July 2015 - July 2016 (reverse chronological order)
SC19496 - Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities v. Echo Hose Ambulance ("We are called upon to decide what test should be applied to determine whether an unpaid volunteer is an 'employee' for purposes of the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act (CFEPA), General Statutes § 46a-51 et seq. More specifically, we must decide whether a volunteer must satisfy the predominant 'remuneration test' used to resolve similar federal causes of action or Connecticut's common-law 'right to control' test.
"This certified appeal arises out of a complaint filed with the plaintiff, the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities, by Brenda Puryear (Brenda), on behalf of her then minor daughter Sarah Puryear (Sarah). The complaint alleged that the defendants, Echo Hose Ambulance and the city of Shelton, had discriminated and retaliated against Sarah on the basis of her race and color in violation of CFEPA and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (Title VII). The trial court rendered judgment dismissing the commission's administrative appeal from the decision of the commission's human rights referee, who had struck the complaint on the ground that Sarah was not an employee under the remuneration test. The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's judgment; Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities v. Echo Hose Ambulance, 156 Conn. App. 239, 253, 113 A.3d 463 (2015); and Sarah appealed to this court. We affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.")
AC36895 - Matos v. Ortiz ("It is well established that a court may summarily enforce—within the framework of existing litigation—a clear and unambiguous settlement agreement reached during that litigation. Audubon Parking Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Barclay & Stubbs, Inc., 225 Conn. 804, 812, 626 A.2d 729 (1993) (Audubon). We are now called upon to decide whether that power extends to the summary enforcement of agreements reached both outside the framework of and before the start of the litigation in which enforcement is sought.")
AC37628 - Morrissey-Manter v. Saint Francis Hospital & Medical Center ("In this wrongful termination of employment action, the plaintiff...appeals from the summary judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of the defendants.... On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to four counts of her amended complaint because one or more genuine issues of material fact existed with respect to her claims that (1) an implied contractual agreement between the parties prohibited her discharge without cause, (2) the defendants terminated her employment in violation of an important public policy, (3) the defendants breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing by terminating her employment in ‘‘bad faith,’’ and (4) the defendants withheld certain medical records and destroyed evidence that would have supported her cause of action. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")
AC37251 - Dickman v. University of Connecticut Health Center ("The plaintiff...appeals from the decision of the Workers’ Compensation Commissioner for the first district (commissioner) dismissing her General Statutes § 31-290a discriminatory
discharge claim against the defendant, the University of Connecticut Health Center. On appeal, the self represented plaintiff challenges the commissioner’s findings and conclusions. The defendant responds that the plaintiff has failed to provide any grounds for reversing the commissioner’s dismissal, and that the record supports the commissioner’s dismissal. We agree with the defendant, and, accordingly, affirm the decision of the commissioner.")
SC19323 - Trusz v. UBS Realty Investors, LLC ("Specifically, we conclude that, under the state constitution, employee speech pursuant to official job duties on certain matters of significant public interest is protected from employer discipline in a public workplace, and § 31-51q extends the same protection to employee speech pursuant to official job duties in the private workplace.")
AC36092 - Bridgeport Board of Education v. NAGE, Local RI-200 ("The plaintiff...appeals from the decision of the trial court denying its application to vacate an arbitration award in favor of the defendant.... On appeal, the board claims that the court should have vacated the award because (1) it failed to conform to the submission, (2) the arbitrators exceeded their authority and issued an award that is not mutual, final and definite, and (3) the award violates public policy. Because we conclude that the award violates public policy, we reverse the judgment of the trial court. In light of this conclusion, we need not address the board’s additional claims.")
AC36868 - Cragg v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act ("In this case, the plaintiff...appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the defendants.... On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly (1) granted the administrator’s motion for judgment and (2) denied the plaintiff the opportunity for oral argument before ruling on the administrator’s motion. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")
AC36986 - Santos v. Massad-Zion Motor Sales Co. ("The defendants...appeal from the judgment of the trial court enforcing a settlement agreement purportedly entered into by the defendants and the plaintiff.... The defendants claim that the court erred because the parties had not reached a clear and unambiguous agreement as to the terms of a confidentiality provision, an essential component of the parties’ settlement agreement. We agree and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the trial court.")
