The mission of the Connecticut Judicial Branch is to serve the interests of justice and the public by resolving matters brought before it in a fair, timely, efficient and open manner.
Employment Law

Employment Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Oumano, Emily

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=6074

AC46677 - Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities v. Travelers Indemnity Co. (“These two appeals, although not consolidated, involve closely related claims. In Docket No. AC 46677, the plaintiff, the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities (CHRO), appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing its administrative appeal brought against the defendant Travelers Indemnity Company (Travelers). The plaintiff claims that the trial court erred in concluding that Travelers had not engaged in age discrimination per se, in violation of General Statutes § 46a-60 (b) (6), by means of posting a job advertisement that contained the phrase ‘‘recent college graduate.’’ In Docket No. AC 46678, the CHRO appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing its administrative appeal brought against the defendant Yale University (Yale). The plaintiff claims that the court erred in rejecting its claim that Yale had engaged in age discrimination per se, in violation of § 46a-60 (b) (6), by means of posting a job advertisement that contained the phrase ‘‘recent graduate.’’ We affirm the judgments of the trial court.”)


Employment Law Supreme Court Opinion

   by Oumano, Emily

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5976

SC20847 - O'Reggio v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities (“This certified appeal raises the question of who qualifies as a ‘‘supervisor’’ and renders an employer vicariously liable for the creation of a hostile work environment in violation of the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act (state act), General Statutes § 46a-51 et seq. The named defendant, the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities (commission), concluded in an administrative decision that the defendant employer, the Department of Labor (department), was not vicariously liable for the creation of a hostile work environment in the office where it employed the plaintiff, Tenisha O’Reggio. The decision was upheld by the trial court, and the Appellate Court affirmed that judgment. See O’Reggio v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 219 Conn. App. 1, 4–5, 20, 293 A.3d 955 (2023). We granted the plaintiff’s petition for certification to appeal, limited to the following issue: ‘Did the Appellate Court correctly conclude that the legal standard adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Vance v. Ball State University, 570 U.S. 421, 133 S. Ct. 2434, 186 L. Ed. 2d 565 (2013), applied to the plaintiff’s claim under the [state act] . . . that the [department] was vicariously liable for the hostile work environment allegedly created by one of the [department’s] employees?’ O’Reggio v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 346 Conn. 1029, 295 A.3d 944 (2023). Following our well established use of federal case law applying Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (Title VII), to guide our interpretation and application of the state act, we conclude that the Appellate Court’s comprehensive and well reasoned opinion correctly adopted the Vance definition of the term ‘supervisor.’ Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.”

SC20847 Dissent - O'Reggio v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities


Business Law Supreme Court Opinions

   by Oumano, Emily

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5933

SC20821, SC20823 - Dur-A-Flex, Inc. v. Dy (“These appeals arise from a dispute over whether the defendants misappropriated the trade secrets of the plaintiff, Dur-A-Flex, Inc., in violation of the Connecticut Uniform Trade Secrets Act (CUTSA), General Statutes § 35-50 et seq. After a bench trial, the trial court rendered judgment for the plaintiff on certain of its claims and for several defendants on other claims.” The plaintiff appeals from the judgment in favor of the defendants Indue Sales and Services, Inc. (Indue), Christopher Krone, Engineered Coatings, Inc. (ECI), and Merrifield Paint Company, Inc. (Merrifield). The defendants Steven Lipman, Durafloor Industrial Flooring & Coating, Inc. (Durafloor), and ProRez Performance Resins and Coatings, LLC (ProRez), appeal from the judgment against them in favor of the plaintiff. In turn, the plaintiff cross appeals, challenging a number of adverse rulings. We conclude that the trial court incorrectly determined that the plaintiff was not required to prove that Lipman and, through him, Durafloor and ProRez, had knowledge of the plaintiff’s trade secrets and used that knowledge in order to establish the elements of misappropriation under General Statutes § 35-51 (b) (2) (B) (iii). The case must therefore be remanded for a new trial limited to that issue. We further conclude that the trial court applied an incorrect standard when it crafted the monetary and injunctive relief as to Lipman, Durafloor, and ProRez. If the trial court determines on remand that those defendants had knowledge of and used the plaintiff’s trade secrets, it must then apply the correct standard. Finally, we conclude that the trial court incorrectly determined that the noncompete agreement between the plaintiff and the named defendant, Samet Dy (Samet), was unenforceable because continued employment can never constitute consideration for a noncompete agreement. The judgment as to the breach of the noncompete agreement claim must herefore be reversed, and the trial court must determine on remand whether there was sufficient consideration for the noncompete agreement and, if so, whether Samet breached the agreement. We affirm the judgment of the trial court in all other respects.”)

