STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. CHRISTOPHER BOLDEN, SC 21063
Judicial District of Waterbury
Tampering with
Physical Evidence; General Statutes § 53a-155 (a); Whether Appellate Court
Correctly Determined that Evidence Was Sufficient to Prove Defendant Concealed
Motor Vehicle to Impair Its Availability in Criminal Investigation.
The defendant, Christopher Bolden, drove his girlfriend's sport utility vehicle
(SUV) to Baldwin Street in Waterbury around 8:40 p.m. on May 1, 2020. A witness
saw the SUV approach an intersection and, without slowing down or breaking,
strike the victim as she entered a crosswalk, which caused her to roll over the
hood of the SUV and to land in the street. The defendant performed a U-turn,
returned to the scene, and paused momentarily before leaving. The victim died
from multiple blunt impact injuries. Meanwhile, six or seven miles away from
the accident, the SUV began to smoke, and the defendant maneuvered it partially
into a driveway containing seven other vehicles. He reported to the homeowner
that he was having car trouble, and the homeowner called a cab. The cab driver,
the homeowner, and the defendant pushed the SUV far enough into the driveway so
that its front end, which was visibly damaged from the accident, was not in the
street. The cab then took the defendant and his girlfriend to a hotel. The next
morning, a patrol officer observed the SUV in the driveway and noted the
damage. A crime scene technician was dispatched to the residence to collect
evidence around the same time that the defendant and his girlfriend came to
retrieve the SUV. Upon seeing the police, they left and reported the SUV as
stolen. When the police interviewed the couple, the defendant confessed to
striking the victim, to leaving the scene, and to parking the SUV at the
residence. He was arrested and found guilty of, among other crimes, tampering
with physical evidence in violation of General Statutes § 53a-155 (a), which
prohibits someone who believes that a criminal investigation is pending or is
about to be instituted from "conceal[ing] . . .
any record, document or thing with [the] purpose to impair its verity or
availability" in that investigation. On appeal to the Appellate Court (227
Conn. App. 636), the defendant claimed that the evidence was insufficient to
prove that he had believed that a criminal investigation was about to begin or
that he had "conceal[ed]" the SUV. The court
rejected both claims, first concluding that the jury could have reasonably
inferred that the defendant believed that a criminal investigation was about to
commence given that he saw the victim on the ground upon returning to the scene
and, moreover, due to the "significant damage to the SUV." Even
though the SUV was "in plain sight," the Appellate Court reasoned
that there was sufficient evidence to prove concealment, as the jury reasonably
could have concluded that the defendant "likely knew that he seriously
injured a pedestrian" and "saw an opportunity to make the SUV less
noticeable in a private driveway with a significant number of other
vehicles." The Supreme Court granted the defendant's petition for
certification to appeal pursuant to General Statutes § 51-197f, limited to
whether the Appellate Court correctly determined that there was sufficient
evidence that he "concealed his motor vehicle for the purpose of impairing
its availability in connection with a criminal investigation." The defendant
claims that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he "believed that
it was probable" that an investigation was pending, as nothing
contradicted his statement to the police that he did not see anyone in the
street following the accident. He also claims that there was insufficient
evidence of concealment because the SUV and its damaged front end were in plain
sight and faced the street. The state argues that the Appellate Court properly
upheld the conviction based on the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from
the evidence and, also, that the defendant's claim regarding his belief that an
investigation was pending is beyond the certified issue, which pertains only to
whether the SUV was concealed with the intent to impair its availability.