The mission of the Connecticut Judicial Branch is to serve the interests of justice and the public by resolving matters brought before it in a fair, timely, efficient and open manner.

Criminal Law Supreme and Appellate Court Opinions

by Booth, George

 

SC19663 - State v. Delgado (Murder; "Under recent changes to juvenile sentencing law, a court may not sentence a juvenile who has been convicted of murder to life imprisonment without parole unless the court considers mitigating factors associated with the juvenile's young age at the time of the crime. In the present appeal, we must determine how these changes in juvenile sentencing law impact individuals who were sentenced before the changes occurred. The defendant, Melvin Delgado, was sentenced to sixty-five years imprisonment without parole in 1996 for crimes that he committed when he was sixteen years old. Although he is now eligible for parole following the passage of No. 15-84 of the 2015 Public Acts (P.A. 15-84), he filed a motion to correct his allegedly illegal sentence, claiming that he is entitled to be resentenced because the judge who sentenced him failed to consider youth related mitigating factors. The trial court rejected the defendant's claim and dismissed his motion to correct, and the defendant has appealed to this court. We affirm the trial court's dismissal of the motion to correct.")

SC19673 - State v. Boyd (Murder; "The defendant, Ray Boyd, appeals from the trial court's dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence for lack of jurisdiction. The defendant, who was sentenced to fifty years imprisonment without parole in 1992 for a crime that he committed when he was seventeen years old, contends that he is entitled to resentencing on the basis of recent changes to juvenile sentencing law. We discussed this precise issue in State v. Delgado, 323 Conn. ___, ___ A.3d ___ (2016), and our resolution of the defendant's appeal is controlled by our decision in that case. We affirm the trial court's dismissal of the defendant's motion to correct.")

AC38088 - State v. Fernandez (Risk of injury to child; sexual assault in second degree; sexual assault in fourth degree; prosecutorial impropriety; "The defendant, Ruffino Fernandez, appeals following his conviction of one count each of risk of injury to a child in violation of General Statutes § 53-21 (a) (2), sexual assault in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-71 (a) (1), and sexual assault in the fourth degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-73a (a) (1) (B). The defendant claims that (1) the trial court abused its discretion by not permitting him to make a missing witness argument during closing remarks; (2) the state committed prosecutorial impropriety by basing part of its closing argument on facts not in evidence; and (3) he was deprived of his rights to an impartial tribunal and a fair trial when the trial court made comments in front of the jury that bolstered the credibility of the victim. We disagree with the defendant and affirm the judgment of conviction.")

AC37464 - State v. Fernando V. (Sexual assault in second degree; risk of injury to child; "The defendant, Fernando V., appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered following a jury trial, of one count of sexual assault in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-71 (a) (1), one count of sexual assault in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-71 (a) (4), and two counts of risk of injury to a child in violation of General Statutes § 53-21 (a) (2). The defendant claims on appeal that the trial court improperly precluded him from presenting testimony from the complainant's boyfriend of four years. In particular, the defendant argues that the boyfriend's testimony was relevant to counter the state's evidence that she had become more withdrawn or exhibited other characteristics generally associated with sexually abused young adults, as testified to by the state's expert witness, as well as to impeach testimony that the defendant had tried to prevent the complainant from associating with boys of her own age. We agree that the boyfriend's testimony improperly was excluded by the court and that its exclusion was not harmless error under the circumstances of this case. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of conviction and order a new trial.")