AC36582 - Heyward v. Judicial Dept. ("In this action arising out of alleged workplace discrimination, the plaintiffs...appeal from the judgment of the trial court granting a motion to dismiss certain counts of the complaint against the defendants...and transferring venue for the remainder of the action from the judicial district of Waterbury to the judicial district of Hartford. The dispositive issues on appeal are (1) whether the court’s dismissal of only some of the counts brought against the state was an appealable final judgment, (2) whether the trial court properly dismissed all claims against Axelrod, and (3) whether the trial court’s order transferring venue was an immediately appealable final judgment. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that (1)the judgment dismissing some, but not all, of the plaintiffs’ counts against the state was not an appealable final judgment, (2) the plaintiffs have failed to adequately brief and therefore have abandoned their claim that the court improperly dismissed all claims against Axelrod, and (3) the interlocutory order transferring venue with respect to the remainder of the action was not an appealable final judgment. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal except as to that portion challenging the judgment of dismissal as it relates to the counts brought against Axelrod, and, as to that portion of the appeal, we affirm the judgment of the court.")
AC36778 - Benedetto v. Dietze & Associates, LLC ("In this case arising out of alleged employment discrimination, the plaintiffs...appeal from the summary judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of the defendants.... The plaintiffs claim on appeal that the court (1) abused its discretion by granting the defendants’ motion to reargue its ruling sustaining the plaintiffs’ objection to the defendants’ request to revise, and (2) improperly granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")
AC36506 - Sidorova v. East Lyme Board of Education ("The plaintiff...appeals from the summary judgment rendered in favor of the defendants...in this action arising out of the termination of the plaintiff’s employment. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial court erred in determining that (1) she lacked standing to pursue a breach of contract claim alleging violation of the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement (agreement) between the board and the East Lyme Teachers’ Association, (2) governmental immunity applied to the superintendent’s conduct in terminating the plaintiff, which conduct the court found to be discretionary, and (3) the plaintiff had failed to allege sufficient facts in support of her claims that the defendants breached their duties of good faith and fair dealing. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")
AC36199 - Kachnowski v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act ("The self-represented plaintiff...appeals from the judgment of the Superior Court dismissing her appeal from the decision of the Employment Security Board of Review (board). On appeal, the plaintiff claims: (1) 'the [board] improperly handled [her] appeal when it certified the appeal to the Superior Court and failed to comply with Practice Book § 22-1 . . . and . . . [§] 31-237g-51 [of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies]'; (2) 'the [board] erred in [not] certifying all pertinent file records concerning the appeal to the Superior Court as pursuant to . . . § 31-237g-1 (b) [of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies] and the Superior Court erred in ignoring the plaintiff's argument that the board failed to do so'; (3) 'the board failed to respond to, file and certify [her] motion to correct to the Superior Court, as required by Practice Book §§ 22-4, 22-7 and 22-8, and . . . the Superior Court erred in dismissing [her] argument regarding it [because the] exclusion of this motion precluded further review of the facts by the court'; (4) '[the board] failed to follow the guidelines of . . . § 31-236-26d [of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies] and the plaintiff did not commit wilful misconduct in the course of employment and, therefore, was eligible for unemployment benefits'; and (5) 'the Superior Court erred in making a judgment of dismissal in [her] case . . . .' Based on our review of claims four and five, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.")
AC36826 - Varley v. First Student, Inc. ("The plaintiff...appeals from the summary judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of the defendant.... The plaintiff claims that the court improperly determined that no genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether (1) the defendant was her employer for purposes of analyzing her wrongful discipline and discharge claim under General Statutes § 31-51q, and (2) the defendant tortiously interfered with her contractual employment relationship. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")