AC44253, AC44254 - Pryor v. Brignole (“These appeals involve a novel issue of statutory interpretation regarding a legal standard for which neither the language of the statute nor its legislative history provides clear resolution. It thus falls to this court to divine, as best we can, the proper construction of that statutory standard, ever mindful that it is the prerogative of our General Assembly to modify, alter, and amend the laws of this state.

In these related appeals, the defendants, Timothy Brignole and the law firm of Brignole, Bush & Lewis, LLC (law firm), appeal from the judgments of the trial court denying their special motions to dismiss filed pursuant to Connecticut’s anti-SLAPP statute, General Statutes § 52-196a, in this breach of contract action brought by the self-represented plaintiff, J. Xavier Pryor. On appeal, the defendants claim that the court improperly construed § 52-196a (e) (3) to require a moving party, as part of its initial burden under the first prong of that statute, to admit to engaging in the conduct alleged in the plaintiff’s complaint. In response, the plaintiff argues that the alleged conduct did not involve a matter of public concern, as required by § 52- 196a (e) (3), and that the defendants waived their ability to file special motions to dismiss because those motions were untimely. We agree with the defendants that the court improperly interpreted § 52-196a (e) (3) and, accordingly, reverse the judgments of the trial court.”)