SC20822 - Dur-A-Flex, Inc. v. Dy (“This appeal arises from a dispute between the plaintiff, Dur-A-Flex, Inc., a manufacturer of resinous flooring systems, and the named defendant, Samet Dy, a former employee of the plaintiff, over whether the defendant misappropriated the plaintiff’s trade secrets in violation of the Connecticut Uniform Trade Secrets Act (CUTSA), General Statutes § 35-50 et seq. The plaintiff brought this action, claiming that the defendant had breached his noncompete agreement with the plaintiff, misappropriated the plaintiff’s trade secrets in violation of CUTSA, and breached his duty of confidentiality. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the breach of the noncompete agreement and breach of the duty of confidentiality claims. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that (1) the trial court improperly rendered judgment for the defendant on the breach of the noncompete agreement claim on the ground that it was unenforceable for lack of consideration, (2) even if the noncompete agreement was invalid, it became enforceable when the defendant orally reaffirmed his promise not to compete, and (3) the trial court improperly rendered judgment for the defendant on the breach of the duty of confidentiality claim on the ground that it was preempted by CUTSA. With respect to the plaintiff’s first claim, we conclude that the trial court incorrectly determined that the noncompete agreement was unenforceable as a matter of law and that the case must be remanded for further proceedings on that issue. We reject the plaintiff’s second and third claims. We therefore reverse in part and affirm in part the judgment of the trial court.”


Employment Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Oumano, Emily

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5905

AC46099 - Demarco v. Charter Oak Temple Restoration Assn., Inc. (“The plaintiff, James Demarco, appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the defendant, Charter Oak Temple Restoration Association, Inc., following the granting of the defendant’s motion to strike the plaintiff’s revised complaint. The revised complaint alleged that the defendant violated General Statutes § 46a-60 (b) (1), a provision of the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act (CFEPA), General Statutes § 46a-51 et seq., by terminating the plaintiff’s employment because of his association with a disabled individual. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly concluded that his allegations failed to state a valid cause of action under CFEPA because, as the court determined, CFEPA does not recognize claims for associational discrimination on the basis of disability. We disagree with the plaintiff and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.”)


Administrative Appeal Supreme Court Opinion

   by Dowd, Jeffrey

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5900

  • SC20717 - Dept. of Public Health v. Estrada (Administrative appeal; Whistle-blower complaint, (1) "Did the Appellate Court correctly conclude that Estrada's disclosure was not a protected disclosure under ...§4-61dd?" (A) "Specifically, does §4-61dd apply to purported misconduct in municipal government?" (B) "Can an employee seek whistleblower protection for reporting her own error?" (2) "Did Estrada establish a causal connection between any alleged whistleblower disclosure and the complained of personnel actions?" And (3) "[t]o the extent that an actual violation of state law is required to establish a prima facie claim of retaliation under ...§4-61dd, did the Appellate Court correctly conclude that there were no required qualifications for acting directors of public health under ...§19a-200?")


Employment Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Oumano, Emily

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5896

AC45563 - Michel v. Hartford (“The plaintiff, Sean Michel, appeals from the judgment rendered in favor of the defendant, the city of Hartford, following the partial granting of its motion to strike and the subsequent withdrawal of the remaining count set forth in the plaintiff’s operative complaint. On appeal, the plaintiff contends that the court improperly granted the defendant’s motion to strike as to counts one, two, and three of that complaint, which alleged free speech retaliation claims pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 2019) § 31-51q and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We agree with the plaintiff as to counts two and three of the operative complaint, which set forth the plaintiff’s claims under § 31-51q, and, accordingly, reverse in part the judgment of the trial court.”)


