RASHAD MOON v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION, SC 21069

Judicial District of Tolland

Habeas; Whether Evidence of Alleged Co-Conspirator's Lack of Mental Capacity to Enter into Criminal Conspiracy Satisfied Petitioner's Burden of Proving Actual Innocence of Conspiracy to Commit Robbery. In response to a Craigslist post listing electronic devices for sale, the petitioner and Marvin Mathis met the seller in Hartford. During the meeting, the seller was robbed and shot and subsequently died. The petitioner subsequently admitted to the police that he had gone with Mathis to meet the victim, but he claimed to have believed that Mathis intended only to buy something from the victim and that it had been Mathis who shot the victim. Thereafter, Jahvon Thompson, who was under arrest at the time, informed the police that he and the petitioner initially had planned to rob the victim. According to Thompson, a day or two before the shooting, he, the petitioner, and Mathis were together, and the petitioner was texting the victim using Mathis' cell phone. Thompson, however, ultimately did not participate in the robbery. The police also received information from another inmate, who stated that the petitioner had confessed to him that he and Mathis were involved in a "robbery that went bad" during which Mathis shot the victim. The petitioner and Mathis were thereafter arrested in connection with the shooting. The petitioner was tried first and ultimately was found guilty of first-degree robbery, conspiracy to commit first-degree robbery, and felony murder. In a separate trial, Mathis was found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect of first-degree robbery, conspiracy to commit first-degree robbery, and first-degree manslaughter. After his conviction was affirmed on appeal, the petitioner commenced the present habeas corpus action alleging, inter alia, that he is actually innocent of all three offenses. He reasoned that, because Mathis was found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect, Mathis necessarily lacked the requisite mens rea to enter into a conspiracy with the petitioner, and that his inability to form an intent to commit any crime at the time disproves each of the three crimes of which the petitioner was convicted. The habeas court denied the petition. After quoting from our Supreme Court's decision in State v. Colon, 257 Conn. 587, 602–603 (2001), which held that there is no requirement for consistency of verdicts where alleged conspirators are tried separately, the habeas court concluded that "the factual findings from Mathis' case cannot simply be inserted into the petitioner's trial" and that the verdict in Mathis' case was insufficient to satisfy the petitioner's burden of proving actual innocence. The court explained that Mathis' verdict merely proved that, if evidence related to Mathis' mental state had been presented during the petitioner's criminal trial, the jury could have come to a different result. The Appellate Court (227 Conn. App. 838) affirmed the habeas court's judgment, albeit on a different basis. That court held, in relevant part, that the habeas court's reliance on Colon and consequent failure to consider the evidence of Mathis' verdict was erroneous, finding Colon relevant only in the context of direct appeals. The court further concluded that Mathis' acquittal established by clear and convincing evidence that he was unable to form any intent to conspire with the petitioner and that the petitioner was therefore actually innocent of conspiring with Mathis to commit first-degree robbery. The Appellate Court nevertheless affirmed the denial of the petitioner's habeas petition on the ground that Thompson's statement to police, which was admitted into evidence at the petitioner's criminal trial, would not prevent a reasonable jury from finding that the petitioner was guilty of conspiring with Thompson. The petitioner thereafter sought certification to appeal to the Supreme Court, which was granted, limited to the issue of whether the Appellate Court correctly concluded that the habeas court had properly determined that the petitioner failed to meet his burden of proving that he was actually innocent of the crime of conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree.