COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND OPPORTUNITIES EX REL. WENDY PIZZOFERRATO et al. v. THE MANSIONS, LLC, et al.,

SC 21111/SC 21113

Judicial District of Tolland

Discriminatory Housing Practices; General Statutes § 46a-64c; Whether Appellate Court Correctly Concluded That Trial Court Applied Incorrect Legal Standard for Determining Whether Accommodation is "Necessary" for Use and Enjoyment of Dwelling; Whether Plaintiff Had "Mental Disability" Within Meaning of General Statutes § 46a-51 (20). Wendy and Rudy Pizzoferrato (Pizzoferratos) applied to rent an apartment in a complex owned by The Mansions, LLC (Mansions). They sought a waiver of the Mansions' "no pets" policy for their two dogs as an accommodation for Wendy's anxiety disorder. The Mansions' director of operations approved the Pizzoferratos' accommodation request for only one dog and sought additional information from the Pizzoferratos, including an "explanation" from Wendy's therapist about "why [Wendy's] anxiety requires not one, but two support animals." The Pizzoferratos thereafter canceled their lease and, together with the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities (commission), brought this action against, inter alia, the Mansions. The Pizzoferratos alleged that they were discriminated against on the basis of Wendy's disability and that the Mansions denied their request for a reasonable accommodation in violation of General Statutes § 46a-46c (a) (6) (C) (ii), which provides that "discrimination includes . . . a refusal to make reasonable accommodations in . . . policies . . . when such accommodations may be necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling." They asserted that Wendy has a mental disability within the meaning of General Statutes § 46a-51 (20), which defines someone with a "'[m]ental disability'" as "an individual who has a record of, or is regarded as having one or more mental disorders." After a trial, the court rendered judgment for the plaintiffs. The defendants appealed, claiming, inter alia, that the trial court improperly concluded that Wendy suffered from a disability under § 46a-51 (20) when the trial court found only that the defendants regarded her as being disabled. The Appellate Court (231 Conn. App. 121) concluded that the claim was without merit because the trial court also had found that the plaintiffs satisfied their burden of proving that Wendy had a "record of" having a mental disability within the meaning of § 46a-51 (20). Next, the defendants claimed that the trial court improperly concluded that two emotional support dogs were "necessary" for Wendy's equal use and enjoyment of the dwelling under § 46a-64c (a) (6) (C) (ii). The Appellate Court determined that the plain meaning of "necessary" in § 46a-64c (a) (6) (C) (ii) requires that the accommodation be "essential" to the equal enjoyment of the dwelling and not just preferable. It further determined that, in the present case, the trial court erred because the definition of "necessary" that it had applied was so broad as to include preference, thereby diluting the plaintiffs' burden of proof. The court proceeded to hold that the evidence submitted by the plaintiffs, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, was insufficient as a matter of law to prove that both dogs were necessary to ameliorate the effects of Wendy's generalized anxiety disorder. Accordingly, it reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the matter with direction to render judgment for the defendants. The Supreme Court granted both the commission and the defendants certification to appeal. In the commission's appeal, the Supreme Court will decide whether the Appellate Court properly concluded that the trial court had applied an incorrect legal standard for determining whether an accommodation is "necessary" for the use and enjoyment of a dwelling under § 46a-64c (a) (6) (C) (ii). In the defendants' appeal, the Supreme Court will decide whether the Appellate Court correctly concluded that the trial court had correctly determined that the plaintiff had a "mental disability" within the meaning of § 46a-51 (20).