Employment Law Supreme Court Opinion

   by Oumano, Emily

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5883

SC20628 - State v. Connecticut State University Organization of Administrative Faculty, AFSCME, Council 4, Local 2836, AFL-CIO (“This case presents the question of whether the public policy of this state is violated by an arbitration award ordering the reinstatement of a public sector employee whose employment was terminated after being arrested and charged with crimes involving off-duty conduct. The defendant, the Connecticut State University Organization of Administrative Faculty, AFSCME, Council 4, Local 2836, AFL-CIO (union), appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered following the court’s denial of the union’s motion to confirm an arbitration award that reinstated the grievant, a union member, to his employment at Central Connecticut State University (university). The court denied the union’s motion to confirm the award, granted an application to vacate the award filed by the plaintiff, the state of Connecticut (state), and rendered judgment thereon, after concluding that the award violated public policy. We disagree that the arbitration award, which reinstated the grievant, violated an explicit, well-defined and dominant public policy and, therefore, reverse the judgment of the trial court.”)

SC20628 Dissent - State v. Connecticut State University Organization of Administrative Faculty, AFSCME, Council 4, Local 2836, AFL-CIO


Employment Law Appellate Court Opinions

   by Oumano, Emily

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5801

AC46091 - Bartolotta v. Human Resources Agency of New Britain, Inc. (“The plaintiff, Alyssa Bartolotta, appeals from the summary judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of the defendant, Human Resources Agency of New Britain, Inc., in this employment discrimination action. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly concluded that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on all four counts of her complaint. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.”)

AC46927 - Torrington v. Council 4, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Local 442 (“This appeal presents a matter of first impression: whether a judgment of the Superior Court vacating an arbitration award and remanding the matter for a new arbitration hearing is a final judgment for purposes of an appeal pursuant to applicable statutes governing arbitration proceedings and municipal collective bargaining. We conclude that the defendants, Gerald Peters (Peters) and Council 4, AFSCME, AFLCIO, Local 442 (union), have appealed from a final judgment in this case and, accordingly, deny the motion to dismiss the appeal filed by the plaintiff, the city of Torrington (city).”)


Contract Law Supreme Court Opinion

   by Zigadto, Janet

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5764

SC20803 - Stiegler v. Meriden ("The plaintiffs are three firefighters who retired during ongoing contract negotiations between their municipal employer and their union regarding a wage reopener to their collective bargaining agreement. After the effective dates of their retirements, an arbitration panel issued an interest arbitration award pursuant to the provisions of General Statutes § 7-473c of the Municipal Employee Relations Act, General Statutes § 7-460 et seq., granting all firefighters in that municipality a retroactive wage increase. The plaintiffs filed a breach of contract action, alleging, among other things, that they were entitled to a recalculation of their pension benefits to reflect the retroactive wage increase. The trial court agreed with the plaintiffs and rendered judgment in their favor on the breach of contract claims. On appeal, the defendants claim that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiffs had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies and, on the merits, that the trial court had incorrectly concluded that the plaintiffs were entitled to a recalculation of their pension benefits. We conclude that the trial court properly exercised jurisdiction but erroneously determined that the plaintiffs are entitled to receive a retroactive increase in their pension benefits and, therefore, reverse in part the judgment of the trial court.")


Employment Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Oumano, Emily

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5745

AC45969 - Twerdahl v. Wilton Public Schools (“The plaintiff, Robin Twerdahl, appeals from the judgment of the trial court, rendered following the court’s decision striking her complaint against the defendant, Wilton Public Schools, in which she claimed that she was constructively discharged from her employment with the defendant. The plaintiff claims that the court erred in granting the motion to strike filed by the defendant on the grounds that the filing of her complaint alleging age discrimination to the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities (CHRO) was untimely and she failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted. We agree that the plaintiff’s complaint to the CHRO was untimely and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.”)


Employment Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Oumano, Emily

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5737

AC46206 - Roman v. A&S Innersprings USA, LLC (“In this employment discrimination action, the plaintiff, Jessica Roman, appeals from the summary judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of the defendant, A&S Innersprings USA, LLC. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly determined that (1) no genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether certain claims of pregnancy discrimination were time barred, as they occurred outside the 180 day limitation period contained in General Statutes (Rev. to 2017) § 46a-82 (f), (2) the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination on her claim that the defendant failed to rehire her on or after December 2, 2018, and (3) the continuing course of conduct doctrine did not toll the statute of limitations contained in § 46a-82 (f) with respect to any untimely claims. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.”)


Employment Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Oumano, Emily

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5725

AC45548 - Forestier v. Bridgeport (“This appeal arises out of an action by the plaintiffs, Jonathan Forestier and Stephen Vitka, against the defendant city of Bridgeport (city) and the defendant Board of Education of the City of Bridgeport (board) alleging that the plaintiffs wrongfully had been laid off from their employment as special police officers with the board for having exercised their rights to workers’ compensation benefits, in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 2015) § 31-290a (a). The trial court granted motions for summary judgment filed by the defendants and rendered judgment in their favor, from which the plaintiffs have appealed. On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the court improperly granted the defendants’ motions for summary judgment because genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether (1) the plaintiffs established a prima facie case of discrimination, and (2) the defendants’ proffered nondiscriminatory reason for the elimination of the plaintiffs’ positions and their layoffs was a pretext for discrimination. We affirm the judgment of the court.”)


Employment Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Oumano, Emily

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5719

AC45802 - Lassen v. Hartford (“The plaintiff, Alfred Lassen, appeals from the summary judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of the defendant, the city of Hartford, on his two count complaint, alleging disability discrimination and retaliation in violation of General Statutes § 46a-60 of the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act (act), General Statutes § 46a-51 et seq., in connection with the defendant’s failure to rehire him as a police officer. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court erred in rendering summary judgment in favor of the defendant because it improperly concluded that no genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether (1) the plaintiff had failed to make out a prima facie case of disability discrimination and retaliation, and (2) the defendant’s proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for not rehiring1 him was pretextual. For the reasons that follow, we disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.”)


Employment Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Oumano, Emily

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5698

AC45866 - Femia v. Meriden (“In this employment discrimination action, the plaintiff, John Femia, appeals from the summary judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of his employer, the defendant, the city of Meriden. The plaintiff claims that the court improperly concluded that there was no genuine issue of material fact with respect to his allegation that he was not selected for a promotion in 2019 within the Meriden Police Department (department) on the basis of his age in violation of the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act (CFEPA), General Statutes § 46a-51 et seq. We affirm the judgment of the court.”)


Employment Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Oumano, Emily

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5664

AC45220 - Schofield v. Rafley, Inc. (“This action sounding in breach of contract and employment discrimination follows a prior action commenced in 2017 between the same parties that involved similar claims (2017 action). See Schofield v. Rafley, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-17-6078256-S (May 14, 2020). The substitute plaintiff, Andrea Sadler, executor of the estate of Lydia Schofield (decedent), now appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the defendants, Rafley, Inc. (Rafley), Joseph Mason, and Karen Mason. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly (1) dismissed the decedent’s employment discrimination count as untimely and (2) granted the motion for summary judgment in favor of Rafley on the breach of contract count. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.”)


Employment Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Oumano, Emily

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5647

AC45498 - International Assn. of EMTs & Paramedics, Local R1-701 v. Bristol Hospital EMS, LLC (“The defendant, Bristol Hospital EMS, LLC, appeals from the judgment of the Superior Court granting the motion of the plaintiff, International Association of EMTs and Paramedics, Local R1-701, to enforce a prior judgment of the court confirming the arbitration award to reinstate an employee of the defendant. The defendant claims the court (1) lacked subject matter jurisdiction to require that medical authorization be given to the employee and (2) improperly awarded back pay and attorney’s fees when those issues were not properly before it. We agree and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the Superior Court.”)


