing, improperly denied her request for leave, which primarily alleged that the custody and visitation order in place contained an impermissible delegation of judicial authority. We reverse the judgment of the trial court denying the plaintiff’s request for leave and we remand the matter for a hearing on the plaintiff’s motion for modification.”)
AC47073 - Milot v. Milot (Postdissolution motions to modify custody and visitation; §46b-56
(g); “On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court (1) improperly
delegated its judicial authority over visitation to the plaintiff and (2)
abused its discretion in ordering that the defendant was not permitted to
contact the healthcare providers or therapists of the parties’ youngest child
without finding good cause in support of the order. We reverse in part the
judgment of the trial court.”)
AC46764 - J.
B. v. K. B. (“This appeal arises from a postjudgment motion for contempt
filed by the self-represented defendant, K. B., alleging that the plaintiff, J.
B., wilfully failed to comply with a prior court order modifying certain
provisions of the parties’ separation agreement, which had been incorporated
into their judgment of dissolution, concerning the parties’ obligation to pay
for the unreimbursed medical and dental expenses for their daughter, K. The
plaintiff claims that the court erred by entering a remedial order requiring
him to reimburse the defendant for the cost of unreimbursed medical and dental
expenses incurred after K reached the age of majority. We reverse in part the
judgment of the trial court.”)
AC46429 - Rettman v. Rettman (“In this marital dissolution action, the defendant, Maura
L. Rettman, brings this amended appeal from the judgment of the trial court
denying her motion to open the court’s denial of several motions to open the
financial orders entered at the time of its final decree. The defendant also
appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying her motion for contempt
that was based on the alleged noncompliance of the plaintiff, John C. Rettman, with the financial orders. The defendant claims that the court abused its
discretion in denying (1) the motion to open, (2) the motion for contempt
insofar as it was based on (a) the plaintiff’s failure to comply with his
obligation to pay alimony, and (b) the plaintiff’s failure to timely comply
with the court’s order that he quitclaim the marital home to her. We reverse
the judgment denying the motion to open and remand the case to the trial court
for further proceedings. We affirm the judgment denying the motion for
contempt.”)
AC46803 - Fredo v. Fredo (“On appeal, the plaintiff claims that (1) the defendant did
not have standing to assert a claim regarding the lot that he was supposed to
transfer to a trust for the benefit of their children; (2) the court erred in
finding him in contempt; (3) the court’s monetary award to the defendant
constituted an impermissible postjudgment modification of the parties’ property
settlement; and (4) there was no evidentiary basis for the court’s award to the
defendant of compensation for lost financial benefits stemming from the
plaintiff’s failure to transfer the lots. We agree with the plaintiff’s claim that
the defendant lacked standing to assert a claim as to the lot that was supposed
to be transferred into a trust for the benefit of the parties’ children and
vacate the portion of the judgment related to that lot. We affirm the judgment
of the trial court in all other respects.”)
AC47619 - Emrich v. Emrich (Alimony; “The plaintiff claims that the court abused its
discretion in issuing that alimony order on the grounds that it (1) failed to
properly consider all of the criteria set forth in General Statutes § 46b-82;
(2) did not ‘scrutinize the parties’ financial affidavits equally’; (3) failed
to consider the defendant’s own hand at the depletion of his property
settlement; and (4) erroneously characterized her request for further alimony
as a request for funds to expend on her children versus funds for ‘her benefit’
to fulfill ‘her need to see her children and grandchildren.’ (Emphasis
omitted.) The plaintiff also claims that the court abused its discretion by
declining to award additional court costs to her ‘as a self-represented party
when she had only $8865.29 left in her bank account.’ We affirm the judgment of
the trial court.”)
AC47248 - J. E. v. J. N. ("In this custody action, the self-represented defendant, J. N., appeals following the trial court’s
judgment of custody and orders of visitation with
respect to the parties’ minor children. On appeal, the
defendant claims, inter alia, that the court improperly
required the defendant to proceed with the underlying
custody trial in the absence of his attorney. We agree
with the defendant and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the court.")
SC20988 - Simpson v. Simpson ("This certified appeal requires us to construe provisions in a separation agreement governing obligations to pay additional child support and alimony on the basis of the payor spouse’s income attributable to bonuses and profit sharing. Upon our grant of her petition for certification, the plaintiff, Janel Simpson, appeals from the judgment of the Appellate Court reversing in part the decision of the trial court, which had issued certain remedial orders in connection with the obligation of the defendant, Robert R. Simpson, to pay additional child support and alimony under the separation agreement that was incorporated into the judgment dissolving the parties’ marriage. Simpson v. Simpson, 222 Conn. App. 466, 470, 498, 306 A.3d 477 (2023). On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that the separation agreement unambiguously relieved the defendant from the obligation to pay additional child support and alimony after his gross income, including his base draw, bonuses, and profit sharing, exceeded $700,000. We conclude that the relevant provisions of the separation agreement are ambiguous on this point and that a remand to the trial court is required for consideration of extrinsic evidence as to the parties’ intent. Accordingly, we reverse in part the judgment of the Appellate Court.")
AC47189 - M. W. v. G. C. ("The defendant, G. C., appeals from the
judgment of the trial court dissolving his marriage to
the plaintiff, M. W. On appeal, the defendant challenges
the court’s property distribution orders on the basis
that the court made clearly erroneous factual findings
as to (1) the defendant’s net income and (2) the value
of the marital home. We affirm the judgment of the
trial court.")
AC47205 - Sonthonnax v. Xing ("The defendant, Longbao Xing, appeals
from the judgment of the trial court dissolving her marriage to the plaintiff, Mehdi H. Sonthonnax. On appeal
the defendant claims that the court improperly based
its financial awards on a clearly erroneous factual finding with respect to the plaintiff’s income. We agree and,
accordingly, reverse in part the judgment of the trial
court and remand the matter for a new trial on all
financial orders.")
AC47372 - Mathews v. Mathews ("In this postdissolution matter, the self-represented plaintiff, Walden H. Mathews, appeals from the
judgment of the trial court granting the motion for contempt filed by the defendant, Susan M. Mathews, and
denying the motion for contempt filed by the plaintiff.
On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly
(1) denied his motion for contempt regarding the disposition of personal property located in the basement of
the marital residence and (2) granted the defendant’s
motion for contempt regarding a court order that obligated him to escrow $15,000 with the defendant’s counsel. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")