STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. DAVID D. ROBERTS, SC 21061

Judicial District of New Britain

Criminal; Plea Canvass; Waiver of Constitutional Rights; Whether the Appellate Court Properly Held that Defendant Knowingly, Voluntarily, and Intelligently Waived His Constitutional Rights. In September, 2020, the defendant cocked and aimed a shotgun at a group of individuals renting his neighbor's property, called them racial slurs, and, using expletives, told them to leave. He subsequently left a voicemail message for the owner of the property "that the war was on if he found out that there would be more people of color renting at that residence." The defendant was arrested and charged with various crimes. In January, 2022, pursuant to a plea agreement, the defendant appeared in court and pleaded guilty to certain charges. During the plea canvass, the trial court asked him whether his attorney had explained the constitutional rights that he was waiving by pleading guilty, although the court did not identify any specific constitutional rights. The defendant responded in the affirmative but, prior to sentencing, filed a motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. The defendant argued that he had not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently pleaded guilty because he had not expressly waived his constitutional rights against self-incrimination, to a jury trial, and to confront his accusers, as outlined by United States Supreme Court's decision in Boykin v. Alabama, (395 U.S. 238). In Boykin, the court held that a waiver of those three federal constitutional rights cannot be presumed by a "silent record." Here, the state argued that the plea canvass was sufficient under Boykin because it substantially complied with Practice Book § 39-19 and because the defendant affirmed during the canvass that his attorney had explained the constitutional rights that he would be waiving. The trial court denied the defendant's motion to withdraw on the ground that the plea canvass substantially complied with § 39-19, and he was sentenced to six years of incarceration, execution suspended after nine months, followed by three years of probation. The defendant subsequently appealed to the Appellate Court (227 Conn. App. 159), which affirmed the conviction after reasoning that Boykin does not require "any specific canvass, or talismanic words." The court reasoned that "the record as a whole" reflected that the defendant had knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his constitutional rights because he affirmed during the canvass that his attorney had explained to him "all the constitutional rights" that he was waiving. The Appellate Court concluded that the defendant therefore "understood all of the implications of his guilty plea[s]" such that they were knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. The Supreme Court granted defendant's petition for certification as to whether the Appellate Court correctly concluded that the trial court had properly determined the defendant's plea canvass adequately established that he knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his constitutional rights. The defendant argues that the Appellate Court incorrectly determined that his guilty pleas were knowing, voluntary, and intelligent because he was not specifically advised of the constitutional rights pursuant to Boykin, which the defendant argues sets a federal constitutional minimum that every defendant who pleads guilty be informed that he or she is waiving certain specific constitutional rights. The defendant further argues that the Appellate Court improperly placed the burden on him of proving that he did not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waive his constitutional rights. He argues that "the record is literally silent" as to "what, if anything, the defendant had been told" about his constitutional rights, and, furthermore, that deficits in the defendant's plea canvass cannot be cured by his "willingness to plead guilty."