Workers’ Compensation Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Oumano, Emily

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5634

AC45341 - Dusto v. Rogers Corp. (“The plaintiff, Lana Kelly, acting in her capacity as executor of the estates of Harold Dusto and his wife, Anita Dusto,1 appeals from the summary judgment rendered in favor of Harold Dusto’s employer, Rogers Corporation (Rogers), and the judgment of dismissal rendered in favor of Special Electric Company, Inc. (Special Electric), which sold asbestos materials to Rogers. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly (1) rendered summary judgment in favor of Rogers on the ground that her claims against Rogers were barred by the exclusivity provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act (act), General Statutes § 31-275 et seq., and (2) dismissed her claims against Special Electric for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We agree with the plaintiff that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether her claims against Rogers satisfied the substantial certainty exception to the exclusivity provision of the act, and we therefore reverse the summary judgment rendered in favor of Rogers. We affirm the dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims against Special Electric.”)

  • AC45341 - Dusto v. Rogers Corp. — Concurrence & Dissent


Administrative Appeal Supreme Court Opinion

   by Dowd, Jeffrey

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5633

SC20733 - Middlebury v. Fraternal Order of Police, Middlebury Lodge No 34. (“In this certified appeal, the plaintiff, the town of Middlebury (town), challenges the trial court’s dismissal of the town’s administrative appeal from the decision of the labor board concluding that the town violated MERA by unilaterally changing the town’s past practice of including extra duty pay in the calculation of pension benefits for members of the named defendant, Fraternal Order of Police, Middlebury Lodge No. 34 (union). The town claims that the Appellate Court incorrectly determined that the labor board did not act unreasonably, illegally, arbitrarily, or in abuse of its discretion when it declined to apply the ‘‘contract coverage’’ standard, as adopted by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) in MV Transportation, Inc., Case No. 28-CA173726, 368 N.L.R.B. No. 66, slip op., pp. 1–2, 9–11 (September 10, 2019), and instead applied the clear and unmistakable waiver standard to the union’s claim that the town’s unilateral change to its pension plan constituted a refusal to bargain collectively in good faith in violation of MERA. We disagree and affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court..”)


Employment Law Supreme Court Opinion

   by Oumano, Emily

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5628

SC20677 - Ahmed v. Oak Management Corp. (“This appeal arises under highly unusual, perhaps unprecedented, circumstances, involving the application of the ‘fugitive disentitlement doctrine’ in an arbitral proceeding but implicates settled law on the limits of judicial review of arbitral awards. The plaintiff, Iftikar Ahmed, appeals from the trial court’s judgment denying his application to vacate an arbitration award rendered in favor of the defendant, Oak Management Corporation (Oak), and granting Oak’s motion to confirm the award. Ahmed contends that the trial court erroneously declined to vacate the award because the arbitrator had deprived him of the full and fair hearing to which he was entitled, in violation of governing law, public policy, and the parties’ arbitration agreement. Specifically, Ahmed contends that the arbitrator improperly applied the fugitive disentitlement doctrine to prevent him from asserting counterclaims or defenses, contesting Oak’s allegations, and viewing the evidence against him. After considering the grounds he has raised for vacating the award, we conclude that, notwithstanding the gravity of the arbitrator’s rulings, Ahmed has not satisfied any of the legal standards required for reversal of the judgment. We therefore affirm the trial court’s judgment.”)


Employment Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Oumano, Emily

 https://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=5600

AC45395 - Cooling v. Torrington (“The plaintiff, Jason Cooling, appeals from the summary judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of the defendant, the city of Torrington, on the plaintiff’s complaint alleging violations of the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act (CFEPA), General Statutes § 46a-51 et seq. The plaintiff alleged in his complaint that the defendant discriminated against him on the basis of disability by, inter alia, failing to engage in a good faith interactive process to provide him with a reasonable accommodation and by subjecting him to a hostile work environment. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly determined that he failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact that the defendant (1) had not engaged in the requisite good faith interactive process to discover a reasonable accommodation for his disability and (2) had subjected him to a hostile work environment. We disagree with the plaintiff and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the court.”)